



Post-Hegemonic Global Governance

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INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained a privileged position in global politics. In that time, the United States has been instrumental in the development of a series of global liberal and neo-liberal institutions, rules, and practices designed to organize and manage global political, military, and economic affairs. But that system of global governance and management is changing. Today, the international system is in a period of significant transition with the (relative) decline of U.S. power and influence, a series of significant domestic and international economic crises across advanced democracies, the rise of a still-authoritarian China, the emergence of unpredictable regime changes in the Middle East, the rise of regional tensions in South Asia and East Asia, natural resource dependence and civil strife in Africa, the spread of crime and drug trade in the Americas, the shift in the unifying beliefs underlying the post war order, and a looming set of global environmental, resource, and demographic challenges.

We are now entering a profound era of uncertainty. Without the prospect of U.S. hegemonic leadership and with a declining consensus about guiding principles and policies, and in light of the substantial growth and influence of international institutions and non-state actors, it is now widely accepted that international rule making today is more complex than ever. We now live in a world with multiple overlapping actors and regimes that do not conform to a homogeneous set of shared rules backed by enforcement mechanisms.

To gain a better understanding of the uncertainty and complexity associated with the new global environment, the Five College International Relations Program (consisting of International Relations faculty from the University of Massachusetts Amherst and Smith, Mount Holyoke, Amherst, and Hampshire Colleges) has been conducting a two-year research colloquium to investigate a series of critical issues on global governance and international security in the coming decade. The colloquium has been hosting a series of senior scholars to examine the macro-level questions on this set of topics from a range of theoretical and methodological perspectives.

As part of this effort, the colloquium partnered with the group of 17 International Relations scholars who participated in ITD's Study of the U.S. National Security Policymaking Institute sponsored by the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs from January 28 to March 10, 2012. Participants came from Argentina, Armenia, Cambodia, Chile, China, Ecuador, Greece, India, Indonesia Japan, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Russia, Sierra Leone, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine. The participants spent the first four weeks of their academic residency on the Amherst College campus and ITD facilities in Amherst. They also traveled to Harvard University and the Council of Foreign Relations in New York. During the last two weeks of the program, the group traveled to San Diego (University of California at San Diego) and Washington D.C. for more lectures. In total, 18 faculty members from the Five Colleges offered lectures to the group.

We asked the global scholars to write essays and present views from their own regional focus or areas of substantive expertise on the broad questions associated with post-hegemonic global governance. The essays that follow represent their views and provide a geographically and theoretically diverse set of perspectives.

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TOPIC GROUP 1

THEORETICAL

The authors in this section use a theoretical approach to help us better comprehend the conceptual issues in international relations and global security. Ekaterina Arkhipova presents us with the challenge of maintaining international coherence within the current drive toward greater global governance. Ashlee Godwin offers a provocative perspective on the frequently quoted “special relationship” between the UK and the US. She suggests a redefinition of the concept of leadership in a post-hegemonic world. Konstantinos Koliopoulos presents the Hellenistic experience as a counterbalance to the argument that the world is trending toward fewer and fewer global conflicts. Similarly, in her essay Carla Alvarez Velasco questions Joshua Goldstein’s premise that armed conflict is actually declining worldwide? Phyu Yamin Myat challenges us to consider the viability of global governance in a post-hegemonic world. In his well-crafted essay, Yusuke Dan lays out the potential and pitfalls of neo-trusteeship and privatization in post-hegemonic global governance.



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Coherence as a Challenge to a Global Government

The main problem that faces every government is coherence. The more area it manages the more problems it faces because of their diversity. The management theory says the more sections the system has the more potential losses it faces.

The development of International Law at the end of the XX-the-beginning the XXI-centuries encouraged the appearance of the idea of a universal global government, which could lead all societies and manage international conflicts. But there are different approaches to its interpretation.

We can divide them into two groups.

1. The representatives of the first one following the experience of the UN and developing it through the practices of the EU, consider the global government as a sum of representatives. Although in some aspects EU reached a great success, at least the economic cooperation

was very improved, still some EU practices demonstrate the difficulty of reaching any agreement in some special issues, particularly if they concern security. For instance, the consequences of the so-called “Arab Spring” encouraged the wish of some European countries to reduce their border transparency. However they could not achieve any common resolution as they were afraid of losing control. So, they could defend their interests, but played a lone hand. That is why I believe that in the contemporary world with collapsing (dividing) nations it is impossible to provide the complete representation.

The complicated procedure of decision-making, worked out by the UN, protracts concrete implementations even in emergence situations. By the way, the UN itself became the hostage of monitoring the situation closely: in order to be familiar with local societies the organization became over-bureaucratized and was involved in a group of scandals connected with the loss of coherence. The work of development projects in poor countries shows the consistent problems with controlling the money redistribution.

2. The second group concentrates on the activity of a dominating superpower alone or in cooperation with alliances. Although we can see in practice, the allies' influence upon the process of decision-making is considerably limited. And here we came to the question about the coherence again. It is difficult to make conditions for interactive work and for consideration all the participants' interests in the conditions of one power (nation, group)

domination (see Wallerstein¹). The leader usually is not as much interested in cooperation, as it is in the policy implementation. Being familiar with the decision-making process within the UN, any strong leader cannot allow itself the continuous discussion. This logic encouraged the policy of G. W. Bush's unilateralism.

The similarities we can find even in the period of Cold War, when the leader in one block implemented its policy regardless the interests of its allies. As an outcome of such an activity, for instance the Soviet Union was obliged to use military support for its influence upon Hungary and other allies. Such relations caused discontent with the leader's activity and fostered at least passive resistance with listless performance on any kind of decision if not an active resistance.

Thereby, two approaches demonstrate "coherence" as the Achilles' heel of any universal government.

Obviously, any superpower seeks world supremacy, and according to Morgentau's principles tends to become a leader. In some periods the leader can feel the burden and decide to share some authority, but not for a long time. The structure of relations emerged under conditions of one dominating force has a trend to become an empire. As it happened with empires, the coherence problem will challenge everyone. Should they draw on imperials' experience? Yes and no.

In the 19-th century many empires controlled huge areas as global governments tend to do and were successful during the long period. However, they could not resist nationalism when it appeared in their suburbs. It seems that they lost the very feeling of their inhabitants, although the empire regimes tried to give the local mono-ethnic societies more autonomous rights.

Empires (Austro-Hungarian, Great Britain, Russian and later Soviet) created the system of self-governance. They attracted the most experienced local intellectuals (who were educated usually at the center of empire or at least were the best students in the imperial educational institutions in removed areas; this educational system created more loyalty for uniting culture) and appointed them as local authorities. This system allowed the central power to support security and safety within the area, because the local inhabitants used the community law, order, for their everyday life until they went out the local borders. The local authorities were devoted to the imperial power until their demands corresponded to the central policy.

The main imperials fault was the limitation of their career expectations. The local intellectuals usually did not have an opportunity to develop their careers in the center of an empire with a higher salary and more respect, that is why they became ethno-national leaders. Furthermore, those "must-be-loyal" individuals did not have an opportunity to bring the local problems, expectations, and ideas to the center of the empire for a discussion and possible

¹Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) *the Modern World-System*, New York, Academic Press, pp. 347-57

resolution. It was the main lack of coherence for empires, which led to their collapse. The imperial authorities tried to reduce the social non-coherence to the prejudice of political, juridical and institutional ones.

After Wilson's 14 points, big countries were divided even more than they expected. Mostly those disintegrating processes were encouraged by their neighbors, expecting to divide and rule. But the process was not over after World War II (secessionism movements were supported by the USSR as national democratic movements), and was aggravated at the end of the XX-the century (also receiving the support from outside). Obviously, the new standards of international law determined the disintegration process. Specifically the right of nations to self-determination led to the rise of new unrecognized states. The idea of humanitarian intervention adds fuel to the fire. But even after any recognition, those new states have no guarantees for their territorial integrity (as happened in Serbia, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and so on). States still have a tendency to divide into fractals.

A hundred years after Wilson's 14 points, governments face problems similar to the empires' problems: ethnic enthusiasm demonstrated in interethnic conflicts, the border disputes following those conflicts do not allow recognized countries to feel free with their smaller ethnic groups.

Obviously this trend was complicated by the main contemporary global trend: migration, which led to the confusion of cultures with different backgrounds. The influence of

migration in perception of nationality both in newly-arrived and host societies is also increasing; the protest movements of migrant descendants in the second and third generations against rules issued by mono-national groups became very strong. The roots of those protest activities seem to be not ethnic, but social.

The accepting governments of developed democracies in Europe were more concerned about the security than the comfortable feelings of the permanent residents, considering newcomers as a temporary labor force. They missed the appearance of second and even third generations, neglecting the very idea of their presence. Germany did not promise too much: guest workers were not German, but still they settled here, being not accepted. In France, newcomers are considered French after proving his/her good knowledge of the French language and culture. Nevertheless those ethnic groups were not fully included into the whole society: they were concentrated in poor suburbs and ignored by their governments, similar to the experience of the German descendants of guest-workers. As we can see the process, the European governments started to consider the social programs for migrants integrating or adapting only at the end of the XX-th century. It means that this issue has not been in the agenda for a very long period. Governments have ignored the problems of migration. Their protest actions became the consequence of such an exception. As a result some European governments decided not to manage immigration communities but to exile those

peoples. This approach was applied towards a group of Gypsies in France, Turk-Meskhetians in post-soviet area and others. It demonstrates not only the wish to neglect the problem, but also the strong desire to dissociate different migrant groups, and label them as “other” from the domestic societies.

We can see that those accepting communities usually suffer from the lack of coherence, they do not involve the new groups into their democratic system and consider them as the “other”, a temporary disturbance. The new coming societies usually do not have their own representatives, they face the problems of supporting their cultural background, the accepting societies do not allow any cultural changes in their own life. For instance, as the issue about the clothes of Muslim groups, their family patterns, arose in European countries, their governments denied any compromises.

The problem might be complicated with the phenomena of “failed” and “weak” states, when state authorities cannot control some part of their country. I believe, the discourse of “failed” and “weak” states is often considered as a good reason to interfere into the domestic policy by stronger states, but I cannot deny this trend. It happens usually in the corrupted systems, in which governments also lost the connection with suburbs.

We can mark out four reasons for non-coherence: social, political, juridical and institutional.

Once small societies even in successful countries lose the connection with the local government, how can a universal government

take into account the interest of small groups? In this meaning, can we consider the very idea of a universal government as an empire replication and how can a global government manage this challenge?

Why do I apply the state level issues for the level of a universal government? The universal government tends to universalize those social trends and will meet the same problems.

In this meaning the second approach to the global governance, as a leading superpower, rules out the social development for a person, demonstrates the strong neglect of the lower levels’ interests. Thus the conflict of interests of different levels arises. Obviously, the first approach to the universal government seems to be better, but not the best, as it includes some interaction and institutional coherence.

Thus, the system which tends to be universal is intended to create the opportunities for social improvement which must include the education in human terrain. Also this system must provide for interaction between different levels as well as the possibility for the lower levels to establish the rules for their societies, but they have to be recognized outside. This most difficult object can only be achieved within a tolerant educational system so that every person could have the possibility to see and to understand the “other”. It means that social non-coherence must be reduced with social activities, and Internet social networks now give an opportunity for progress in this area. By the way that the heads of some governments have created their personal accounts, it could inspire some citizens to bring their local

problems to the top of power. But in no one can spend all his/her time looking through all the claims. Nevertheless we have to admit that the blogosphere can reduce social and political non-coherence.

The institutional coherence is the object of management researches. It can be reached within the system of a transparent control. But every time we increase our control, the effectiveness dramatically declines.

The most difficult task is to reduce the juridical non-coherence. Ungoverned areas can be found not only in unsuccessful states but even within developed democracies (i.e. Chinatowns, ghettos and so on). In order to re-establish the state control over those territories some governments resort to the use the power. It is not the best, but at least the most effective way.

Obviously the social non-coherence involves step-by-step political, institutional and juridical problems. In order to resist them any government should provide complex affairs in those fields.



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The United Kingdom in the 'Post-Hegemonic' World: Redefining 'Leadership'

The international order has already been reshaped for a new century ... Perhaps, the argument goes, these [emerging] nations represent the future, and the time for our leadership has passed.

That argument is wrong. The time for our leadership is now.

President Obama's speech to the MPs gathered in Westminster Hall during his May 2011 state visit to London¹ ticked all of the conventional diplomatic boxes, with liberal reference to the 'special relationship' between the United States and United Kingdom, their 'joint leadership', shared values and unity of beliefs, and unwavering courage at a time of mutual peril seventy years ago; and he was careful to cast the UK in a leading role in his vision for the future, a principal actor alongside the world's pre-eminent power.

¹ *The White House*, 'Remarks by the President to Parliament in London, United Kingdom', 25 May 2011.

Yet the most significant phrase amongst the president's judicious rhetoric went largely unnoticed by UK commentators: 'The international order has already been reshaped for a new century.'

The notion of a 'post-hegemonic' world which will witness the 'decline of the US', as nations such as India, Brazil and China in particular rise, has certainly gained significant traction, prompting fear that, in this new international order in which the US will have to compete for influence and power for the first time in decades, the global governance institutions created by the dominant players of the 1940s and 50s may be paralysed at best, and rejected outright by the 'emerging' nations at worst.

However, the label 'post-hegemonic' is unhelpful in considering the effects of 'the rise of the rest': first, it does not accurately reflect the extent to which US influence was limited by the complexities of international affairs in the last two decades, with perhaps the only truly 'hegemonic' act being the US liberation of Kuwait in 1991; secondly, the term is too sweeping to allow for any nuanced understanding of what this shift in world order may look like and its potential impact on global governance. Certainly, China and other nations are rising, and of course this means that the landscape of international influence will adjust accordingly. Yet this will not mean that the US will become ineffective or its leadership will be rejected. It will still wield a formidable combination of hard and soft power which will continue to attract and persuade other nations

for some time to come. Therefore, an evaluation of this changing world should consider the *rise* of China and others rather than the *decline* of the US, which will be relative and slow; not absolute.

The Changing International Landscape

It seems unlikely, however, that this rise of the rest will significantly or adversely affect the global governance institutions such as the UN (at worst, the composition of the Security Council will need to be updated sooner rather than later to better reflect the broader dispersal of power – perhaps with India and Brazil as new permanent members or more frequent rotation of temporary members). This is likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future for two reasons: the US will continue in its role as a dominant superpower, with all of the opportunities and responsibilities that entails; moreover, the emerging nations are already invested to a certain extent in the international system as it stands. China, for example, already votes, and vetoes, according to its national interests. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that the international system will continue to work as intended for the time being, allowing for action only when there is a certain level of consensus.

This may, however, result in more frequent deadlock in the UNSC, similar to that experienced during the Cold War, as national interests diversify and ‘new’ powers become more assertive. It is likely that negotiations will be more protracted and sometimes the international community will simply have to

accept that there is insufficient agreement to take action (as is the case with the Syrian problem at the time of writing). It follows, then, that the US and its allies will need to find new ways of bringing to pressure to bear in order to avoid extended paralysis and to ensure effective global governance which responds to their interests.

Two solutions to this issue present themselves: the establishment of more bilateral and multilateral agreements to create a greater convergence of national interests and increase the likelihood of international consensus; and a greater emphasis on regional groups to legitimise action – the proactive support of the Arab League was thought to be crucial in dissuading China and Russia from vetoing UNSCR 1973, for example.

The Resilient Relationship

So, what does this changing world order mean for the UK? Has the time for its leadership passed or does it still have a significant role to play, as President Obama suggested? Of course, to remain an influential player the UK will need to address its own relative decline. However, equally importantly, the UK will also need to address the prospect that, as the US seeks to form new partnerships to counter the perceived challenge to its hegemony, the once uniquely ‘special’ relationship will, in some ways, become less special.

The Obama administration’s first national security strategy indicates that, while there is still room for ‘old’ alliances, the United States’

gaze has been drawn eastwards away from Europe and towards a rising Asia spearheaded by China and India, in a world that is now decidedly post-Cold War.² Of course, the actual outcome of this policy of 'pivoting' towards Asia should not be pre-judged, nor its success taken for granted; as Kori Schake points out, the US has had little success so far in encouraging co-operation among its Asian allies, while it has failed to persuade Japan and Guam, for example, to keep or expand US bases on their territory.³ Similarly, the impact of the attendant 'turn away' from Europe may not be as drastic as feared, because it is not, in many ways, a major departure from the status quo. Indeed, the notion that after 1945 the US was entirely focused on Europe as the Cold War's central battleground is something of a myth. The US may have based significant numbers of troops along the continental fault-line for more than half a century, but its role there was, ultimately, passive; its active focus was the flashpoints where the Cold War was fought by proxy, primarily in Africa and Asia.

In gauging the likely impact of the 'pivot' policy on the UK more specifically, it is important to acknowledge the longevity and resilience of the so-called 'special relationship', which has withstood such significant disruptions as the Suez Crisis over the decades. The outdated rhetoric about the 'special' nature of the relationship does reflect a friendship rooted firmly in shared experiences, values, culture

and language; and at its core – and the source of its resilience – is a natural and uniquely close security alliance, based on common national interests and international outlooks, shored up by business and trade ties. The key point, as noted by Foreign Secretary William Hague, is that 'Today it is impossible to imagine a mortal threat to each other's security that we would not face together'.⁴ Even though the US has the military capability to fight alone, in many cases it prefers to have its closest military ally alongside it, and it is primarily because the US and UK 'stand together' and 'bleed together'⁵ that the relationship endures.

Furthermore, this collaborative culture is resolutely entrenched in both countries' governmental bureaucracies: the UK remains the only nation with which the US shares nuclear design information; the two countries' military and intelligence communities have a remarkably open and frequent exchange of sensitive information; while British government officials enjoy much greater and more ready access to their US counterparts. Former Prime Minister John Major's account of visit to Washington in September 2001 underlines the closeness of this security relationship: staying at the British embassy, he witnessed many in the British intelligence hierarchy arriving hours after the 9/11 attacks to brief and consult with their US colleagues.⁶ Clearly, this collaboration is unlikely to be unravelled entirely by the

² *The White House*, 'U.S. National Security Strategy 2010', 1 May 2010.

³ Kori Schake, 'US retrenchment is right and overdue', in Tomas Valasek (ed.), 'All alone? What US retrenchment means for Europe and NATO', Center for European Reform, March 2012.

⁴ Nile Gardiner, 'Mind the Gap: Is the Relationship Still Special?', *World Affairs Journal* (March/April 2011).

⁵ President Obama cited in Nicholas Watt, 'Barack Obama: UK-US alliance one of the greatest ever known', *Guardian*, 14 March 2012.

⁶ John Major, 'America, Britain and Europe: An Evolving Relationship', speech given at Chatham House, London, 10 November 2011.

proposed US pivot to Asia. Its fundamental nature does not change, even if its significance ebbs and flows with US administrations and UK governments, and with the evolution of policy.⁷ Nevertheless, the declaration of 'America's Pacific Century' does pose problems for the UK, which in recent years has come to define its role within the global system almost entirely in relation to the US. In the last decade in particular, labouring under its self-appointed function as the 'transatlantic bridge' between NATO's North American and European members, the UK has tied its fortunes to those of the global superpower so strongly that even when it became clear such support would cost it dear in terms of international legitimacy and credibility. However, with the US' focus drawn away from the Atlantic, it may well be that the UK is no longer among its first points of reference in international issues.

Therefore, the UK finds itself in a 'strategic moment' at a time when the world is characterised by great uncertainty, both geopolitical and economic; when the intimacy of its longstanding alliance with the US is not guaranteed; and – more broadly, but still of great import to the UK – when US commitment to NATO is wavering. Given this complex set of challenges, the critical question for the UK is how it can best maintain its position of global leadership.

⁷ The apparent importance of the relationship has fluctuated significantly even during Obama's presidency. In the first seventeen months, Obama mentioned the UK eight times in key policy statements, speeches and media interviews – remarkably infrequently in comparison with China (fifty-eight), India (forty-six), Germany (twenty-five) and Brazil (sixteen). Citing these figures, Nile Gardiner noted that Obama's initial aversion towards 'old' alliances, including those with the UK and Israel, has since been reversed in favour of alliance-building. See Nile Gardiner, 'Mind the Gap: Is the Relationship Still Special?'

Staying at the Top Table

The UK should seize this strategic moment as an opportunity to fundamentally reorient its foreign policy. It cannot sustain its relative influence as other nations rise simply because it is a nuclear power, has a comparatively advanced military, and certainly not because it was once a 'great power'. Only by forging a different role for itself within the global system, by extending its hand to the emerging powers, as well as continuing its work to strengthen NATO, will the UK be able to justify its position at the top table of the international system in the long term, especially should these trends continue apace.

Of course, this should not preclude maintaining the alliance with the US, which will remain a global superpower even if its economy is eventually surpassed by that of China. Even if the relative importance of the transatlantic relationship declines, however temporarily, the UK can maintain a level of intimacy by working to uphold shared national interests, promoting nuclear non-proliferation and free trade, and by being a candid friend whenever required – when the US withdrew its funding from UNESCO for accepting Palestinian membership in October 2011, for instance. Likewise, there is scope to facilitate US interests east of Suez, perhaps by developing a stronger relationship with India – to influence the key future dynamic in Asia, the Sino-Indian relationship – or by helping to hold down US security interests in the Gulf through

established relationships in the region.⁸ Such measures would strengthen the UK-US alliance in more practical and realistic ways, thereby going beyond the rhetoric to prove that this relationship is truly 'essential' – the description of choice since President Obama's 2011 visit to London⁹ – not just to the UK but also to the US, and not just because of established security ties.

Yet the UK must be careful to respond to the changing world on its own terms. If it is to strengthen its influence, the UK must become a reliable ally of countries other than the US, especially of the emerging nations, and a dependable leader of NATO. It must take this opportunity to carve out an identity which is more distinct from that of the US and which more accurately reflects its own strengths and capabilities.

Negotiator and Counterweight

It is not inevitable that the UK, like other former 'great powers' in prolonged relative decline, such as France, will be relegated in international affairs as other powers rise. Instead, these 'middle' powers can play the crucial role of facilitator and diplomatic mediator, both within and outside of institutions such as the UN, thereby maintaining their status as a 'force for good' in the world and proving themselves essential to global governance.

As acknowledged by John Major, 'embedded in [the UK's] national character is a gift for diplomacy. We should use it, encourage it, enhance it – both for trade and political purposes.'¹⁰ The UK should seek to create a much broader network of strong relationships, through bilateral and multilateral partnerships and co-operation in security and defence, trade and industry, for example. By more closely and formally aligning its national interests with those of other countries, the UK can develop leadership based on restored legitimacy and friendships that form the basis of coalitions at the international level, including within the UN and NATO. This reverses the order of priorities defined in the recent SDSR, which listed the 'pre-eminent' relationship with the US above the development of 'new models of practical bilateral and security cooperation with a range of allies and partners', 'an effective and reformed United Nations', and the affirmation of 'NATO as the bedrock of our defence'.¹¹

The UK should embrace the opportunity, presented by the rise of the rest, to facilitate the management of the international order and to deploy the soft power, historic knowledge and niche abilities which play to its strengths. The diplomatic efforts of the US are too often overshadowed by the perceived threat of its military might, or undermined by its image as the hegemon policing the world. In this context, the UK could offer an alternative diplomatic option – lower in profile, less pressured and

⁸ Michael Clarke, 'The United Kingdom's Strategic Moment', in Michael Codner and Michael Clarke (eds.), *A Question of Security* (London: RUSI, 2011), p. 16.

⁹ *The White House*, 'Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom in Joint Press Conference in London, United Kingdom', 25 May 2011.

¹⁰ John Major, 'America, Britain and Europe: An Evolving Relationship'.

