“Indeed, it is a peculiarity of every ideological conception, especially if it had conquered a scientific conception by diverting it from its true meaning, that it is governed by ‘interests’ beyond the necessity of knowledge alone. […] Unlike a science, an ideology is both theoretically closed; and politically supple and adaptable. […]Ideology changes therefore, but imperceptibly, conserving its ideological form; it moves, but with an immobile motion which maintains it where it is, in its place and its ideological role. It is the immobile motion […]” (Althusser, *Reading Capital*, <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1968/reading-capital/ch02.htm>)

“In the theoretical mode of production of ideology (which is utterly different from the theoretical mode of production of science in this respect), the formulation of a problem is merely the theoretical expression of the conditions which allow a solution already produced outside the process of knowledge because imposed by extra theoretical instances and exigencies (by religious, ethical, political or other ‘interests’) to recognize itself in an artificial problem manufactured to serve it both as a theoretical mirror and as a practical justification” (op.cit., p. 45-6 <https://devrijemarxpolitics.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/louis-althusser-etienne-balibar-roger-establet-jacques-ranciere-pierre-macherey-reading-capital_-the-complete-edition-verso-2016.pdf>)

“But this equivocal notion of ideology was brought into play within the rationalist context of the antithesis between truth and error. And so ideology was reduced to error, and error called ideology, and this whole rationalist game was given a fraudulent Marxist appearance . Nevertheless, and even in the equivocal terms of The German Ideology, this disguise of error as ideology could take on and in fact did take on another meaning. Ideology was only the Marxist "name" for error. But even in The German Ideology, which itself carried out this reduction, you could feel that behind the contrast between "positive truth" and ideological illusion, a quite different break with the past -- not simply theoretical, but political and ideological, and on a quite different scale -- was making its appearance and working itself out. This break was the one which Marx made not with ideology in general, not only with the existing ideological conceptions of history, but with bourgeois ideology, with the dominant, reigning bourgeois conception of the world, which held sway not only over social practices but also within the practical and theoretical ideologies, in philosophy, and even in the products of Political Economy and utopian socialism. The fact that this domination was not absolute, but the result of a struggle against survivals of the feudal conception of the world and against the fragile foundations of a new, proletarian conception of the world -- this too is a fact of vital importance for understanding Marx's position. For he was only able to break with bourgeois ideology in its totality because he took inspiration from the basic ideas of proletarian ideology, and from the first class struggles of the proletariat, in which this ideology became flesh and blood. This is the "event" which, behind the rationalist facade of the contrast between "positive truth" and ideological illusion, gave this contrast its real historical dimension” (Althusser, “Elements of Self-criticism”, p.71-2 <https://cesarmangolin.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/althusser-essays-in-self-criticism.pdf>).

“ It is customary to suggest that ideology belongs to the region of 'consciousness'. We must not be misled by this appellation which is still contaminated by the idealist problematic that preceded Marx. In truth, ideology has very little to do with ' consciousness', even supposing this term to have an unambiguous meaning. It is profoundly unconscious. even when it presents itself in a reflected form (as in pre-Marxist 'philosophy '). Ideology is indeed a system of representations, but in the majority of cases these representations have nothing to do w ith ' consciousness': they are usually images and occasionally concepts, but it is above all as structures that they impose on the vast majority of men, not via their 'consciousness'. They are perceived-accepted-suffered cultural objects and they act functionally on men via a process that escapes them […]So ideology is a matter of the lived relation between men and their world. This relation, that only appears as ' conscious ' on condition that it is unconscious, in the same way only seems to be simple on condition that it is complex, that it is not a simple relation but a relation between relations, a second degree relation. In ideology men do indeed express, not the relation between them and their conditions of existence, but the way they live the relation between them and their conditions of existence: this presupposes both a real relation and an 'imaginary', ' lived' relation. Ideology, then, is the expression of the relation between men and their ' world', that is, the (overdetermined) unity of the real relation and the imaginary relation between them and their real conditions of existence. In ideology the real relation is inevitably invested in the imaginary relation, a relation that expresses a will (conservative, conformist, reformist or revolutionary), a hope or a nostalgia, rather than describing a reality” (Althusser, *For Marx*, pp. 232-4 <https://palmermethode.files.wordpress.com/2018/10/webpage2.pdf>).

