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The challenge of multiculturalism in European foreign policy

LISBETH AGGESTAM AND CHRISTOPHER HILL

I believe it is obvious that a key issue in the decades ahead will be our relations with the wider Muslim world. The wider Muslim world is obviously our neighbour if we look at the big maps of the big world, but increasingly it is also our neighbour if we look at the local grocery store or across the street. Again, we see the lines between domestic and foreign affairs becoming increasingly blurred.¹

The observation that making a distinction between domestic and international politics is like drawing 'a line in water' is not new.² Yet in the context of multiculturalism this problem manifests itself in a new and distinct way. Europe is immersed concurrently in deeply contested political debates about the roles of culture, religion, ethnicity and identity. One of the reasons for this is that the 'home-grown' element of international terrorism has raised questions about European models of multicultural integration. Another salient issue is the prospect of Turkish membership of the European Union, which has given rise to intense debates about the role of Islam in Europe and the impact it will have on the EU. Yet another is the realization that civil peace and international peace are now connected. The EU's High Representative, Javier Solana, talks of a 'global conflict in which our values are tested'; 'a borderless conflict, taking place in distant countries and in our cities and societies. Some of the flashpoints are Iraq, Israel–Palestine, Kashmir. But also Amsterdam, London, Copenhagen and Madrid.'³ The volatility of the present situation has been demonstrated in the recent controversies surrounding the publication of the so-called Mohammed caricatures in the name of freedom of expression, first in Denmark and more recently in Sweden. These show how domestic debates about multiculturalism rapidly become not only politicized in terms of a contestation over values, but also internationalized, involving diplomats and governments at the highest level. Conversely, the Iraq War of 2003 and thereafter demonstrated the 'blowback' that international events have on domestic politics (the 'second image' reversed⁴), mobilizing specific groups

¹ Carl Bildt, 'Europe 1957–2007–2057', speech at Chatham House, London, 15 March 2007, <http://www.demokratitorget.gov.se/sb/d/7956/a/78899>, accessed 1 Sept. 2007.

² Kjell Goldmann, 'The line in water: international and domestic politics', *Cooperation and Conflict* 24: 3, 1989, pp. 103–16.

³ Javier Solana, speech on the occasion of receiving the Carnegie–Wateler Peace Prize, The Hague, 23 Nov. 2006.

⁴ Peter Gourevitch, 'The second image reversed: the international sources of domestic politics', *International Organization* 32: 4, pp. 881–912.

who feel disproportionately affected by particular foreign policies. These issues are significant at a time when the EU is seeking to carve out a more proactive role in the world. In contrast to the United States, where the influence of minorities on foreign policy has long been debated,⁵ there has been little debate in Europe about the reciprocal relationship between multiculturalism and foreign policy.⁶

This article explores the intricate ways in which multiculturalism and European foreign policy are entangled and some of the issues, both political and academic, that they raise in terms of identity, democratic legitimacy and coherence. These questions need to be addressed, not least because the EU articulates its role in terms of being an ethical power—a ‘peacebuilder’—promoting the values of tolerance, accommodation and reciprocity.⁷ But they are also pertinent given that a more proactive and assertive European foreign policy may well both affect and mobilize particular minority groups within Europe. However, as we will argue below, the EU is handicapped in addressing these issues coherently because member states themselves have different approaches and traditions, making even more difficult the EU’s already compromised ambition to speak with ‘one voice’ in European foreign policy.

This diversity exists in relation both to *multiculturalism* and to *multiculturality*. The distinction between those two terms, used throughout this article, is important. ‘Multiculturalism’ will not suffice on its own, although it is almost universally employed in public discussions. It has become, like its root term ‘culture’, so contested and abused as to approach redundancy. To clear the ground, we will be using Brian Barry’s distinction between *multiculturalism*, which is an *ideology*, a project, about the acceptance of diversity and group rights, and *multiculturality*, which refers to the *fact* of cultural diversity, with many groups defining themselves separately from the nation-state—and perhaps asserting their right to a higher loyalty. One should also note that *ethnicity*, which strictly refers to racial distinctiveness, should also be distinguished from multiculturalism, precisely because it is often wrongly used to denote national, linguistic or religious communities.⁸

⁵ Yossi Shain, ‘Multicultural foreign policy’, *Foreign Policy*, no. 100, Autumn 1995, pp. 69–87; and, more recently, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, *The Israel lobby and US foreign policy* (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2007).

⁶ See, however, Christopher Hill, ‘Bringing war home: foreign policy-making in multicultural societies’, *International Relations* 21: 3, 2007, pp. 259–83; Shane Brighton, ‘British Muslims, multiculturalism and UK foreign policy: “integration” and “cohesion” in and beyond the state’, *International Affairs* 83: 1, 2007, pp. 1–17; Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, ‘Political Islam and foreign policy in Europe and the United States’, *Foreign Policy Analysis* 3: 4, pp. 345–67.

⁷ Javier Solana, ‘Countering globalisation’s dark side’, *Europe’s World*, policy dossier, Autumn 2007, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/articles/96791.pdf, accessed 15 October 2007.

⁸ Brian Barry, *Culture and equality: an egalitarian critique of multiculturalism* (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp. 22–3. Barry himself took the underlying distinction from Charles Westin’s ‘Temporal and spatial aspects of multiculturalism’, in Rainer Bauböck and John Rundell, eds, *Blurred boundaries: migration, ethnicity, citizenship* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998).