¹¹ HM Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: Strategic Defence and Security Review* (London: The Stationery Office, October 2010), p. 59.

more sensitive to complexities – to nations which do not wish to partner more directly with the US. Not only would this bolster the UK's international standing, but it would also complement the work done by the US and help to mitigate the superpower's isolation.

Restoring Credibility, Repairing Relationships

The UK's reputation and relationships have suffered in many quarters of the world as a result of its willing association with US policies in the Middle East in the last decade. Although the UK previously provided a counterweight to US policy, and a connection between US, EU and its own diplomatic efforts to advance the Israel-Palestine peace process, its reputation in the region foundered dramatically after the invasion of Iraq in 2003.¹²

For example, the prevailing view in a 2006 survey of Egyptian intellectuals and columnists was that 'the British decision to join the US invasion of Iraq was based on a desire to please the Americans and join in the exploitation of Iraqi oil resources'. In polls conducted by the University of Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies in Egypt and Jordan, countries with which the UK traditionally had strong relationships, the number feeling 'not at all positive' about France was remarkably lower than those who felt 'not at all positive' about the US and UK – at least 37 percentage points in Jordan, for example.¹³ As Rosemary Hollis has noted, 'Britain incurred hostility derivatively, along with Americans, as anti-Americanism

rose across the Arab world'; yet while its involvement in the Iraq invasion 'helped the Bush administration claim that the whole endeavour was a combined or multinational one, ... it won the British government little leverage in the conduct of the war.'¹⁴ This active support for US policy – as with other instances of close alignment thereafter, such as Tony Blair's refusal to demand an immediate ceasefire in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war – alienated its allies both in the Middle East and in Europe; and it ultimately became the proclaimed reason for the 2005 attacks in London by 'home-grown' terrorists, reflecting increased disaffection among elements of the UK's Muslim population.

It will take some time, and no little effort and determination, to repair the UK's relationships in this region. Indeed, it may be 'helpful – and prudent', as Major has commented, if the US were to 'lead from behind' in the Middle East;¹⁵ while the UK could potentially restore some of its credibility by taking both a more vocal stand on those issues where the US cannot – such as Israel's continuing illegal settlement of the West Bank and East Jerusalem – and a leading role in negotiations where the issue is too politically sensitive for the US.

An Outward-Looking Nation

Relatively untroubled by direct threats to its mainland, except for potential acts of domestic- and international-based terrorism, the UK can

¹² Rosemary Hollis, *Britain and the Middle East in the 9/11 Era* (Chichester: Blackwells, 2010), p. 134.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 129, 134.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 114, 134.

¹⁵ John Major, 'America, Britain and Europe: An Evolving Relationship'.

afford to be an 'outward-looking' nation,¹⁶ using its resources to advance global governance and 'add value' to the international system. This approach to international engagement is especially appealing to the UK because it perceives national and global security to be inextricably intertwined, based on the notion that in the globalised world a problem elsewhere may soon become a problem for the UK if left unchecked.

Given its advanced military capabilities and defence expenditure,¹⁷ the UK is well-positioned to use military co-operation to enhance its relationships and establish new partnerships. However, due to the reduction of its armed forces, the UK will not always be able to participate in partner operations. It should be noted, too, that the really difficult decisions about the long-term structure of the UK's armed forces have yet to be made: the SDSR was an avowedly short-term exercise, with many capabilities ring-fenced while the UK is engaged in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the renewal of Trident was not considered as part of the 2010 review and therefore neither was the cost of its replacement, which will not be clear until 2016. Therefore the next defence and security review, post-Afghanistan and with the UK's future nuclear capability defined, will inevitably make the harder choices about defence priorities and will likely see even more downward pressure on military expenditure and

further, substantial reductions in British military capacity.

In such circumstances, the UK should focus on the quality of the capabilities it retains, ensuring that they add real value to both multilateral and partner operations. As a 'force multiplier' in terms of global security, the UK can effectively use the hard power it possesses to enhance its soft power, building trust, interoperability and shared norms.

'Active Engagement, Modern Defence'

Such defence co-operation and leadership could prove most beneficial to the UK in its own neighbourhood, particularly *vis-à-vis* NATO. There is a growing reluctance in the US to continue providing the majority of the Alliance's military capabilities while most of its European allies fail to meet the '2 per cent threshold' for defence spending. Given US plans to redeploy troops from Europe to Asia as part of its 'pivot' policy, compounded by looming substantial reductions to the US defence budget, it is not surprising that outgoing Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned that 'Future U.S. political leaders ... may not consider the return on America's investment in NATO worth the cost'.¹⁸

NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept outlined a more global outlook for the Alliance, but the declaration of America's Pacific Century and the plundering of defence budgets as austerity bites together highlight the potentially crippling gap between its ambitions and capabilities. In

¹⁶ HM Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy* (London: The Stationery Office, October 2010).

¹⁷ In 2010, the UK spent almost \$60 billion on military capabilities, with only the US and China spending more. *SIPRI.org*, 'Yearbook 2011: Appendix 4A. Military expenditure data, 2001–10'.

¹⁸ *WSJ Blog*, 'Transcript of Defense Secretary Gates's Speech on NATO's Future', 10 June 2011.

Operation *Unified Protector*, NATO's most recent 'success story', only four members followed the UK and French lead; the rest proved unable or unwilling to do so. Indeed, the Libya operation revealed an alliance 'having to work demonstrably hard to cope with a small military operation, not morally ambiguous from a humanitarian point of view, that was well within its geographical compass.'¹⁹ It seems that the future of the transatlantic alliance is under threat at a time when its collective security and collaborative measures are most needed. To counter this, Europe's NATO members must lock the US in by showing their willingness to pull their weight, by providing security in their own neighbourhood, at least.

Capitalising on NATO's Smart Defence concept, the UK can lead efforts to ensure the Alliance has the combined military capacity to act effectively with or without the US, 'adding value' by contributing its own expertise and capabilities where possible. For example, acting as a force multiplier, it can increase interoperability and efficacy by providing the command structure framework for ad-hoc coalitions within NATO or training the armed forces of both NATO members and potential partners – such as the Qatari special forces which participated in Operation *Unified Protector*. Joint procurement initiatives with European NATO members could negate some of the key capability gaps; indeed, it is no surprise that the January 2012 Lancaster House agreement with France provided for the joint development of the ISTAR capabilities

fielded by the US as it 'led from behind' in Libya. It can also facilitate NATO's goal, expressed in its Strategic Concept, of partnering with organisations outside of Europe – such as the Arab League, whose support proved crucial to the Libya operation – through the strengthening of its own relations with key countries in strategic regions. Although these efforts would take some time to come to fruition, the UK's leadership in these areas would help to bolster NATO's presence on the global stage.

Redefining 'Leadership'

Speaking to Members of the UK Parliament in May 2011, US President Obama asserted that 'We remain the greatest catalysts for action'. If this is to remain true for the UK in the long term, UK policymakers will need to re-evaluate what 'we' actually means with regard to its international relationships.

In a world in which US hegemony is being challenged and the UK faces its own relative decline, the UK can no longer define its role on the global stage so narrowly; more specifically, it cannot continue to identify itself so closely with US interests alone but instead must make itself a dependable ally of many nations, especially to emerging and strategic regional powers, following, where necessary, an independent route. President Obama's prescription that the new situation 'require[s] building new partnerships ... [and] remaking ourselves to meet the demands of a new era'²⁰ could not be more appropriate for the UK, but

¹⁹ Michael Clarke, 'The Making of Britain's Libya Strategy', in 'Short War, Long Shadow', *RUSI.org*, March 2012, p. 10.

²⁰ *The White House*, 'Remarks by the President to Parliament in London'.

the two countries will not necessarily take the same path. If the UK is to remain a key player on the world stage and, indeed, an 'essential' ally of the US in its lonely task of global governance, it must redefine its leadership so that it is firmly rooted in legitimacy and friendship among the wider international community.



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SEEN IT BEFORE?

**The decline of war and the spread of
democracy in historical perspective**

*Costas Koliopoulos**

War, especially interstate war, is receding; international relations are progressively institutionalized; democracy is spreading – this is how international politics seems to look like at the beginning of the 2010s, and many people think that a long period of international peace and stability is being ushered.¹ However, it should not be forgotten that strikingly similar political phenomena took place many centuries ago, and the end result was very different. The present paper attempts to examine several aspects of contemporary international politics in the light of remarkably similar political experiences in the Hellenistic period, namely the period of ancient Greek history that began with the conquest of the Persian Empire by Alexander the Great (circa 334-331 B.C.) and ended with the incorporation of Ptolemaic Egypt, the last Hellenistic monarchy, in the


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¹For a recent example, see Joshua S. Goldstein, *Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide* (New York: Dutton, 2011).

Roman Empire (30 B.C.). After a brief overview of the Hellenistic international system and its political evolution, the paper will deal with (1) the relations between great and small powers and the question of war, and (2) the spread of democracy and its political implications.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

It took Alexander the Great a mere three years (334-331 B.C.) to supplant the Persian King, and five more years to consolidate his empire territorially (see Map 1).²



Map 1

*The Empire of Alexander the Great at the time of his death, 323 B.C.*³

However, political consolidation remained elusive as Alexander died too early, in 323 B.C. that is. There followed a rough-and-tumble among his generals, which continued well into the 3rd century B.C. When it ended, circa 270 B.C., the Alexandrine Empire had been split into three big monarchies, a number of smaller kingdoms, and a host of

²The best ancient source on Alexander's conquests is Arrian, *Alexander's Anabasis*. For a modern historical work, see A. B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: The reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). For an inimitable strategic analysis of Alexander, see J.F.C. Fuller, *The Generalship of Alexander the Great* (Ware: Wordsworth, 1998).


³Source: <http://www.american.edu/dgqolash/slide3.htm>.

independent city-states, some of which gradually coalesced into two federal states (see Map 2).⁴

The three big monarchies were, in roughly descending order of relative power, the Ptolemaic Monarchy (comprising Egypt, Palestine, southern Syria, Cyprus, and parts of Asia Minor and the Aegean Sea), the Seleucid Monarchy (comprising northern Syria and southern Mesopotamia, plus large tracts of Asia Minor and Iran – though its control over these last-mentioned areas was becoming increasingly precarious), and the Antigonid Monarchy (comprising Macedonia, Thessaly, Thrace, and some important strongholds in southern Greece).⁵ Here it must be pointed out that, although these monarchies, especially the Seleucid one, do look impressive on the map, in actuality they were not compact territorial states like those we are used to seeing nowadays. Their borders were fluid, and even within these borders their control was not absolute, being mitigated by the existence of independent cities and powerful temples.

Among the smaller kingdoms, the most important were the Kingdom of Pergamos (northwestern Asia Minor) and the Kingdom of Pontus (southern coast of the Black Sea). The

barbarian tribes of the Illyrians (modern Albania) and the Galatians (who, after many adventures, settled in central Asia Minor) were certainly forces to be reckoned with, posing many an “asymmetrical threat” to all and sundry. City-states continued to flourish in mainland Greece, the Aegean Sea, and Asia Minor; the most important among them was the island of Rhodes (southeastern Aegean Sea), a considerable naval and commercial power. Finally, Greece proper witnessed the development of two federal states, namely the Achaean League (emerging from northwestern Peloponnese, eventually to cover the whole of the Peloponnese) and the Aetolian League (emerging from the western part of central Greece and gradually expanding eastwards).



Map 2:
*The Hellenistic political constellation, circa 200
B.C.*⁶

The biggest international political issue of the period was the struggle between the Ptolemies and the Seleucids. Up until 217 B.C. the Ptolemaic Monarchy had the upper hand, but after that it began to lose ground to the Seleucids.

⁴For a thorough analysis of the political entities of the Hellenistic period, see M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941), vol. I, pp. 189-602.

⁵In fact, there were two more “big monarchies” among the successor states of the Alexandrine Empire. To the east of the Seleucids, the Parthian dynasty of the Arsacids gradually assumed control of the Iranian heartland, turned into a great power of its own accord, and managed to hold its own against Rome until the 2nd century of the Christian era, when it was supplanted by the Persian dynasty of the Sasanids. Further east, the Greek Kingdom of Bactria not only managed to retain control of that area, but also expanded into India sometime during the 2nd century B.C. However, that kingdom came to an end in the 1st century B.C. Despite the power and resilience of these two monarchies, they played but a peripheral role in the affairs of the Hellenistic world proper: Bactria was a remote Greek outpost that eventually faded away, whereas Parthia, although a serious external threat to the Seleucids, basically remained an Iranian outsider.

⁶Source: <http://www.greek-thesaurus.gr/hellenistic-period.html>.

However, by that time this did not matter much. Far to the west, Rome decisively defeated Carthage in the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.) and after that it started taking a keen interest in Eastern Mediterranean affairs. Virtually every state that came to the attention of Rome eventually ended up as a Roman province of one sort or another, and the Hellenistic states proved to be no exception. What is truly remarkable is the speed and ease of these states' collapse. Macedonia offered the most stubborn resistance, though it fell far short of what the Carthaginians had done when facing Rome. The Roman victory at Cynoscephalae (197 B.C.) essentially turned Macedonia into a vassal state, and a second Roman victory at Pydna (168 B.C.) put an end to Macedonian independence. The Seleucids were expelled from Asia Minor in 188 B.C., following the great Roman victory in Magnesia the previous year – though it took several decades before the Romans began to assume formal control of the area. Southern Greece fell completely into Roman hands in 146 B.C. The last king of Pergamos bequeathed his kingdom to Rome upon his death in 133 B.C. In 63 B.C. the remnants of the Seleucid Monarchy, which had suffered grievous territorial losses to the Parthians in the late 2nd century and had been confined to Syria, were turned into a Roman province not with a bang, but with a whimper.⁷ The end came in 30 B.C., following Octavian's defeat of Anthony at Actium the previous year: the nominally independent Ptolemaic Monarchy, which in 273 B.C. had been the first Hellenistic power to establish diplomatic

⁷The ancient Greek historian Plutarch mentions this event almost in passing; Plutarch, *Pompey*, 39.

relations with Rome⁸ and had served as a base for Anthony, was incorporated into the emergent Roman Empire.

GREAT POWERS, SMALL POWERS, AND WAR

The contemporary experience

One of the most conspicuous features of contemporary international politics is the relative absence of interstate war. The world has not witnessed such a war since the five-day Russo-Georgian war of 2008; prior to that, the last unequivocal case of interstate war had been the war between the US-led coalition and Iraq in 2003.

It is widely agreed that major war between great powers is essentially obsolete nowadays.⁹ The advent of nuclear weapons and “mutual assured destruction” has rendered it impossible to regard a nuclear war as a means to achieve political aims, despite the heroic efforts of proponents of war-fighting nuclear strategic doctrines.¹⁰ Even if nuclear weapons can somehow be taken out of the picture, a protracted conventional war among great powers – and a conventional war between today's great powers *is* likely to be protracted – would probably have similar effects. Of course, great powers being just that, namely very powerful states with a variety of more or less global interests, they still

⁸Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, vol. I, pp. 394-395.

⁹See John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Carl Kaysen, “Is War Obsolete?” *International Security*, vol. 14, no. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 42-64; Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991); Michael Mandelbaum, “Is Major War Obsolete?” *Survival*, vol. 40, no. 4 (Winter 1998-99), pp. 20-38; Goldstein, *Winning the War on War*.

¹⁰See Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, second edition (Houndmills and London: St. Martin's Press in association with the IISS, 1989), pp. 403-407, and the sources cited therein.

engage in armed conflicts, albeit with much weaker opponents. The United States is the prime example of this, with Russia following suit in Georgia.

The virtual disappearance of interstate war applies even more to small states. Simply put, war is virtually inconceivable for small states unless they are situated in remote regions of limited strategic value to the great powers (viz. the on-and-off war between Ethiopia and Eritrea). To be sure, there are exceptions: Greece and Turkey have been repeatedly at the brink of war during the last few decades and war between them is still within the bounds of possibility, whereas Israel is clearly ready to resort to violence against other states when perceiving security threats. Nevertheless, even in the cases just mentioned, where the conflicts are fuelled by deep animosities and the states involved may occasionally enjoy considerable leverage due to their special relationship with a great power, the warlike tendencies of the adversaries are severely constrained.

This decline in the occurrence of war has been matched (the institutionalists may say “induced”) by relevant developments in the realms of international law and international organization. The UN Charter has outlawed the threat or the use of force in international relations with the exceptions of self-defense against armed attack and collective UN action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. Furthermore, international organizations, both regional and global, see their numbers and their political importance increased. Among

these, of special interest are the international mechanisms of arbitration and judicial settlement of disputes. The International Court of Justice has been quite active nowadays, whereas the World Trade Organization, apart from other means of dispute settlement, provides for a formal dispute settlement mechanism that is essentially judicial.¹¹

Taken together, all the aforementioned developments might seem to suggest that interstate war or even the very phenomenon of war is eventually bound to fade away. The optimists believe that this is indeed the case,¹² whereas the pessimists believe that, although war is “alive and well” in general, interstate war is in terminal decline.¹³ All in all, world politics has arguably witnessed a “quiet cataclysm.”¹⁴ Still, surprising as it may seem, much of this has been seen before.

The Hellenistic experience

An extremely interesting development of the Hellenistic times is the virtual disappearance of war between small states during the 2nd century B.C. Asymmetrical uses of force did not cease, but classical interstate war had basically become a thing of the past for small states.¹⁵

This decline in the incidence of war went hand-to-hand with the increasing use of arbitration for the settlement of disputes.¹⁶ Lacking an International Court of Justice, many

¹¹For an analysis, see Robert Z. Lawrence, “The United States and the WTO Dispute Settlement System,” *Council Special Report no. 25* (Council of Foreign Relations, March 2007), esp. pp. 7-12.

¹²See Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*.

¹³See Creveld, *The Transformation of War*.

¹⁴John Mueller, *Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995); see also Goldstein, *Winning the War on War*.

¹⁵M. Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, 2 vols. [second edition revised by P.M. Fraser] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), vol. I, p. 3; F.W. Walbank, *The Hellenistic World* [revised edition] (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 141.

¹⁶See Walbank, *The Hellenistic World*, pp. 143-145.

small Hellenistic states had concluded treaties providing for automatic dispute settlement through arbitration by a third party. An interesting instance occurred circa 240 B.C., when the Achaean League launched a surprise attack against the Peloponnesian city of Argos with the aim of overthrowing its tyrant Aristippos. The attack was repulsed and Aristippos, clearly invoking the clause of a treaty, referred the case to the arbitration of the city of Mantinea (also in the Peloponnese). The Mantineans ruled against the Achaeans, who were forced to pay compensation to the Argive tyrant.¹⁷ This episode reveals the existence of a highly institutionalized international environment, governed by a well-developed body of international law that was actually enforced. In fact, the episode becomes even more significant if one considers that Mantinea was militarily weaker than the Achaean League, and probably than Argos as well. Modern international relations have yet to show a case of a state launching a surprise attack against another state and then tamely submitting to arbitration by a third party, weaker than the aggressor, ruling that the aggressor should compensate the target-state.

How could this virtual repudiation of war come about? After all, states like those just mentioned had been busy fighting each other for centuries. There were powerful systemic reasons why the small Hellenistic states had become less war-prone than in the past. Dwarfed by a number of great powers in the vicinity, they were content to be left alone and let the giants fight it out among

themselves. Moreover, any misconceived war could have fatal consequences, given the huge power differentials among the actors in the Hellenistic international system; a nearby great power might be tempted to intervene, with disastrous consequences for the weaker belligerents.¹⁸

War between great powers suffered a similar fate during the 2nd century. Its demise was due to the simple reason that by that time Rome had remained the sole great power in the Hellenistic international system. With the Romans basically reaching a *modus vivendi* with the Parthians, the only interstate wars left to be fought were wars between Rome and abysmally weaker opponents. As far as the Romans were concerned, these wars were fought either for defensive reasons or for aggrandizement, or for both simultaneously.¹⁹

Conclusion

Much as many people would like to see war fading away, the Hellenistic experience suggests that even if there is a low incidence of interstate war for a long time, this is no guarantee against its eventual recrudescence – we all know that even the advent of the Roman Empire was not enough to eradicate war from international affairs.

Systemic reasons are likely to be the single most important factor – though not the only one – affecting the likelihood of interstate war in the future. Nowadays, much as had been the case in Hellenistic times, it is the existence of vastly superior powers that makes small and medium states quite reluctant to

¹⁷Plutarch, *Aratos*, 25.

¹⁸Plutarch, *Philopoemen*, 18; Walbank, *The Hellenistic World*, p. 141.

¹⁹For the notorious example of the war against the Galatians of Asia Minor, see Polybius, XXI, 33-41 and Livy, XXXVIII, 12-27.

engage in war independently (the Western European states being a prime example) and often receive chastisement when they do (viz. Iraq in its Kuwait adventure in 1990-1991). The essentially unipolar contemporary international system definitely increases these constraints. The elaborate institutional superstructure of contemporary international politics should not make one lose sight of the power structure that supports it. To believe that the former may continue to function and to restrict interstate war in the absence of the latter is to deceive oneself.

When tackling the future of interstate war, a few words must be said about an issue where we can receive no guidance from the Hellenistic period. Nuclear weapons, clearly nonexistent in Hellenistic times, do provide a powerful deterrent of interstate war nowadays. International relations scholars have occasionally found it rather difficult to fit nuclear weapons in their analyses; among others, they disagree as to whether these weapons are a systemic-level or a unit-level factor,²⁰ or as to whether they really eliminate interstate war.²¹ Though it has been presciently pointed out that “the thesis that nuclear weapons have made hegemonic war or a system-changing series of limited wars an impossibility must remain inconclusive,”²² practice so far, which is admittedly only a few decades old, has demonstrated that the advent of nuclear weapons does have a potent restraining impact

on large-scale interstate war – though not necessarily on limited interstate wars (e.g. the Falklands/Malvinas War), low-intensity conflicts and terrorist acts. Essentially, the whole issue boils down to the tradeoff between the enhancement of interstate stability brought about by a gradual spread of nuclear weapons and the risks associated with inadequate control or irrational use of these weapons.²³

THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY

The Contemporary Experience

The spread of democracy is one of the defining political characteristics of the last few decades. Nowadays democracy has probably become the prevailing form of human governance. Thus, according to the US-based non-governmental organization Freedom House, in 2010 “electoral democracies” comprised 115 out of the 194 independent states of the world.²⁴ Most importantly, democracy has registered impressive gains in regions that used to be bastions of totalitarianism and autocracy, the Arab Spring being the most recent, though still undecided case.

Democracy seems to have won the ideological battle as well. Communism’s sustained challenge is gone, and one can hear praises to democracy sung virtually all over the world. Thus, in October 2005 the Chinese government felt the need to issue a White Paper on “Building of Political Democracy in

²⁰See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Neorealism and Neoliberalism,” *World Politics*, vol. XL, no. 2 (January 1988), pp. 242-245, 249-251.

²¹See Zanvyl Krieger and Ariel Ilan Roth, “Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory,” *International Studies Review*, vol. 9, no. 3 (Fall 2007), pp. 369-384.

²²Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 218.

²³See Kenneth N. Waltz and Scott D. Sagan, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003).

²⁴See http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/ElectoralDemocracyNumbersFIW1989-2011.pdf.

China,²⁵ the leaders of countries such as Zimbabwe and Belarus stage regular “elections” with multiple participants, while even North Korea, which is little more than a hereditary kingdom, poses as “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”

Many International Relations scholars consider the above to be good news. One of the most significant recent theories of International Relations is the Democratic Peace Theory, according to which democracies do not fight each other.²⁶ Thus, the spread and consolidation of democracy augur well for world peace.

