
Bringing War Home: Foreign Policy-Making in Multicultural Societies¹

Christopher Hill, *University of Cambridge, UK*

Abstract

The debates about multiculturalism, and the democratic conduct of foreign policy, need bringing systematically together. A comparison of state approaches to cultural diversity helps us to understand their interrelationship. For different reasons, neither the United States nor France has experienced a direct link between multiculturalism and foreign policy, as Britain has, but each has the potential to do so. The complexities of social composition, and the growing overlaps between the domestic and international realms, mean that all three states need to revise significantly their understanding of the balance between efficiency and accountability in foreign policy-making, not least because civil peace and international peace are now connected in previously unimaginable ways. It should, nonetheless, be possible to rework practices and principles to allow the state to protect the interests of society as a whole without either scapegoating an internal minority or giving it special privileges.

Keywords: *E. H. Carr, foreign policy, Islam, multiculturalism, terrorism, war on terror*

E. H. Carr was a unique figure in British intellectual history. My interest in history goes back a long way, but like so many others I was awakened to the problem of its meaning by Carr's *What is History?*, read in the sixth form. Later encounters with his major works in two more disciplines, *The History of Soviet Russia* and *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, as well as with some of his wartime writings in the Public Record Office, were critical to an emerging interest in the relationship between international relations and domestic politics.

The international dimension of multiculturalism is a subject of the here and now. Carr, whose main writings appeared between 1939 and 1961, naturally had nothing explicit to say about it. Yet his work gives us several key leads. He was one of the first to see the importance of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy, and he drew attention to the interplay of nationalism and international order, as in his statement in *Nationalism and After* that 'The failure since 1914 to establish any new compromise between nationalism and internationalism is the essence of the contemporary crisis'.² To the extent that our own crisis revolves around a similar failure, in establishing a new compromise between the state and transnationalism, Carr provides some interesting pointers. As, in some respects, a man of the left, he understood transnationalism. He asked the pertinent question: 'Did the Czech working-man, for instance, have a more natural affinity with the Czech noble than with the German working-man?'³ Carr saw a solution to the challenges of nationalism



and transnationalism lying in large multinational units, in which 'there is such an absence of favour to particular nationalities . . . that national jealousy and friction are diminished, though not yet eliminated'.⁴ In 1945 he celebrated the multinational armies of the United States and the Soviet Union, which were in certain respects precursors of modern multiculturalism in their counterpoints to narrow German nationalism. And yet he was at the same time fully aware of the indomitability of the state, through which such multinationalism had to function.

Much has been written about multiculturalism over the last decade, while since 11 September 2001 there has been a renewal of the debate on the appropriate conduct of foreign policy in a democratic society. Yet the two sets of considerations have not been brought systematically together until very recently.⁵ In the United Kingdom the attacks of 7 July 2005 on London, and thus on the British state, produced political exchanges over 'enemies within', or the impossibility of handing a veto over national foreign policy to a particular minority. This article seeks to bring a more analytical dimension to this debate, by providing both comparative and historical perspectives. It takes three different models of state approaches to cultural diversity – the US, the British, and the French – so as to examine their implications for foreign policy, and vice versa. It concludes that each approach will have to revise significantly its understanding of the balance between efficiency and accountability in foreign policy-making, not least because civil peace and international peace are now connected in ways that previous theories had not imagined. Ways must be found to ensure that minority groups with particularly strong concerns about external policy have their voices heard without raising complaints over special treatment. This is a political, moral and technical challenge of a high order, but if it is not met foreign policy risks running into even greater problems of legitimacy than it has already experienced in the first hundred years of mass democracy.

The analysis which follows has four parts. First, the unique nature of the current intersection between foreign policy and multiculturalism is delineated, with a view to identifying the problems which it presents. Second, I examine the meaning of multiculturalism and describe how it is interpreted in three major democracies – the United States, France and Britain – which have very different social formations and constitutional structures. This is followed by a third section, which asks (for each of the three models in turn) how multiculturalism impacts on foreign policy-making, and vice versa. Lastly, I draw some general conclusions and suggest some guidelines for future practice, bearing in mind the need to draw lessons from the disasters experienced in both foreign and domestic policy in a number of democracies over recent years.

Part I: The problem and the context

The eleventh of September 2001 may or may not have ushered in a new era in modern history. It certainly changed the agenda of contemporary international politics towards a focus on terrorism, and an apparent war between radical Islamic terrorists and the

West. It was not immediately obvious that this would call into question the nature of multiculturalism as a variant of pluralist democracy. Yet, as events unfolded, with the restrictions of the Patriot Act in the US sharpening tensions with the Muslim community, and the invasions of Afghanistan and then Iraq producing increasingly strenuous opposition from Muslims (and others) worldwide, concerns rose in all quarters about religious-based conflicts arising in Western societies.

The mass killings in Madrid on 11 March 2004 and in London on 7 July 2005 brought all this out into the open in Europe, since when there has been a flood of political argument, press commentary and (now) academic discussion over the nature of Islam, its relationship with democracy, and US–UK foreign policy. The fear of further terrorist attacks has naturally been a main theme. But lesser clashes have also created a climate of fear, including in countries not in the front line of ‘the war on terror’, and, in particular, not so responsible for the invasion of Iraq as were Britain and the United States. In the Netherlands the killing of the film-maker Theo Van Gogh, by a young Muslim outraged at Van Gogh’s attack on Islamic attitudes to women, plunged that apparently tolerant society into crisis.⁶ In Denmark, another episode of satire towards Islam, this time in the form of cartoons published in a right-wing newspaper, rapidly led to riots around the Muslim world and the endangering of Danish lives and interests.

Thus to some extent we are now immersed in a great debate about religion, ideology and social systems, not dissimilar to that thrown up by the Russian Revolution and the ending of the Great War, when a ‘*grande peur*’ swept across Western Europe and the United States about the dangers of Bolshevism, and other fellow-travelling enemies from within such as trades unionists, or (in the case of many on the right) the Jews.⁷

It is possible that these developments will prove ephemeral. But given the great personal mobility possible in modern conditions, and the existence, in most contemporary societies, of multiple, settled, religious communities, overlapping to a degree with ethnic diasporas, this is unlikely. Even if dramas like 9/11 prove rare, the fact of asymmetrical state power (that is, some states being far more able to act outside their borders than others), existing in parallel with a complex mosaic of socio-cultural transnationalism, will generate regular tensions. This is all the more probable given the heightened popular awareness of, and concern over, world affairs created by a truly integrated global media system. Foreign policy is thus unlikely to revert to the condition of being made in a club-like elite atmosphere, relatively undisturbed by mass politics. Rather, we have entered a period in which changes in the state, civil society, national identity and foreign policy are closely interdependent.

It has rarely been possible to understand foreign policy without taking into account its interaction with domestic society, but framing the two together has now become essential. Talk about ‘democracy and foreign policy’ has always been too general. But, as many writers have shown, interest-groups and other forms of organised opinion have intermittently forced governments to take pause even on matters of high security, as occurred with the pacifist movement in Britain in the 1930s, and Germany in the 1980s.⁸ The realist stereotype, indeed, of policy-makers pursuing

clear national interests relating to a defined piece of territory, and supported by a national consensus, has almost never been accurate. There is a continual process of interplay between internal and external policy, shaping both, in all kinds of state. In recent decades the very boundary between the two has become more blurred (though not non-existent) as a result of the interpenetration of all forms of public policy, and the public interest in more of the spectrum of world affairs.

The set of issues revolving around multiculturalism and foreign policy can thus be seen as the latest, perhaps inevitable, development in an evolving historical process whereby civil society is drawn ever more into the processes and politics of international relations. On the other hand, it may be that we should regard ethnic groups with diasporic ties as a special case, on the grounds either that they might exercise a privileged veto over some aspects of national policy or that they might be excluded altogether. In the US, the US Israel Public Affairs Committee has undoubtedly been a formidable player in the debates over the direction of US policy in the Middle East, with the result that for many years the opponents of that policy have been seen as disadvantaged. Recently this issue has been taken up by mainstream realists who have asked why the United States seems unwilling to use its leverage on Israel.⁹ There will always be intense controversy when a particular ethnic group is accused of improper influence, whatever the merits of the case. The debate over the Jewish and pro-Israeli lobbies (by no means identical) is always the most inflamed, for obvious historical reasons, but the same kind of argument has occurred in the US at various times over the Cuban, Greek, Irish, Polish and Turkish lobbies, and in Britain over the activities of white Rhodesians/Zimbabweans.¹⁰

Terrorism adds another dimension altogether. It has turned an increasingly complex set of issues arising from multiculturalism into one of the most serious dilemmas of our day. How we handle the problems of security, loyalty, diversity and transnationalism contained within it will affect the peace and well-being of millions. In the past, ethnic minorities have often felt beleaguered and powerless. Their level of political activism was generally low, with foreign policy the most inaccessible area of all. As a result, their views and interests could be discounted by those making foreign policy, with no fear of consequences in the letter-columns or ballot boxes, let alone the streets. This is no longer the case, although it should be stressed that there are many members of ethnic and religious communities who see themselves as never having had problems with participation in normal British political life.