'Unity in diversity': European identity, ethics and multiculturalism

The EU is founded on the inherently multicultural idea of 'unity in diversity', which posits that the EU shall promote the cultural diversity of its member states, yet also advance a set of values common to all.⁹ Prominent among the latter are the ideals of democracy, tolerance and respect for human rights, which both internally and externally have become key identity markers of the EU as a would-be carrier of universal values. This would suggest that a European identity potentially represents an open and inclusive framework accommodating minorities and cultural plurality.¹⁰ In fact, the treaties of the Union do not provide explicit protection for minorities, but rather safeguard against racial discrimination. Interestingly, the protection of minorities has nonetheless become a central issue in recent EU membership negotiations to which political conditionality has been applied (the 'Copenhagen criteria').¹¹ As a consequence of its growing role in the formulation of a common EU immigration policy, the European Commission has also been active in asserting a 'holistic approach' that stresses that immigrants should be granted equal rights (legal, economic, social and cultural) without being expected to give up their cultural distinctiveness.¹²

The multicultural idea of 'unity in diversity' rests on a 'constructive ambiguity' to enable it to be acceptable to everyone. There are tensions inherent in the concept, between the European and the national, and between the individual and the community. The member states also differ significantly in their policies towards minorities, on which we will focus in the next section. This tension has become more prominent with the rapid expansion in the membership of the EU. But the meaning attributed to a European identity has also been put in the spotlight by a conflation of different domestic and international developments, such as globalization, increased flows of legal and illegal migration, the advent of Islamist movements in the Arab world, the prospect of Turkish EU membership, the EU's desire to play a global role, and the political engagement of a growing number of European Muslims. Muslims are the largest and fastest-growing minority groups in Europe, and as they make their home in European states they increasingly assert their right to difference and recognition, although not necessarily as one transnational Muslim community.¹³

⁹ See the founding treaty establishing the European Community, art. 151, title XII.

¹⁰ Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou and Ricard Zapata-Barrero, eds, *Multiculturalism, Muslims and citizenship: a European approach* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 13.

¹¹ On the consequences of this policy practice for European foreign policy, see Ulrich Sedelmeier, 'The EU's role as a promoter for human rights and democracy: enlargement policy and role formation', in Ole Elgström and Michael Smith, eds, *The European Union's roles in international politics: concepts and analysis* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 118–35.

¹² Communication from the EU Commission on immigration, integration and employment, COM (2003)336, 3 June 2003.

¹³ A caveat needs to be made here about Muslims. They do not necessarily represent a monolithic community. While they may be said to share a transnational identity through the idea of the *Umma*, Muslims as a minority group in Europe are highly diverse and fragmented. In some cases, their geographical roots are more important than their cultural practices. See further Ceri Peach, 'Muslim population of Europe: a brief overview of demographic trends and socioeconomic integration, with particular reference to Britain', in Steffen Angenendt et al., *Muslim integration: challenging conventional wisdom in Europe and the United States* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Sept. 2007), pp. 7, 16.

One way to explore European identity and multiculturalism is to focus on the meaning attributed to the ethical value of 'tolerance'. Tolerance is a key term accompanying the discourse of the EU as a 'peacebuilder' in the world.¹⁴ It can be seen both as a *means to* and as a *condition of peace*.¹⁵ As such, a European identity can be conceived in two distinct ways, each with its own ethical consequences for the development of a European foreign and security policy.

Tolerance as a means to peace

In this view, European identity is a rational outcome based on tolerance leading to an ultimate convergence on a set of values, derived from individualism. Tolerating diversity makes it possible to identify what we as individuals share and have in common over time—the ideal of the 'universal common good'. This teleological view of history characterized much of the early thinking on European integration as a higher form of civilization. As Jean Monnet put it himself, 'The object of our efforts is the development of man.'¹⁶ Ernest Haas, founding father of the theory of neo-functionalism, similarly conveys this teleological vision when he argues that nationalism is only 'a necessary stage through which human societies have to pass'.¹⁷ From this liberalist perspective, tolerance ultimately enables individual freedom to flourish and makes it possible for rational individuals to liberate themselves from their communitarian straitjackets to choose their own identity. European secularism has come to incarnate these universal aspirations: the dignity and autonomy of the individual, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. They are considered to be universally applicable because they stand free of cultural, historical and political circumstance. This teleological view of the EU as a carrier of universalist values has been fundamental to the notion that it serves as a civilizing role model and 'example' in the world. Yet the emphasis on tolerance also implies a view of Others in need of change.

Freedom of religion is an important part of the ideal of European secularism. While there is a diversity of views over the precise interpretation of this tenet, a clear expression of its strength was the rejection of any reference to God, religion or a Christian heritage in the Berlin Declaration celebrating the EU at 50.¹⁸ This is why the Islamic idea of a symbiosis between religion and politics—*Islam din wa dawla*—is so challenging to a European identity. As political Islam transgresses the secular democratic boundary between the categories of public and private, the meaning and limits of European tolerance become more visible. As Tariq Modood and colleagues note, 'Muslims press politicians and intellectuals to rethink what is secularism, whether it has truly characterized modern European societies and most

¹⁴ Solana, 'Countering globalisation's dark side'.

¹⁵ This distinction draws on John Gray's *Two faces of liberalism* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000).

¹⁶ Jean Monnet, *Mémoires* (Paris: Fayard, 1976), p. x.

¹⁷ Ernest Haas, 'Nationalism: an instrumental social construction', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 22: 3, 1993, p. 545.