However, there is also a downside to the aforementioned developments. To start with, these developments are not necessarily sustainable, as the recent authoritarian backlash in Russia demonstrates. Moreover, elections do not guarantee democracy, as any Zimbabwean or Belarusian voter can testify. Actually, “electoral authoritarianism,” namely the existence of regimes that combine a façade of electoral democracy with systematic abuse of democratic procedures and rights, has become pretty widespread since the end of the Cold War. It has been estimated that such regimes exist in 65 countries whereas, using another classification, Freedom House classifies 29 of its 115 electoral democracies as only “Partly Free.”²⁷

Though electoral authoritarianism is definitely a pernicious development as far as democracy is concerned, arguably far more important developments are taking place in otherwise unexceptionable liberal democracies. These regimes do guarantee personal freedom and human rights; do permit a lively political debate; do have free mass media; and do allow genuinely democratic elections; but all this has actually become much less significant than one may think, because the electorate often lacks effective control over many an important decision. Dwight Eisenhower had famously warned about the dangers that the so-called military-industrial complex posed for democracy. His warning has basically come true, although the ruling elite are perhaps broader than that, including large chunks of the political establishment and key figures of the mass media. At any rate, it may be argued that the increasingly depoliticized electorates of contemporary liberal democracies more often than not merely rubber-stamp decisions that have been taken elsewhere and have been attractively packaged by huge propaganda mechanisms. This is exemplified in, among others, the nearly universal aversion of governments to making decisions on important issues in pre-election periods. In other words, democratic debate is lulled precisely when it is most needed, i.e. when the electorate needs to decide on the future course of the state’s policy.

Undemocratic elements are particularly strong in the European Union: a powerful

²⁵State Council Information Office (China), *Building of Political Democracy in China*, October 19, 2005, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Oct/145718.htm>.

²⁶For the democratic peace theory see, among others, Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 7 (Summer 1983), pp. 205-35; Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principle of a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (eds.), *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).

²⁷Andreas Schendler (ed.), *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006);

Amichai Magen, “To Catch a Ballot Thief,” *International Studies Review*, vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring 2007), pp. 110-112; http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIW%202012%20Booklet--Final.pdf.

unelected bureaucracy that purports to regulate a great many aspects of the Europeans' everyday life; avoidance of referenda on the issue of the accession of new members; refusing to take a people's "No" for an answer, even when this has been expressed in referenda (thus, the European Constitution, rejected by the French and the Dutch people in referenda held in 2005, has been by and large adopted nevertheless, disguised as the Lisbon Treaty).²⁸ These practices have been justified with the argument that although the people must directly express their opinion on certain issues, subjects such as the Lisbon Treaty are way too complex and the electorates are likely to be inadequately informed and led astray by populist slogans.²⁹ This is correct, but it also demonstrates how patronizing and fundamentally undemocratic the attitude of politicians toward their electorates has become in the contemporary liberal democracies. C' est magnifique, mais c' est ne pas la démocratie.

The Hellenistic experience

The greatest Hellenistic states were monarchies. This model of government found many imitators in smaller states, especially in the periphery of the classical Greek world. However, in the Greek cities themselves (and in Rome) the story was different: democracy was to triumph – in ways strongly reminiscent of its present-day triumph as described in the previous subsection.

The 3rd century B.C. witnessed a revival of tyranny in southern Greece, partly

due to Macedonian support.³⁰ However, this was eventually eclipsed by the complete victory of democracy throughout the Greek cities and federal states. The democratic constitutions of the Hellenistic period were modeled on the Athenian constitution of the 4th century. A Hellenistic democracy comprised a citizen assembly and a smaller council that cooperated with each other in decision-making; a number of magistrates that managed daily affairs and often held military commands; and a judiciary consisting of popular courts.³¹ The Roman constitution did possess its own unique characteristics, but after the gradual union of the orders of the patricians and the plebeians was completed in 287 B.C., it also came to basically conform to this pattern.³² All in all, democracy had won the ideological battle against both oligarchy and tyranny.

Still, this mattered less than one might think. Land and wealth tended to concentrate into fewer and fewer hands. These immensely rich citizens came to monopolize political power in their cities and to be elevated far above their ordinary fellow-citizens.³³ Democracy was still there; the people were still sovereign; but real power lay elsewhere.

This development took extreme forms in Rome. The story is too well known to recount in any detail here. The Senate superseded the popular assemblies, only to be itself supplanted by a few powerful individuals who settled scores in an almost continuous civil

³⁰Walbank, *The Hellenistic World*, pp. 95-96.

³¹See Hans-Joachim Gehrke, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* [Greek translation by Angelos Haniotis] (Athens: National Bank Cultural Institution, 2000), pp. 107-109, 259-261 and the sources cited therein.

³²Scullard, *A History of the Roman World, 753 to 146 B.C.*, pp. 115-130.

³³Gehrke, *Geschichte des Hellenismus*, pp. 107-109, 259-261.

²⁸"Deal paves way for EU to move on," *BBC News Online*, 23 June 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6232728.stm>.

²⁹Ioannis M. Varvitsiotis, "No Referendum for the Treaty", article reproduced in *e-LOGOS*, no. 24 (8 May 2008), [http://www.elogos.gr/articles.asp?subject_id=49&article=760&lang=\(in Greek\)](http://www.elogos.gr/articles.asp?subject_id=49&article=760&lang=(in Greek)).

strife that raged through the 1st century B.C. and saw the final victor, Octavian, become the first Roman Emperor under the name of Augustus.

Conclusion

To start with, it must be stated in the strongest possible terms that it is normally much better to live in a democracy than in an autocracy. Still, the above presentation demonstrated that democracy faces serious problems of sustainability in the long run. It is indeed possible that the traits described in the two previous subsections (retention of democratic forms while the important decisions are taken by certain elites regardless of the people's will) reflect a common trend in democracies, especially as the problems of administration and policy become more complex.

Will contemporary democracy survive? The Hellenistic precedent prompts one to answer in the negative. To be sure, one should probably not make too much of the Roman experience and not expect the contemporary liberal democracies to be rent asunder by civil wars between powerful individuals representing different factions of the ruling elite (the Roman social and political context was quite unique³⁴). Oswald Spengler has claimed that democracy is bound to become increasingly hollow and be eventually replaced by what he called "Caesarism."³⁵ One may not fully subscribe to this prediction (and to Spengler's idealization of

the "Caesar"), but the above analysis indicates that contemporary liberal democracy does become increasingly elite-dominated, for better or for worse.

How does this affect the validity of the Democratic Peace Theory? Like-minded elites are not necessarily more or less war-prone. Thus, the European states were governed by like-minded elites during both the 18th and the 19th centuries; the former was relatively warlike, the latter relatively peaceful. However, and leaving aside the systemic reasons that account for the war-proneness of an international system, it can be said that the existence of like-minded ruling elites normally leads to a limitation of the scale of war and a mitigation of its worst excesses. This may account, at least partly, for the restrictions of war prevalent during the Hellenistic era, during the era of the Ancient Regime, and during the century following the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (nevertheless, the First World War provides an obvious counterexample where like-minded elites failed to limit war). Viewed from this angle, the undemocratic tendencies of contemporary liberal democracy may actually be good news. News may be even better if one takes into account that the transparency provided by modern democratic institutions contributes substantially to mitigating the impact of security dilemmas; for instance, it is quite hard for a democracy to launch a large-scale surprise attack along the lines of Hitler's Operation Barbarossa.

³⁴For an analysis of the causes of Rome's domestic political trajectory see Arnold J. Toynbee, *Hannibal's Legacy: The Hannibalic War's Effects on Roman Life*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), vol. I, pp. 294-353, and vol. II, pp. 486-517.

³⁵Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, 2 vols. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926-1928) [English translation by Charles Francis Atkinson], vol. 2, pp. 431-432, 460-465.

WHAT NEXT?

There are some obvious differences between the Hellenistic and the contemporary situation that have to be taken into account when exploring the applicability of insights from the Hellenistic experience today. The impact of nuclear weapons has already been touched upon. Another major difference is the truly global scope of contemporary international politics, in contrast to the regional one of Hellenistic international politics. Although the Hellenistic international system was fairly insulated from outsiders, it was still vulnerable to external destabilizing influences; indeed the external challenge of Rome proved fatal to the very system's existence. On the other hand, a global international system is by definition immune to external challenges; in other words, if peace and democracy come to reign throughout the world, then the absence of external challenges will enhance the durability of that state of affairs. Consequently, the Hellenistic experience may be considered outdated because the contemporary international system is neither spatially confined nor externally vulnerable.

However, there are two problems with this argument. First, even nowadays the aforementioned developments re war and democracy do not influence all the world's regions equally. For instance, Greater Central Asia (meaning the landlocked Central Asian states plus Russia and China) is still not exactly democratic, and even though it has been free from interstate wars, it has also been quite violent and unstable domestically. As a result, such regions may well exert destabilizing

influences into the international system – and, in the example of Greater Central Asia, the presence of countries like Russia and China in the destabilizing region would mean that the relevant influences could be very powerful indeed. Second, not only is the contemporary global international system not immune in principle to destabilizing influences, but actually its global character makes it likely that any destabilizing influence, irrespective of its origin, will be keenly felt throughout the world (the current debt crisis of tiny Greece is a case in point). In other words, the global character of the contemporary international system does not move it into an altogether different plane from the Hellenistic one as regards stability. As a result, insights derived from the Hellenistic experience may not be necessarily outdated.

The main insight drawn from the present analysis is that progress is not irreversible; there is no guarantee against the eventual recrudescence of war and the erosion of democracy. The Hellenistic achievements in those fields did not last; the contemporary ones may not last either. Indeed, it seems that, although the next few decades will be remarkably stable, there is huge potential for instability further down the 21st century.

The argument for the increasing stability and peacefulness of the world, at least from a Western perspective, has been recently gaining increasing currency among academics, though maybe not yet among policymakers.³⁶ As was mentioned above, this argument is

³⁶Christopher J. Fettweis, "Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy," *Survival*, vol. 52, no. 2 (April-May 2010), pp. 59-82; Goldstein, *Winning the War on War*; Micah Zenko and Michael A. Cohen, "Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure than Washington Thinks," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 91, no. 2 (March/April 2012), pp. 79-93.

indeed backed by the empirical evidence and does rest on solid systemic foundations – precisely as had been the case during the Hellenistic period. However, this argument may be valid *only for the next few decades*. Further down the century, one can see powerful destabilizing forces looming in the horizon. At least four can be identified. First, the relative decline of the USA, assuming it is not checked domestically or is not offset by a catastrophe overtaking China, is bound to create systemic instability in direct proportion to its pace. With the United States progressively unable to sustain its international commitments, rising regional and/or global powers may wish to exploit their chance to shape the international environment accordingly. This is exactly what happened in Europe during the mid-18th century, when the simultaneous decline of Austria and France gave Prussia its chance to emerge as a great power – and this was not done peacefully. Second, the seemingly ever-increasing flow of human migration, mainly from the Third World to the First, definitely brings instability in its train. From “Mexifornia”³⁷ through “Londonistan”³⁸ to the Chinese migration to the Russian Far-East,³⁹ the potential for domestic instability and international repercussions is there. This may even have an adverse impact on democracy, with the median voter reacting to the influx of immigrants by reverting to nativism and moving

away from liberal democratic norms. Third, fragile and failing states will continue to be obvious sources of domestic and international instability. It has long ago been pointed out that state weakness rather than state power can be a source of conflict.⁴⁰ Although recent history has witnessed some remarkable instances of fragile and failing states that managed to revert to more or less normal status (Colombia and Sierra Leone being prime examples), it has also witnessed a number of formerly stable or even very stable states reverting to the status of fragile or even failing ones (Kenya and Mexico being cases in point). This has not only led to a significant increase in domestic violence, but has also had adverse regional consequences. Judging from the fact that ethnic tensions, always a major cause of state fragility and failure, show no sign of abating, fragile and failing states are bound to be with us for a long time to come. Finally, competition for access to basic resources such as food, water and land, exacerbated by climate change, is definitely going to be a powerful destabilizing force during the 21st century,⁴¹ and it is unlikely to be mitigated by such factors as the spread of democracy (for the moment leaving aside the question of democracy’s erosion, touched upon above). For better or for worse, history steadfastly refuses to end.

³⁷Victor Davis Hanson, *Mexifornia: A State of Becoming* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2004); see also Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We: The Challenges to America’s National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).

³⁸Melanie Phillips, *Londonistan* (New York: Encounter Books, 2006).

³⁹See, among others, Joshua Kucera, “‘China is the destiny of Siberia’”, *Foreign Policy*, December 29, 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/29/china_is_the_destiny_of_siberia?page=full

⁴⁰Philippe Delmas, *The Rosy Future of War* [revised English translation by Camilla Hewitt] (New York: Free Press, 1997).

⁴¹Jeffrey Mazo, *Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it* (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2010).



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Winning the War on War: A brief answer

On September / October 2011 Foreign Policy Magazine published an article titled "Think Again: War. World Peace Could Be Closer Than You Think". In this paper Professor Joshua Goldstein says that the war is a resource increasingly obsolete and we are on the long road towards a more peaceful world. The mentioned article is an abstract from the book: "Winning the War on war. The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide", published on September 2011, written by the same author, and his arguments are explained in depth in each article.

This work intends to question some of the ideas expressed by the Professor Goldstein. In fact, the main objective is to analyze if effectively world peace is getting closer.

The discussion starts describing the Foreign Policy article, written by Goldstein. Which is divided in 7 parts, each one of them tries to demystify some scenarios pointing the


world at war all the time; concluding that we live in a world increasingly more peaceful than before. My intention is to analyze each part, and to show how today violence has adopted new ways, places and victims. As yet we cannot see peace closer than before.

In the first part, the author starts by posing the following statement: **The World Is a More Violent Place Than It Used to Be.** Immediately the author says: **No.** He argues that public opinion tends to believe that the world today is more violent because of the wars in Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, among other social conflicts. However, in Goldstein's expresses, violence in the world has been considerably reduced.

"In fact, the last decade has seen fewer war deaths than any decade in the past 100 years. Worldwide, deaths caused directly by war-related violence in the new century have averaged about 55,000 per year, just over half of what they were in the 1990s (100,000 a year), a third of what they were during the Cold War (180,000 a year from 1950 to 1989), and a hundredth of what they were in World War II. If you factor in the growing global population, which has nearly quadrupled in the last century, the decrease is even sharper. Far from being an age of killer anarchy, the 20 years since the Cold War ended have been an era of rapid progress toward peace".

In my opinion, there are two main arguments to refute this initial statement. First, it is well known that *war deaths* have been reduced, but it is also important to know that during 2010 the total number of annual deaths due to intentional homicide¹ has been 468.000 people² worldwide.

Most murders are concentrated in Africa and America, in proportion to the number of inhabitants of these regions, as seen in the chart below.



In a long period of time, murder statistics show a decreasing trend, except for Africa and Central America. However, the great number of homicides added to the *war deaths* does not make us think in a more peaceful world. Instead, the data shows an increasing violence that is changing its forms and its locations. In the past, specifically in 20th century, war deaths occurred mainly in Europe,

but after the Cold War (at the end of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21 century) violence takes place in developing countries in a different way than conventional war.

My second counter argument about the first part, points that the category of *war deaths* has a lot of methodological limitations. These limitations underestimate the real implications of war violence, as we can see in the following affirmation: "(...), which point out that many conflicts are characterized by numbers of non-violent deaths due to humanitarian crisis that by far exceeds the loss of lives in combat"³. And because the different types of conflict, violence has not been quantified in all its dimensions yet. This is the beginning to quantify the real human costs of war.

Without denying the usefulness and importance of Professor Goldstein's work, it seems that his optimism avoids the mentioned limitations in his analysis. If violence does not only consider the category of war dead, but also in a wider spectrum, we face the possibility of having a less peaceful scenario than what professor Goldstein intends to show. In this sense, it could be argued that forms of violence have changed and the use of war in its conventional forms has fallen into disuse; and new forms of violence, with different actors, in different regions with new victims, have appeared in the scene of conflict.

¹ This term means: "unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person". UNODC. "Global Study On Homicide 2011". P. 15. On: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf. P. 15.


² UNODC. "Global Study On Homicide 2011". On: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf. P. 9.

³ Lacina, B. and N. P. Gleditsch, 2005, Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths, *European Journal of Population*, 21: 145–166.

Section two of Goldstein's article sustains that it is not true that **America Is Fighting More Wars than Ever**. At this point, the author tries to demonstrate that the United States has had less war deaths than people killed by diseases, despite wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and interventions in Libya, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen.

Chart 2


LOS ESTADOS MÁS PROPENSOS A LA GUERRA
Países involucrados en la mayor cantidad de conflictos internacionales 1946-2005



Source: Human Development Atlas.

About this point, again I have two statements: the first one says while U.S. wars now are less lethal than before, specifically in terms of the number of U.S. soldiers killed, U.S. historically has been one of the country's most prone to war in the world (see chart 2). In addition, U.S. has the highest military expenditure worldwide, leaving far behind other powers such as China (see chart 3). The combination of high military budget and war propensity could induce us to think that hostile behavior is a permanent characteristic of American society.

Chart 3




Source: SIPRI

My second statement against Goldstein, points out that the few casualties of American soldiers in combat do not evidence

lower levels of violence in the world. In fact, the wars waged by the U.S. in the world, are those of high intensity in Middle East, however, in the rest of the world are fought many wars of low intensity (see in chart 5) in which annually hundreds of thousands of people are killed. For example, in Latin America, there are two emblematic cases whose high death toll has allowed them to be classified as high-intensity wars even though they are intrastate conflicts. The first one is Mexico, where drug war has killed about 60,000 people from 2006 until today. The second case is Colombia, which has the world's oldest insurgency, whose legacy has been approximately 200,000 deaths from 1964 to present. This added to other violence problems in regions like in Central America, it makes Latin America as the second most violent region in the world, as seen in Table No. 1.

Chart 4



Source: Wikipedia. On: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_military_conflicts

The third myth that Goldstein tries to clarify is: "**War Has Gotten More Brutal for Civilians**". People believe that the most important victims of the war are the civilians, in

a relation of 90% civilians and 10% militaries. According with the author, this data is false; reliable research shows that the ratio of civilian and military deaths in battle is 50 / 50. In fact, the impact of violence on civilians has decreased despite global spending on defense has followed the opposite trend. While much of increase in military expenditure is a direct responsibility of the United States, that is fighting wars in the Middle East; however, countries like China, whose military budget has also risen, has not fired a single bullet in 25 years.

From my point of view, Goldstein's argument is incomplete because he ignores the whole spectrum of military spending. The global military spending amounted to \$1.630 billion dollars in 2010, while the production of weapons represents \$385 billion dollars in the same year. In this context, U.S. is the country that made the highest military spending worldwide (42.8%), but also the global leader in production of weapons (59%)⁴.

My main argument is focused on violence, specifically on homicides. All murders in the world represent 8 times the number of war deaths; 42% of the whole assassinations are committed by guns. In regions such as Latin America, organized crime uses arms to kill people. In fact, 74% of all homicides in Latin America are caused by this kind of guns⁵.

In cases where the killings are related to illegal activities, such as robberies,

kidnappings, the elimination of members of rival groups, the assassination of government authorities; or slaughter of civilians in order to intimidate the population in order to establish a territory for illegal activities. In short, brutality inevitably accompanies the killing, especially when associated with criminal activities.

In conclusion, it is possible to say that in a war time the number of victims of civil society has progressively been reduced, because of two main reasons: first, technological development, which allows weapons to be more precise than yesterday; and second, the international regulations have permitted to reduce and control most of attacks on civilians during a war conflict. This situation is undoubtedly positive. However, violence to civilians emanates from sources other than conventional war, especially in developing countries. Organized crime is one of those sources, whose modus operandi uses guns and brutality to achieve their goals. In this case, technology in weapons serving the organized crime causes 42% of all homicides in the world. Once again we could be away from thinking that we live in a world more peaceful than before, or that we are closer to achieving peace.

The fourth statement that Goldstein shows in his article is: **"Wars Will Get Worse in the Future"**. His immediate answer is **No**. He says that it is possibly that few countries in the world go to war (like Pakistan and India) with terrible consequences for humanity; but it is also true that people are dying due to other

⁴ SIPRI. 2010. "SIPRI Year Book 2010". On: www.sipri.org

⁵ *Ibid.*

causes, related with climate change or other natural disasters.

Goldstein's argument tries to show us that more people die due to natural causes than by violence related to war. The number of deaths in 2010 resulting from natural disasters is 350,000 people, the deadliest year in two decades according to the UN⁶. No doubt this figure far exceeds the number of deaths in wars. However, it is important to remember that deaths from natural disasters are still lower than homicide deaths worldwide (468,000).

Numbers clearly show that violence against civil society has many sources; conventional war is only one of them and probably the smallest one. This situation does not reflect that we are in a more peaceful international context, or that we are closer to peace than ever before. We can see that less people die in battles; in contrast more people are dying for reasons related with organized crime.

In points five and six of Goldstein's article, he presents some arguments not related with the decreasing of the number of wars. These arguments are: Fifth: A more democratic world not necessarily provides a more peaceful one. I completely agreed, because the history of wars demonstrates that democracies don't always avoid them. Sixth, Peacekeeping has done a very good job. However all the efforts made are

still not enough. The economic price of the war (\$1.630 billion dollars) and its human consequences are too high to be covered by just 18 billion dollar invested in humanitarian aid during 2008⁷.

In point seventh, the author affirms that it is not possible to say that "**Some Conflicts Will Never End**". He supports this idea mentioning some cases in which the conflict has ended as in Colombia, The Balkans and Northern Ireland, among others.

If we take the example of Colombia, we can say that conflict and violence in this country is far from ending. In fact, this country is classified by the 2011 Global Peace Index as 139 of 153 countries⁸. It means that Colombia is one of least peaceful countries worldwide. In addition, according to the number of annual deaths, Colombia falls into the category of countries experiencing high intensity wars, due to its internal conflict situation. If we take a close look to the numbers, we see that this country is the main ejector of refugees in America, with approximately 350,000 people. Additionally, this country is one of the top ten with highest record of political violence, with the highest numbers of deaths because of this situation (1,400 people in the year 2005), which also places the country in the top ten of the least respectful for human rights. Under these conditions one can say that Colombia has eliminated its conflicts?

⁶ UN. Noticias. On: <http://www.un.org/spanish/News/fullstorynews.asp?newsID=20114&criteria1=desastres&criteria2>

⁷ The information related with humanitarian aid is taken from Goldstein's article. Op. Cit.

⁸ Institute for Economics & Peace. 2011. "Global Peace Index".

Conclusions:

The conclusions I want to present here, are oriented to open the possibility of starting new research, related to war, violence and international relations:

First, and from my point of view, violence is changing the way society is acting. With my doubts about Professor Goldstein's proposal, I can say that war is becoming instrument for international politics less used than in the past. However, it does not mean that we are living in a more peaceful world; this trend just means that we are observing that war is not the best mechanism to achieve goals.

The fact that U.S. as the main superpower in the world is changing its mind about how useful is the war does not mean that the violence is disappearing. This argument tends to ignore the behavior of developing countries that represent the 80% of the members of the International System, and have evidence of violent behavior. The core problem is that violence is still increasing in unconventional ways, is still underestimated, and it is not considered yet as an international problem.

The reduction of the interstate conflicts and the increasingly violent behavior in the world makes us think about the possibility that the State in most of international community members is losing the monopoly of the legitimate use of the force. This means that

States are too fragile to control violence and guarantee the human rights to its citizens.

Finally, the fragility of the states could affect the world governance and the world order, whether unipolar or multipolar. If the State in developing countries have the unknown force in the wrong hands, they will have an absolutely unpredictable behavior; they will be prone to break the rules imposed by international institutions, and will be unable to respect international law and the world order.