Yet the fact that 24 per cent of British Muslims in July 2005 felt 'some sympathy with the feelings and motives' of those who had just carried out the attacks in London suggests a deep disenchantment with something about the society in which they are living.¹¹ Conversely, the state's readiness to resort to 'emergency' measures such as torture, rendition and detention without charge (as laid bare by Rosemary Foot in last year's Carr lecture) inevitably affects Muslims in this particular context more than any other section of society, and is likely to alienate them from established legal and political processes.¹² The mistaken police raid in Forest Gate of 2 June 2006 epitomised the risk. In the interests of security in the broadest sense we need to decide, in Ian Buruma's words, 'the limits of tolerance', but also the practical

meaning of our commitment to the rights of minority groups, and indeed of human rights across the board.

Whichever way the problem is approached, the admixture of terror, difference, religion, tradition and accusations of disloyalty is highly unpredictable and calls into question most assumptions about how our society does and ought to operate, in particular the notions of collective action and shared identity which are so closely tied to the notion of foreign policy.

At a deeper level, the very idea of multiculturalism, the orthodoxy in countries like Britain, Canada and the Netherlands over the last 20 years, is now being seen in many quarters as fatally flawed. Amartya Sen has noted that in Britain it amounts to 'plural monoculturalism', with religious leaders seeking to cramp people's natural preference for multiple identities.¹³ This critical appraisal is unlikely to have become so prevalent without the blowback from international events into domestic society.

Three key questions arise out of the interaction between the two levels; they drive the analysis in each section of the remainder of this article. First, does multiculturalism pose significant problems for the conduct of foreign policy in a democratic state? Second, and conversely, is the conduct of foreign policy always likely to unsettle relations within a multicultural society? The third problem follows from the synthesis of the first two, namely: what might represent a workable relationship between foreign policy and multicultural civil society in a democratic state? This last question has an inherent normative dimension, as indeed does the underlying category of foreign policy-making in a democracy. Rethinking foreign policy accountability (as opposed to the kind of principles and objectives to be served by policy) is a task which is long overdue.

Definitions

But what is 'multiculturalism'? Whenever a term becomes the focal point of public debate it risks losing such agreed, precise meaning as it possessed. The fact that 'culture' itself is a contested notion makes multiculturalism even more elusive. Culture can subsume ethnicity, religion, nationality, identity and all the artefacts associated with them. Starting from this recognition Brian Barry distinguishes between (1) *multiculturalism*, which is an *ideology*, and project, about the acceptance of diversity and group rights; (2) *multiculturality*, which refers to the *fact* of cultural diversity, with many groups defining themselves separately from the nation-state – and perhaps asserting their right to a higher loyalty; and (3) *ethnicity*, which strictly refers to racial distinctiveness but is often wrongly used to denote national, linguistic or religious communities.¹⁴ This set of distinctions provides a solid starting-point.

The great debate about multiculturalism which preceded 9/11 was in part about the ideology, or strategy, of allowing democracy to evolve in the direction of permitting group rights and privileges as a way of coping with the consequences of increased multiculturality, itself a function of heightened global mobility and immigration to the developed democracies. Cultural diversity had turned out to mean not just the enriching of our cuisine and the dazzling displays of the Notting Hill carnival, but

also thorny problems of changing localities, intercommunal tensions and claims for exemptions from legislation on such matters as headwear and schooling. In many respects these matters have been resolvable without drama; indeed, it is remarkable how much has been achieved inside such societies on all sides. Still, significant difficulties remain, notably over human rights, where honour and dowry killings are an automatic affront to societies based on the values of individualism and equal rights before the law. The result has been a noisy debate – or rather a series of poorly connected separate debates – particularly in Western Europe.

The argument has been fierce among political philosophers, as well as in the public prints. The lines may be broadly drawn between ‘communitarians’ on one side and ‘egalitarian cosmopolitans’ on the other. The former stress the importance of respect for difference, and for tradition. They are prepared to envisage a good deal of decentralised decision-making on matters affecting custom and morality, to the point where they open themselves to a charge of ethical relativism. Prominent among them are Will Kymlicka, Bhikhu Parekh and (more ambivalently) Michael Walzer.¹⁵ Even John Rawls, in his later work *The Law of Peoples*, moved in this direction by accepting the inevitability of different kinds of society.¹⁶ The egalitarian cosmopolitans, in contrast, stress universal principles, the exercise of freedom but *within* a structure of agreed common rules, and the rule of law as the basis of democratic cohesion. They emphatically believe that human rights do not stop, or should be reinterpreted, at the water’s edge. Brian Barry is the most assertive member of the school, while Fred Halliday is an important voice in an IR context.¹⁷

The contrast between the two approaches is set up for heuristic purposes, but is always subject to qualification. Attitudes to the value and reasonable claims of the state, for example, vary widely. Furthermore, once multicultural arguments are brought together with debates about international politics particular difficulties and ambiguities arise. If we assume, for example, that members of minority groups not only have the same stake in their country’s foreign policy as any citizen, but also a separate set of concerns qua members of the minority group, then governments face the problem of whether to give extra weight to that latter claim, or to disregard it as special pleading. To a degree this is the same problem that occurs with any interest-group, whether charity, diaspora or workers in an arms factory. It becomes particularly difficult when certain citizens disavow not only a particular policy, but even the very idea of loyalty to the state. Even then, the rub only comes at the point of action, or implementation. Thought and expression are free, but if activity is undertaken which, while legal, seems to be at the behest of a foreign actor, threatens internal security, or attempts to undermine in the field the stated foreign policies of the government of the day, there will inevitably be conflicts. Such activity need not be at the dramatic end of the scale, where lies spying or *jihad*; it can involve selling arms to the wrong people, stirring up trouble between different societies, or seeking to divert public funds in the cause of a special interest.

Many aspects of these problems are not unique to multiculturalism. But the particularly strong claims of religious groups, and their transnational dimension, present sharp dilemmas for foreign policy-makers in contemporary conditions, where

both international terrorism and the various conflicts in the Middle East undeniably have a religious dimension, playing further into the politics of the West through immigration and diasporas. The conflicts which result can now be illustrated by a brief analysis of the different forms of multiculturalism/multiculturalism which have evolved in the three Western members of the UN Security Council: the United States, France and Britain. The balance between considerations of equality and diversity has been struck differently in the three countries, according to their contrasting histories and socio-political compositions. Each therefore represents a distinctive set of problems with regard to multiculturalism and foreign policy.

Part II: Three models of multiculturalism

1. *The United States*

The United States sees itself as a great melting pot of ethnicities and traditions, a place to which immigrants flock and wear the badge of being American with pride. Since 1782 the scroll in the beak of the American eagle has borne Benjamin Franklin's motto *E pluribus unum* – 'out of many cometh one'. The US thus makes a virtue of fostering both diversity and singularity. Immigrant communities have long enjoyed the freedom to maintain their own cultures, in their own neighbourhoods. Accordingly they are 'hyphenated' citizens, as in 'Polish-Americans', 'Greek-Americans' and so on. Gratitude both for being allowed into the country and for being able to retain a sense of their roots is the way in which Americanism is thus consolidated. This is the theory.

In practice the situation is more complicated. For one thing, there has been oscillation over the years in the way in which hyphenated Americans have been viewed. For example, in and after the First World War hyphenated Americans of German or Irish extraction were criticised by Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson for insufficient patriotism.¹⁸ For another, ethnicity and culture have become steadily thoroughly blurred, with many African-Americans believing that 'American means white'.¹⁹ Thus alternative cultural reference points emerged as a way of opposing racial discrimination. Some black Americans turned to Islam, or looked to Africa for their roots.²⁰ The US Jewish population has been subject to the same running together of ethnic and cultural characteristics, but it has not been affected so directly by the debate over multiculturalism. This has been partly because until the formation of Israel in 1948 it did not have a single country to come from or hark back to; most Jewish immigrants were only too glad to rid themselves of past national affiliations. The particular horror of the Holocaust also gave them a special status within US society. Jews in the United States then in turn began to emigrate to Israel, reinforcing the links between the two societies and making for a unique nexus in terms of foreign policy and transcultural relations.