¹⁸ Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome, Berlin, 25 March 2007, http://www.europa.eu/50/docs/berlin_declaration_en.pdf, accessed 1 June 2007.

importantly when and in what versions it is still desirable.¹⁹ Elizabeth Shakman Hurd points out the significance that this mindset has for foreign policy: ‘when religion manifests itself politically it is conceptualized as fundamentalism ... interpreted as a negative force directed against science, rationality, secularism’.²⁰ While these secular sentiments become manifest in the EU’s dealings with ‘Islamist’ political actors, they can also be observed in the unease some Europeans feel in dealing with the American President, George W. Bush, who makes overt references to God and openly states his religious convictions.²¹ Ironically, rather than leading to a rational end-point of history, this notion of European identity may lead to an essentializing process of identity contestations between Us and Them and end up undermining efforts at mutual tolerance as a means to peace. It is further complicated by the fact that a minority of Muslims fear proselytizing Christianity within the EU as much as they do secularism—as evidenced by the hostility shown towards converts to Christianity, stigmatized as ‘apostates’.

Tolerance as a condition of peace

This is a ‘deontological’ view of ethics, where the actual practice of tolerance is an end in itself. It does not necessarily presuppose an ultimate convergence on a set of values, but views tolerance in terms of ‘agreeing to disagree’: a *modus vivendi*. Cultural plurality is welcomed as a mark of ‘diversity in the good life’.²² This strand of thinking can be found in the International Relations literature that depicts ethics in terms of a ‘reconciled presence’ to others,²³ that is, positing that our relations towards others define who we are. A European identity, in this view, is less about the projection of the universality of values and more about a continuous process of self-constitution, with Europe envisaged as a community of inclusion rather than exclusion. This perspective is reflected, for example, in the assertion by the president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, that ‘Islam is part of Europe ... We have a very important Islamic heritage’.²⁴ It implies a continuous negotiation over the precise meaning of a European identity and how multiculturalism is understood. It also involves an identity that is reflexive, acknowledging, for instance, both the historical and the contemporary forms of racism and xenophobia. In foreign policy, it would imply sensitivity to how a global role for the EU may be perceived in many parts of the world with a history of imperialism. Thus, rather than being a potential source for a ‘clash of civilizations’,²⁵ Europe’s role as a global ‘peacebuilder’ would be about promoting dialogue in a plural world. Rather than trying to shape others in the image of

¹⁹ Modood et al., *Multiculturalism*, p. 3.

²⁰ Shakman Hurd, ‘Political Islam and foreign policy’, p. 346.

²¹ It is noteworthy that while the former British prime minister, Tony Blair, did not seek to hide his religious convictions, his closest aide attempted to insist that faith lay in the private realm alone: ‘Campbell interrupted Blair as he spoke of his faith: “We don’t do God”’, *Daily Telegraph*, 3 May 2003.

²² Gray, *Two faces of liberalism*, p. 105.

²³ Jean-Marc Coicaud and Daniel Warner, eds, *Ethics and international affairs: extent and limits* (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001), p. 1.

²⁴ *International Herald Tribune*, 16 Feb. 2006.

²⁵ Samuel Huntington, ‘The clash of civilizations?’, *Foreign Affairs* 72: 3, pp. 22–49, Summer 1993.

Europe, it would project a European identity ready to listen and treating others as a source of insights from which Europe might learn.

Indeed, 2008 is the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. The objective is to promote cultural diversity and strengthen the EU's commitment to solidarity, social justice and reinforced cohesion: 'to raise the awareness of developing an active European citizenship which is open to the world, respectful of cultural diversity and based on common values in the EU'.²⁶ The dialogue is to be conducted both internally and externally. Externally, Europe's first ever 'strategy for culture' states that culture should become an integral part of political dialogue with partner countries and regions around the world.²⁷ This is in line with the steady increase in the importance of public diplomacy over the last decade. But the Intercultural Dialogue also has a security dimension attached to it. Addressing the problem of international terrorism involves a dialogue with minority groups in Europe. In the aftermath of 9/11, and particularly following the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, and foiled attacks in countries like Germany and Denmark, engagement with Muslim communities within and beyond Europe has become a top priority on the EU's agenda.

'Speaking with one voice'? Member states' approaches to multiculturalism

While the EU has been able to speak with 'one voice' on issues of human rights on numerous occasions, it has been less articulate on the specifics of minority rights.²⁸ EU member states hold distinctive positions on questions of multiculturalism and how to interpret minority rights more specifically, both in their own domestic politics and in their external relations. The reason for this is that these questions are closely linked to concepts of citizenship, nationhood and history. The multicultural composition of countries like Britain (with a large South Asian component) and France (with a significant North African population) reflects to a large extent their particular histories as former imperial powers. The cultural and ethnic diversity in a country like Sweden, on the other hand, is a more recent phenomenon and largely a consequence of an internationalist foreign policy in which the right to asylum has played an important part.²⁹ Similarly, member states in southern Europe, such as Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal, have only recently changed from being sources of mass emigration to countries of immigration. As for the new member states which joined in the 'Big Bang' enlargement of 2004–2007,

²⁶ See the European Commission's initiative for an Intercultural Dialogue, http://ec.europa.eu/culture/eac/dialogue/dialogue_en.html, accessed 1 September 2007. For a succinct overview of the issues the ICD raises, see Sara Silvestri, 'Islam and the EU: the merits and risks of Inter-Cultural Dialogue', policy brief, European Policy Centre, June 2007.

²⁷ Europe's strategy for culture, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/646>, accessed 20 Aug. 2007.

²⁸ However, the protection of national minorities is an important criterion for EU membership. More lately, it has also been included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Indeed, through conditionality the EU has made more of minority rights externally than within its own borders. See Karen E. Smith, *European foreign policy in a changing world* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), pp. 150–51, 161.