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Global Governance for Global Security
An essay from public policy
perspective

Phyu Yamin Myat (Myanmar)

The world we are living is insecure where a superpower, rising powers, great powers and responding powers are struggling in security dilemma. Security in dictionary definition includes safety (free from danger or the risk of danger) and confidence (free from doubt and worry). Human security can be rightly defined as human right and national security is a public good to be provided by a government. Then, the global security should be a global public good to be provided by a kind of global governance.

However, the world order accommodating security dilemma fails in achieving a form of global governance as well as such governance to provide global security as global public good. We are failing to institutionalize a form of governance based on trust and cooperation, a form of governance born out of consensus on the shared interests

of sovereign states. Why it is so and how to amend? This essay will explore these questions from policy perspective.

Global Security Dilemma

In his "History of the Peloponnesian War", on account of the war between Athens and Sparta, Thucydides stated "what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta" It is the policy case study on *Security Dilemma* from human history as far as 404 BCE. Security Dilemma is a situation where one country's enhancement in its security measures cause insecurity in the other. As result, the other country will also engage in enhancing its security measures which will cause more insecurity in the first country. Both countries then locked in such a situation are in a dilemma about whether to be defensive or responsive. If a country chooses to be defensive, it will become vulnerable to the exploiting power. However, being responsive will cause more insecurity in the other country too.⁹

Now and then in our history of human civilization, we have plenty of cases to put security dilemma under the microscope of policy analysis; the cold war conflict between the United States of America and former Soviet Union, Iran and Israel, Iran and U.S etc., and other countless international conflicts relating to national security and defense issues. In fact, it is a global phenomenon. In security dilemma, the actions to achieve security ironically diminish it.

⁹ Cases in Public Policy and Administration: from ancient times to the present, by Jay M. Shafritz

The world today is in unipolar power structure and the power is military or hard power. After two world wars, the destructive power of the atomic bomb, and cold war, US has accumulated its knowledge, resources, products, economy on warfare and has been exercising advantage of its military power as a superpower. China, European Union, India and Brazil are the great powers in which China is being assumed to become super power in par with United States. The world might become multipolar in one day but according to the condition, it still is in unipolar scenario for the time being and probably to be so for quite more time.

In unipolar world, some claims, the security is better maintained under an only power. The idea is credited to Bordies' "the only sane strategy". Some refer the U.S as the provider of world peace, and security. If global security is defined global public good, it is true that the super power should be the governing body providing and distributing it for global citizens in nation states. Is this the case and is it successful? With empirical evidence, Goldstein argues that the major wars between nation states are declining. However, the number of wars may decline. The amount of conflicts are never-ending and reducing the number of wars cannot solve the security dilemma among nations nor bring the world peace and harmony.

Although the total wars among nation states are decreasing, most of today's wars are with the only super power. Regarding this, United States of America does exercise power. Consciously or unintentionally the influence of

superpower is on the rest of the world. Although the U.S does intervene in world affairs exercising its power, in doing so, it is hardly successful in many cases. It is encountering resurgences, anti-democracy, anti-America and extremists around the world making its legitimacy as world leader questionable. U.S also needs to guard upon other great powers and rising powers' hostility and hospitality. The battle of being a super power is getting more difficult with emerging opponents as ideological non-state actors. Diverse actors make preventive measures difficult. The quantity, intensity and types of attacks are getting hard to maneuver pre-emptive measures. So, such escalating security issues make the U.S go to war with invisible enemies around the world. Such a situation makes the U.S insecure, and U.S insecurity makes the world insecure too.

Another side of the story is told by nation states in their never ending power struggle. We do not need to be reminded of the fact that all nation states are operating realistically. The very existence of nation states is rooted in their own identity thus all nations have their own exceptional politics, tendency to influence less powerful states, expand their territory and secure their interests and safety.¹⁰ Every nation state without exception for the superpower and great powers thinks of being in the center of the universe regarding its national interests, each of them tries to exert influence over others. It is Hubris, or pretentious arrogance or exceptionalism as true as their realism. The world system is thus anarchy and

¹⁰ lecture of Joe Tulchin 20 Feb 2012, ITD

economic power always is subordinated to the military power.

Here nonetheless, Goldstein's brief explanation upon the difference of peace and justice can be applied. No war means peace but it is not necessarily the peace with justice.¹¹ You can have peace which can be with relatively low justice. The peace under the influence or dictation of a bigger power is most likely to be perceived as unfair or unjust. Without justice there are oppressed conflicts that are unresolved. So there is always a tendency to encounter the struggles and attempts of powers to influence one another despite declining the number of wars. There always is and always has been the security dilemma among them.

When taking the super power into the equation of conflict, all nation states need it on their side or they need to accept the external intervention anytime and any point. The superpower presence can initiate and escalate the security dilemma between and among the nations. For example, Iran push for nuclear possession is not directly to challenge the U.S superiority but to defend itself from its neighboring enemy Israel, who is backed and supported by U.S. On the other hand, most of the U.S deterrence and harsh foreign policies upon some nation states are not direct welfare for U.S citizens but to protect its indispensable allies who are in turn important geopolitically or geo-economically. U.S exercises deterrence policy and pre-emptive policy to the world. When U.S exceptionalism meet with such affected nations', Brodie's "the only sane

strategy" is now counter back with idea of "mutual destruction". Every nation is and has tendency to expand military whenever it is possible, with visible evidence on magnitude of military expense and defense budgets of the world countries. The U.S, the superpower exhibits the biggest defense budget still and will be in the future.

Global Governance for Global Insecurity

If it is the usual to live with security dilemma, why it is it even an issue to solve? For this question, the answer is simple - Security Dilemma is costly. It is wasting resources from nation states in expense of their security and many other resources.

Wars and conflicts are always costly. Since security dilemma cannot solve the conflict rather maintaining peace oppressing conflicts, it costs democracy, global social capital, trust and resources. Since nation states are strengthening their powers hoping for the worst case scenario, thinking of war and preparing readiness for war has already **undermined the democracy** since it has determined to use force to dictate the opponents to behave the way you want. Most importantly, it induces social distance: alienation; what security dilemma and realism also foster is **distrust among nation states** watching each other's step for their own security, hard to coordinate and cooperate with each other in getting consensus for common interest, trying together to achieve it. Last but not least it is also costly in terms of **resources and money**. The once British emperor who imagined the vast continent under its

¹¹ Goldstein, "winning war on wars"

governance umbrella dropped the idea mainly because they couldn't afford it anymore at the expense of its own citizen back home realizing their limited resources after two world wars. The once only opponent of America, the Soviet Union disbanded itself because of its economic decline. Today America and the world's largest and expending defense and security related budget would testify to the cost of the security dilemma. Under the oath to realism and the habit using hard power, nation states are wasting their resources more upon warfare rather than welfare. Under the name of providing security to their fellow citizens, nation states ironically are creating insecurity to them without cooperation among one another.

It is the natural process to look at it from a realism way of thinking, nation states will balance power among each other in time. However, it is costly and more dangerous, when you put the world's untangled or unsolved problems like - possibilities of wars from the conflict of **nuclear deterrence and disarmaments**; limited and depleting world resources (especially for energy); undeniable climate change; strong potential of food insecurity etc. into the equation. Some of those issues are safer to start solving now than be sorry later. "Power without governance" is a jungle rule as survival of the fittest, where the strongest creature will survive at the expense of all weaker ones. It should be the difference that we can behave as civilized human.

The issue of security dilemma unsolved, and the powers without governance is like a high speed vehicle running for more disasters. All stakeholders, nation states are

trapped on the vehicle. And with the indecisive nature of nation states to cooperate with each other in bringing global consensus to solve global challenges, to coordinate their efforts in confronting those challenges, more lives will cost which in fact can become more than the wars did in human history. Again solving this need trust and cooperation among nation states fostering a form of governance.

Global Governance; Is it There? Is it Possible at All?

Now we can only imagine to achieve such kind of governance, it is possible only when nations come together for global consensus on common interests, to sacrifice some of their status, and to become more collaborative and cooperative solving global challenges and public "bads", to provide global public goods such as global security.

Public policy study can explain the prospect of global governance in this issue in a framework; Mark Moore's strategic triangle¹². Regarding global governance as the policy action which would deliver the global security as public goods, it can be framed as; the concept of global governance to provide global security (an indispensable mission), legitimacy of such global governance (political will of stakeholding nations), and the institutional capacity to foster such governance (the use of power). In brief, the mission of global governance is seen distorted with the concept and practices basing on the world hard power politics. Distorted mission and obsolete

¹² Mark H Moore, Organizational Strategy in the Public Sector Creating Public Value, Strategic Management in Government, chapter (3)

practices also damage the political will (the will to govern and to be governed) among sovereign nation states. Such situation makes capacity nurturing impossible.

As a counterpoint to a proper governance to provide global public goods, IR theories argue that we already are participating in the practice of automated governance as the politics of world order. This essay recognizes that as a major factor distorting should be mission of global governance.

In 21st century of globalization, studies argued that world governance is a form of evolving mechanism with political process among states and private agencies. It tries to solve collective problem, realizing common interests.¹³ In theoretical background; classical liberalism pictured global governance as an international trade regime and institutions which are necessarily acquired by nation states in their quest to prosper with minimal interferences by the state. However, in this century, nation states are successfully fostering the economies, by supporting new non-state actors, private corporations, international organizations and government sponsored organizations.

So, Social constructive scholars argue a form of governance emphasizing the role of international non-state actors which are getting powerful with globalization and technologies which enabling them act globally, to set values globally without the help or interference of nation states.

Neoliberals on the other hand, although agree the role of the state but argue non-state

actors; INGO, NGO are passive to the nation states where they are comprised. Also, IGOs are merely tools used by nation states in pursuit of their interests. They argue only the mutual adjustment between states will bring successful cooperation, installing technological innovation, removing outdated institutions in domestic level.

On the other hand, the realism hardly believe the formation of global governance in a world of sovereign states controlled by national governments because all national governments work for their own national interest and act realistically.

Thus, picturing the virtue of world order, IR's so called global governance is somewhat between strong realism and neo-liberalism with missionary endeavor to spread liberal market and democracy across the world. One quote said "*Global governance is the ideological influences that have fostered the realignment of elite thinking to the needs of the world market*¹⁴." And, in another, "*The world dominant ideology is liberalism*¹⁵"

Reviewing some examples on the practice of the international institutions, the aid agency CIDA defines the term *governance* with values, rules, institutions and process, to work toward common objectives, make decisions, generate authority and legitimacy, and exercise power.¹⁶ For USAID, governance should be the ability to develop an efficient, effective, and a countable public management process that is

¹³ Held, David, and Anthony McGrew, 2002, governing globalization; Power, Authority and Global Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press

¹⁴ Robert W. Cox, "Structural issues of global governance: issue for Europe", in Cox with Timothy Sinclair, Approaches to world order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)

¹⁵ Murphy N. Craig, *Global Governance: poorly done and poorly understood, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs)*, Oct 2000, pp, 789-803

¹⁶ Canada, CIDA, <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-111883426-HX4>

open to citizen participation and that strengthens rather than weakens a democratic system.¹⁷

According to their lucid perception governance is hierarchical and the exercise of power promoting a particular set of values in the world. Those definitions, although initially for the term governance, they represent the perception and practices of the international non-state actors, aid agencies, who are giving out the ODA to the less fortunate countries around the world. Their ODA in many countries have more than a corner stone for governance, institutions and public value setting.

Then, with no wonder we experience a statement such as: *Global governance is inefficient, incapable of bringing global public goods to people despite promoting democracy and the empowering of women*¹⁸.

We do have some initiatives to look at institutional capacity for global governance. The impact of them partly contribute into milestones of cooperation and most importantly the increasing dialogue in solving global problems and international conflicts. The list can start with international organization and co-operations such as G20, the UN, International criminal court, IMF, the World Bank, WTO and global fund as well as global institutions such as human rights and humanitarian law, Montreal protocol, Nagoya protocol for biological diversity, the health impact fund, flexible global carbon pricing (FGCP) etc.

However, the issues they dedicate to deal are only a few parts of global security and

still very fragmented in terms of coordinating, harmonizing their efforts. The reason refers back to the fact, as neo-liberals argued, they are more likely passive and sometime pawns and often lacking the ability to strengthen the institutions.

Thinking more on the argument saying the world order is collectively built by realistic nation states where liberal market and democracy is also realistically missionized, the quote "*Despite there is a sense in the arguments that capitalism has reshaped the identity of the state and its social structure (class formation and civil society) there by affecting the way in which it defines its interests and policies*"¹⁹ is worth to analysis.

The missing point in that statement is the time frame. Especially, identity and social structure do evolve but it take quite a time. If a state can reflect its people will as in democracies, the change in national interests and policies come only after socio-political structure change and it takes quite amount of time, timing and sophistications.

On the other hand, the current super power bases on hard power advantage. So called soft power such as; media, aid, alliance and network etc. is only recently recognized. The military power is a kind of traditional power, visible and fast to see the impact thus has been in practice for a long time. Soft power is subtle, sometime invisible, and its impact is variable.

It is not only the type of powers but also the way to exercise them. Hard power demanding change on nation states identity

¹⁷ United States, USAID, Office of democracy and governance:

¹⁸ Murphy N. Craig, *Global Governance: poorly done and poorly understood, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs), Oct 2000, pp, 789-803*

¹⁹Thomas J. Volgy, *Armed and Alone: The American Security Dilemma* by Dean Willian Rudoy, review by; Thomas J. Volgy, *The american political science review*, Vol.68. no.1 (Mar 1974), pp.360-361

and values, there will be serious strains on the recipients. Such exercises are termed as “commanding change”²⁰ by Nye as first of the three face of the exercise of power. Even with his second face “controlling agenda”, whether the type of power is soft or hard, if the recipient sense it is being dictated by a bigger power leaving non negotiable options, it will lead back to anti-power by all means necessary. On the other hand, using soft power in softest way; empowering recipient to “establish preferences” needs skills, liberal mind and patience. And it is the path never well-traveled by all nation states including US. thus institutional capacity of them to use power to govern is questionable.

To recap, in current world order and world economy, automated global governance occurs from the power politics among nation states. It's based on hard power strategy by which nation states commanding changes to one another and controlling agenda of one another. Such practices lose trust among them, and fail to achieve political will to cooperate. Without political will built by trust, a form of global governance is impossible.

Way toward Global Governance

In the metaphor of nation states being trapped in high speed vehicle of global insecurity, it is obvious that no one is in position to jump off from the vehicle as it can be disastrous for all stakeholders. The best alternative and due effort will be the slowing down all together, building back trust among nation state and looking for a consensus in long term game plan. That should be the true

mission of global governance providing the public goods as global security.

The prescription can be based on the statement, *the emerging pattern of governance will have to be networked rather than hierarchical and must have minimal rather than highly ambitious objectives.*²¹ The *governance institution* as it stated should be a platform where nation states effectively join in to find consensus among their identity, values and interest. The process should be in most non-threatening way, a truly democratic with inclusiveness of voices from all stake holding nation states.

There will be counter arguments basing on experiences of current practices, their impacts and tradeoffs. They will rightly criticize the impossible nature of a global government or a globally governing body, and the lack of governmental instruments to enforce consensus building and compliance to achieved rule and regulation. However, including them in consideration, the policy recommendation is to know the process, to start now and keep the continuum.

Solving security dilemma of super powers, rising great powers and every responding powers around the world will need third party mediators to initiate the process, to make it most credible and trustworthiness. The criteria to determine as third party mediators can be based on being from a country with lesser stakes in global affairs and often worse off because of its negative externalities. The mediators should not be assigned or appointed;

²⁰ Joseph Nye, “The Future of Power”

²¹ Keohane and Joseph Nye (2000:37)

they should be volunteers and take the role willingly.

With agenda setting for the provision of global security as a global policy, the policy making process can start right away. The formulating activities, making decisions, implementing the agreed consensus can follow. The monitoring and analysis upon the achievements and impacts to make new and more complete agenda will allow the policy cycle to continue developing. The role of mediator is to initiate it, to ensure participation of all stake holding nation states, to facilitate cooperation in every step of the process, to encourage and bring coordination among the reconciled efforts and to sustain the endeavor.

I will conclude the essay establishing some optimistic preferences. "Bring back global security together" can be a successful general common interest to initiate the process. Minimal rules and criteria of the governance platform can empower sovereign nation states to become its owners, easy to participate for dialogue, forum, debate to conference for global resolution. Such activities can foster cooperation among participants in bringing consensus upon their common welfare. It will help to set feasible goals and also pave the way to coordinate each other's efforts pursuing the goals. The accumulated achievements of all size and magnitude (both the process, activities and varied results) will gradually build trust among nations to enhance such governance activities, and to better institutionalize the process.

So, start now, and once nation states realize the power they possess and

responsibility they have for it, they will sense a smarter and more civilized way of handling it in their endeavor to achieve their national security which also is aligned with the global security as the global public goods. Start now, and the world will get better.

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Colloquium on Post-Hegemonic Global Governance

The Dilemma of Today's Global Governance:
Neo-Trusteeship and Privatization

Yusuke DAN
March 24, 2012

Research question: What is the nature of global
governance in the 2010s?

1. Introduction
2. US Hegemony
3. Trusteeship
4. Privatization
5. Conclusion

1. Introduction

This paper seeks to address the topic of global
governance by highlighting two major, and
often conflicting, characteristics of today's
global governance regime. One, the Neo-
Trusteeship regime, consisting of
peacebuilding, humanitarian intervention and
post-conflict reconstruction, has been a major

global endeavor to increase stability in global
governance in the past 2 decades. I explore the
roots of this current agenda. The other, the
impacts of Privatization, pervading various
spheres of today's global landscape, has
rapidly eroded the sovereignty of nation-states,
especially in the past decade.

Both these characteristics, as I contend, have
affected the nature of the nation-state. On the
one hand, intervention based on the idea of
neo-trusteeship has sought to (re)establish
sovereignty in a failed state, but it remains to
be seen whether such a framework reflects a
return to a stable inter-state system or a more
global-minded governance regime under the
United Nations or otherwise. On the other
hand, privatization of national and international
governance functions can cut both ways: it can
either erode national sovereignty making global
governance more unpredictable, or lead to a
more stable governance system based on
private and market-oriented initiatives.

My underlying contention is:

- (1) that U.S. hegemony will continue to be
relevant as long as the U.S. pursues public
goods multilaterally in global governance;
- (2) that humanitarian intervention will continue
to shape the future of global governance;
- (3) that control and balancing of the vigorous
private sector, aided by advance in
information and communication technology
(ICT), will enhance global governance as
state sovereignty declines; and

(4) that Japan's contribution to a multilateral governance regime characterized by these agendas will be vital.

2. U.S. Hegemony

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed a growing concern for the plight of citizens in failed or autocratic states, as well as in developing and developed states. Intervention to keep and/or build peace has aimed to reinstall governance, and this invariably meant forming a government in countries which do not have one. However, the purpose of intervention lies in bringing governance to realize the well-being and human rights of the local people. Its focus is not the government but the realization of governance in the region.

Following the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, unilateral US intervention has come to be questioned, both within the US and internationally. As a consequence, the US was obliged to rely on the NATO to intervene in Libya. Even though the US continues to maintain a military superiority by a huge margin over the rest of the world, it has become increasingly difficult for the US to use that military power in today's world. Any humanitarian intervention or post-conflict reconstruction will have to be multilateral, if the US intends to secure any level of local or global trust. Further military intervention by the US in the Middle East will not lead to any stable global governance, because this element of trust will then be lost.

Based on Joseph Nye's analysis of 3-layered power structure, i.e., of the military, the economic, and civil society, the influence of state sovereignty at all three levels has declined. At the military/sovereign level, the number of nuclear warheads can no longer provide sufficient physical security against terrorist and other non-traditional threats, which are one of the major sources of global physical threats today.

The economic arena consists chiefly of private firms including mega multinational firms, each of which can influence the future of smaller nation-states. States today are neither equipped nor willing to control this private sector, as seen in the recent financial crises (1997 and 2008).

The civil society level is composed of an increasing number of various non-state actors, including social enterprises as well as civil society and aid organizations. This sector as a whole has gained both in size and influence, with the result that sovereign states cannot operate without them. This sector has come to reflect the global public opinion, which neither the state nor the private sector can ignore. It is true that the nationstate will continue to provide for the needs and expectations of the global citizens. However, it cannot be denied that, increasingly, the power of the nationstate has eroded and that the global citizenship will rapidly depend on the other two sectors. Global governance needs to stand on three feet: the nationstate has come to depend on the other

two sectors to provide for the welfare, rights and security of citizens.

The lone hegemon is no exception to this general trend. The US merely manages to maintain hegemony at the military level: however, this level commands a diminishing power of influence in today's world. As for the other 2 levels of economy and civil society, the US as a nation is not a hegemon any longer. At all the 3 levels, the US needs to seek international cooperation rather than coercion, especially after the war on Iraq: otherwise, it will alienate even its allies.

The US seems indifferent to retrieving or increasing its influence in the multilateral world, especially at the UN. According to some non-US observers in the UN Delegation, smaller nations are better equipped to dispatch experienced and influential diplomats on long-term assignments in order to voice their views in the multilateral forum. This reflects the level of interest on the part of the US in promoting multilateral governance. This is chiefly due to its distorted self-image as a military hegemon in an era when its sovereign influence does not readily reach the economic and civil sectors.

It is true that the US continues to be the hegemon at the military level. The US will also continue to maintain its leadership measured in terms of:

intellectual property rights;
ICT research and innovation projects;
Nobel Prize laureates;

financial sector turnover centered in New York; and

the source of the American dream.

However, the US should realize that multilateralism has prevailed. The US needs to let other actors, state and non-state, respect its greatness. "*Noblesse oblige*" is the way for the big sister. Leadership is granted by followers, not by coercion or threat by the leader herself.

3. The Rise of Neo-Trusteeship

It is possible to identify two intertwined strands of thought and forms of governance in the past two to three centuries which are conducive to explaining what has come to be termed as the Neo-Trusteeship agenda. This section explores these as seen from an historical context.

3-1. Civilizing Mission

Historically, European powers approached the outside world with a pervasive consciousness to improve the conditions existing in non-western societies. This consciousness was behind imperial expansion in the past three centuries. During the colonial era, especially in the late 19th century, the idea of civilising mission was, whether consciously or not, prevalent. The intention was to civilize "backward" regions of the world for the sake of governance and of well-being of the indigenous people. This was prominent in the British Empire, but the French counterpart also shared a similar perspective ("mission civilisatrice"). Civilization in this context often included Christianity, European culture, manners and language, sense of hygiene, education, and modern transportation and industrialization.

Together with the theory of evolution and notion of progress which were developing around the same time, this sense of civilizing mission urged uni-linear progress of the various peoples of the globe. Administrators, politicians, missionaries and enlightened emigrants benevolently sought to realize such ideals in colonies, which were not necessarily obtainable in their home countries.

Imperial expansion culminating in the Scramble for Africa in late 19th century came to be criticized for its drawbacks by the beginning of the 20th century. The civilizing mission was also targeted. In the 1920s, when Britain's hegemony was superseded by the US, "colonial development" started to be discussed and implemented, which began as a policy to extend the shelf life of colonial rule, notably the British colonies. Colonies were to be developed so as to follow in the footsteps of the newly independent self-governed Dominions (such as Canada and Australia) within the empire.

Colonial development evolved to become the idea and practice of development in the second half of the 20th century. This terminology, despite criticisms by "*dependencia*" and other schools for its uni-linearity, is still a key global concept today. Development is another form of modernization. It is difficult to address the issue of global governance without referring to this term (development).