The religious dimension of multiculturalism in the United States should be straightforward because of the constitutional separation of church and state. In practice, Christianity is of central importance to US public life; it is impossible to

imagine an avowed atheist even winning nomination as a presidential candidate, while churchgoing is still at high levels in the US in comparison to Western Europe.²¹ Furthermore evangelical Christianity has increasingly grown close to Zionism, which tends to increase the sense of marginality experienced by the six million Muslims who live in the US (about 2 per cent of the population). The importance of Christianity to the dominant neo-conservative movement of the last decade has increased the entanglement of religious and cultural issues with foreign policy, no less than has the atrocity of 9/11, which made Muslims in the United States an object of suspicion.

Despite the higher levels of suspicion and misunderstanding, there have been relatively few intercommunal problems. Muslims have suffered disproportionately from the heightened security concerns after 9/11, but there have been no cases of pogroms or riots of the kind which have disfigured relations between blacks and whites over many decades, or which have occurred between Muslim and white youths in some British towns. Nonetheless, anxiety has begun to rise among those attached to a certain idea of the United States. Arthur Schlesinger Jr said that the United States represented historically 'a brilliant solution' to the 'inherent fragility of a multi-ethnic society', but by this he meant an Americanism derived from British influences, which have subsequently come under pressure from multiculturalism.²² Samuel Huntington, in typically stark fashion, has drawn the conclusion that such pressure risks dividing the country, but this is not a reference to 9/11. Rather, he draws attention to the increasing Hispanic (specifically Mexican) challenge to 'the America we have known for more than three centuries', arguing that the United States faces a critical choice over whether or not it wants to be 'a country of two languages and two cultures'.²³

The debate on multiculturalism in the US is thus multifaceted. The 'melting pot' is no longer an appropriate image, but it is not clear what might replace it. One close observer has noted that 'paradoxical as it may seem, the United States has a common culture that is multicultural'.²⁴ To some extent the debate is between pessimists and optimists, with Huntington in the first camp, together with those progressives who fear the damage being inflicted by neo-conservatism, and liberal multiculturalists in the second, together with conservatives like Francis Fukuyama. Fukuyama argues that 'if you want to see a real problem with cultural assimilation, look no further than European countries like France and Spain, who have discovered after September 11 that they are host to angry second- and third-generation Muslims prone to terrorism and violence'.²⁵

2. France

France resists the very idea that it is multicultural. Its official policies are founded on a self-conscious notion of republicanism, described by the French themselves as the 'Jacobin model'. The state, nation, people and culture are seen as an integral whole. The influence of the French Revolution is profound here, for, as Will Kymlicka says, 'who could have predicted in 1750 that virtually everyone within the current boundaries of France [or Italy] would share a common language and sense of

nationhood?'²⁶ To challenge the French state is to challenge the dominant notion of Frenchness, and vice versa. The approach to minorities is to deny their official existence, and to pursue an assertively assimilationist policy centred on the French language, republican history and a deeply secular distrust of the role of churches in public life.²⁷ This means an explicitly hostile attitude to policies of multiculturalism, and no allowance for the concept of hyphenation. The concept of a Moroccan-Frenchman (say) is an alien one, even if dual nationality has been legal since 1973. Despite this there is a curious similarity with the United States, in that there is a fundamental presumption that being French (or American) is to have won first prize in the lottery of life – to adapt Cecil Rhodes on Englishness.

Another similarity with the US is that theory is notably at odds with practice. Despite the hostility to multiculturalism, there is a great deal of multiculturalism in France. Paris has long been known for its intellectual and artistic internationalism, and the impact of empire, as in Britain, has been to bring large numbers of people to the Hexagon from Africa, the Maghreb and the Caribbean. The sub-Saharan Africans and Caribbean immigrants suffer discrimination and disadvantage, but do not on the whole constitute a challenge to the French way of life. Indeed, their countries of origin, independent since the 1960s, have themselves been shaped by *rayonnement*, or the export of Frenchness. The Maghreb is a different story. There are around six million Muslims in France, or 10 per cent of the total population, most of whom come from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. This is the biggest Muslim population, in both absolute and relative terms, in the EU.²⁸ Nonetheless it is not so visible as one might imagine, being confined largely to run-down estates in the *banlieue*, away from historic city centres, and hardly present at all in the higher echelons of French business and society, including the media (a stark contrast to Britain, this last). This approach has allowed the elite to assume that assimilation was working, and that there was no need for any overt recognition of diversity. If so, the riots of October 2005 in predominantly Muslim areas must have come as a sharp shock. Jocelyne Cesari has commented that, 'as the utopian structures of modernity begin to crumble . . . this [integrationist] vision of the State is no longer possible'.²⁹ Suddenly, French confidence in its handling of multiculturalism has been shaken.

The riots followed on from a prolonged controversy over the wearing of the headscarf, which was banned in schools by law in March 2004.³⁰ But in fact they had little to do with the 'foulard', or indeed with religion more generally, being largely a shout of rage against deprivation and exclusion. They were made worse at the time by Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy's remarks about 'hosing the scum' off the streets, but the anger was of long-standing.³¹ In 2001, less than three years after France celebrated winning the World Cup with a multi-ethnic team led by Zinedine Zidane, the *Marseillaise* was drowned out by whistles at the Stade de France, and the match between France and Algeria had to be abandoned.³² Seven months later, in April 2002, when Jean-Marie Le Pen of the National Front achieved an unprecedented vote in the first round of the presidential elections, France seemed split down the middle, and Zidane's team made an unprecedented political intervention, condemning 'racism and exclusion'. Le Pen was in the end roundly defeated, but had made his point

by coming second, with an average share of the vote over two rounds of 17.42 per cent, and over five million supporters.

Thus France is multicultural in fact if not in principle. It has a strong state which does not hesitate to shape civil society, but at the same time it has failed to integrate many immigrants, to the point where they (and their offspring) are often hostile to 'the certain idea of France' which has been so important to the history of the Fifth Republic. Although levels of tension are not currently so high, divisions remain deep, and there is no reason to suppose that the confidence lost in the French model will easily be regained. The cultural and religious aspects of multiculturalism are, however, heavily entwined with economic and class issues, and may even be subordinate to them – in which case there is a distinct contrast with the experience of Britain.

3. *Britain*

In Britain multiculturalism has been an official approach to social integration, even if there has never been (and probably never could be) a specific decision to go down this path. As in Canada and the Netherlands, the embracing of cultural diversity has been a logical development from the nature of the state and its past. The United Kingdom in itself embodies a form of multiculturalism, accepting both degrees of devolution to its separate countries and being relatively relaxed about mixed communities – including large numbers from the Irish Republic, despite often strained official relations. Furthermore the British Empire only survived as it did on the basis of coexistence between rulers and ruled, given the small numbers of the colonisers and the huge size of the colonies.

The acceptance of immigration into Britain from a wide range of ex-colonies has meant a very large number of ethnic groupings congregating in the cities, particularly London, which has become a genuine cosmopolis. It has been calculated that London now has 54 ethnic communities of more than 10,000 inhabitants, while more than 26 languages are each spoken by at least 1000 schoolchildren in the capital.³³ No policy of assimilation could succeed, at least in the short term, in such circumstances, so multiculturalism is the natural consequence – with an accompanying attitude of religious tolerance, which has been part of Britain's self-image since the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829.

What was less predictable was the positive encouragement given to a multi-faith Britain by New Labour, supported by the Anglican establishment. This has given a religious dimension to the multicultural model in Britain which contrasts both with French secularism and the US privileging of Christianity. Faith schools have flourished, and religious groups have been seen as important channels for reclaiming young people of all denominations (and none) from the streets. For a time, the enthusiastic promotion of cultural centres and autonomous communities (albeit in a country where local government has been emasculated by the centre) seemed to provide the social capital so badly needed in a fast-changing country. The higher echelons of British life, in the media, academe and even the House of Lords, began to open up to ethnic communities, to the point where the poverty evident in the latter, while still

disproportionate, seemed a no greater risk to national cohesion than that of some Glaswegian Scots or Liverpudlian English.