²⁹ We are talking here of more recent migration. Migration flows have existed throughout history, but the speed with which they are now moving is new.

their problems of minority rights have long historical roots, only some of which are affected by new flows of migration.³⁰

Yet despite this diversity, the fact that EU member states share one and the same external border, given the freedom of movement within the EU itself, means that there are now strong incentives to address what are increasingly perceived as common problems. Consequently, agreement among EU member states in the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 to develop a common immigration policy was followed two years later by the creation of a European area of 'freedom, security and justice', developing out of the Treaty of Maastricht's original 'Justice and Home Affairs' pillar. This led to a significantly increased role for the European Commission in shaping the policy preferences of EU member states on immigration.³¹

Hence, in addressing the challenges of an increasingly multicultural Europe, both the 'logic of diversity' and the 'logic of integration' are at play.³² Member states are still intent on retaining considerable national control of this process, and indeed seek to address the problem of integration and the emergence of 'parallel societies' with references to a strengthened civic sense of national identity. But given that past models of integration increasingly are discredited, the search for new models through which to handle the dual goals of cooperation and autonomy is also now being pursued at the European level. The purpose of this section of the article is to examine the different logics before moving on in the following section to consider the implications of these dynamics for foreign policy in general, and EU foreign policy specifically.

'Logic of diversity'

Approaches to multiculturalism still vary greatly between EU member states because they are linked to distinct national experiences of state-building and concepts of citizenship. These still have a hold on policy-makers' cognitive frameworks, within which contemporary issues are addressed. Multiculturalism as an approach is far from universal. The diversity can be represented by three distinct models, although EU member states may draw on elements of more than one.

The first is an assimilationist model, resisting the very notion of multiculturalism in favour of solidarity and 'acculturation'.³³ Minority groups are expected to assimilate to the dominant culture of the host society, which in turn legitimizes this adaptation on the ground that it is representative of a universalist nationalism.³⁴ France is often taken to be the ideal-typical example of this model, although many

³⁰ To compare the diversity among EU member states, in terms of their immigrant percentages of national populations, see the statistics published by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, www.unstats.un.org/unsd/, or Eurostat, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>.

³¹ For this shift towards the European level, see Andrew Geddes, *Immigration and European integration: towards Fortress Europe?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003).

³² These binary concepts were coined by the Harvard professor Stanley Hoffmann: see *The European Sisyphus: essays on Europe 1964–1994* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), p. 84.

³³ Naomi Carmon, *Immigration and integration in post-industrial societies* (New York: St Martin's, 1996), p. 23.

³⁴ Lisbeth Aggestam, *A European foreign policy? Role conceptions and the politics of identity in Britain, France and Germany* (Stockholm: Akademitryck, 2004), p. 157.

countries have at particular times in their history adopted elements of the assimilationist model. The state, nation, people and culture are seen as an integral whole, captured in the phrase *La République, une et indivisible*. The approach to minorities is to deny their official existence, and to pursue an assertively assimilationist policy centred on the French language, Republican history and a deeply secular distrust of the role of religion in public life. Yet France is in the top rank of countries in Europe with a high percentage of first- and second-generation immigrants, most of whom come from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. France is multicultural in fact if not in principle.³⁵

The second model is the opposite, in that it grants rights not only to individuals but also to collective ethnic and religious groups. In this model, which may be termed multiculturalism proper, diversity is celebrated and considered a permanent rather than a transitory phenomenon. The promotion of civic unity is considered possible only if at the same time it recognizes and seeks to accommodate the multicultural diversity of society. This is a relatively recent approach that became popular to accommodate increasing levels of multiculturalism in countries including Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden—though not necessarily as the result of any specific political decision, or even any prior awareness on the part of the host population. In Sweden a conscious decision to follow this path was taken in 1975, but elsewhere it was the product of incremental change. In Britain, for example, there has been an uneasy coexistence between an anti-racist commitment to the colour-blind, equal treatment of all before the law, and an increasing tendency from the 1980s to believe in cultural relativism and the right to separate development of those whose religious customs led them not to embrace the various icons of British social life.³⁶

Yet today the multicultural model, rather than being seen as a panacea for all the difficulties of accommodating a variegated society, is increasingly criticized on the grounds of having encouraged the alienation of minority groups within society. Particularly in the Netherlands, following the murder of the Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh, and in the United Kingdom, after the terrorist attacks in London, serious retractions from this policy have been evident, and the search for a new model of social cohesion has begun.

The third model is exclusionary, treating minorities as little more than guest-workers. This model is largely discredited today, given that in its purest form it is based on an ethnic conception of common descent which allows only monoculturalism to flourish. Germany and Austria were for many years associated with this model, given their antiquated citizenship laws and an ideology of not being an 'immigrant' nation. Their immigrants were largely conceived as *Gastarbeiters*, and excluded even from citizenship on the basis of the *ius sanguinis*. They were granted

³⁵ Hill, 'Bringing war home', p. 268.

³⁶ It should be said that this came about in part because many in the indigenous population had also come to lack much sense of identification with the Anglican state and its symbols, associated with an imperial age for which they felt distaste as much as with the admired resistance to tyranny of the Second World War. This meant that for many on the left, and even in the centre, of British politics, multiculturalism came to be a progressive cause.

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only very limited rights in the belief that they would ultimately return to their countries of origin.³⁷ Ironically, however, Germany was to become home to one of the largest immigrant populations of any EU state, a situation explained partly by the large number of guest-workers (mainly from Turkey) and partly by its liberal constitutional provisions concerning the right of asylum (which attracted large numbers from the former Yugoslavia).