3-2. Neo-Trusteeship

The largest global frameworks in the 19th century were the empires. Forms of global

governance evolved under such conditions. As major empires disintegrated after WWI, and existing ones being questioned for their legitimacy, two closely related forms of governance appeared. One was the British Commonwealth of Nations composed of self-governing dominions. It was expected that other (non-white) British colonies around the world would join this as they became independent, which was what eventually took place after WWII. The other took the form of mandates and protectorates. After WWI, the concept of mandatory territories came to be widely accepted around the world (except in the colonies) to supersede colonial rule. This was to be realized under the framework of the League of Nations. Generally speaking, since one colony was to be overseen by one regional power or suzerain, it was more of unilateral governance by regionally influential powers than being a multilateral governance structure. However, as a whole, mandatory territories were governed by external powers until they were ready to become independent, and it can be seen as the multilateral precursor to what evolved after WWII.

This model for global governance was carried over to the United Nations in the form of trusteeship territories. It is true that the Trusteeship Council has been dormant since the last of the United Nations trusted territories, Palau, gained self-determination in 1994. However, scholars suggest that peacekeeping/building today has its roots in trusteeship (Ralph Wilde (2008), Richard Caplan (2001) and Michael Barnett (2011)).

I suggest that, on the one hand, civilizing mission, evolution, notion of progress, colonial development, and development assistance serve as precursors to post-conflict reconstruction. I also suggest that, on the other hand, Empire, Commonwealth, self-government, mandatory territories and protectorates, and trusteeship as forms of governance/government led to the regime of peacebuilding and humanitarian intervention which we see today. Both these strings of thought and form of government today serve to promote global governance.

These ideas and forms of government are necessary elements promoting public goods (global values) including human rights, human development and human security of citizens. These are especially pertinent because most nationstates formally subscribe to the UN Charter, which embodies such global values both in theory and practice.

4. Privatization and Technology

Let me turn to the third aspect of today's global governance. Privatization as a recent trend has a strong impact on the future of sovereignty of states.

Privatization has pervaded the military in the form of private military and security contractors (PMSCs), which have outnumbered US soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan (150,000:200,000). This is a growing trend and hard to reject when deployment of soldiers is increasingly difficult and when no other armed bodies are available to protect NGOs, IGOs,

embassies and offices in conflict areas.

However, the chain of command of the military does not permeate the private sector, which calls for a necessity to install various forms of control and regulation of this sector.

The intelligence community in the US has also outsourced much of its work (Tim Shorrock). As with any privatization and outsourcing, the cost element needs to be monitored and justified. More seriously, ownership and security of intelligence and information gathered by the private sector is being questioned: does it belong to the state which outsourced the task? Yes, in theory, but in practice the state does not have adequate control over it. Furthermore, as the private portion of intelligence grows, it can begin to influence the public or governmental sectors, especially if a conflict of interest occurs.

Needless to say, the cyber space has depended heavily on the private sector for technological advance since its inception but the degree of this dependence has clearly increased in the past decade. The technological development is too rapid for the public/governmental sector to catch up with. Cybersecurity can be explored jointly under public-private partnership, but the basic picture is that an elementary school pupil in the public sector is outsourcing cybersecurity to a post-graduate researcher in the private sector. There is little oversight in this respect. (This lack of oversight is evident in Japan as well.)

The private financial sector has expanded in terms of the volume of transaction it handles, so that companies belonging to this sector can influence and dictate policies of smaller states. Despite some attempts to govern this sector (e.g., ASEAN after 1997, Europe after 2008), states cannot easily control it globally. States are also heavily dependent on them, which is another major factor behind lack of control.

The rising importance of technology is vital: drones and robots may cost a fraction of fighter jet planes, yet they have already started transforming the definition of war. The intelligence community can easily have access to such technology (Chris Pyle). Cyber security is based mainly on technical and technological advance promoted in the private sector in controlling human-computer interface: the public sector can no longer maintain its competitive edge against the private sector. The public and civil society sectors rely on the private sector for cyber and ICT-related security issues.

Privatization has eroded the power of sovereignty, as witnessed in the Arab Spring (Twitter), cyber crimes (Stuxnet), and expansion of the financial market (robot trading). Furthermore, the emergence of powerful non-state and private actors at the economic and civil levels shows that sovereignty of states is becoming weaker. States are no longer in control of these levels.

5. Conclusion

How do the three major characteristics of today's global governance regime relate with

one another: namely, on the one hand, the agenda of development coupled with peacebuilding and humanitarian intervention as a new form of trusteeship (Neo-Trusteeship), and, on the other hand, the phenomenon of privatization coupled with technological advance, both of which are becoming conspicuous within the framework of the existence of the weakening but still dominant hegemon, the US? My contention is that all point in the direction of multilateralism and erosion of sovereignty.

There is a tension between Neo-Trusteeship and Privatization. Neo-Trusteeship seeks to establish stability as a basis for any improvement of citizens' human security. There is a definite sense of moral obligation to reduce all kinds of threat to humanity. It seeks this multi-laterally. It seeks this by establishing (or restoring) stability in the form of national sovereignty. There is a certain element of control from outside or above during the transitional process. It is expected that this nationbuilding effort ends in strengthening the state sovereignty of that region, but it remains to be seen whether this will prove to be the case, as seen in Libya or Afghanistan.

Privatization offers a tendency counter to this: Privatization seeks to diffuse power, which often leads to destabilization. Privatization stems from a sense of moral obligation to promote democracy and freedom. It seeks democracy and freedom multi-laterally, but not in the sense of multiple nations: rather, it seeks democracy and freedom by involving multiple

private actors in the process, thereby outsourcing vital functions of the state. This may work in a resource rich state, but most probably not in a failed state.

This can be called a dilemma of today's neo-liberal thinking vis-à-vis global governance. It is taken for granted that we share the moral obligations to reduce threat and promote democracy and human rights simultaneously. However, these obligations do not necessarily go hand in hand, as depicted in this paper. Often, they radically run counter to each other. If our moral imperative becomes a destabilizing factor, it will become an unwelcome threat to "us".

Who/what can emerge to promote global governance in this era of paradigm shift? As far as multilateralism is concerned, there is no immediate alternative to the United Nations, however flawed and inefficient it may be. However, it can be supplemented by numerous regional organizations.

As for erosion of sovereignty, each major power should be prepared to (1) confront the issue of privatization, (2) make a global contribution to promote public goods (global values), and (3) work at the levels of multilateralism and civil/economic community.

In this respect, Japan's experiences and future global role may offer invaluable insights. After WWII, Japan started rebuilding itself during US/Allies military occupation. This can be seen as a precursor to the Neo-Trusteeship

paradigm. This nation building process promoted land reform, democracy, civil liberty, as well as economic growth and privatization of the market.

Sandwiched geographically among major global powers in this paradigm shift, Japan needs to review its role. For Japan, the three current global trends depicted above are quite vital. Peace operations within the multilateral framework of the UN will increase as a growing part of Japan's development assistance overseas. Japan, with its leadership in technology, may play an important role in managing the privatization of state functions, which will affect all the global players in the years to come.

Due to the decline of sovereignty, Japan will have to respect interdependency in the region. Caught between the US and China, and in a strained relation with Russia, Japan will increasingly serve to keep channels open for these three large powers to communicate, as well as to trade, with each other. Whether to side with the US or China is already not an option, since conflict with either of the two will hurt Japan most.

Currently, domestic constraints can hamper its active international role:


- (1) The earthquakes, tsunami and ensuing disasters after March 11, 2011, have further depressed the sentiments of the people already downtrodden by two decades of recession ("the lost two decades"), not to mention the resulting

financial burdens (upwards of 300 billion US Dollars for imminent compensation and reconstruction);

- (2) Politicians continue to be selected based on domestic concerns and as providers of the needs of local constituencies;
- (3) Its bureaucracy continue to be bound by precedence, unable to break the mould established during the booming 3 decades since WWII;
- (4) This national conservatism has restricted the country's internationalization, including lack of immigration (refugees and non-Japanese workers), weak language education (ever fewer Japanese students studying abroad), and weak foreign direct investment in Japan; and
- (5) Exodus of Japanese manufacturers to produce outside Japan as a result of recession and appreciated currency.

In short, Japan needs to seek a new place in the globalized stage, with its cutting edge technology and human resources. Instead of boasting its cultural and ethnic uniqueness as a nation, Japan should be prepared to play an active role as a regional mediator, given its geo-political conditions. Even if Japan continues to refrain from playing a military role, constrained by its pacifist constitution, it can play a key leading role in the fields depicted in this paper without menacing its neighbors: contributing to the agendas of development and peacebuilding, while pursuing a global governance agenda in the ever-expanding arena of privatization. This is the only niche left for Japan to survive as a respectable player.

Diagram (left and right correlate only to an extent)
 ---Idea--- ---Form of government---



TOPIC GROUP 2

CONFLICT PREVENTION

In the following section, six authors consider different strategies toward conflict prevention as a means of reducing inter-state violence. Taking advantage of their time together in the US, Sartika Soesilowati of Indonesia and Nicolás Comini from Argentina wrote an essay together using their own countries' experience. They present the advantages and challenges of regional alliances, then propose a system for sharing best practices between regional groups. Benyamin Poghosyan of Armenia examines the implications of a reduced US presence in the Middle East to South Caucasus security. Polina Sinovets writes a provocative essay about the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of different deterrence strategies on the emergence of nuclear weapons in Iran. Kamara M. Foray offers an African perspective, when he illuminates the impact of post hegemonic global governance on Sierra Leone. Ricardo Neeb Canterero's focus on Latin America reveals, among other things, that post-hegemonic governance coupled with increasing drug violence contributes to increased uncertainty especially in certain Central American states. In his insightful essay, Josh Wineera leaves us to ponder whether or not the Pacific Islands states could act as a conduit to facilitate power sharing between the US and China.



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**Regionalization and Global Governance
Comparative Case study:
ASEAN – UNASUR**

By: Sartika Soesilowati and Nicolas Comini

I. Introduction

The development of regional institutions in the world now is at a genuine crossroads. As a result of the global crisis, particularly among European countries, there is concern about the future of the European Union (EU). Can EU as considered the most ideal regional organisation in the world would survive and succeed to solve its debt crisis and economic security? Current EU crisis affects the assumption of the future of other regional institutions like ASEAN and UNASUR in which the member states just recently are moving to develop their regional institutions seriously. So

far the EU is considered as one of the most concrete examples of a favourable and desirable combination of multilateral institutions for creating global governance, but since that organization is now in the middle of a fragile situation, it remains the question of which type of multilateral institutions should be created to govern the world? Could other regional institutions like ASEAN or UNASUR -which obviously have divergencies among the members and qualifies as much less developed than EU- be able to create stability and security within the region and support the global security governance? What sort of security order ASEAN and UNASUR could create?

The development of multilateral security institutions can enhance regional security in ways that are not possible for self-reliant or bilateral security arrangements. The regional member states (ASEAN and UNASUR) cannot merely rely on their own limited capacities or autonomous policy responses to solve transnational problems such as illegal immigration, terrorism, trafficking, drugs and environmental challenges which are emerging in the region. It remains, however, a major concern among member-states about ASEAN/UNASUR's ability to conceptualise and to deal with critical regional security issues. Illustrative of these issues are problems related to intra-ASEAN-UNASUR relations.

There has been recognition of the role of regional cooperation in the promotion of peace and security. For instance, the United Nations has been promoting the concept of "security regions", and the U.N. Secretary-General's Report "In Larger Freedom", which

was considered by the Heads of State and Governments in September 2005, called on regional organizations “to play complementary roles” with the United Nations in facing the challenges to international peace and security. A major aspect of this debate, however, is whether ‘cooperative security’, which prevail in the region, can sustain conflict prevention as well as to support the global governance.

This paper, therefore, aims to examine the concern mentioned above through examining the nature of regional institutions among member-states of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Union of South American Nations (in Spanish, UNASUR). It particularly will explore common actions or policies conducted by ASEAN and UNASUR to confront member states threats and insecurity and to react to the global security governance. Which is the dominant nature of ASEAN and UNASUR to govern the regional security and to respond the global security governance? Which are the characteristics, strengths and limitations of the regional institutions dealing with regional and global insecurity? This concern would be examined through analyzing the development and process of institutionalization and identifying several empirical cases related to this matter.

II. Theoretical Overview and General Assumptions

Regional institutions like ASEAN or UNASUR are usually defined by scholars of “new regionalism”, such as Anthony Payne

and Andrew Gamble, as a “state-led or states-led project designed to reorganize a particular regional space along defined economic and political lines”¹. Such a project is constructed (or ‘reconstructed’) by collective human action. It assumes that the world’s regions can develop more cohesive and autonomous identities within their own parameters. This school of thought also recognises that the forces of globalisation impose exogenous or outside pressures on how the entity of ‘region’ develops over time. Other theorists have identified specific sub-components of this process: regionalisation or informal integration; identity; inter-state cooperation; state-led integration and cohesion². A practical example of how the ‘new regionalism’ school’s of thought’s thinking can be applied to the ASEAN case is that endogenous factors such as the rise of terrorism in ASEAN societies driven by poverty, social marginalisation or domestic political power plays can combine with exogenous factors such as intensified United States (US) or the United Nations (UN) pressure directed toward the ASEAN states to strengthen counter-terrorism efforts in the Southeast Asia.

On the other hand, UNASUR represents the effort of the South American countries to switch the model of the integration schemes created during the nineties years, characterized by the implementation of neoliberal measures. For that reason, UNASUR is presented today as a regional integration

¹ Anthony Payne and Andrew Gamble. ‘Introduction: the Political Economy and World Order’, in Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne (eds) *Regionalism and World order* (Basingstoke, England: Macmillan, 1996), p. 2

² Andrew Hurrell, ‘Regionalism in theoretical perspective’, in Louise Fawcett & Andrew Hurrell (eds) *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 39


system that exceeds the strictly economic issues and extends its scope toward the most varied fields of action, represented in the political, social, cultural, environmental areas and also in defense and international security matters. In this latter case, the extra-regional pressures are associated, mainly, with the so-called "war on drugs", trying to involucrate the Armed Forces of the region in this "war".

The understanding of regionalisation defines regionalisation not as mainly developed by and for their member states in their regional entity, but also as influenced by, and to some extent in contribution to, the development of global governance.

The idea of global governance can refer to understanding the collective management of common problems at the international level. The term "global governance" as used here includes all the institutions, regimes, processes, partnerships, and networks that contribute to collective action and problem solving at the international level. Ideally the two level of institutions, namely regional and global, will support each other to create regional and global security.

The ideal assumption which links regional institutions and global governance is that not only the establishment of regional institutions would create share, common understanding and avoiding war among the member states but it would also support the global governance. Regional institution will achieve this goal, at least in two ways: first by implementing or adopting the policies, norms of global governance, and second, by providing feedback and input for the global policies. This

can be described through the diagram as below:



III. The Institutionalization of ASEAN Security Community: from Establishment to ADMM

This part is going to highlight briefly some of the important events, policies and action of ASEAN to dealing with some intramural conflict and external forced in Southeast Asia and beyond it during the association's journey. ASEAN is an institution which spans a major sub-region of the world. It encompasses ten countries with an area of 4.5 million square kilometres and a combined population of over 600 million people. It comprises one of the largest regional markets in the world (ranking 6th in trade, for example, within the US) and occupies a central strategic position in the greater Asia-Pacific region.

On August 8 1967, in Bangkok, the governments of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Philippines officially established ASEAN. The creation of ASEAN in the aftermath of Indonesia's *Konfrontasi* with Malaysia and Singapore suggests a strong link

between these two events. It was a powerful symbol of Jakarta's reconciliation with its neighbours. It had paved the way for political settlement to Indonesia's coercive challenge to the legitimacy of Malaysia between 1963 and 1966. The establishment of ASEAN was also as a result of the awareness of the leaders to the dangers of major power rivalry and the ideological competition between them. The United States had just revived its 'domino theory' (originally advanced by President Dwight Eisenhower in the height of the Cold War).³

From 1967 until 1997, the ASEAN member states has successful to lay foundation for friendly relationships among the member-states and to guide some regional respond to minimise the excessive major power in to the regions. The period was also one of consolidation for ASEAN, particularly because they managed to avoid further intramural conflict. This provide condusive environment for the member states to focus on its national development. In addition, the five ASEAN states also looked to ways of dealing with external factors in a rapidly changing strategic environment. The concept of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (ZOFPAN) issued on 27 November 1971 is an example of how ASEAN sought to deal with such issues in the years following its establishment. The idea was to respond in a unified way to the changing

policies of the external powers active in Southeast Asia.

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) emerged from the Bali Conference convened on 24 February 1976. It was first meeting of the ASEAN heads of state and this alone signified that the institution was becoming more important to the foreign policies of the member-states. The conference and its outcomes reflected the concerns of the leaders for the geo-political situation in the region. The retrenchment of US military power from Southeast Asia and the related collapse of anti-communist regimes in South Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975 provided a powerful rationale for ASEAN's political development as a basis of underwriting its member-states' regime survival.

The treaty made a reference to a regional 'code of conduct' and an institutional mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes in order to "to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among their peoples."⁴ The guiding principal of the TAC was mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations. Other principles included: freedom from external interference; non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; renunciation of threats or use of force; and effective cooperation between the member states.

In effect, the TAC embodied the most important norms and values governing the behaviour of states in the international

³ See the explanation of Domino Theory in Tim Huxley, 'Southeast Asia in the study of international relations: the rise and decline of a region', *The Pacific Review*, 9, 2, 1996, p. 204. It was proposed by Dwight Eisenhower in 1954 when he claimed that 'the loss of Indochina will cause the fall of Southeast Asia like a set of dominoes.' This view underlined the American policy in the region and influenced the attitude of non - and anti-communist Southeast Asian governments.

⁴ Article 1, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 24 February 1976.

environment. It also served as a non-aggression pact between the member states. TAC was conceived as a way of promoting greater mutual understanding both within and beyond the boundaries of ASEAN. It thereby served to promote the Association's general security interests and the essence of that understanding was the concept of respect for national sovereignty. This treaty clearly demonstrated an attempt to realize the long-standing commitment for ASEAN member-states to respect national sovereignty in managing security in the region.

One of the achievement of ASEAN before the end of Cold War is the Association's policies and strategies to end the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. This rise a significant international profile as a regional actor. During the occupation, which lasted from 1978 to 1990, ASEAN demonstrated its ability as a community to apply diplomatic pressure that eventually compelled Vietnam to depart from Cambodia and underscored ASEAN's ability to be a coherent diplomatic force.

The case of Cambodia illustrates the ability of ASEAN to influence the process of conflict management in the region. In this instance ASEAN was: (1) successful in containing the violence and stopping it from transferring to neighbouring countries; (2) able to overcome its own internal differences in order to help restore the situation in Cambodia; and (3) apply its own norms of state sovereignty as part of the process of successfully ending the conflict and restoring Cambodian independence.

With the demise of the Cold War superpower rivalries, ASEAN decided to expand its membership to include Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. Vietnam was the first Indochinese entrant into the Association as a full member. Entering ASEAN on 28 July 1995, its accession was a logical outcome of the end of the Cold War era in Southeast Asia. For ASEAN, accepting Vietnam bolstered the Association's image of "being able to adapt to the post Cold War environment, to be flexible and to have the confidence to embrace as a member a country with political system which differs" from those of other ASEAN member-states. Moreover, having Vietnam as a member would add to their own geopolitical weight in relations with major powers.

The final inclusion of ten countries in Southeast Asia underscored ASEAN's relevance in realizing the ideal of Southeast Asian regionalism. It also demonstrated ASEAN capacities to support better relations among various Southeast Asian states which had long records of conflict. The determination of ASEAN's elite to institutionalise Southeast Asia as a whole ultimately overcame traditional intra-ASEAN tensions and underscored longer term prospects for regional community building. This determination of like-minded elites constitutes an important precedent for regionalisation, not only in the region under study, but also with reference to other developing regions of the world. The ASEAN dream of including all ten countries of Southeast Asia was fulfilled at the end of the Cold War only because, unlike the European

Union, the Association did not impose conditions such as the democratisation of domestic member-states' domestic political system. General adherence by ASEAN to its norms of non-intervention and respect of sovereignty encouraged new states such as Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar to take up membership.

The end of the Cold War and subsequent developments in the international security environment encouraged ASEAN to rethink its strategies and enhance the organization's credibility and performance. Traditional security issues relating to major power involvement in the region still constituted the main concern of ASEAN members. However, a number of non-traditional issues that were muted by the Cold War began to influence the relations between the ASEAN member-states and their relations with external major power

ASEAN members felt that the new post-Cold War strategic environment was unlikely to presage an end to major power rivalry in the region. They also recognized that Southeast Asia could not be isolated from possible rivalry between East Asia's major powers. The problem of regional order as it presented itself to ASEAN was essentially one of creating a stable balance of power between the major powers in East Asia that would not disadvantage ASEAN. In this context, two options presented themselves. One was to strengthen intramural security and defence co-operation in ways that would raise ASEAN's standing as a political-military power. The other centred on extending the existing model of

ASEAN's interaction emphasizing economic development and security diplomacy into the wider region. The establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is an illustration of the second option.

The ARF emerged as a consequence of the fourth ASEAN heads of government summit meeting in Singapore in January 1992. The participants at that meeting recognised the necessity of looking beyond Southeast Asia to cope with the post-Cold War regional security environment. Although it includes major powers, ASEAN actually plays a significant role in the ARF. ASEAN acts as 'an anchoring hub for regional socialization'. The Association remains a neutral broker among the great power interlocutors and works to delegitimize containment and traditional power balancing policies that might aggravate the regional security dilemma. ASEAN has used the ARF to successfully act, in the words of Michael Leifer, as the 'acceptable interlocutor' with the major powers⁵

A key test of inter-ASEAN security cooperation, as the sovereignty issue has impacted upon it, was the South China Sea issue. The South China Sea is an area of competing claims over territory in a maritime space that involves six major claimants namely China, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Indonesia is not a direct party to the South China Sea dispute, but Jakarta has major strategic interest in preserving its claims around Natuna Island

⁵Michael Leifer, 'The ASEAN Regional Forum: a Model for Cooperative Security in the Middle East', Dept. of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies (Canberra: Australian National University, 1998)The ASEAN Regional Forum' p. 26

which lies well to the south of the Spratlys. The overlapping claims in this area have been a particular source of conflict between People's Republic of China (PRC) and ASEAN countries. Vietnam and the Philippines have experienced the most serious conflicts with Beijing on this issue. In fact, ASEAN was able to arrive at a common position on several aspects of its dealings with China, reconciling the dilemma between cooperating with China and engaging the US to minimise the threat of China in the process. This ASEAN posture was embodied in the Declaration of Principles of the South China Sea released at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in August 1995. ASEAN's handling of the South China Sea issue demonstrates how its member-states were able to put the unity of the Association above their individual interests. Despite the hard line Chinese position on its exclusive sovereign claims, ASEAN was able to maintain a united front.

The question of sovereignty over the Spratlys has become controversial since the claimants contest each other on historical, archaeological and legal grounds through maps and legal documents to justify their claims.⁶ Under these circumstances, the signing of the Declaration on the South China Sea between ASEAN and China on 4 November 2002 was a significant milestone. The declaration aims to contain conflict over the numerous maritime boundary and sovereignty disputes in the area. China's acceptance of this statement represented a substantial concession.

⁶ Bob Catley and Makmur Keliat, *Spratlys: The dispute in the South China Sea* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), vii.

Despite these intra-ASEAN policy divergences, the overall desirability of cooperating with China over the South China Sea provided sufficient encouragement to the ASEAN states underwrite a common approach in the negotiations with China. The need to cooperate with China, rather than to oppose it, was actually derived from the reality that the ASEAN countries were not able to challenge the rising economic, and military power of China.