For such a system to work requires a significant degree of trust on all sides and a widespread consensus on its basic merit – especially on the part of the indigenous majority. And indeed, there has been much more harmony and mutual tolerance on display over the last 30 years in Britain than a sceptical observer (to say nothing of a doomsayer like Enoch Powell) would have predicted. The consensus might have taken the form more of permissive liberalism than of a positive and mutual celebration of diversity, but it has proved functional in many respects, with no conflict over the *hijab* and relatively few outbreaks of collective violence.³⁴

Yet weaknesses were apparent in the British model long before 9/11. The Salman Rushdie affair had exposed the breach between the democratic commitment to free speech and the theocratic implications of the *umma*. And despite the class barriers beginning to fall before their dynamic entrepreneurialism, it was becoming apparent that religion continued to set Asians apart in a way that did not affect those from Afro-Caribbean backgrounds. In the case of the Hindu and Sikh religions the consequences were relatively benign, analogous to the barriers to integration between Christians and Jews, but for some Islam proved to have a politicising and estranging effect. In this they were encouraged by the tolerant, even complacent, approach taken by successive governments to radical preachers, whose philosophy had no room in it for the notion of loyalty towards an infidel state – even one which had afforded them asylum.

Since the terrorist bombs in London of 7 July 2005, and the failed attacks of two weeks later, the British state has not only taken a more proactive approach to intervening inside the ethnic minorities, but for the first time has also encouraged a debate about the merits and limits of multiculturalism – a debate seen by many, perhaps inevitably in the current context, as an onslaught. Without the terror, this would probably have happened more slowly and with less drama. As it is, the government is clearly concerned not only about future bombings but also about intercommunal tensions and social cohesion (to say nothing of electoral punishment). The powers of the police have been increased, coinciding with the tightening of asylum and immigration rules which has occurred steadily over recent years. In the current climate it is not easy to pursue the more positive strategy of helping to bring about a wider acceptance of a shared British identity – the new and rather lame citizenship ceremonies hardly go far in that direction – but the debates which have been started on education, the veil and ‘parallel lives’ suggest that the period of self-satisfaction over British multiculturalism has now truly come to an end.³⁵

Part III: Foreign policy and multiculturalism: mutual entanglement

There is no doubt that multiculturalism has become deeply entangled with foreign policy issues in the three countries studied here. I now turn to this relationship for each of the three in terms of four main themes: first, the problem of partiality – whether multiculturalism allows certain domestic groups (and possibly their ‘diasporic

homelands') to have a privileged influence on foreign policy; second, the possibility of incoherence in foreign policy-making, in a system subject to pluralism and diversity; third, the danger of domestic cleavages leading to serious social tensions; finally, and most seriously, the risk of treason and/or domestic terrorism on the one side, and the development of a powerful security state on the other.

1. The United States

The issue of partiality in the making of US foreign policy has slowly gathered pace over the last 20 years, as ethnic groups have become more settled and confident in their ability to make claims on the national interest – although unlike states in Europe, there is a long history in the United States of some access to foreign policy-making for ethnic and other interest-groups. Yossi Shain argues that this ability is both a marker of their acceptance in US political life and a contribution to democratic values, in that the diasporic groups almost always wish to help their original countries attain the same level of political and economic development as their new home.³⁶ On the other side of the argument are not only specific critics of the Israel lobby, and of Middle East policy, but those who argue that US foreign policy-making in general has grown too attuned to interest-group activism, thereby ensuring that on any given foreign policy problem the most vocal and organised will make the running.³⁷ A recent example of this is the argument that after the fall of Saddam Hussein the Iraqi exiles were given too much of a say in determining reconstruction policy in Iraq, with disastrous results.³⁸

Tony Smith objects to ethnic demands for influence on foreign policy on the grounds that groups expect the country to serve their special interests, and that they sometimes act at the behest of foreign actors.³⁹ Even Shain, on the opposite side of the argument, concedes this last point, while pointing out that foreign governments have to be very careful when linking up with domestic lobbies in the US, as any overplaying of the hand might well rebound.⁴⁰ Thanks to authors like Smith and Shain these arguments are now fully on the table, and it is unlikely that the situation in the US will ever go back to the days of innocence when ethnic interest-groups were seen as an uncomplicated development of a pluralist political system, with self-cancelling pressures creating a space in which governments could make judicious decisions for the common good.

A more circumscribed version of this critique of the influence of multiculturalism argues that foreign policy, by definition, requires coherence, which is put at risk by the involvement of special interests. Of course concerns about the impact of parochial domestic concerns, indeed of democracy itself, on the functioning and effectiveness of the United States, are as old as the country itself, finding early voice in Madison's warnings about factions.⁴¹ A degree of incoherence is the price to pay for participation and accountability. Competition over influence and ideas can also be seen as a form of quality control, subjecting conventional wisdoms to constant test. On the other hand, it may be argued that foreign policy is an area where the normal competition

of democracy is lacking, leaving room precisely for organised special interests to gain advantage.

Evidently the climate inside the United States after 9/11 limits the range of ethnic groups which can take advantage. Any Arab, Iranian or other form of Islamic group which does not accept the parameters of the neo-conservative orthodoxy will not only not get a hearing, but is likely to be the focus of suspicion. Conversely, those speaking for states which show strong support for the US at a time when it sees itself as embattled, such as the UK and Israel, will be 'hugged close'.⁴² Such polarisation, acting on an as yet unintegrated multiculturalism, could lead to significant divisions inside US society, especially given the common view, articulated by Michael Walzer, that an ethnic American is someone who 'in principle, lives his spiritual life as he chooses, on either side of the hyphen'.⁴³ In 1992, when he made this remark, Walzer was talking about identity, with all its crucial political ramifications, not religious belief. The first attack on the World Trade Center had not yet happened, and multiple group allegiances did not carry the overtones they now do.

Yet in this new climate Walzer decisively rejects the fear of fragmentation and lurid visions of a clash of civilisations being imported into the country. Although foreign policy has impacted upon US society in the most clamorous of ways through the attacks of 9/11 and their aftermath, that society is still homogeneous enough not to fall into serious divisions. The peculiar mix of assimilationism and multiculturalism which has characterised US history is still preserving the domestic peace. Walzer argues, indeed, that the 'American side of the hyphen' is actually strengthened by empowering ethnic groups.⁴⁴

There is an element of self-deception in this view. The fear of terrorism has carried the United States to extremes, both in its foreign policy and its domestic security measures. The Patriot Act, passed in October 2001 and renewed in 2006, has changed the balance between civil society and the state, subjecting some innocent Muslims to surveillance and unjustified confinement. If the restrictions prove to be a relatively short-term expedient the damage may prove trivial, but if not it could lead to a serious loss of trust on all sides. The very lack of further attacks inside the US since 9/11 tends to reinforce beliefs in the efficacy of such measures, and moves the country back towards the atmosphere of the 'national security state' established at the start of the Cold War.⁴⁵

It must be acknowledged that some of the changing climate has nothing to do with 9/11. Huntington's strong warnings are about another aspect of foreign policy altogether, as the 'Hispanic challenge' largely relates to immigration, the Mexican border and the changing nature of US cities. It is revealing that he is less concerned with the very much smaller and more dispersed Muslim population. But whatever the sources of concern, US society as a whole is now sensitised to the problems associated with multiculturalism in a way that it never was during the passionate, but restricted, debates about affirmative action, political correctness and the like. What is more, the interplay between foreign policy and civil society is clear for all to see, and is being played out not in conventional left-right, or isolationist-interventionist, terms, but in those of religion, ethnicity and identity.

2. France

French foreign policy has a long history of being affected by domestic politics, and in its turn of producing occasional ferment inside society. The final years of the Third Republic were played out in a perpetual chain of external events impacting on internal weakness, while its successor suffered the same fate in 1958, after defeat in Indo-China, humiliation at Suez and crisis over Algeria.

Yet since General de Gaulle brought the Fifth Republic into being there has been a conscious effort to insulate foreign policy from the vagaries of domestic politics, with some success. The insulation worked in both directions so that French intellectuals, and the powerful French Communist Party, were the last Western Europeans to abandon Stalinism. And because foreign policy has remained the *domaine réservé* of the presidency (despite the latter being undermined by episodes of *cohabitation* and the reduction of the tenure from seven years to five) it has not been so much subject to the uncertainties of public debate as in other Western countries, even with the changes in society brought about by immigration. Given the traditionally assimilationist approach to multiculturalism, it is not then surprising that the four problems afflicting the United States seem less important in the French context.

For instance, French foreign policy seems barely troubled by the problem of partiality, or privileged access to certain ethnic lobbies (other kinds of lobbies, like oil interests, are another matter).⁴⁶ Those with links to ex-colonies have special access, but that is because *rayonnement* is seen as a strategic interest of the state. Nor is coherence a particular concern, at least in the sense of policy bouncing from one set of special interests to another. The executive is simply too strong, which imposes the opposite pathology on the country, of unresponsiveness. Its foreign policies benefit from a permissive domestic environment, but rarely reflect real debate. In principle this kind of gap in the democratic process could lead to social turmoil, if important groups felt that their legitimate international concerns were being excluded. Occasionally the Israel lobby in France has complained to this effect, but it has either not wished or not been able to exert strong pressure. On the other hand the more numerous Arab/Islamic communities, while suffering social exclusion, have not felt so moved by foreign policy issues, as France is still generally associated with pro-Arab policies and is the only major Western state seeking to 'soft balance' US power. Insofar as France is vulnerable to ethno-cultural tensions, therefore, they do not directly flow from foreign policy issues.