The pressures for a more coherent German policy of integration began after German reunification, and it is interesting to note two distinct ways in which the EU became integral to the ensuing reforms of German citizenship and asylum provisions. On the one hand, the development of a more restrictive EU policy framework on asylum provided a convenient 'cover' under which Germany could limit its liberal laws on asylum. On the other, European integration opened up space for the emergence of a more civic and republican model of citizenship based on a 'post-national identity' and constitutional patriotism.³⁸ This gave the large immigrant communities that had been resident in Germany for several decades the right to acquire citizenship if they so wished. Even so, a second-generation migrant born of two foreign parents can still acquire citizenship only through naturalization.³⁹ Moreover, despite the profound reforms to the country's citizenship laws, there is in Germany a persistent feeling of cultural insecurity about an increasingly heterogeneous society, a feeling which is reflected in an ambivalent policy towards social integration.⁴⁰

'Logic of integration'

The three models of diversity outlined above are increasingly contested in domestic debates and seen as inadequate to meet the challenges of multiculturalism in European democratic societies. While EU member states primarily seek to renew the 'social contract' and bonds with reference to the 'national community', the European dimension has also gained in importance. The reason for this is threefold. The first element is the past failure to integrate immigrants adequately into host societies; the second is the rise of right-wing parties and extremism; the third is the realization that the problem of migration will persist in a globalized world and that a collective EU policy is likely to have more effect than individual measures. The European level simply provides member states with more options to address domestic legal and political constraints. In this context Alan Milward's depiction of European integration as a 'rescue of the nation-state' seems rather apposite for the kind of process that is currently under way in the area of immigration and integration on the European level.⁴¹

³⁷ Angenendt, 'Muslims, integration, and security in Europe', p. 16.

³⁸ Jürgen Habermas, *A Berlin republic: writings on Germany* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1997).

³⁹ Urmila Goel, 'Citizenship and identity among second generation South Asians in western European countries', MA diss., School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 1998, <http://www.urmila.de/DesisinD/Jugend/citizenship/citizenindex.html>.

⁴⁰ Werner Schiffauer, 'Enemies within the gates: the debate about the citizenship of Muslims in Germany', in Modood et al., *Multiculturalism*, pp. 94–116.

⁴¹ Alan Milward, *The European rescue of the nation-state* (London: Routledge, 1992).

Member states remain the key actors, but the European Commission plays an important role in framing policy initiatives that shape member states' preferences and policy-making, not only on immigration issues but increasingly on social integration. Also, since 2003 member states have been exchanging information on existing integration policies within the so-called 'National Contact Points' (NCP) framework. Given the securitization of migration that has taken place since 9/11 and the subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe, there has also been a general trend towards linking migration to security issues in the European Union, and to issues within the Union's external and development policies.

The EU as a whole advances a 'holistic approach' to integrating immigrants which draws on the European idea of 'unity in diversity' mentioned earlier and covers the full range of issues relating to economic, social, cultural and political integration of immigrants. The Charter of Fundamental Rights enshrines the principles of cultural and religious diversity within member states.⁴² Thus, the 'logic of integration' would suggest that while the cacophony of EU member states' voices still persists, there are signs that there may be more harmony in the future. Yet, of the three models outlined above, the EU's shared approach is still closest to some kind of multiculturalism in that the emphasis is on immigrants being able to preserve and practise their cultures and faiths. It is also arguable that the concepts of subsidiarity, and a 'Europe of the regions', enshrine a form of multiculturalism within the EU, in the form of the principle of devolution to the lowest practicable level of group identity and decision-making.

Multiculturalism and foreign policy: a new research agenda⁴³

In the post-Cold War decade of the 1990s the debates—both expert and political—which rumbled on over multiculturalism on the one hand and foreign policy on the other took place in separate, parallel channels. Each was also highly variable in national terms, with some countries untroubled by issues of cultural diversity, and others finding little controversial in the operation of their national foreign policies. Since 11 September 2001, however, this picture has changed with a vengeance. Multiculturalism has become an issue of high politics through what many regard as a self-evident connection with international relations. The impact of terrorism inside the United States, Spain and Britain has led both to a crisis in multiculturalism as a principle for organizing modern democratic societies and to the fear that the old notion of 'the enemy within' (given full rein in the Cold War, but in fact harking back via the European wars of religion to the wooden horse of Troy) now applied to communities whose loyalty to a transnational religion might lead them into acts of violence against their own fellow citizens.

We are thus now faced with a new dual agenda, at both the political and the academic level: on one side of the coin, the impact of a multicultural (and probably also multi-ethnic and multi-religious) social composition on the conduct of foreign

⁴² All member states except the United Kingdom have endorsed the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

⁴³ This section draws in part on Christopher Hill, 'Bringing war home'.

policy; and on the other side of the coin, the impact of international relations on that same delicate social composition. The two-way flows of interaction we observe in this framework stimulate red-hot political argument, and should in time generate much intellectual analysis. At present, the latter has only just begun. But this research agenda needs developing if it is to be taken forward effectively. The present article as a whole is an attempt to carry the debate forward in its ethical dimension, while this particular section aims at specifying the components of the new foreign policy agenda.

The first thing to note is that the interplay between foreign policy and multiculturalism, while new in its specifics, is simply the latest manifestation of the long-running entanglement of international and domestic politics. It has never been possible to understand foreign policy without taking into account its interaction with domestic society, notwithstanding the cruder versions of realism which seemed to see politics stopping 'at the water's edge' (actually a very Anglo-American metaphor; it would be truer to say 'at the frontier fence'). If we look at almost any foreign policy case-study in modern history, we find a continual process of interplay between internal and external policy, shaping both. If in recent decades the very boundary between the two has become more blurred through the interpenetration of all forms of public policy, and the public interest in more of the spectrum of world affairs, it is now absolutely essential to understand the two realms as interconnected—not least because they are not identical. This also requires us to focus more on agency in international relations, rather than on the apparently self-executing factors of economic structures or the balance of power, and in particular on the behaviour of states. For all their variety, and diverse forms of incompetence, only states (by definition) have civil societies; and states are also the most significant intermediaries between the forces of localism and universalism which together define so much of the politics on our planet.