Diplomatic interaction between the ASEAN member-states has evolved quite visibly, particularly regarding the number of organisational committees and meetings they convene. ASEAN has also moved to deepen and strengthen its member-states' politico-security interaction by promulgating 'Vision 2020' in 1997, an ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Issues in 1997, the Bali Concord II in 2003, and the ASEAN Charter 2007. All of these measures anticipate an ASEAN Community which encompasses three components or 'pillars' namely the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. ASEAN member-states have also increased cooperation with external powers in the region

The declaration of Bali Concord 2003, ASEAN institutions has projected to realise ASEAN Community in 2020 which has three pillars namely ASEAN Economic Security (ASC), ASEAN Security Community and ASEAN Socio Community. Later the idea to realize ASEAN Community has been reschedule earlier by 2015. Security

Community which has latter accommodated politics issues become ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) is the main inspiration for ASEAN member states to deal with security issues.

Blue print of APSC guided by ASEAN Charter, provides a roadmap and timetable to establish the APSC by 2015. It mentions ASEAN purpose's namely: 1) to avoid arm conflict; 2) to settle the dispute among the member states peacefully; 3) to build common understanding of significance to consider that member state national security regional interlink with regional environment and its neighbor that "...pledge to rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision"⁷ It also aims to realize common regional security that "it envisages ASEAN to be a rules-based Community of shared values and norms; a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security".

The Blue print of ASPC is guidance by ASEAN Charter recognises to develop this institutions commitment to sustain "a dynamic and outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world." This declaration shows that any development of ASEAN to realize regional security community was build upon consideration to adjust with the fast growing globalization and arrangement in the global level.

Before the Blue print of ASEAN community was issued and ASEAN Charter was ratified by ASEAN member states recently, other regional tactical and strategic actions to accommodate immediate and unprecedented threat was conducted through other principles. For example, an effort to combat terrorism in regional level was conducted through the 2001 Declaration on Terrorism. This is an important statement of ASEAN's political will to combat terrorism by considering the characteristics of domestic and regional threats, capacities and social political consequences, without blindly following the U.S. scenario.

The regional cooperation has also employed in bilateral, or trilateral cooperation. For example, in effort to secure the Malacca Straits is conducted by trilateral states namely, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (only recently Thailand is included due to the concern of the insecurity in small area of North-East part of the Strait which under sovereign of this country).

The institutionalisation of ASEAN as illustrated above shows that the development of its association based on the respond of this institutions to intra mural problems and common external problem including international insecurity.

Asean Defence Ministerial Meeting (ADMM). Currently, one the main instrument to implement the Blue print of ASPC is the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) established in 2006 is the highest defence mechanism within ASEAN. The annual ADMM facilitates the ASEAN defence ministers to

⁷ see ASEAN Political-Security Community Blue Print, <http://www.aseansec.org/5187-18.pdf>

discuss and exchange views on current defence and security issues and challenges faced in the region.

Under the minister level, cooperation among ASEAN member states conducted in various meetings, and forum among the members. ASEAN Special SOM serves as a joint forum between senior foreign and defence officials. Furthermore, ASEAN defence officials attend the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) ministerial meeting, ARF Senior Officials' Meeting (ARF-SOM), ARF Inter-Sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures (ARF-ISG-CBM), the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC), and the ARF Defence Officials' Dialogue (ARF-DOD).

Beside ADMM, outside the ASEAN framework, various military-to-military interactions and activities have been held over the years, namely (a) ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces Meeting (or Chiefs of Staff); (b) ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting; (c) ASEAN Navy Interaction; (d) ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference; (e) ASEAN Military Intelligence Meeting; and (f) ASEAN Armies Rifles Meet. These forum provide complementary effort to build more diverse and deep share understanding to identify commonality problem, threat and solving problem.

To guide the cooperation among the member states ADMM has promulgated three-year Work Programme. The First Three-Year ADMM Work Programme (2008-2010) issued in 2007. This Programme included measures and activities in five areas, namely 1) promoting regional defence and security cooperation; 2)

shaping and sharing of norms; 3) conflict prevention; 4) conflict resolution; 5) post-conflict peace building. The second ADMM Three-Year Work Programme (2011-2013), which focuses on measures and activities in four areas, namely 1) strengthening regional defence and security cooperation; 2) enhancing existing practical cooperation and developing possible cooperation in defence and security; 3) promoting enhanced ties with Dialogue Partners; 4) shaping and sharing of norms.⁸

This forum issued Concept Paper on the Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and the Concept Paper on Defence Establishments and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) Cooperation on Non-Traditional Security. ASEAN member countries agree to share their concern on handling non-traditional security issues and to improve their operational actions in defense cooperation in order to enhance regional peace and security. The ADMM has also reassured its commitment to improve interaction at all levels and build a strong foundation to realise ASEAN Community and ASEAN Political-security Community (APSC).

III. The Reality of Strength and Weakness of ASEAN Security Community

There is deliberation over ASEAN's accomplishments and limitations as a framework for regional order building as well as significant conflict solution and prevention. One of this is its record to survive is association for

⁸ ASEAN Defense Minister, <http://www.aseansec.org/18816.htm>

more than 45 years. Another more important achievement of ASEAN is that this institutions has successful discouraged going war between the neighbor, although there was still minimal dispute remains such as between Thailand and Cambodia currently. This empirical evidence to avoid war is basic argument for the existence of Security Community. In Southeast Asia particularly this achievement is very important due to the historical conflicts and wars among the members. There is no doubt that these interpretations of the shared principles embodied in the ASEAN Security Community have greatly helped to establish and improve friendly relations between the nations of ASEAN.

In regard to the the dynamics of the international security environment, in particular the policies and rivalries of the great powers, China and the US that have influenced the region, has shaped the perceptions of ASEAN. In this context, ASEAN has served as a forum for its members to share their views on such issues and mediate the impact of these external factors on the region. In this way, it has developed policy initiatives that allow its member-states to adapt to changes in a rapidly evolving and changing international environment and to formulate a common approach to security based on norms and values that are shared by all of its members. This approach has helped the Association to limit the disadvantage imposed by this external dimension, while boosting their confidence through acting as a bloc, rather than as weak, individual states.

Even though the security cooperation between the ASEAN member states has been successful, obstacles remain that impede the ability of the nations to further their cooperative efforts. ASEAN has created numerous declarations and agreements at the highest level (the heads of government). These expressed a joint political commitment to combat regional threats. In the context of such a loose association of states, marked by considerable political, cultural, and historical diversity, the declaration had a powerful symbolic value that should not be too readily discounted. However, in terms of translating this will into policy achievements, the Declaration has largely remained emblematic of the Association's desires, rather than its ability to act.

One of the main obstacle is related to the norm of sovereignty. The member states has still preoccupied traditional Westphalian sovereignty which hamper genuine cross cooperation. This norms makes ASEAN has some incoherence with the value of humanitarian intervention. ASEAN states adopted the principle of state sovereignty in the context of their efforts to pursue nation building and state making. This was generally projected at two different levels of international relations. At one level, (and for most developing states in the Southeast Asia this was the more important consideration), non-intervention was a normative guarantee against superpower involvement in their internal affairs. At another level, it was represented as a political guarantee of peaceful relations between neighbouring states whose sovereign authority

was being challenged from within their own borders.

ASEAN states thus presume that an intervention applying force against any one of them will bring the credibility of the entire organization in to question. This is something that would endanger national security more than any internal problem. ASEAN states explicitly reject the norms of humanitarian intervention, because they recognise their vulnerability to such norms during the state-building process. They have deliberately limited the institutional power of ASEAN to prevent it from infringing on their sovereignty. In these circumstances, ASEAN member-states have been greatly concerned about each other's sovereignty. The UN sanctioned humanitarian intervention in East Timor, which has been led by Australia, has only strengthened the idea within ASEAN that intervention by external parties will jeopardise the territorial unity and legitimacy of the state. Another example of ASEAN's reluctant to infringe their sovereignty can be referred to member states action to Myanmar which has been argued by international community to violate human rights. Member states acting as a group have never condemed and strongly enforced Myanmar authoritarian rezim to change its policies in to more democratic system.

Within Southeast Asia rivalries and suspicions continue to exist in the form of thorny territorial disputes and domestic instabilities. Major concerns among member-states about ASEAN's ability to conceptualise and to deal with critical regional security issues.

Illustrative of these issues are problems relating to intra-ASEAN relations

More recently, transnational issues such as environmental protection, terrorism, piracy, avian influenza (H5N1), drugs and illegal migration have occupied a central position in the ASEAN security agenda. Individual Southeast Asian states and regional institutions generally lack the capacity to deal with such problems. In effort to secure the Mallaca Straits, even though the coordinated security cooperation between the littoral states (Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore) has been successful, obstacles remain that impede the ability of the three nations to further their cooperative efforts.

One of these obstacles, is the relatively informal nature underscoring much of the ongoing nature of cooperation. ASEAN overall remains a weak institution. A majority of Southeast Asian countries still lack high levels of domestic political consensus, technical expertise, financial resources and the political will within their own sovereign purviews to overcome their own national security threats, much less region-wide challenges. Traditional approaches such as the 'ASEAN Way' –are no longer suited to the demands of the contemporary international environment. Such approaches are perceived by analysts to have prevented ASEAN from acting effectively in meeting a diverse array of security challenges.

ADMM: srength and weakness. The establishment of ADMM annual conclave represents an important early step in the institutionalization of ASEAN. The future

function of the ADMM should also be a significant benchmark for the organization, especially considering that since its establishment, ASEAN has been reluctant to include any type of security cooperation as part of its core business. ASEAN business focuses more on politics and latter economics. In spite of the reason, to promote strong cooperation measures was very sensitive issues among them. ADMM, therefore provides a forum for robust security and military cooperations in order to bring more security and stability in the region. The creation of the ADMM and its work program should also eventually support the development of an explicit security community, as they commit to strengthen its cooperation to sustain ASEAN Community.

However, the ADDM initiative has, as well, its share of sceptical observers. They commit to promote dialogue and cooperation on securities and military issue. But what kind of dialogue and cooperation can occur? This is due to the many basic differences still evident between ASEAN members on various security issues including over its commitment of the members, the structure and purpose of their respective militaries. Several important questions need to be address it. Can member of the states able to implement the working program? Up to now there is no structure to comply its member to implement it. For example, in the first working plan (2007-2010) they agree to promote on conflict resolutions, conflict preventions, and post-conflict peace building. But, with several arms conflicts occurs recently including sovereignty conflict between Cambodia – Thailand, South China Sea, and

others border dispute among the member such as Indonesia-Malaysia, there is a lot of doubt that the member-state able to work in realise the work plan. For example, the welter of competitive overlapping claims to sovereignty and jurisdiction in the South China Sea has led to fears of escalating armed conflict and tests ASEAN cohesion in the face of growing Chinese powers.⁹ In the 20 ASEAN summit meeting on April 2012 in Pnom Penh, Cambodia, the ASEAN members-states has suspicious to Pnom Penh policies for not raising the case of controversial actions of China in South China Sea in to the ASEAN agenda. Some believe that China pressures to Cambodia has halted this country to bring the issues on the Summit agenda.

Therefore, the questions remain such as: How can they bridge their differences in securities issues when this issues related to national interests and sovereignty? Do they really want to share their securities concerns, and resources? Even If they have commonality in the securities concern, can they really able to cooperate in significant level and to operationalize it? In fact, most of every member states of ASEAN has depend on others non ASEAN members, particularly the US and China on securities and military issues. There is no doubt although numerous declaration, agreements and formal arrangements among the member have been established, but significant challenges for hampering closer cooperation still occurs among them.

⁹ Donald E. Weatherbee. 'Conflict and Conflict Resolutions in Southeast Asia'. In Donald E. Weatherbee (ed.) *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Authonomy*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2005.

To conclude, from a less critical perspective, the creation of the ADMM represents an important institutional step that has accelerated ASEAN's commitment to a higher level of security cooperation. This represents an important initial move in developing a security community in Southeast Asia and support global security governance. It is however still pessimistic to see the significant result of numerous agreement of ADMM to realize more robust security cooperation immediately when serious security and military conflicts and disputes still happened among Southeast Asian countries.

IV. UNASUR and its South American Defense Council

Established formally in May 2008, the Union of South American Nations (in Spanish, UNASUR) is an integration scheme formed by twelve countries in South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. This organization came into being in March 2011 when its Constitutive Treaty was ratified by nine of its Member States¹⁰.

Thus, UNASUR adds to the existing large number of sub-regional initiatives in South America. It should be remembered that, beyond the *Southern Common Market* (in Spanish, MERCOSUR)¹¹ and the *Community of Andean*

Nations (CAN)¹², still persist other projects as the *Organization of American States* (OAS), *Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of America - Treaty of Commerce of the People* (in Spanish, ALBA-TCP)¹³, the *Latin American Integration Association* (in Spanish, ALADI)¹⁴, the *Latin American and the Caribbean Economic System* (in Spanish, SELA)¹⁵ and many others.

In the case of defense, there is great diversity of arrangements and mechanisms -in the bilateral, sub regional, regional and hemispheric levels- in South America which range from the construction and strengthening of confidence building measures (such as the exchange of experiences on the development of doctrine and documents of national defense policy; exchanges, formation and staff training in the defense area; joint/combined military exercises; participation in joint/combined Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations) until the pursuit of a higher complementarily among the defense industries, tending to the development of a production of dual-use capabilities. That kind of capabilities could be used, for example, to face with natural disasters or humanitarian assistance (such is the case of the activities carried between Argentina and Brazil in the areas of land, naval

incorporation has not yet been ratified by the Paraguayan parliament.

¹² CAN is made up of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.

¹³ ALBA – TCP is constituted by Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vicente and Granadinas, and Venezuela.

¹⁴ The member countries of the ALADI are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

¹⁵ SELA is made up of Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Granada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

¹⁰ As will be seen in this paper, although UNASUR came into force legally in 2011, its real action began, *ipso facto* right when the countries signed its Treaty in 2008. From then onward, UNASUR began to make numerous interventions in the region, even though its founding document had not yet been ratified.

¹¹ MERCOSUR is formed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay as full members. Venezuela has joined the bloc, but its

and aeronautical¹⁶) and, also, they could be generate employment.

But cooperation projects in the field of Defense does not represent something new in region. In fact, along the history of South America several military cooperation initiatives have took place. There have been since circumstantial alliances which unfortunately unleashed in armed conflicts (such is the case, among others, of the association between Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay during the "War of the Triple Alliance" against Paraguay) until the establishment of multilateral mechanisms designed to ensure the protection of the region against "external threats" to it (for example, the signature of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance -Rio Treaty- in 1947).

The truth is that, beyond the different strategies to address them, the countries that conform the international system -and South America is no exception to the rule- have historically given to the defense a privileged level in the configuration of their respective agendas¹⁷, even though our region would not share the same sources of insecurity that the Central Powers or similar needs or have different capabilities to protect themselves.

IV. 1 South American Defense Council (SADC)

IV.1.a Background

The proposal to create a SADC was initially driven by the Brazilian government and,

with that goal, the defense minister of that country -Nelson Jobim-, started a travel trough Latina America taking meetings with his peers in the subcontinent. This occurred in the beginning of 2008 and the Brazilian maximum objective was to approve the establishment of the SADC on the same day of the signature of the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR (May 23, 2008).

The minimum target involved the call for a Working Group who be in charge to elaborate a proposed of SADC Statute, which should be to the consideration of the Council of Heads of State of UNASUR for its approval.

Finally, during the May 23 the leaders of the region decided to join efforts in the last sense. The Working Group -composed by representatives of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs of the twelve countries- met on four occasions in Santiago, the capital city of Chile, country who exercised the Presidency Pro Tempore of the UNASUR for those times. The final meeting was held in December 2008, being its outcome a draft statute that was finally adopted by heads of state of UNASUR the 16th of that month.

The novelty of this cooperation defense mechanism is that it has been installed in a context which presented several complexities for South America. While, on the one hand, the region has experienced a state of simultaneous homogeneity of democratic regimes that remain over time, on the other, the SADC emerged in a period characterized by the restructuring of the Brazilian defense industry, the attempt to use Colombian bases by American troops, the restoration of the United States Fourth Fleet,

¹⁶ Complementary Protocol to the Framework Agreement on Cooperation in the field of defense between Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil, 2008.

¹⁷ Morgenthau, Hans (1986). *Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Grupo Editor Latinoamericano Buenos Aires.

the promulgation of the U.S. White Paper of the Air Mobility Command and the United States Southern Command Strategy (USSOUTHCOM) for 2018.

IV.1.b SADC 's architecture

As a result of that negotiations, the SADC has adopted a flexible institutional composition. It was created created like as forum of consulting, cooperation and coordination in defense matters. In this sense, the Brazilian perspective -similar to the perspective of the majority of the others countries- gained more strength than the Venezuelan proposal. In this regard, while the Venezuelan delegation proposed the creation of a *South Atlantic Treaty Organization* (a kind of South American NATO), the Brazilian representation proposed that the organization acquired an supple anatomy who avoided thinking about the SADC as a military alliance.

In this context, it could be argued that the Council it could be incorporated within the commonly called "Cooperative Security" in "which states identify positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all"¹⁸.

The SADC does not involve the construction of a collective security system¹⁹, is just a simply a forum for defense cooperation. It was created in order to build consensus to deepen regional cooperation in defense. Its creation aimed mainly to achieve the overall objective of

consolidating South America as a peace zone as a basis for democratic stability and the development of their peoples, and to contribute to world peace. It also aimed to build a common South American identity on defense that contributes to strengthening the unity of the region²⁰.

This Council is chaired by the Ministers of Defense, accompanied by senior representatives of the foreign ministries of the twelve countries of UNASUR. It has ordinary sessions annually but has an executive body composed of the Deputy Ministers of Defense who meet each six months.

IV. 1. c Action Plan

The South American Defense Council has diagrammed its activities in the framework of the so called "Action Plans". In November 11, 2011, the Ministers of Defense approved the Action Plan 2012, which is divided into four main areas: Defense Policies; Military Cooperation, Humanitarian Actions and Peacekeeping Operations; Defense Industry and Technology; and Education and Training.

IV. 1. d Strengths and weaknesses

As a forum for cooperation in defense, the creation of the South American Defense Council has had highly positive impact on the regional integration process faced by UNASUR.

Not only has allowed that representatives of the Defense areas gather to discuss systematically issues of regional, subregional or bilateral concern. It has

¹⁸ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics", *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), p. 400.

¹⁹ Henry Kissinger says that the idea of "collective security" - theoretically- to resist and threat against the peace against any of the members of the system (Kissinger, 2011).

²⁰ Statute of the South American Defense Council, art. 4 (december 2008). Retrieved from Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano: http://www.cdsunasur.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=78&Itemid=188&lang=es

achieved, in fact, develop concrete actions. For example, within it has been generated an important document of Confidence Building Measures that allow to decrease the levels of tension that erupted in the region after the signing of the agreement between Colombia and the United States in 2008 from which troops of this last country would make use of military bases in Colombia.

Also, in the second ordinary meeting of the council of Defense Ministers, held on May 6 and 7, 2009, it was agreed the creation of a "Center for Strategic Studies on Defense" with its headquarters in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Its main goal is to "create a regional-level strategic thought, which contributes to the coordination and harmonization in the defense policies in South America"²¹. One of the most remarkable ingredients of this Center is that its constitution represents the creation of the second permanent agency created in UNASUR, after the General Secretariat.

But beyond those sort of important actions, there are many factors that still hinder the deepening of regional schemes on defense, such as the SADC. Among them, have particular relevance: the regulatory differences; the high armament dependence from extra regional suppliers; the persistence of anachronistic views about potential intra-regional military conflicts in some sectors of the political and military establishment; the political institutional frailties; and the role of the presidency of the Council.

Regulatory differences: SADC member countries differ, among other things, in regard to the organizational and normative characteristics of their Defense systems. Such is the case, for example, of the separation between the functions of internal security and external defense or the different levels of control and civil conduction of the defense and the armed forces. While in South America the armed forces fulfill primarily external security roles (mainly in cases as Argentina, Chile and Uruguay), in cases as Colombia, Peru, Venezuela or Brazil they have been constantly implemented to combat internals problematic. How can twelve countries increase their levels of cooperation in Defense when each of them have their own definition about the concept of Defense? The different conceptions of the Defense term have important consequences in the implementation of the Armed Forces and in the possibilities to increase the multilateral cooperation in South America. In many cases, the regulatory norms of some countries could threaten the regulatory norms of the others. It was the case, for example, when Colombia -during the negotiations of the Statute of the SADC- tried to include the combat against internal insurgences as a subject of the Council. That kind of functions are forbidden for the Argentinean, Chilean or Uruguayan and could violate their legal systems.

Extraregional Dependency: any South American company is located between the leading producers of weapons and no South American country ranks among the largest sellers. According to the latest report of

²¹Constitution of South American Center for Strategic Studies for Defense (2010).

the *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute* (SIPRI)²² this list is headed by, as might be expected, United States -holding a 30 percent of the world market-, follows by Russia with a 23 percent and Germany with a 11 percent. Then we find France and Great Britain with portions of 7 and 4 percent of the market, respectively. Also, seven of the ten largest arms-producing companies are from the U.S.²³. The other three? - European²⁴.

Furthermore it is necessary to add that the weapons systems of South American countries are highly dependent on inputs from outside the region. This becomes easily perceptible in the aeronautical area (whether of combat, training or transportation aircraft) where the presence of the United States, France, Spain and Israel is immense. In Argentina, most of the aircraft were made in United States or in France²⁵. In Chile, the matrix is quintessentially American²⁶. Even Brazil -which in recent years has fallen off markedly from the other countries of the region in this area for the growth of Embraer- has French fighters -Dassault Mirage 2000- and American airplanes -like Boeing, Learjet and C-130 Hercules-.

And even more difficult is that even the aircraft built in the region itself requires essential inputs which are outside the subcontinent. The Embraer *Tucanos* and

Supertucanos -that are being exporting to countries like Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Dominican Republic and, soon, United States- are comprised of avionics systems of the Israeli ElbitSystems, PT6A-68A turboprop of the Canadian Pratt & Whitney and Hartzell's propellers made in U.S. Dependence similar schemes fall on the Argentines *Pampa* or *Pucara*, Chileans *Pillán*, Peruvians *Kuntur* or Colombians T-90 Calima.

Anachronistic perspectives: beyond the demonstrated trajectory of peaceful resolution of disputes in South America, still exists in the imaginary of certain political and military sectors the outdated perception of a potential military conflict with the neighboring countries could explode in some moment. This is evident in the Andean region, where, recurrently, some officials refer to the eventual outbreak of war between Colombia and Ecuador and Colombia and Venezuela or when troops and material resources are regrouped in border areas in the middle of political tensions between some of the governments.

Institutional Vulnerabilities: the SADC, like the majority of South American regional institutions, is heavily dependent on the political will of the governments in power and of the affinities between them. The principle of unanimity in decision-making process implies that a project can disappear with a single dissenting vote. To this should be added that there is no institutional mechanism of "rewards and punishments" that forces the States to respect the agreements signed.

²² SIPRI. *Yearbook, 2011. Armaments, disarmament, and International Security*. Available in www.sipri.org

²³ Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Raytheon, L-3 Communications and United Technologies.

²⁴ BAE Systems, EADS y Finmeccanica.

²⁵ Argentina has incorporated Lockheed Martin A-4AR Fightinghawk, B-45 Mentor Gates Bombardier, Learjet LJ-35A and Lockheed KC-130 Hercules- from U.S. and Mirage and Aerospatiale SA 315B Lama from France, among others.

²⁶ F-16 Fighting Falcon from Lockheed Martin, F-5E Tiger III from Northrop, C-130 Hércules, Boeing 767 or Learjet 35.

Presidential role: the SADC depends deeply of the actions of the President Pro Tempore. This was demonstrated by the enormous progress of the SADC along the presidences of Chile and Ecuador (2008-2009 and 2009-2010, respectively) and the significant complications during the administration of Guyana (2010-2011). During the administration of Georgetown, the lack of financial, physical and human resources caused the presidency passed into the hands of Peru. However, not only much time was lost in the transition and implementation of the Council but also Peru assumed this responsibility in an election year, changing the government in the middle of it terms.