Yet there are still links, indirect but significant. In both 1991 and 2003 the very size of France's Islamic community made Presidents Mitterrand and Chirac cautious over the wars against Iraq.⁴⁷ Furthermore Algeria perpetually lurks in the background of French politics. Because France has been a major source of support for the anti-fundamentalist government in Algiers – fearing the proximity of an Iranian-style regime – the government has been all too aware of the prospect of reprisals at home.⁴⁸ That is why its security services have cooperated closely with those of Britain and the United States. The fear of a fifth column is ever-present. It is understood in Paris that opposition to the Iraq war does not confer immunity against terrorist attacks, and that France's assertively secular policies on such matters as the *hijab* could easily lead to

links between the internal and external enemies of the state. There has already been an incident in Iraq when kidnappers have demanded the withdrawal of the headscarf law in return for the lives of French hostages.

Other issues play subtly into this mix. French popular concerns about EU enlargement have roots in both fear for jobs and concerns about the size of the Muslim population being augmented. Since the French public had never been consulted on this issue, it took the first opportunity available to it by voting down the draft European Union Constitution, to the shock and dismay of the governing elite. The support which exists in the *Assemblée Nationale* for the Armenian cause is another way in which concern over Turkish entry into the EU, and thus also Islamic influence, is indirectly expressed.⁴⁹ It has certainly been exploited as such.⁵⁰

Thus despite the continuing strength of Republican assimilationism, and the relative freedom from domestic constraints, some fault-lines are beginning to open up in the relationship between the state, civil society and foreign policy. Nicolas Sarkozy has challenged what he calls the 'taboo' of the French President's monopoly of foreign policy-making, and has called for it to be open to normal political processes.⁵¹ The riots across France confirmed that the French establishment could not easily adapt to the changing nature of society, in which religion plays a larger part, that rich states are not immune from the problems of the developing world, and that the republican virtues have less appeal. Yet, as Olivier Roy has pointed out, this was no 'intifada of the *banlieues*'. There was 'a complete absence of Palestinian flags, references to the war in Iraq and elsewhere in the Muslim world, or even symbols of Islam'.⁵² Those who whistle during the *Marseillaise* have not yet made foreign policy a priority, or formed transnational alliances with those in their homelands, partly because of a repression in Algeria and Morocco themselves which is not entirely unconnected with the policies of the French state. But the potential is there. Given that the substance of French foreign policy, paradoxically like that of the USA, hovers between support for secular authoritarianism in Islamic states and a professed sympathy for the democratic expression of the Arab voice, it does risk discontent at home and abroad.

3. Britain

International events, and the government's response to them, have had a dramatic effect on community relations in Britain's multicultural society. One of the shared beliefs of Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair was that the United Kingdom should once again be a leading player in international politics. The consequence of this high profile has been to draw the attention of those domestic groups already sensitised to events outside their own borders (that is, largely ethnic and diasporic groups) to what the government has been doing in their name.

The wars in Iraq of 1991, 1998 and 2003, which aroused popular anger among Muslims across the world, have tended to overshadow the fact that the UK went to war to protect Muslim Kosovo in 1999, and continues to help secure the independence of largely Muslim Bosnia.⁵³ But impatience at Europe's initial passivity over Bosnia led some young British Muslims to help their co-religionists fight in Bosnia, and the

awareness of many more was heightened. To those already ill at ease in the Westernised society in which they have grown up subsequent British interventions in the Middle East felt like another dose of humiliation and imperialism. The invasion of Afghanistan, which gained widespread majority support in public opinion, was for many Muslims an unnecessary onslaught on innocent lives, as well as the illegitimate overthrow of one of the few regimes not acting as a tool of the West. When the same approach was taken in Iraq, against the wishes of the majority of European citizens of all faiths, the British government lost all chance of achieving a consensus behind its foreign policy. The years 2001–3 therefore magnified an existing, simmering discontent with British foreign policy on the part of Muslim citizens.

Taking the four problems which arise out of the encounter of foreign policy with a multicultural society, we see that Britain, unlike the United States, suffers less from the more prosaic problems and proportionately more from the dangerous end of the spectrum. Thus, British foreign policy is not much plagued by the problem of partiality, through the offering of special access, or vetoes, to particular interest-groups. Whereas there are complaints about special treatment in domestic multiculturalism, few have made this accusation in relation to external policy. More common is the view that policy has been formulated without proper sensitivity to domestic opinions, over Israel/Palestine as well as the wars. Although the Blair government has protested its even-handedness in relation to the Israel–Palestine conflict (as between India and Pakistan) it has steadily lost credibility with Muslims, compounding their frustration.

The second problem, of incoherence, also has little bite. Insofar as foreign policy in the Blair years has oscillated it is less through being pulled between different interests than because of uncertainty over substance. The most that can be said is that an awareness of the impact of major foreign policy decisions on an already fragile multicultural society has at times led the government to waver between stressing support for moderate Islam and warning of its determination to stand up to fundamentalism.

Moving to the more difficult aspects of the relationship between foreign policy and multiculturalism, there can be no doubt that social tensions in the UK have been exacerbated by the direction of the government's foreign policy. Decision-makers have conceded the point in private. The most important evidence is the leaked letter from Sir Michael Jay, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, to Sir Andrew Turnbull of the Cabinet Office, sent on 18 May 2004. Jay remarks, tellingly:

Experience of both Ministers and officials working in this area suggests that the scope of British foreign policy and the perception of its negative effect on Muslims globally plays a significant role in creating a feeling of anger and impotence amongst especially the younger generation of British Muslims. The concept of 'Ummah', ie that the Believers are one 'nation', has led to HMG's policies towards the Muslim world having a very personal resonance for young British Muslims, many of whom are taking on the burden both of the perceived injustices and of the responsibility of putting them right, but without the legitimate tools to do so.⁵⁴

This view has led the Foreign Office itself to become a promoter of transnationalism, by encouraging links between moderate Muslim communities in Britain and outside. Wisely, if extraordinarily, officials have decided to use civil society and its outreach rather than to fight it.

Not surprisingly, British Muslims share Sir Michael's view of the impact of foreign policy. In a survey of more than 450 Muslim students in further and higher education after the July 2005 bombings 62 per cent said that British foreign policy had played a 'major' or 'complete' part in leading to the attacks. More than a quarter said they felt a conflict between their loyalty to the UK and their loyalty to the *umma*.⁵⁵ A Sky News poll of the same period came out with a very similar finding.⁵⁶

It is possible that a generalised Muslim alienation accounts for this last view. But a year after the London bombings the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that British Muslims had a far more negative attitude towards the West than Muslims in other European countries, which suggests that the particularity of Britain's foreign policy has had some independent effect.⁵⁷ It is otherwise difficult to explain why in France, given the riots in heavily Muslim areas, only 28 per cent of French Muslims see a conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society, compared to 47 per cent of their British equivalents – and this despite the resentment towards assimilationist attitudes.⁵⁸ Factors like Guantánamo affect Muslims everywhere, but particularly those living in a country so closely associated with the policies of George W. Bush. As the Muslim Council of Britain has pointed out, the UK armed forces can hardly expect to recruit among Muslims in current circumstances.⁵⁹ The one-sided extradition treaty which the UK signed with the US in 2003, whereby the latter can demand extradition of British citizens without *prima facie* evidence, has also helped to radicalise opinion, specifically through the case of Babar Ahmad, a British Muslim detained for two years, appealing against extradition on a charge of assisting terrorists.⁶⁰ The US policies epitomised by Guantánamo have an extra-territorial dimension, as also illustrated by the controversy over 'rendition', and the unauthorised use of airports in Britain and elsewhere to refuel planes carrying terrorist suspects (usually Muslims) to incarceration in the United States.