The interplay between domestic society, international politics and transnational actors, then, is the matrix within which any concern over the relationship between multiculturalism/multiculturality and foreign policy falls. We have already defined the former terms. 'Foreign policy' also needs some consideration. It can be seen as the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor on behalf of a given community, in the international system.⁴⁴ This means that while states naturally have foreign policies by virtue of their sovereignty, other entities may also pursue foreign policy. Prominent among them is the EU, which while it does not (and cannot) claim an exclusive right to conduct foreign policy on behalf of its members, has pursued a foreign policy in parallel with their own for nearly 40 years. It thus complicates, replicates and sometimes amplifies the dilemmas which its members face in international relations.

The overlap between national and EU foreign policies raises the question of who exactly is to be heard in any expanded debate on foreign policy. The 'domestic environment' exists both at the level of individual states and at that

⁴⁴ This is a slightly refined version of a definition given in Christopher Hill, *The changing politics of foreign policy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 3–5.

of the EU as a whole. Both have evolved to contain a far greater variety of vocal groups than at any previous time. Moreover, while we are used to the idea that interest groups will create a pluralist set of pressures of policy-making, with some, indeed, virtually coopted into the policy process, the idea that nationalities, let alone ethnic groups and religious communities, might also have interests to assert is still a delicate issue, to the point where it raises fears about subversion. Devolution to Scotland, or Catalunya, for example, is acceptable so long as it relates to the internal balance of power of a state, and does not extend to its international behaviour. The idea of distinctive ethnic concerns is even further beyond the pale. While Turkish *Gastarbeiter* in Germany are fully expected to have a sympathy for their home country, and to send funds home, they also have to keep their heads down over the question of Turkey's accession to the EU for fear of provoking the precise opposite of their desired outcome. First-generation British Asians have also been very cautious about identifying with their place of birth, since Norman Tebbit's pointed—and spectacularly ill-judged—remark about them needing to meet the 'cricket test'.⁴⁵

It is religion, and its admixture with the events of 9/11 and after, that has finally brought these suppressed transnational issues fully into the open. Religions tend to transcend states, even if they have to make incessant compromises with them. They represent universal belief-systems, and they look to a higher authority than that of government, indeed of humankind. With hindsight (and a little knowledge of history) it is clear that religious communities are vessels that can be filled with the combustible fuel of political anger and violence in the right circumstances—that is, circumstances where the usual human preference for a quiet and private spiritual life is overborne by a sense of outrage either at insults to holy icons or at an injustice for which all other remedies seem inaccessible. Thus the mixture of highly controversial foreign policies, as over Palestine and Iraq, with larger minority communities inside western countries producing more confident but also more alienated second and third generations has thrown up the issues we currently face: who speaks for the country internationally? How far may a citizen go in working against his or her government's foreign policy? And do groups (whether religious or ethno-religious) have any special rights to be heard in foreign policy-making? These are some of the key questions now on our political and research agendas, barely dreamed of even a decade ago.

The policy-maker has a slightly different perspective on the same questions. Here the dilemma revolves (as usual) around how to balance competing and often incommensurable considerations. At one extreme lies the possibility of domestic appeasement, that is, of buying civil peace through a change in foreign policy. This is what the Spanish leader José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero has been accused

⁴⁵ In 1990 the Conservative politician Norman Tebbit said that supporting the English cricket team (as opposed to those of India, Pakistan or the West Indies) was a good test of immigrants' loyalty to the UK. This disregarded the fact that English sports teams were increasingly including some top-class products of immigrant families, who at first suffered racism from white crowds but gradually became idols of the whole community. The test was ironically reversed in August 2006 when the English-born Sajid Mahmood was abused as a 'traitor' by some British citizens of Pakistani descent in the crowd when playing for England against Pakistan in a match in Leeds. This was just over a year after the London bombs of 7 July 2005.

of in withdrawing troops from Iraq after his election victory in March 2004 over José Maria Aznar's People's Party, a victory itself overshadowed by the bombs on the Madrid metro. However unfair this accusation may be (as Zapatero's Socialist Party was committed to troop withdrawal before the bombs, and the Moroccan immigrant perpetrators were implacably hunted down), the impression of having bent the knee before a dangerous internal enemy was difficult to dispel—not least as Zapatero was increasingly accused of the same kind of accommodating attitude towards the terrorists of ETA.

At the other end of the spectrum the policy-maker may have to consider whether a minority group is not only a serious obstacle to the successful implementation of foreign policy but an actual threat to the state itself, through acts of what have in the past been called 'treason'. Treason is usually associated with attempts to help foreign powers undermine one's own sovereign state, although it can be interpreted simply as any attempt to overthrow a government by unlawful means—like the Gunpowder Plot. It is interesting that the Madrid and London bombs led only to charges of murder and conspiracy, not to accusations of an attack on the state. There is no doubt that in the febrile atmosphere in Britain after the bombs of 7 and 21 July 2005, and the renewed attacks of 2007, the government and security services are operating on the clear assumption of an enemy within (the head of MI5 said in November 2007 that there were about 2,000 potential terrorists to be watched inside Britain), even if they are also at pains to distinguish these people from the majority of those making up the Islamic community from which most of them come.