V. Common issues, shared weaknesses: the need to know each other.

Incredible, but real. Although integration processes in Southeast Asia and South America share common concerns and face similar problems, little has been done to approach experiences and look for channels of dialogue between both sub-continent until now.

Much effort has been made trying to examine the European model, but little has been done in order to seek other alternatives or attempting to find other stories. And in them usually we find the same conclusions. The European system is the adult and the other ones are teenagers. The regional institutions in Southeast Asia and South America has not established commonalities of ideology, social, politics and strong levels of interdependence like in the European continent. The same thing

can be pointed out when we try to analyze successful schemes in international security matters. Researches from both Asia and South America use to be focused in NATO and, in some cases, in the European Common Security and Defense Policy (ECSDP). Nothing else.

However, this paper has tried, as a first and brief approach, to break that tendency and to explore how each region has created its own regional institutions, mainly in defense and security terms. In this regard, we could observed that they have established initiatives contributing to the strengthening of peace and regional confidence. Paying attention to the cases of the ASEAN Security Community and the South American Defense Council, is easy to detect more similarities between them than among them and the European project. It could be appreciated, for example, when the institutionalization problems and steps taken by ADMM and SADC are studied.

It could also be argued that development of regionalization in the world should be treated as unique. The history of colonialism, the geopolitical strategies of the regions, including temporary threats to both regions have differentiated between European Security and Defense Policy Institutionalization to ASEAN and UNASUR. ASEAN and UNASUR cannot and will not be able to follow the steps of the EU in the process of institutionalization even though the regions have similar aims to create regional security and to support global security. Every region has their own capacities and characteristics to

develop their norms and ways to institutionalize their regionalism.

The significance of both, however, is not restricted to the regional level. In fact, if the two institutions succeed in consolidating themselves, both might be extremely useful as a contribution to "global governance". Institutionalization of global security and stability can be dealt through supporting regional institutions. Regional institutions in ASEAN and UNASUR has envisaged their member states to institutionalize democratization, good governance and to build norms of conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Any modification of Karl Deutsch thesis of security community which much heavily taken from the European experiences, therefore need to be appreciated and explored.

The importance of this issue is something that worth to be stressed. Their actions are highly useful to developed confidence building measures, in order to increase the levels of bilateral and multilateral sub-regional cooperation and for the peacefully resolution of disputes, guarantee the political control over the armed forces, among other things. In addition, both areas share the fact of having to cohabitate with great powers: the United States in the case of UNASUR, China and US in ASEAN. Coexistence with big powers is presented as a factor that motivates, in either case, the strengthening of relations between the countries of South America and Southeast Asia.

Furthermore, the two regions have significant roles regarding their contribution in managing global security. Both regions are

categorized as: (1) a center for global war on drugs and terrorism (in the case of UNASUR, this is not a competence of the SADC, but is the main function of the Council to Fight Drug Trafficking); (2) a significant area for preserving the nature and ecosystem in order to reduce global warming; (3) an area where channels of dialogue to guarantee the peace in the zone have been established; (4) a zone with strong dependence to major countries for security capacity building.

Of course the two organizations presented divergences among themselves. The South American Defense Council is newer than the ASEAN Security Community and while the former has no competence in matters such as pressure to combat drug trafficking, it did have the Asian version such as to struggle with terrorist acts. It has also become clear that each region has obviously its own challenges and histories.

In this respect, along this work it can be appreciated that the study cases should be addressed to overcome the current institutional weakness, the enormous levels of armaments and technological dependence, the ideas of traditional state sovereignty and the consequent importance of the political wills in the destiny of the integration process.

For these reasons, this has been the first step in a process which intends to bring together two sub-continent that are so far away geographically but, at the same time, offers great potential. There is a long way to go and, of course, this will not be a simple task. It will demand innovative and robust research

and policy making. But why shouldn't we travel this path together?

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Shift in Global Geopolitics: Implications for the Middle East and the South Caucasus.

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The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of the new era in international relations the main feature of which was unipolarity and almost absolutely uncontested hegemony of the United States. Many experts argued that this new situation will last long enough as in the midterm perspective no power could change the equilibrium.

Meanwhile, since the beginning of the twenty first century the US has started to lose at least some of his influence and also capabilities to project power globally. This tendency was accelerated by the financial crisis which mainly hit the United States and Europe. Simultaneously China and some other powers were gaining momentum. This new equilibrium will have implications for all regions but especially it may spur more tensions in such a

volatile region as the Middle East with its long history of conflicts and current developments such as “Arab Spring”, uncertainty in Iran nuclear program, changes in Turkish foreign policy, the Kurdish issue, etc.

The South Caucasus is bordering the Middle East and is the crossroad of the interests for Russia, Turkey, Iran and also for the EU taking into account the vast energy resources in Central Asia (especially natural gas in Turkmenistan) which may be brought to the EU bypassing Russia via the South Caucasus and thus diminishing the EU dependence on Russian energy resources. The region has its own problems such as frozen conflicts in Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh and South Ossetia.

This paper will argue that the shift in the global geopolitics and the possible diminishing role of the United States in the region will make the Middle East more volatile and more prone to conflicts. It also will raise the influence of regional powers such as Iran, Turkey and Russia, and may resulted in the competition between them for gaining more impact. These developments may have serious ramifications for US and EU long term interests in the promotion of stability and sustainable development.

US and EU vital interests require consistent involvement in the region despite the lack of resources and more focus on Asia pacific region as a pivotal for American interests.

The Geopolitics of the Middle East in 2003-2008. Main trends

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The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 changed the geopolitical equilibrium in the Middle East. Till 2003 the most significant value in the region was the stability. For the sake of stability democracy, human rights and other features of modern liberal society very abandoned by regional and external powers, particularly by the US. The huge support to countries like Egypt by the US was based on this perception. Since 2003 the US has started to implement the policy of the Middle East transformation with the focus on promotion of democracy. The official articulation of this policy was done by President Bush in his November 2003 speech at the National Endowment for Democracy¹. This new policy triggered waves of changes in the region including the creation of de facto independent Kurdish state in the Northern Iraq, it also was one of the reason for change in the Turkish foreign Policy toward more close relations with Russia and states like Iran and Syria².

Meanwhile, the strong American presence in the region was an important pillar for preserving relative stability. In 2007 more than 160.000 American troops were deployed in Iraq thus giving the US strong influence. The creation of de facto independent Kurdish state in the Northern Iraq was another pillar of the American power. Kurds have at least not friendly relations with neighboring countries such as Turkey, Iran, and Syria due to large Kurdish communities there and the United

States was the main partner of the Kurds. The importance of US - Kurdish relations was emphasized by two visits of Kurdish Autonomous region President Barzani to Washington and meetings with President George Bush in 2005 and 2007. Meanwhile strong American presence in Iraq also restrains Iran's capabilities to project its power using Shia majority of Iraq.

The Sunny monarchies of the Middle East also were interested in the strong American involvement in the region as they saw Washington as the main shield against possible rising of Iranian influence. Simultaneously American engagement in the region was one of the key factors of Israel's security which is the strategic partner of the US in the Middle East.

The US presence in the Middle East was important for balancing the Turkish rising influence in the region. The ruling AKP party in the Turkey declared new foreign policy of "Zero problems with neighbors" activating its relations with such countries as Iran and Syria. Simultaneously the Turkish – US and Turkish - Israeli relations started to deteriorate due to the refusal of Turkish authorities to allow American troops to open second front against Iraq from the Turkish territory in 2003 and due to active support of the Turkish Government to Palestinians.

The Iran nuclear program was another reason for the strong US presence in the region. Despite the assurances from Iranian side that its nuclear program had only peaceful aims and did not focus on the creation of nuclear weapon, at least the western powers and

¹ Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, Nov. 6, 2003, <http://www.ned.org/george-w-bush/remarks-by-president-george-w-bush-at-the-20th-anniversary>.

² F. Stephen Larrabee, Troubled Partnership: U.S. - Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG899.pdf.

especially the US, plus Israel, Saudi Arabia and Gulf States had serious doubts about program's real purposes. The strong US presence in Iraq and Afghanistan gave America some necessary leverage in dealing with Iran.

Strong US engagement in this volatile region was important for preserving some stability which had not only geopolitical but also economic importance taking into account the vast oil resources in the region.

Some experts and analysts argue that US hyper presence in the region had destabilizing effect as US policy was unbalanced and triggered much controversy and counter steps by such states as Iran and Syria. In any case, it's clear, that even the "enemies" of the US somehow need a strong American presence in the region as the US plays the role of checks and balances in the region. It should not be surprising that even during George Bush Presidency the US and Iran had some cooperation on Afghanistan. US presence created a more predictable situation which made much easier for different powers to make right calculations regarding their policy options.

U.S. involvement in the South Caucasus

The South Caucasus is bordering Iran, Russia and Turkey and may serve as a corridor for Caspian energy resources (especially natural gas from Turkmenistan) transfer to Europe bypassing Russia. Meanwhile it should be stressed that US has little direct involvement in the region. The US is among co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group dealing with the Karabakh conflict; also since 2003 Rose revolution

Washington supports the new government of Georgia in its efforts to implement necessary reforms toward more western style state building. The main interests of the US in the South Caucasus are to preserve the stability, support the creation of southern energy corridor from Caspian Sea to Europe. It should be emphasized that the US yielded tangible efforts in construction of Azerbaijan - Georgia - Turkey gas and oil pipelines in the mid 2000's.

As for the South Caucasus republics Georgia considers the US as the main partner and defender especially with its relations with Russia, Azerbaijan perceives the US as a power which can guarantee the implementation of its energy export plans. Armenia believes that US involvement in the region could help Yerevan to decrease its dependence over Russia. Armenia also relies on the strong Armenian lobby in Washington which mainly deals with the issues of US support to Armenia and also yielding pressure on Turkey by promoting the Armenian Genocide recognition process in the US Congress.

Current shift in Global Geopolitics

The 2008 global financial crisis, which mainly affected the Western countries, marked the end of the unipolar system which was created aftermath of the Cold War. Even before September 2008 which is largely perceived as the starting point of the crisis, some experts were arguing that the US entered the phase of the decline which in combination with the rise of other powers such as China, India, Brazil would have huge implications for global governance and will shift the centre of power in international

relations from the Western hemisphere to Asia. There were plenty of definitions on what will like the upcoming system of international relations, Fareed Zakaria called it post - American world. CFR President Richard Haass in his paper published in May/June 2008 issue of Foreign Affairs called it The Age of Nonpolarity³. Despite the differences in definitions all agreed that American hegemony should be either changed or at least transformed.

The Obama administration which came into power in 2009 tried to accommodate these changes by accepting more multilateral approach in its foreign policy. Obama launched the reset process with Russia, tried to reach Iran, withdrew American troops from Iraq and put a timetable for withdrawing American troops from Afghanistan. Obama had to deal with huge national debt and budget deficit, which was increased due to bail outs of several American financial institutions. Meanwhile the Asian powers especially China and India are continuing their rise making American hegemony even more problematic. The reflections of current situation in international affairs can be well seen in the new American defense strategy which was published in January 2012. In this document the US emphasized that while the US military will continue to promote security globally, America will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia Pacific region. Meanwhile, the new strategy stressed that over the long term China's emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect US economy and security in

various ways. Therefore the US will continue to make necessary investments to maintain regional access and to operate freely in the region.

The rebalance of the US military power which is the result of both global geopolitical shifts and financial restraints facing by America will have important implications for many regions of the world. The new defense strategy envisages that the US will pivot to the Asia-Pacific but hedge against unexpected threats elsewhere, particularly in the Greater Middle East. The lack of financial resources and possible shifts in China's foreign policy toward more assertive options in the Pacific region may compel the US to redistribute its resources and mainly concentrate in the Pacific trying to contain China developing strong relations with its key allies in the region like Japan, South Korea and Australia.

Meanwhile any significant decrease of the American involvement in the Middle East could have serious implications not only for the region but also for both the US and overall western influence. This will indirectly affect the South Caucasus too as the region is already involved in the Greater Middle East geopolitics and is being affected by the changes taking place there.

America's decline: Possible Implications for the Middle East and the South Caucasus

The Middle East continues to be one of the most volatile regions of the world. The Israeli-Palestinian unresolved conflict, the Sunni – Shia competition led by Saudi Arabia and Iran,

³ Richard Haass, The Age of Nonpolarity, What will follow U.S. Dominance, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63397/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity?page=show>

“Arab spring” with its uncertain consequences, Iran nuclear program, the civil war that is underway in Syria, the Kurdish problem - all those make eruption of violence with spillover effects more possible.

The Israeli – Palestinian negotiations are in deadlock. Three years of efforts by Obama administration did not bring any tangible results. The last effort of Obama was his speech on May 19, 2011 when he outlined his vision of settlement⁴ but that offer was rejected by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in his speech in the US Congress on May 24⁵. In any case, the US strong involvement in the negotiation process is the firm guarantee that no large scale hostilities between Palestinian autonomy and Israel will be launched, especially with HAMAS controlled Gaza Strip. The decline of the American influence may resulted in more hard position from Palestinian side as the US is perceived as a main security guarantor of Israel and these developments could make any prospect of settlement even more complicated.

The Sunni Shia rivalry in the region also has the potential of violent conflicts between two camps. The some features of that violence are now seen in Bahrain where Shia majority tries to overthrow the Sunni royal family. The Sunny monarchies of the region which are united in the Gulf Cooperation council organization perceive the US as the main guarantor of the security against Iranian led Shia influence and

any reduce in US involvement of the region will compel these countries to find alternative solutions to their security concerns which in its turn may add more tensions in the region. The US withdrawal may be perceived by the Iranian authorities as a good sign to implement more assertive policy toward its Sunni neighbors.

The uncertainty on prospects of Iran nuclear program is another reason of strained relations in the region. The other regional powers who are not interested in the nuclear armed Iran believe that the US has an ability to stop Tehran. Any sign of US weakness may trigger nuclear arm race in the region, as at least Saudi Arabia, Turkey and may be even Egypt has the potential to have their own nuclear weapons as deterrence against Iranian nuclear threat, and also it will make preemptive Israeli strike with unpredictable implications more possible.

The Kurdish problem is also has direct connections with the American influence in the region. The de facto independent Kurdish state in the Northern part of Iraq has been established mainly with US and Israeli support. The Kurds are natural allies for the US and Israel as they have problems with Iran, Turkey and Syria, as well as with Baghdad central government. But strong US involvement in the region is the guarantee that leaders of the Kurdish Autonomy in the Northern Iraq will not make unexpected steps towards de jure independence, which may further complicate situation in the region and resulted in the regional conflict with the involvement of Turkey, Iran and even Israel.

⁴ President Obama's Middle East Speech, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20064356-503544.html

⁵ Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's address to Congress, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/israeli-prime-minister-binyamin-netanyahus-address-to-congress/2011/05/24/AFWY5bAH_story.html

The relative decline of US influence in the Middle East will have indirect implications also for the South Caucasus. It will undermine Georgia's position in the region because America is perceived as the main guarantor of the continuation of the current Georgian policy toward close cooperation with the Euro - Atlantic institutions. American support was once more reiterated during 2012 January 30 meeting between Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and US President Barack Obama⁶. Otherwise Georgia will feel itself more vulnerable against assertive Russia under the Putin's third term.

Azerbaijan perceives US as a partner in promoting energy supply routes diversifications in the region, which serves Azerbaijani national interests. The US strongly supported construction of Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan oil and Baku - Tbilisi - Erzurum Gas pipelines, and Azerbaijan hopes it will promote also the construction of NABUCCO gas pipeline which should bring Azerbaijani and possibly also Iraqi and Turkmen gas to Europe via Turkey bypassing Russia. US abstention from the region could make Azerbaijan to recalculate its involvement in the southern energy corridor and prefer Russia as the main export route for its resources.

Armenia is Russia's strategic partner and the key ally in the South Caucasus. A Russian military base is deployed in Armenia. Armenia also is the member of Russia dominated

Collective Security Treaty Organization. Meanwhile, it is obvious that Armenia should diversify its foreign policy as the overdependence on Russia narrows Armenia's choices. Armenia attempts to cultivate strong relations with Euro -Atlantic institutions particularly with NATO in the late 2011 signing the third Individual Partnership Action Plan with Alliance covering period of 2012 – 2013. Armenia perceives the US role pivotal in promoting more diverse foreign policy due not only to the US leadership position in the world but also to the strong Armenian - American Diaspora which yields some influence in the US Congress. The diminishing of US involvement in the Middle East could complicate Armenia's efforts toward more diversified foreign policy.

Thus, all the South Caucasian republics are interested at least in the preservation of the current level of US engagement in the region, but definitely the more desirable option for them is the further US involvement. Otherwise, region will be fully controlled by Russia, Turkey and somehow Iran. The Turkish suggestion in 2008 to create the Platform for Stability and Democracy in the Caucasus with 3+2 format (Russia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) was perceived by many analysts as a clear message of Turkish government to Russia that it was ready to divide the South Caucasus into two zones on influence and reduced the involvement of both the Western powers and Iran. The decline of the US involvement in the region will only make Armenia more dependent on Russia with not very predictable implications at least in the midterm future.

⁶ Remarks by President Obama and President Saakashvili of Georgia after Bilateral Meeting, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/30/remarks-president-obama-and-president-saakashvili-georgia-after-bilatera>

Another aspect of possible decline of America's influence in the region is connected with the power vacuum which that process will definitely create. The current global international system is based on America's ability to protect the common rules of the game which at least by majority of players perceived as essential tools for promoting public good. The strong American influence in the Middle East contributes to the at least relative stability in the region. The American withdrawal will require more burden sharing and more involvement from other international players such as China, the EU, India, and Russia. Meanwhile, it should be emphasized that none of the above mentioned powers has necessary capabilities to be involved in the Middle Eastern mess. The power vacuum created by the decline of American influence will not be filled and that situation will contribute to the destabilization of the region.

Conclusions

The Middle East continues to be one of the most volatile regions of the world. The strong US positions in the Middle East is the key pillar for preserving relative stability in the region. The US mainly plays not only the role of collective goods' provider, but also that of the balancer, thus preventing the region from the jump to the chaos. Any substantial reducing of US involvement in the region may crack the regional balance of powers and trigger

conflicts with possible spillover effects. These developments could jeopardize US interests in the region and as a consequence could compel America to spend much more resources for regaining its positions. Any significant reduction of the American involvement in the Middle East should be carefully calculated and evaluated for avoiding any serious damage both for the US and for the region.



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***The Emerging Deterrence System in the
Middle East: Modeling Scenarios***

The development of the Iranian nuclear program continues to rank highly among the challenges to international security. This winter was marked with a number of statements, made by US and Israeli officials that a military operation against the Islamic Republic remains on the table as a contingency plan for dealing with Iran. The corresponding discussion also was started in the pages of "Foreign Affairs", highlighting the positions of the advocates and the opponents of the military operation. At the same time, while the US officially still supports a way of negotiations and non-military form of coercion, special attention should be paid to Israel, the unofficial and the only nuclear state in the Middle East today. It is not a secret that Tel-Aviv regards a nuclear Iran as an existential threat, referring to the popular slogan of the Islamic authority, that "Israel must be wiped off the map." Considering the possibility of a

nuclear Iran, security in the Middle East looks increasingly fragile, both from the perspective of the possible military operation against Iran before it goes nuclear as well as from the perspective of a potential nuclear rivalry between Tehran and Tel-Aviv. Therefore continuing the debates on the role of military force dealing with Iran, three options will be considered: a) United States' or Israel's potential to coerce Iran away from acquiring nuclear weapons; b) a preventive military operation against Iran; c) a nuclear deterrence relationship applied to the virtual model of a nuclear Iran, which may become reality in the near future. Consequently, we will go through the following pre-deterrence and deterrence models:

1. The effectiveness of the coercive strategy against Iran, from the side of both Israel and the United States;
2. The effectiveness and the results of Israeli or US pre-emptive actions against Iran;
3. The possibility of stable nuclear deterrence emerging between Iran and Israel.
4. The possibility of the stable deterrence of Iran within the model of US extended deterrence guarantees provided to Israel.

The analysis of the scenarios, introduced in this research, sums up the idea of a new, emerging nuclear state in the Middle East. The last case may also be interesting as the litmus test of deterrence theory transformations in the twenty-first century.

Coercion Plan

Leaving the economic tools of

influence behind (as many works have already been focused on this issue), the main attention will be devoted to the role of the military pressure. The analysis of pre-deterrence models in the Middle East suggests that it is hardly possible for Israel or the United States to block Iran's potential decision to cross the nuclear threshold, by threatening the use of force. Coercion is likely to be ineffective and even damaging due to the risk of misperception, which could catalyze Iranian nuclear ambitions. Israel or the United States runs a great risk of aggravating the situation by drawing "red lines", which might be regarded by an adversary as a direct security threat. The term "red lines" usually refers to the boundaries that a state sets to its opponent, warning that crossing these boundaries will result in a military response. In the absence of stable diplomatic channels with Iran, the warnings of Israel or even the US that it will launch a preventive strike if Tehran steps over the nuclear threshold might be interpreted by the Iranian side as direct security threats. In turn, Iran might try to avert those threat by: 1) blocking the Strait of Hormuz, as a deterrent measure aimed at demonstrating the possible consequences of military conflict with the Islamic Republic; 2) using the asymmetric preemptive strategy, such as prompting its proxies (such as Hamas or Hezbollah) terrorist activities to divert Israeli attention from attacking Iran; 3) acquiring nuclear weapons as fast as possible for the deterrence purposes.

The main obstacle for the successful coercive strategy in the Middle East is the absence of any institutionalized regional process for adversaries to ensure structured communications on a routine basis outside of formal political channels. In case of Iran and Israel, or Iran and the United States it might be a real problem. Here it is worth quoting Robert Jervis saying that "...states sometimes fail to deploy threats that would benefit them and ... probably more numerous occasions employ threats that provoke rather than deter". Referring to the Matthew Kroening's famous article "Time to attack Iran" it seems reasonable to argue his thesis about the possibility "to reassure the Iranian regime" before the military operation starts that the Washington is interested only in destroying Iran's nuclear program", not in regime change. The idea that the main motivation of the West is regime change in Tehran, hidden under the debates about the Iranian nuclear program, is definitely popular today in Iran. That is why any attempt to "reassure" Iran might be met with the deepest distrust of the Iranian authorities. Moreover the phenomenon of theory-driven information processing may take place. This refers to the tendency of certain individuals to hear only what they would like to hear, illustrated by the famous meeting of Saddam Hussein and US ambassador April Glaspie, who having tried to avert Iraq from attacking Kuwait, got the opposite result. On one hand Iran's situation might be regarded as more

optimistic because of the collective leadership of the country, on the other it seems that the interests of the Iranian beurocracy today are drifting towards radical conservatism. Also, taking in consideration the peculiarities of the Iranian strategic culture, based on cult of victimhood, deep distrust to the hostile strategic environment and high national pride, there is reason to believe that the US or Israeli coercive threats might be viewed as an attempt to deceive Tehran, aiming to mitigate the high costs of Persian resistance.

Thus the attempt to manipulate Tehran by the use of force coming from the United States or Israel, who are often associated with the “Big” or “Small Satan” might push Iran towards preemptive military actions, aimed to take place before Iran will be disarmed by the first US or Israeli airstrike.

Preventive Military Operation

This variant of actions runs the high risk of failure due to the wide dispersal of Iran’s nuclear installations throughout the country and their comparative invulnerability due to the adequate hardening. Advocating the necessity to start the military operation against Iran, Kroening refers to the formidable efficacy of the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, able to destroy the deepest targets. However, there are two questions here. The first is whether all Iranian nuclear installations are known at present, and the second is the

consequences of using MOP against Iranian nuclear installations and the storages of chemical weapons. Might this create an unprecedented environmental catastrophe in the region?