Poll evidence shows that most Muslims have the same worries, over unemployment and the like, as other citizens. But they are particularly concerned about British foreign policy, some aspects of which they see as in direct conflict with their religion. The moral claims made by New Labour for its international posture sit uneasily with them, and invite claims of double standards. One civil servant argued that 'this isn't a conflict between Muslim values and British values; it's a conflict between an ethical foreign policy and an unethical one'.⁶¹

This pool of disaffection means that there is a greater possibility in Britain than in other European states of the most serious consequence of the collision between foreign policy and multiculturalism – terrorism. In August 2006, 36 Muslim associations and public figures addressed a letter to 10 Downing Street calling for a 'principled' foreign policy, and saying that foreign policy had made the UK a target for terrorism.⁶² This last is a difficult position to dispute, factually, although it was both paradoxical and unexpected that actions abroad should have led to terrorism

from within. Muslims have taken what legitimate avenues are open to them to protest over the war, joining in demonstrations, and switching electoral support to the Liberal Democrats and Respect, especially in constituencies where it might make a difference.⁶³ Yet for a small but significant minority the lack of government response to protest means that they feel justified in turning to violence – they have taken up arms against their own society, as a way of pressurising, or perhaps just punishing, the government. Their actions have in turn brought forth a powerful reaction from the state, with a subsequent heightening of intercommunal tensions.

We are thus in a situation where serious issues about loyalty and internal security are at stake on both ‘sides’, the terminology itself revealing a change in what has been a remarkably stable civil society given the great changes that have occurred in the last 30 years. This disturbed domestic context has occurred partly because of the substance of the issues contested and partly through the executive’s ability to ignore the democratic dimension of foreign policy-making. In Britain the executive has great powers in this area. As judges in the High Court observed when rejecting a demand for judicial support for the British residents being detained in Guantánamo, ‘Decisions affecting foreign policy are a forbidden area’.⁶⁴ This does not mean that the executive remains unpunished; apart from losses in the 2005 general election, Tony Blair’s personal position has been seriously undermined in his party and the country at large. Even when he leaves office, and/or British troops are withdrawn from Iraq, it is likely that the effects of the current polarisation will still be felt.⁶⁵

Part IV: Conclusions

It is evident that the three national models of multiculturalism examined here have all interacted with foreign policy in important but very different ways. The United States is now highly sensitised to the potential downside of multiculturalism, and has imposed a disproportionate internal security regime, given the fact that 9/11 was perpetrated by foreigners. It continues to have problems with partiality and incoherence in the making of foreign policy because of the activities of ethnic lobbies, but these are long-standing and have arguably been reduced – or at least put under the spotlight – by recent events. Fear and polarisation on all sides are the consequences of foreign and domestic policies becoming more entangled. Ironically the one area where social tensions have been increased through the interplay of multiculturalism and external factors has nothing to do with terrorism; the debate over the growing Hispanic population is fuelled by economic and cultural factors, and territorial contiguity with Mexico.

In France little has changed on the surface. The presidents of the Fifth Republic have not suffered much from problems of partiality and incoherence through lobbying over their foreign policies, and the post-9/11 period has seen no dramatic changes in this respect, or even in relation to social tension. The riots of 2005 were largely driven by feelings of deprivation and exclusion, and France has not suffered acts of terrorism since the metro bombs of 1995. Yet there are many indirect links

between international events and domestic issues of integration, as the referendum vote against the Draft EU Constitution clearly showed. It may not prove so easy in the future for the French state to insist on its clear ‘republican’ identity, as a new generation of politicians is beginning to understand, using a new language in relation to multiculturalism as they observe the conflicts elsewhere and heed the warning signs for their own fragile model of integration.⁶⁶

As for Britain, foreign policy has had a dramatic effect on domestic society, if not vice versa. Like the United States, and France to a lesser degree, the UK has suffered a serious terrorist attack, almost certainly connected to the way it behaves internationally.⁶⁷ This in turn has led to a powerful reaction on the part of the state. Like France, the UK focuses less on the partiality and incoherence associated with ethnic lobby influence in the US. Yet, unlike France, its foreign policy has connected to, and stirred up, serious domestic problems, which exist across the Channel but manifest themselves more indirectly.

Given the qualitatively new situation all three states now face, with ethno-religious groups more concerned about foreign policy, and with civil peace and issues of loyalty at stake, it is important to suggest a constructive way forward. The existing models, whether of multicultural diversity, pluralist integrationism or strict assimilationism, are evidently under great strain. Nor is there yet any ‘multiculturalist theory of foreign policy’; multiculturalists are pulled uneasily between the state and global civil society, hoping for some kind of synergy between multiculturalism at home and cosmopolitanism abroad. In practice we have little choice but to reconcile the state, its behaviour in the world and the multicultural dimension of domestic society. While some painful choices cannot be avoided between democratic citizenship and transnational ties, it would be wrong for the extreme to determine the norm.⁶⁸ Equally, because we should not allow any sub-group (whether Falklanders or Kashmiris – who lobbied Robin Cook relentlessly) to determine a foreign policy does not mean that we should ignore all particular representations, or debates over competing values – quite the reverse.⁶⁹

The following seven prescriptions are presented in the hope of starting a discussion on how to achieve a more sophisticated interplay between the fact of multiculturalism, a conception of the public interest in foreign policy, and the need for security, than has so far been demonstrated. They apply most particularly to the United Kingdom, my own country, but are also relevant to France and to the United States – indeed to any state with a multicultural society:

1. Any attacks on civil society, internally or externally derived, or actions intended to endanger the armed services wherever they are engaged, must be regarded as acts of insurgency, to be dealt with firmly – but equitably, and according to the principles of a society ruled by law. Emergency powers may be required to meet such an exceptional challenge, but they are likely to be counterproductive unless tightly limited in time and scope.
2. No group of any kind can expect to have a veto over national foreign policy, or to have their concerns predominate. Equally, decision-makers should not make

choices as if they were 'rational actors' engaged in a game of strategic chess, with consensual aims and a clear set of rules. Foreign policy is an inherently multi-purpose and multi-value activity.

3. Governments need to recognise that foreign policy cannot be separated from issues of domestic society, civil peace and identity. Accordingly they should take into account the competing values arising from social diversity. It should also be accepted that the traditional dichotomies of left–right, and realist–idealist hardly accommodate the range of views arising from cultural diversity.
4. Governments need to be sensitive to the disproportionate impact which foreign policies, as much as domestic, may have on particular parts of the community. Thus the idea of a 'vital interest', so important traditionally in foreign policy, must now be expanded so that it allows for the possibility that different sections of society will have different 'critical concerns'. Nor should it be assumed that, in their diversity, these critical concerns will cancel out, leaving a space for executive decision. A lofty disregard is as foolish as conceding special treatment. Rather, governments must ensure at the very least that they engage and debate with those passionate about foreign policy issues, as they do over petrol prices or the health service.
5. The general portfolio of a national foreign policy should thus reflect the full range of domestic concerns. Whatever the ultimate lines of policy which emerge from the democratic political process, there should be at least an engagement with the issues important to significant minorities – whether nuclear disarmament, the fate of the Palestinians, or businessmen affected by the US–UK extradition treaty. The neglect of minority concerns, such as exiled Algerians in the 1990s, can have disastrous results. Engagement means being willing to react to a group's concerns and at the least justifying why they should not be met. At best, it means reflecting the pluralism of society without sacrificing either the coherence of foreign policy or the national priorities which should ideally have been established by thorough debate in parliament and cabinet.
6. Indeed we need to encourage a much more extensive and effective debate about foreign policy issues across society – and not just those relating to multiculturalism. For too long, in Britain and France at least, foreign policy-making has been the preserve of a metropolitan elite, plus a co-opted set of favoured pressure-groups.⁷⁰ Public opinion needs to be drawn in, not least by giving it more constitutional pegs on which to hang debate, such as more powerful parliamentary committees and powers over the declaration of war. A healthy society would then provide opportunities for people to participate in such debates as citizens, and not only as members of a religious community, diaspora or privileged NGO.
7. War, and/or interventions in other countries, should be an absolute last resort, and not the ready instrument of political engineering. It may be needed for serious humanitarian purposes, as when the risk of mass slaughter seems high, but the destructive and mediatised nature of modern conflict means that the risks are very high, at home and abroad. In particular, to adapt the metaphor of the British Chief of Staff, General Dannatt, you do not 'kick the door in' of a house belonging

to some of your relatives, or at the very least not without careful thought and consultation.⁷¹

The two sets of debates examined in this article – on foreign policy, and on multiculturalism – began by running in parallel and mutual exclusion. This produced feelings of bewildered impotence when events led them to collide. The argument here has been that they should be brought systematically together. It is always possible that absent the current sharp controversies, domestic interest in foreign policy will once again subside. But there are structural reasons why democratic governments are unlikely to be permitted the free hand enjoyed by their predecessors. And when difficult issues arise it is vital that a clear understanding be reached of the interaction between the two sets of pressures, and some reconciliation sought of their respective needs. This is one of the most fundamental challenges facing modern democracies, and indeed many non-democracies.