Between these two extreme positions lie the more routine, but still critical, balancing acts which governments have to perform. Societies are always complex and variegated, but in modern conditions include sizeable organized minorities, with distinct *ethoi* and sets of values that may set them on collision courses with the majority. This is multiculturalism, as in France. Where, as in Britain or the Netherlands, there has also been a deliberate policy of multiculturalism, or the belief that a mix of communities is the most effective way of promoting civil peace and cultural efflorescence, this dilemma may be sharpened. For the thorny problem of group rights then arises. This takes the form not only of the argument that a given group might have a veto on official policy (as has been plausibly said of the Israel lobby in the United States) but also of the view that any problem that might arise within such a group is best handled within the group, by its own methods, rather than by the law of the land.

The balancing acts governments face derive from the fact that they must assume *both* that members of minority groups have the same stake in their country's foreign policy as any other citizen, *and* that they will have a separate set of concerns as members of the minority group. A policy-maker must decide whether to give special weight to that latter claim, or to disregard it as special pleading. And given the heightened interest in foreign policy throughout society evident in recent decades, and particularly in Muslim groups since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, aspects of these dilemmas present themselves virtually every day in one form or other.

This leads naturally to another key part of the new agenda: how to think about the need for the cohesion and domestic consensus that have been traditionally seen as prerequisites of an effective foreign policy. Should this assumption be questioned, in the belief that domestic contestation (within limits) might actually improve the quality of democratic decision-making—or because it cannot be prevented in any case? Or should the nature and basis of domestic support be reframed, to include a kind of consociationalism over big external decisions? The concept of the national interest was never an easy one to operationalize, even on the assumption of a pliant and cohesive domestic environment. Now that assumption can no longer be made, it could—ironically—come back into favour, as a way of pitching policy above the conflicting interests of inter-group politics. Either way, conventional thinking about what constitutes the conditions for successful and legitimate foreign policy-making must be worked through from first principles.

In the particular context of this article, the problem of cohesion takes on a distinctive meaning. The impact of multiculturalism on the idea and practice of a European foreign policy is complicated. At one level one can conceptualize it in terms of a single European set of social processes, with immigration flows loosening up traditional national societies, and the same basic issues confronting the governments of most member states. At another, we may think of European foreign policy decisions being affected both by the sum of 27 national domestic politics and by cross-national links between ethno-religious groups, some of whose members may feel little loyalty to the old European nation-state in which they happen to be domiciled. Just as there is debate about what constitutes a truly European foreign policy action, so it is difficult to make a case for an authentically European public opinion providing legitimacy for such actions. This does not mean that we can simply settle back into a traditionally national frame of reference; we have to work simultaneously with the national, collective and transnational levels of analysis. This produces, to adapt Stanley Hoffmann, not one but several, cross-cutting, 'logics of diversity'.

The problems of voice and legitimacy run very close to the more explicitly normative question, central to this special issue, of what constitutes an ethical foreign policy. It is difficult enough to give an answer to this question for a single, cohesive nation-state. The difficulty is compounded in the case of the EU, which parades its international morality but suffers from an inability both to sustain unity in action and to translate values into impact. The dimension of multiculturalism then adds a further set of ethical complications, for it calls into question most assumptions about how society does and ought to operate, in particular the notions of common identity and collective responsibility which are so closely tied to the notion of foreign policy. It also raises the question to which many are once more giving voice: namely, how to ensure the democratic accountability of foreign policy in a political environment where elites have special advantages, while those seeking to influence them represent more the cacophony of special interests than a measured debate accessible to the mass public.

At the European level multiculturalism seems to add yet another cleavage to an already fragmented quasi-polity, given that some states are deeply preoccupied with the problem, while others (such as the new eastern member states) are barely touched by it. It also raises the question of how far the concerns of particular groups, often derived from the colonial roles of certain European states, should be the responsibility of all within the EU, when some members had little to do with Europe's imperial expansion, or were indeed, like Ireland and Cyprus, themselves colonies. Of course, the non-imperial states face their own dilemmas, often welcoming victims of oppression only then to face unaccustomed problems of multiculturalism of their own. Denmark, Sweden, Italy and Ireland have all been caught up in serious foreign policy conflicts through a combination of their own liberalism and becoming countries of net immigration.

Then there is the securitization dimension, which arises from the fear of terrorism, but almost inevitably contaminates relations among ordinary, law-abiding citizens of all faiths and none. The need to counter very serious threats, actual and potential, strengthens both the national state security apparatus and that created through intergovernmental coordination. Both will be shadowy and by their nature difficult to subject to democratic controls. It is also true that less dramatic transnational crimes in the form of drug- and people-smuggling have increased the tendency for migration issues to become securitized, so that they are now an inherent part of foreign policy. States feel that the threats to their borders come from a set of national and transnational actors whose identities are often deliberately blurred, with responsibility extremely difficult to pin down. In response they have recourse only to state and intergovernmental (whether EU or in wider groupings) mechanisms. In negotiating with Libya, for example, Italy has to face not only the moral issue of how to expiate its colonial past, but also the ethical and practical dilemmas associated with slowing the relentless wave of illegal migration (to which Tripoli turns a blind eye) from the Libyan coast towards Lampedusa, Sicily and all points north. Nor is the problem only Italian. Once unidentified migrants (that is, those who cannot be returned to an obvious country of origin) have been held for 40 days they are released, soon making their way to more distant locations within the EU. Very few indeed of these people are likely to pose a serious security risk, but their collective impact may well be to disturb existing community relations, especially when—as is almost always the case—they gravitate towards the already crowded poor zones of major cities.

The collision of the issues of multiculturalism and multiculturalism on the one hand, and an ever more difficult and contested foreign policy debate on the other, has thus produced a striking new agenda. This will continue to play out at the political level, but it is important for research to bring a more measured approach to bear. This agenda is critical to Europe's future, both in itself and for its interconnections with pre-existing issues of governance, culture and basic values.