“Now I can return to a thesis which I have already advanced: it is not their real conditions of existence, their real world, that ‘men’ ‘represent to themselves’ in ideology, but above all it is their relation to those conditions of existence which is represented to them there. It is this relation which is at the centre of every ideological, i.e. imaginary, representation of the real world. It is this relation that contains the ‘cause’ which has to explain the imaginary distortion of the ideological representation of the real world. Or rather, to leave aside the language of causality it is necessary to advance the thesis that it is the imaginary nature of this relation which underlies all the imaginary distortion that we can observe (if we do not live in its truth) in all ideology . […] If this is the case, the question of the ‘cause’ of the imaginary distortion of the real relations in ideology disappears and must be replaced by a different question: why is the representation given to individuals of their (individual) relation to the social relations which govern their conditions of existence and their collective and individual life necessarily an imaginary relation? And what is the nature of this imaginariness? “,( Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”, p.32 http://www.csun.edu/~snk1966/Lous%20Althusser%20Ideology%20and%20Ideological%20State%20Apparatuses.pdf)

“Human societies secrete ideology as the very element and atmosphere indispensable to their historical respiration and life. Only an ideological world outlook could have imagined societies without ideology and accepted the utopian idea of a world in which ideology (not just one of its historical forms) would disappear without trace, to be replaced by science. For example, this utopia is the principle behind the idea […] that religion could be destroyed by science which would in some way take its place; that art could merge with knowledge or become ' everyday life', etc. And I am not going to steer clear of the crucial question: historical materialism cannot conceive that even a communist society could ever do without ideology, be it ethics, art or • world outlook '. Obviously it is possible to foresee important modifications in its ideological forms and their relations and even the disappearance of certain existing forms or a shift of their functions to neighbouring forms; it is also possible (on the premise of already acquired experience) to foresee the development of new ideological forms (e.g. the ideologies of ' the scientific world outlook' and ' communist humanism ') but in the present state of Marxist theory strictly conceived, it is not conceivable that communism, a new mode of production implying determinate forces of production and relations of production, could do without a social organization of production, and corresponding ideological forms” (Althusser, *For Marx*, p. 232).

“ […] it is clear that ideology (as a system of mass representations) is indispensable in any society if men are to be formed, transformed and equipped to respond to the demands of their conditions of existence […]” (o.p. p. 235).

 (Althusser, “Elements of Self-criticism”, p.71 <https://cesarmangolin.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/althusser-essays-in-self-criticism.pdf>).

By this I mean that, even if it only appears under this name (the subject) with the rise of bourgeois ideology, above all with the rise of legal ideology,[15] the category of the subject (which may function under other names: e.g., as the soul in Plato, as God, etc.) is the constitutive category of all ideology, whatever its determination (regional or class) and whatever its historical date – since ideology has no history. I say: the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology, but at the same time and immediately I add that the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of ‘constituting ‘” (“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”, p. 37-8)

“I shall then suggest that ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’ [18] Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed individual will turn round. By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail was ‘really’ addressed to him, and that ‘it was really him who was hailed’ (and not someone else). Experience shows that the practical telecommunication of hailings is such that they hardly ever miss their man: verbal call or whistle, the one hailed always recognizes that it is really him who is being hailed. And yet it is a strange phenomenon, and one which cannot be explained solely by ‘guilt feelings’, despite the large numbers who ‘have something on their consciences’” (op. cit, p. 40)

**QUESTIONS (choose one)**

1. 1)Which criticism can be made to the first extract of Althusser here? Did he make a relevant self-criticism?
2. Which are for him the differences between science and ideology according to the two first texts?