Yet we need not be too pessimistic. In the United Kingdom we have in some ways been here before. In David Jones' great prose poem *In Parenthesis*, recounting life on the Western Front, he recalled:

My companions in the war were mostly Londoners with an admixture of Welshmen, so that the mind and folk-life of those two differing racial groups are an essential ingredient to my theme. Nothing could be more representative. These came from London. Those from Wales. Together they bore in their bodies the genuine tradition of the Island of Britain, from Bendigeid Vran to Jingle and Marie Lloyd. These were the children of Doll Tearsheet. Those are before Caractacus was . . . It was curious to watch them harnessed together . . . to watch them, oneself part of them, respond to the war landscape . . . the day by day in the wasteland.⁷²

If to names like Fluellen and Bardolph, which have echoed down the years of Shakespearean Britain, we can ultimately add those of Faruq and Shilpa, we shall have succeeded in meeting the challenge of integrating our society while simultaneously defending it, as we have done in the past. Let us hope only that the price will not prove so high.

Notes

- 1 I am most grateful to Ken Booth and his colleagues at Aberystwyth for the invitation to give the E. H. Carr Memorial Lecture, on which this article is based. I should also like to thank – for the help I have had in its writing – Ayla Göl, Duncan Bell, Helen Drake, Geoffrey Edwards, Georgios Evangelopoulos, Barbara Franz, Fred Halliday, Jonathan Haslam, Charles Jones, Andrew Linklater, Naveed Mohammed and Frank Rusciano. I also owe a debt to Bertrand Badie and his students at the Centre des Études des Relations Internationales in Paris, who provided a stimulating and hospitable audience for an earlier attempt to develop my ideas. Finally, I acknowledge with gratitude a grant from the British Academy in 2003 which made it possible for me to begin work on public opinion and international politics.
- 2 E. H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan, 1945), p. 7.

- 3 A question asked in 1937, and cited in Charles Jones, *E.H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 44.
- 4 Carr, *Nationalism and After*, p. 65. Here Carr was quoting from J. Maynard, author of books on Russia. See also p. 36, where he praises the multinational composition of Britain and the British Commonwealth: 'there is no name for the citizen of the entity known as "the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland"'.
- 5 One of the first pieces in the area is Shane Brighton, 'British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK Foreign Policy: "Integration" and "Cohesion" in and Beyond the State', *International Affairs*, 83(1), 2007, pp. 1–17.
- 6 On the complexities of the Dutch situation, see Ian Buruma's brilliant book, *Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo Van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006). The febrile atmosphere in the Netherlands preceded Van Gogh's death, being associated with the rise of the anti-immigration politician Pim Fortuyn, who was then himself assassinated, albeit by a psychotic vegan rather than an opponent of his policies on multiculturalism.
- 7 It was ironic that the real enemy within, the fascists, were able to organise themselves to take power unimpeded by any organised democratic action.
- 8 See Martin Ceadel, *Pacifism in Britain 1914–1945: The Defining of a Faith* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); Thomas Risse, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
- 9 The controversy has simmered for many years, but erupted spectacularly after the publication of 'The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy', by John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (Harvard University Working Paper RWP06-011, March 2006), published in abridged form as 'The Israel Lobby' in *The London Review of Books*, 23 March 2006. See also the authors' response to their early critics in 'Unrestricted Access', *Foreign Policy*, 155, 2006, pp. 57–8.
- 10 For good (if diverging) accounts of these various lobbies and their impact, see the writings of Yossi Shain and Tony Smith: Yossi Shain, 'Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy', *Political Science Quarterly*, 109(5), 1994–5, pp. 811–41; Yossi Shain, *Marketing the Democratic Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and their Homelands* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Tony Smith, *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of US Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
- 11 YouGov poll for the *Daily Telegraph* carried out between 15 and 22 July 2005. Available at: http://www.yougov.com/archives/pdf/TEL050101030_1.pdf. Thirteen per cent said they had 'a lot' of sympathy, and 11 per cent 'a little' with these feelings and motives. Only 6 per cent thought the attacks were justified, but in the days after 7 July it would have been difficult for anyone to admit to that view. Given that, the 24 per cent figure for 'sympathy' is remarkable.
- 12 Rosemary Foot, 'Torture over a Peremptory Norm in a Counter-Terrorist Era', *International Relations*, 20(2), 2006, pp. 131–51.
- 13 Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence* (London: Allen Lane, 2006), pp. 156–60; also interview in *The Guardian*, 18 February 2006.
- 14 Brian Barry, *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism* (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp. 22–3. It should be noted that Barry abhors the linguistic ugliness of 'multiculturality'. He notes the term, and takes the underlying distinction, from Charles Westin's 'Temporal and Spatial Aspects of Multiculturality', in Rainer Bauböck and John Rundell (eds), *Blurred Boundaries: Migration, Ethnicity, Citizenship* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998).
- 15 Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Bhikhu Parekh, 'Barry and the Dangers of Liberalism', in Paul Kelly (ed.), *Multiculturalism Reconsidered* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002); Michael Walzer, *Politics and Passion: Towards a More Egalitarian Liberalism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
- 16 John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
- 17 See Fred Halliday, 'Universality and Rights: The Challenge to Nationalism', in Umut Ozkirimli (ed.), *Nationalism and its Futures* (London: Palgrave, 2003).
- 18 See Desmond King, *Making Americans: Immigration, Race and the Origins of the Diverse Democracy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 90–1.
- 19 The statement is Toni Morrison's, cited in King, *Making Americans*, p. 40.
- 20 François Heisbourg and Jean-Luc Marret, *Le terrorisme en France aujourd'hui* (Paris: Éditions des Équateurs, 2006), pp. 85–90.
- 21 The generally accepted figure for many years was that 40 per cent of US citizens attended church weekly, as opposed to circa 2 per cent of French or British. Recent discussion has suggested that this is an over-representation, with 30 per cent nearer the true figure. See Andrew Walsh, 'Church,

- Lies and Polling Data', *Religion in the News*, 1(2), 1998, available at: http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/RIN%20Vol.1No.2/Vol1_No2.htm (accessed 25 April 2007).
- 22 Cited in King, *Making Americans*, pp. 270–1.
- 23 Samuel Huntington, 'The Hispanic Challenge', *Foreign Policy*, March–April 2004, available at: www.foreignpolicy.com. Also his book, *Who Are We? America's Great Debate* (London: Free Press, 2005).
- 24 Diane Ravitch, a New York educationist, cited in Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, *The Disuniting of America* (New York: Norton, 1992), p. 135.
- 25 Francis Fukuyama, 'Identity Crisis: Why We Shouldn't Worry About Mexican Immigration', *SLATE On-line Magazine*, available at: <http://www.slate.com/id/2101756/> (posted 4 June 2004).
- 26 Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 229.
- 27 France has even declared that the basic minority rights provision of Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights shall not apply to it. Patrick Thornberry, 'Human Rights and the Shaping of Loyalties', in Michael Waller and Andrew Linklater (eds), *Political Loyalty and the Nation-State* (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 93.
- 28 My understanding of the position of Muslims in France has been enhanced by reading Barbara Franz, 'Europe's Muslim Youth: An Inquiry into the Politics of Discrimination, Relative Deprivation and Identity Formation', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 18, 2007, pp. 89–112.
- 29 Jocelyne Cesari, *When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 78. Until the 1980s, the usual French way of characterising official policy was 'assimilationist'. From then on a conscious change of discourse saw 'integrationist' preferred. I am grateful to Helen Drake for this point.
- 30 On the headscarf controversy, see Barry, *Culture and Equality*, pp. 60–1, and Cesari, *When Islam and Democracy Meet*, pp. 72 and 78.
- 31 In French these terms are even stronger and more contemptuous: 'racaille' and 'karcheriser'.
- 32 Simon Kuper, 'Racism Lives On in France as World Cup Win Fades', *Financial Times*, 12–13 November 2005.
- 33 Barbara Franz, 'Europe's Muslim Youth'; data (collected in 1998–9) also from the National Centre for Languages, available at: <http://www.cilt.org.uk/faqs/langspoken.htm> (accessed 1 October 2006).
- 34 The *hijab*, which covers the hair, has been relatively uncontroversial in Britain, unlike France where its use was prohibited in schools. But there is always a line to be crossed in cultural disputes, and in Britain that has been represented by the *niqab*, or *burkha*, which covers the whole of a woman apart from her eyes. The Leader of the House of Commons, Jack Straw, deliberately started a debate on the *niqab* in 2006, probably with tacit cabinet approval. Despite his careful language and evident desire to be reasonable, his intervention led to much hostile comment, especially (but not exclusively) in the Muslim community. Nonetheless, opinion polls showed that he had majority support in asking women to show their faces in public meetings. The results of several tribunals on the issue of covering the face in the workplace provided support for Straw's position, and at the time of writing tensions over the issue have subsided.
- 35 The phrase 'parallel lives' was used by the Conservative leader David Cameron in his speech to the annual party conference on 4 October 2006, to describe the existence of separate 'Muslim ghettos' and the inability (or unwillingness) of different parts of British society to mix. In this he was referring to the Cattle Report into the riots in some northern cities in 2001, which talked about many communities living 'parallel lives'. Cameron's speech is available at: <http://politics.guardian.co.uk/conservativepartyconference2006/story/0,,1887540,00.html> (accessed 7 October 2006).
- 36 Shain, *Marketing the US Creed Abroad*, e.g. pp. x and 199–205.
- 37 Smith, *Foreign Attachments*; Mearsheimer and Walt, 'The Israel Lobby', pp. 6–7. 'For the most part, the individuals and groups that comprise it are only doing what other special interest groups do, but doing it very much better. By contrast, pro-Arab interest groups, in so far as they exist at all, are weak.'
- 38 Just as it is often argued that Ahmad Chalabi, leading the Iraqi National Congress and encouraged by his Pentagon contacts, helped to sway the decision for war itself, with his wrong intelligence about weapons of mass destruction. See Helen Thomas, 'Iraqi Exile Achieves his Goal', available at: <http://www.commondreams.org/views/04/0302-06.htm> (posted 2 March 2004).
- 39 Smith, *Foreign Attachments*, p. 44.
- 40 Shain, *Marketing the US Creed Abroad*, pp. 198, 207–8.
- 41 James Schlesinger, 'Fragmentation and Hubris: A Shaky Basis for US Leadership', *National Interest*, 49, 1997, available at: <http://www.nationalinterest.org/general.aspx?id=92&id2=10208> (accessed