Conclusion: the problem of a European demos in the context of collective foreign policy-making

If multiculturalism has a solvent effect on the nation-state, it will at the least further complicate the EU's development, including its system of foreign policy coordination. Any putative political entity, such as the EU, will struggle to develop beyond a certain point if it does not manage to engender a sense of shared community among those who live inside its borders, that is, to create a demos which recognizes its own existence. This task was proving difficult even before the onset of inter-communal tensions associated with foreign policy and with acts of terrorism.

There are, however, some reasons for conceding the possibility of an immanent European society, despite its increasing multiculturality. Four factors in particular stand out. First is the political drive towards greater union, through the single market, the common currency and constant rhetoric about Europeanness, reinforced by financial incentives in many subregions. Second is the effective acceptance in all member states (including Britain) that some sovereign powers have been definitively conceded to a European entity. Third is the heightened social mobility that has been in evidence in Europe in the last two decades, facilitated by cheap air travel, legal freedoms of movement and the variability of national labour markets. Fourth is the impact of immigration from outside the EU, which has greatly increased the diversity of European societies, some of which had remained demographically stable for centuries.⁴⁶ This has overshadowed the sense of the major fissures in Europe being between separate nations and/or nation-states. Just as we had got used to the fading of the fault-lines between Protestants and Catholics, to say nothing of those between communists and capitalists, we now have to take into account cleavages between Muslim and Christian, believers and secularists, which cut across the usual boundaries.

While these factors are disturbing the status quo, they could equally be seen as laying the ground for the creation of a single, 'melting-pot' society within the EU's borders. Yet a common space is not a society. Jihadists have exploited the 'four freedoms' in order to create their own enterprises within Europe, and in the case of the 9/11 terrorists for use against a third party. They had evidently not the slightest identification with or preference for Europe over the United States, just finding it a useful sea in which to swim unobserved. On the more positive side, however, and notwithstanding the fact that Europeans still also move easily between their home countries and others like the United States, Argentina or Singapore, many European citizens now find themselves feeling just as comfortable ('at home') in other states of the Union as in that of their origin, partly because of the technical freedoms they enjoy, but also partly because of a sense of common culture. Language barriers and national sentiments still act as brakes on this process. But this is still a very different Europe to live in from its predecessor of 30 years ago. The fact is that we now inhabit a continent that contains intertwined national

⁴⁶ Robert D. Putnam, 'E pluribus unum: diversity and community in the twenty-first century', the 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture, *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30: 2, 2007, pp. 137–74.

and transnational systems, leading to the possibility of a European *Gemeinschaft*. Whether this comes to fruition, and whether it will be genuinely multicultural, or by contrast ever more homogeneous, only our grandchildren will know. Societies are not made but develop, and over centuries, not decades.

In the last five years, foreign policy has given hope to those who believe that Europeans share similar views, preoccupations and objectives, because of the evident common trend of public opinion against the war in Iraq. Yet this very case raises the key question, in terms of a European demos which might be able to raise ethical issues over such matters as multiculturalism and foreign policy: that is, whether, when the EU does manage to act seriously in foreign policy, it has to take account of a transnational debate across national boundaries. The conventional wisdom is that domestic politics enters in only via national governments and bargaining in the Council of Ministers. It has indeed been noticeable since 9/11 and the subsequent US actions how little real transnational debate there has been in Europe. Muslim voices have been raised in individual countries over Iraq, but have generally preferred to focus on their own national governments, often with frustrating results. The Brussels institutions, whatever their qualities, have evidently not seemed a natural site for minorities or for intercultural debate. The European Parliament seems otherworldly in this respect.

Yet this conclusion need not hold for the future. Developments *either* at the level of European foreign policy *or* at that of a transnational European society will inevitably affect the other level, since the two, like all foreign policy environments, exist in a condition of dynamic interaction. If, for example, European foreign policy were to become more effective, that would expose the fragmented, national nature of debate and accountability, creating a legitimacy gap. Conversely, if trends in European public opinion were to show greater homogeneity on foreign policy issues, and/or transnational minority groups were to prove vocal and active, that would act as a pressure for more concerted intergovernmental responses.

As we look towards the future from this uncertain moment in international history, with European foreign policy-makers unsure of the contexts, both intergovernmental and domestic, in which they have to make decisions, we may conclude two things about our multicultural theme: first, that foreign policy at the EU level is likely to be persistently affected in some way by the multicultural dimension, not least because of its highly variegated nature; European societies have widely differing attitudes towards the project of multiculturalism, and diverse degrees of multiculturalism. Some states, like cosmopolitan Britain, are far more deeply enmeshed in the dilemmas which result than others, like the central European members.

Yet, second, all domestic societies are now increasingly engaging in direct interactions without mediation from official sources, creating ever more problems for diplomacy at the national and multilateral level—indeed, creating the need for forms of diplomacy even within a state, through the existence of cultural diversity. This the Danish government discovered during the affair of the cartoons, just as the Netherlands had done over the films of Theo van Gogh. It is no wonder

that decision-makers now view their 'home base' in distinctly ambiguous terms. Conversely, a government can produce dramatic and unexpected hostility on foreign streets by an action which seems purely domestic, as Britain did recently in honouring the writer Salman Rushdie with a knighthood. Any country, however small or apparently peaceful, can easily be plunged into a serious cross-national dispute through the linkages between domestic cultural disputes and external interests made possible by the voracious global media, feeding off each other throughout their 24-hour news cycle. These disputes generate foreign policy by their very nature. What kind of Europe we are becoming, and what kind of foreign policy we are capable of, will be determined in part by the interplay between our internal social composition and our relations with the rest of the world, the two conjoined in a series of endless and sometimes dangerous feedback loops.