- April 2007); Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Erosion of US National Interests', *Foreign Affairs*, 76(5), 1997, pp. 28–49, both cited in Tony Smith, *Foreign Attachments*, pp. 44–6. Smith discusses Madison on pp. 5–6, and 32–3.
- 42 Peter Riddell, *Hug Them Close: Blair, Clinton, Bush and the 'Special Relationship'* (London: Politico's Publishing, 2004). The phrase 'hug them close' was apparently coined by one of Tony Blair's senior advisers to describe policy towards the US.
- 43 Michael Walzer, *What it Means to be an American* (New York: Marsilio, 1992), cited in Tony Smith, *Foreign Attachments*, p. 137.
- 44 Michael Walzer, *Politics and Passion: Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 42. The view he was contesting was that of Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr in the latter's *The Disuniting of America*.
- 45 On the concept of the national security state, see Michael H. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
- 46 David Styan, *France and Iraq: Oil, Arms and French Policy-Making in the Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006).
- 47 France led the peace-making effort in 1990–1, but then finally joined the war to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Its participation led to protests at home by the 'beurs' (young Frenchmen of Maghrebian parents), and antagonism towards them in turn. See Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, 'Immigrants as Political Actors in France', in Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Martin Schain (eds), *The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe* (London: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 104. Yet see also Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, (eds), *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2006), pp. 219–20. Laurence and Vaisse argue that the opposition to the war in 1991 came from the left, with Muslims not playing a distinctive part.
- 48 See the 2006 preface to Alistair Horne's indispensable *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962*, 3rd edn (New York: New York Review of Books, 2006).
- 49 The Armenian issue became even more salient in France with the passing of a bill in the Assemblée in 2006 making it an offence to deny the Armenian genocide, an act which has predictably caused outrage in Turkey.
- 50 President Chirac visited Armenia at the end of September 2006 and confirmed that Turkey should accept the Armenian genocide before entering the EU. He never visited Turkey.
- 51 'Nicolas Sarkozy's attaque au "domaine réservé" du chef de l'état', *Le Monde*, 6 October 2006.
- 52 Olivier Roy, 'Foreword', in Laurence and Vaisse, *Integrating Islam*, p. xi.
- 53 The apparent betrayal of Bosnia by Britain in 1993–5, when opposition to the 'lift and strike' policy advocated in Washington made possible massacres like that at Srebrenica, shaped the image of British policy held by many Muslims. See Brendan Simms, *Britain's Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia* (London: Penguin, 2002).
- 54 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Sir Michael Jay to Sir Andrew Turnbull, 18 May 2004. Released on the website of *The Guardian*: <http://politics.guardian.co.uk/foi/images/0,9069,1558170,00.html> (accessed 9 February 2007).
- 55 The survey was by the Federation of Student Islamic Societies, 'Muslims Admit Loyalty Conflict', *Times Educational Supplement*, 30 September 2005.
- 56 Sky News poll of UK Muslims, fieldwork on 20–1 July 2005, conducted by Communicate Research, available at: <http://www.communicateresearch.com/poll.php?id=61> (accessed 9 February 2007).
- 57 'The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other', pp. 11–17. The survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Project was conducted (by telephone) in 13 countries, including the United States, from 31 March to 14 May 2006. The sample in Britain was 902 people, with a Muslim oversample of 412. Available at: <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/253.pdf> (accessed 9 February 2007).
- 58 'The Great Divide', p. 4.
- 59 See 'Muslim Soldier's Family Condemn "Terrorist" Claims', *The Guardian*, 5 July 2006, about the hostile reactions among some British Muslims to news that one of their number, serving in Afghanistan with the Intelligence Corps, had been killed. Subsequently, in February 2007, arrests were made in Birmingham of individuals who, it was alleged, had been plotting to seize and execute 'collaborationist' British Muslims.
- 60 Khalida Yusif, *A Counter-Productive Extradition Policy – The Effect of the Babar Ahmad Case in Radicalising Muslims in Britain*, available at: www.freebabarahmad.com (accessed August 2006).
- 61 Ashraf Miah, quoted in 'Muslim Anger: The Real Story', *The Observer*, 20 August 2006.

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- 62 'Muslim Leaders Want UK to Adopt "Principled" Foreign Policy', available at: <http://www.arabicnews.com> (accessed 15 August 2006). 'Muslim Leaders Say Foreign Policy Makes UK a Target', *The Guardian*, 12 August 2006. This kind of reaction, as Naveed Mohammed has pointed out to me, has led to the government privileging organisations such as the Sufi Muslim Council, which dispute the key role of foreign policy in creating alienation.
- 63 On the electoral consequences in the UK of Muslim concerns about foreign policy, see the article by Rob Blackhurst of the Foreign Policy Centre (a think-tank closely associated with New Labour), 'A New Force in British Politics', *New Statesman*, 26 July 2004.
- 64 'Judges Powerless over Detainees at Guantánamo', *The Guardian*, 5 May 2006.
- 65 As suggested by the results of a poll which showed that 37 per cent of Muslims aged between 17 and 24 would prefer to live under sharia law rather than British law, as opposed to 17 per cent of those over 55. The large proportion of 86 per cent said that religion was the most important thing in their lives. Poll conducted by Populus for conservative think-tank Policy Exchange. See Munira Mirza, Abi Senthilkunnaran and Zein Ta'far, *Living Apart Together* (Policy Exchange, 2007), available at: <http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/> (accessed 17 March 2007).
- 66 Even Nicolas Sarkozy has begun to talk of the need for 'positive discrimination' – just as his British counterparts are becoming disenchanted with multiculturalism. *International Herald Tribune*, 25 November 2005.
- 67 The metro bombs in Paris in 1995 were probably motivated by anger at French support for the government in Algiers which had cancelled the Islamist election victory four years earlier.
- 68 As Tony Smith has argued; see *Foreign Attachments*, p. 143.
- 69 I owe the information on the Kashmir lobby to Fred Halliday.
- 70 Even a government minister, Harriet Harman, said recently: '[Foreign policy] has come to symbolise the government not listening, just doing things.' 'Let the Public Shape Policy, Says Harman', *The Guardian*, 23 September 2006.
- 71 'We Must Not "Break" Army, Warns Top General After Triggering Iraq Storm', *The Guardian*, 14 October 2006. General Dannatt actually said in his original interview in the *Daily Mail* (12 October 2006) that 'we are in a Muslim country and Muslims' views of foreigners in their country are quite clear. As a foreigner you can be welcomed by being invited in a country, but we weren't invited certainly by those in Iraq at the time. The military campaign we fought in 2003 effectively kicked the door in.'
- 72 David Jones, *In Parenthesis: seinnyessit e gledyfym penn mameu* (London: Faber and Faber, 1963), p. x.