Continuing the debate in “Foreign Affairs” for Colin H. Kahl argues Kroening’s idea, that the destruction of the Iranian nuclear facilities might prevent Tehran from further nuclear development, referring to the Iraqi precedent which after 1981 continued clandestine development of its nuclear program. Also, Kahl supposes that after the beginning of the conflict Iran might launch a quick all-out response attack without any care for the “red lines”, trying to act preemptively against US military bases and also Israel.

There is a ground to believe that Israeli military airstrike against Iran won’t be effective due to the number of the abovementioned factors and also to the fact that the Israeli air force – unless it could use bases in Azerbaijan to which it has been given limited access – would have to mount its attacks over long distances controlled by hostile states. It would have to overcome a formidable Russian-supplied air defense system, running a high risk to provoke Iranian military response, also stimulating the development of its military nuclear program.

As for the military operation of the United States against Iran, it has a high chance of being ineffective without a full-scale ground operation. However, such an

operation might turn into a catastrophe for the US economy and even undermine the US position as the world superpower. Moreover, a military operation against Iran can have a number of further consequences, such as the following: 1) Iran may block the Strait of Hormuz, destabilizing the world oil market, raising the price of oil twice or even more, and seriously aggravating the world economic crisis. 2) Iranian society may rally around the regime, raising radical resistance moods and general support to acquire nuclear weapons as soon as possible. 3) Iran may withdraw from the NPT. 4) Iran may develop and implement asymmetric war strategies. Besides the increase of activities from terrorist organizations, it is probable to expect a guerilla war (in the case of ground operations) as well as something like the “human waves” Iran used during the war with Iraq. 5) The conflict may escalate due to potential UAE and Syrian interference in the war, trying to resolve their own territorial problems with Iran or Israel. Here while the UAE has no significant armed forces it might have a temptation to rely on US military support also running a risk to complicate the situation. 6) Rise of strong anti-American sentiments around the world. 7) Migration from Iran to the neighboring states, which may create humanitarian catastrophe. 8) As already mentioned, the environmental consequences should also be taken into account. For example, bombing of the nuclear facilities in Bushehr Tehran might

provoke massive radiation fallout throughout the region, comparable to the Chernobyl catastrophe. Also, the destruction of the Iranian chemical weapons stockpiles potentially endangers by the fallout contamination, increasing the collateral damage for the region.

Debating the necessity of the military operation Kroening and Kahl come to a different conclusion as for the possibility of an emerging nuclear Iran in the region. For Kroening nuclear Iran is undeterrable and associated with the greatest possible catastrophe, whereas Kahl considers it can be contained by the strong US military presence in the region, supported with the development of ballistic missile defense throughout the Middle East and in Europe. Regarding this question we will focus the analysis on the interests of the most concerned and the only nuclear state in the region – Israel, looking at the whole situation through the prism of possible nuclear deterrence interaction between Tel- Aviv and Tehran, also analyzing the option of the American participation in the system.

Bilateral (Iran-Israeli) Nuclear Deterrence in the Middle East

Regarding the prospects for a mutual nuclear deterrence system between Israel and Iran, there is a high risk of escalation due to the possibility of Israeli pre-emptive action at the stage when Iran goes public with its nuclear weapons program and/or in the period immediately

after that announcement. Also this stage is marked by the risk of US intervention, where the latest American PGMs might be used to disarm the newly born nuclear potential of Iran. Moreover it is impossible to exclude the introduction of US nuclear weapons at this stage, at least in the form of nuclear blackmail to use miniaturized nuclear warheads against the Iranian nuclear stockpile. Here the credibility of the nuclear threat might become the crucial issue, leading to the “commitment trap” where the United States will have to perform its retaliation in response to Iran’s provocative behavior, which should be expected given the risk-prone style of the Iranian leadership. This in turn might cause an environmental catastrophe in the region as well as provoking unprecedented levels of international anti-American sentiments, and even create a domestic crisis of the US legacy.

Should a nuclear deterrence system between Iran and Israel be established, its prospects for success are increasingly fragile as the result of:

1. The absence of regular communication channels, necessary to avoid any misperception concerning “red lines” and behavioral patterns. Moreover nuclear ambiguity, constituting the core element of the Israeli security policy always deprived Israeli nuclear weapons of clarity granted by the public status. Therefore it remains unclear exactly what type of actions might provoke Israeli retaliation and in particular what that retaliation might be. On the other

hand if Israel goes public with its nuclear weapons, it might create a “nuclear domino” effect throughout the region, making the situation even less predictable.


2. Israel is likely to find it difficult to sustain a credible second-strike capability and as a result both sides might gravitate toward first-strike options, although for different reasons: Iran because of its initially small numbers of nuclear weapons and their vulnerability to the first strike; Israel due to its small territory and high rate of unacceptable damage. Thus geographical proximity and the disparity between the territory and populations of Iran and Israel (Iran’s population is about 10 times bigger than Israel’s, while its territory is 78 times the size of Israel’s) tends to decrease the stability of mutual deterrence system due to the lack of the second-strike option for Israel. A report, presented by the Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon in March 2004, stated that to deter the most overwhelmingly destructive first strike by an enemy, Israel must seek and achieve a visible second-strike capability to target approximately 15 enemy cities. Today’s Israeli nuclear potential is estimated to be 172–200 warheads, quite enough to inflict damage at such a level. However it would only be possible if Israeli nuclear weapons survive the enemy’s first strike and therefore preserve its second-strike capability, which is the country’s main problem.

3. Today there is some speculation about the development of a sea-based nuclear

capability for Israel, which theoretically would provide Tel-Aviv with the second strike option. Nevertheless the obscurity of Israel's nuclear strategy might deprive Tel-Aviv of this trump card, while Iranian authorities may prefer to act preemptively in the hope of annihilating Israel with the first strike. Anyway, a nuclear first strike on Israeli territory bears the potential as well as the temptation to wipe Israel off the map as a viable state.

4. Mutual nuclear deterrence, if established, might produce bilateral interactions in the framework of the stability-instability paradox, and the deterrence system will probably be based on the “chicken-game” pattern, which is connected with the traditional risk-taking strategy of the Iranian leadership. These two factors might be crucial to the stability of the deterrence established and may result in its failure in one of the escalation circles.

Extended Deterrence (US-Israel-Iran)



This scenario supposes that the United States will establish a strong hierarchical deterrence system in the Middle East, containing Israel from the attack on

one hand and deterring Iran by the threats of nuclear punishment vs. denial of the attack by introduction and the development of the missile defense in the region. Theoretically this situation might be a good demonstration of the Crawford's pivotal deterrence model functioning, as Iran and Israel are getting the chance to avoid war between each other as well as with the United States, who, managing the situation carefully, might avert the greatest catastrophe ever seen in the region. The superpower capabilities of the United States as the pivot of the deterrence system might look powerful enough to provide the effective management of the system. On the other hand it is worth while taking in consideration some possible complications of the system, connected with US pivotal role:

a) Encouraging Israel to act more aggressively than it otherwise would, since its actions would be backed not just by its own nuclear force but also by the US arsenal. This might provoke conventional stalemates between Iran and Israel, as demonstrated by the India-Pakistan interaction, where the low probability of full scale war provokes smaller conflicts on instance of the 1999 Kargil War. Describing the pivotal deterrence system Crawford mentions that the so-called “blame game” is quite peculiar feature of typical interaction, where each side tries “to bait the other side into taking actions that call forth forceful retaliation from the pivot”, the situation preserving the high risk of the nuclear

escalation.

b) Restricting Tel Aviv's freedom of action, therefore obliging it to subordinate its defense considerations to Washington's interests and policy, as was the case in 1991, when Israel didn't react to Iraqi Scud strikes. This might create a situation where Israeli military capabilities will be restrained, which can push Iran to start acting in a more challenging way, gaining by its traditional asymmetrical strategies more and more political advantages and at the same time eroding the American as well as the Israeli position in the region. Such a scenario tends to be extremely risky, as political maneuvering demands from Tehran a certain degree of brinkmanship-style behavior, which will present it as unpredictable and risky state, eager to invoke its nuclear weapons against any pressure or threat. This strategy, traditionally peculiar for Iran, might help its leaders to avoid potential deterrent measures by Israel, as the latter would have to keep prudence by not provoking the risk of nuclear escalation. This situation preserves the risk of deterrence failure, if the United States and Israel (in the absence of the direct channels of communication) will misinterpret some of Iran's steps, perceiving them to be a direct threat to Israel's existence or vital US interests. This may provoke the two allies to strike first against Iran, signaling deterrence failure.

This option presents classical "stability-instability paradox" interaction, where the low probability of great conflict

provokes many smaller conflicts, carrying a threat of nuclear escalation.

Conclusions

The paper analyzed three big options as for development of the situation in the Middle East, connected with the risk of emergence of a nuclear Iran. All scenarios are marginal, using the military power as a main tool of influence. Taking in consideration the growing tension between the key players of the system, we can make the following conclusions:

1. The analysis of pre-deterrence models in the Middle East gives an idea that the coercive policy of Israel or the United States might not be effective in blocking the potential decision of Iran to cross the nuclear threshold neither by coercive actions, nor by pre-emptive military operation. The first one has a very high probability of being fruitless or even damaging due to the risk of misperception. As to the second option, on the one hand it runs the risk of failure due to the high dispersal of the Iranian nuclear installations throughout the country and their comparative invulnerability, while on the other the possible consequences of a military operation against Iran might lead to regional catastrophe. Moreover, both strategies instead of stopping Tehran may catalyze Iranian nuclear ambitions.

2. The possibilities of creation a stable deterrence system between Israel and Iran can be assessed as sufficiently low, due to the strategic cultures of both rivalries, where Iran can be regarded as the risk-prone actor and Israel as an actor that traditionally preferred the strategy of offensive dominance. Therefore the

establishment of a stable mutual deterrence system is also threatened by high risk of Israeli pre-emptive actions at the stage when Iran goes public with its nuclear weapons program and/or at the early stage after that announcement.

a) The lack of information channels can be considered as one of the key system loopholes able to prompt the nuclear first strike by Israel as the result of its fear of an accidental nuclear attack. On the other hand it can push Tehran to adopt a strategy of pre-emption, lowering the crisis stability of the deterrence system to an unacceptable minimum.

b) First time in the deterrence history the geographic disproportion of the states plays crucial role for the stability of the system, even more significant than the nuclear arms balance in the new deterrence counteraction.

3. US extended deterrence guarantees, provided to Israel might introduce the pivotal deterrence system in the region, containing Iran by the threat of punishment, as well as restraining Israel by the benefits of the security umbrella. Meanwhile the potential weak points of this system also should be mentioned. There is a risk, that, restricting Tel Aviv's freedom of actions on one hand, Washington might give Iran the potential for brinkmanship on the other. Aimed at changing the regional balance of power, Iran will inevitably meet the response from Israel and the United States, maximizing their efforts to prevent Iranian dominance. Burdened by the nuclear factor, this situation may result the escalation of the nuclear conflict as on the earliest stage of conflict, before the deterrence system will actually be established,

as well as on the latest deterrent stages.

Summing up possible policy options there is a ground to believe that the military force as the instrument of dialogue with Iran can hardly be considered as the remedy against nuclear ambitions of the country. On the contrary it might give state's authorities the wrong signals, catalyzing Tehran's nuclear military program and making the emergence of the nuclear Iran inevitable.

Besides that, there is one more scenario, possible for nuclear Iran. Upon it Tehran will not go public with its weapons program and staying within a step from nuclear capability, just becoming a nuclear threshold state, capable for the prompt development of its own nukes. Basically, it won't break the rule of "non-nuclear Middle East", although in case of growing power's rivalry will give Tehran one more trump of influence. Of course, this situation means a permanent tension in the Middle East, but tension that does not erupt for a long period of time. Iran would have almost all vestiges of influence, but will not invite a first strike from Israel, as well as won't push the development of the Israeli-US military alliance.



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POST HEGEMONIC GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: PROSPECT FOR SIERRA LEONE: AN AFRICAN- A SIERRA LEONEAN PERSPECTIVE

Introduction: Debate on the concept of “Prospect for Post Hegemonic Global Governance” among scholars has increasingly gathered momentum worldwide. Various scholars apparently hold differing opinions on the issue, and such opinions are, to a greater extent, deeply rooted in their regional and cultural orientations on the one hand, and on the other; influenced by their political and socio- economic persuasions.

Aim: The aim of this paper therefore is, to contribute to the scholastic debate on the dynamics of such a complicated phenomenon of post hegemonic global governance, with specific focus on prospect for Sierra Leone, bearing in mind certain epistemological and methodological questions such as (a) what is post hegemonic global governance? (b) what are the conditions for, and national security

polycymaking implications ? (c) is there any prospect for Sierra Leone’s post hegemonic global governance?

The arguments in response to these questions are from the standpoint of an African, and in particular a Sierra Leonean. Without any waste of time, it is very appropriate at this stage to categorically state that, the assertions on the topic under discussion does not represent the views of all Africans and of course all Sierra Leoneans. Only that, it is the perspective of a Sierra Leonean who incidentally happens to be the only African participating in the ITD Program on The study of the United States Institute on U S National Security Policymaking.

Methodology: The methodological approach combines both theoretical and empirical data collection techniques. Whilst the former comprises data obtained from textbooks, reports, articles and journals, the latter combines data generated from personal interviews and practical experiences gained at home and abroad especially in the ITD training program in the US. For the purpose of convenience and logical sequence of analysis, the contributions to the debate begins with an introduction, followed by methodology, definition of key concept, conditions for, and national security polycymaking implications, including prospect for Sierra Leone’s post hegemonic global governance. It ends with a summary of

major findings and policy recommendations.

Definition of key concept: Post Hegemonic Global Governance: Any attempt to discuss this theme, warrants knowledge of what 'governance' is, in the first place, and of course 'global governance', including conditions for achieving it. The term Governance, in my view, has to do with the efficient and effective utilization of state resources for the good of all in a country by the political and administrative executives. By extension, it refers to all those processes and principles involved in service delivery, specifically, production, distribution and exchange of goods and services. Johnson , in his article 'Economic Governance' argues that ' governance, fundamentally, is all about processes , rules and organization' ; and that it can be discussed not only in terms of broad types such as political , economic ,corporate and socio-economic, but also in terms of specific substantive areas to include education , health (including sanitation), physical infrastructure ,water , natural resources ,writing a constitution , and of course, in terms of principles . If the above definitions are admitted, then one may safely state that Global Governance is all about processes, rules, principles, and organization applicable to a family of nations such as UN, EU, AU, etc. etc.

When these processes, rules, principles and organization dominate a family of

nations, then it is referred to as 'hegemonic global governance.'

Conditions for and National Security Policymaking Implications: The conditions are traceable to the nature of an economy with a series of national security policymaking implications. Such policies must, of course, be robust enough to forestall any potential threat to political and socio-economic stability from within and outside the borders of the nation-state. Although the UNDP Human Development Report (1994) identified seven areas of human security (economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political), in this paper however, some of them are examined under economic, political and social headings.

Economic: Every country in the world has an economy, and that economy is characterized by human, material and mineral resources. The effective and efficient exploitation of such resources has to do with the formulation of various national security policies with the aim of creating opportunity for economic development and improved standard of living. Specifically, a country must develop both macro and micro-economic policies that will encourage industrialization (including technological advancement), capital accumulation, and foreign direct investment to stimulate the economy for productive activities (in agriculture, trade, mining, etc.) with the aim of increased output and maximum efficiency;

complemented by the adoption of a policy of regional integration.

Growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) and net national income (NET) determines how strong enough an economy of a country is to accommodate not only the ever-increasing demands of its citizenry (especially national security policy demands), but also those of other countries who recognize and accept the strength and capacity of that economy in accommodating the huge demands of global governance. In effect, when all members of a family of nation-states accept not only the said processes, rules, principles and organization, but also the economic, political, social (including the military) strength, then we say that country has prospect for post hegemonic global governance. This, in my opinion, is exactly the case with the US in the UN. Indeed, for the time being, the US no doubt has a very strong political, economic and social (including military) status than any other member country in the UN, and specifically the Security Council.

Notwithstanding the declining trend of the US economy after the end of the cold war, prospect for its continued hegemonic global governance seems guaranteed. This is true because, a careful review of both theoretical and empirical literatures on all US Administrations from Independence to the present, reveal that huge amount of the Federal Budget has always been allocated to the country's national security-military. (See US budget for the period)

Of course, this notion was unequivocally articulated in the presentations (lectures) of almost all the professors that participated in the ITD program.

Political: This has to do with national security policies designed to achieve democratic good governance within the political system. Of course, countries of the world have different policies as they practice different political systems. There is the liberal democracy that allows political pluralism and the free-market economy (capitalism) practiced mainly in the US and Western Europe, including most parts of Asia, Africa and Latin American countries. There is also the totalitarian regime (Socialist| Communist) which caters for centrally planned or command economic system, practiced mainly in China and loosing influence in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Whether the system is liberal democratic or totalitarian socialist| communist, is not an issue in this case. What matters most is, how best the political security policy of a nation-state allows political modernization, ensure stability and assert influence in global governance, especially within a family of nation-states (United Nations). The best national security policymaking implication, in my view is that dealing with the building of democratic institutions to witness political modernization and socio-economic development. This will include ensuring political pluralism, reviewing all those policies that disenfranchises eligible

citizens, and introducing those that allow wider political participation, irrespective of gender, regional political integration. On the whole, the political security system must be such that it is not only enviable but also influential in global politics. No doubt, the US political security policy is one of such perfect examples, and thus, highly influential in world politics and global governance.

Social: This is very critical to sustainable development and stability of any nation-state. It has to do with the making of macro and micro-social policies for effective and efficient service delivery to the people. These services include, among others, education, health and sanitation, physical infrastructure, energy, water and natural resources. In every activity, man is very central, and therefore his social security is of prime importance in a state, and more so, if the state is to gain influence in global politics and hence post hegemonic global governance.

When a state develops social policies that ensures both human and institutional capacity building, including effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms not only for its own people but also to help other nations, then that state is bound to have influence in global politics and hence prospect for hegemonic global governance. China, though with a totalitarian regime, has very significant influence in global governance and hence prospect for post hegemonic global governance.

Given the above background, the concern now is to examine the prospect for Sierra Leone's post hegemonic global governance.

Prospect for Sierra Leone's Post Hegemonic Global Governance: In order to explore prospect for Sierra Leone's post hegemonic global governance, a critical review of her economy, identifying major issues of prime importance to national security policymaking is very appropriate and inevitable. The rationale for this approach is to provide a framework for the debate on the potentials and prospect of Sierra Leone in confronting the challenges of post hegemonic global governance.

Sierra Leone is a small country located along the West Coast of Africa between latitudes 7^o and 10^o North, and latitudes 10.5^o and 13.18^o West. It is bounded on the North, North-West and North-East by the Republic of Guinea; on the South-East by the Republic of Liberia and on the West and South-West by the Atlantic Ocean. The land area measures approximately 71,740 sq. km (about 45,000 sq. miles), and it was a former British Colony which gained Independence on the 27 April, 1961. Her Foreign Policy is based on the principle of Non-Alignment. However, with the end of the Cold War, much is yet to be done in the review of this policy. The demographic health survey (DHS 2008) revealed an estimated population of 5.9 million people.

Of this population, 37% resides in the urban areas. The female population accounts for 52%, while the remaining 48% constitutes the male population. According to the national census survey 2004 projections Sierra Leone's population would reach the 6 million mark by 2012.

The population consists of more than fifteen tribes; and the principal people are the Temnes, Limbas, Lokos and Korankos in the North and Central regions, whilst the Mendes populate the South; the Kissis and Konos the East. The Western Area is a hotchpotch of several tribes, but of course, Freetown –the Capital City is mostly known to be the settlement of freed slaves popularly known as the Creoles. There is also a fair size settlement of people of non-Negro descent; mainly of Lebanese and Middle- Eastern origins. The population size of the country is no doubt an impediment to the country's prospect for post hegemonic global governance.

Like most developing countries, the Sierra Leone economy is weak, characterized by small scale industrialization, inferior technological advancement, intermittent civil unrest, small population and national security forces, corruption, social injustice, migration and unemployment problems, drug trafficking, etc. etc. It has a dual economy that is divided into monetized and non-monetized sectors. The former comprises business activities such as banking, insurance, etc. and mining industries, with diamond, gold, rutile and

bauxite being the predominant minerals. The later consists largely of subsistence agriculture, which accounts for about 75% of the country's manpower, and they contribute about 30% of the gross domestic product (GDP). The economy has a reputation of been a donor dependent and for quite some time, it has been a donor-driven, especially after the decade old civil war which officially ended in 2002.

Although significant progress has been made in rebuilding various institutions through foreign aid (one three hundred and one US Dollars for the period 2008-2010), yet the APC Government (under the leadership of His Excellency, President Dr. Ernest Bai Koroma) recognizes the slow rates of progress in attaining the MGD indicators and the need for deeper and wider national security policy reforms to tackle endemic corruption in the country and prepare it for the challenges of post hegemonic global governance. In view of the above situation analysis, and also recognizing the fact that good governance is a key prerequisite for economic development, social cohesion and political stability, the government, according to AfD/IDA/IFC Report (November 2009) has reviewed the PRSP-I and developed the PRSP-II based on four key priorities as follows:

- Provision of reliable power supply (energy) which people now enjoy with supply from the Gbungbuna hydro electric power project.

- Raising quantity and value added productivity in agriculture and fisheries in which some relative progress has been achieved with the launching of the smallholder commercialization program in agriculture.
- Developing a national transportation network which is ongoing through the construction of roads in the western area and provinces of Sierra Leone.
- Ensuring sustainable human development through the provision of improved coverage of basic social services and social protection needs of the poor and vulnerable. Progress is also been made in this area, especially with the launching of the free health care services for women and children, and the review of the 6334 education policy(now 6344).

In pursuant of the above priorities, a number of national security policymaking and reform processes have been undertaken by the APC Government. These are discussed under economic, political and social headings.

- Economic Security: This has to do with the reduction of absolute poverty, through the review and formulation of macro and micro-economic policies. The aim of this is to stimulate the economy and attract investments for productive economic activities (especially in the areas of technology, agriculture, trade, mining

etc.),increase the GDP and NNI so as to accommodate huge budgetary allocations for maintaining a very strong navy and armed forces and consequently improve living standards through sustained economic development. The mines and mineral resources Act (2009), the Draft National Land Policy Document (2011) are perfect examples of economic security measures, among others. Whilst the mines and mineral resources Act aims at creating investment opportunities in the exploitation of the country's mineral resources, the national land policy document is developed to allow access to land and ensure tenure rights, among others, for investments and sustainable economic development.

- Political Security: Political stability and democratic good governance are fundamental to sustainable peace, economic development and political modernization. This is attainable only through good political security policymaking. The political system of Sierra Leone is based on a multiparty democracy with prominent features of presidential and parliamentary systems of government. The political security policymaking is somehow liberal, as the system allows the formation of various political parties to ensure broader participation in national politics. It guarantees the

country's membership of regional and sub-regional political groupings. Thus, Sierra Leone is a member of various political and economic groupings, to include the MRU, ECOWAS, AU and UN, among others. These features, including many more, generates potential prospect for post hegemonic global governance. For example, if all members of the AU decide to form a United States of Africa, with a federal system of government; that, in my view, will not only change the complexion of world politics, but also threatens the hegemonic global governance enjoyed by the existing world power(US).

- **Social Security:** This policy has to do with social control and the wellbeing of people. It is very critical to social stability and sustainable political and socioeconomic development. Social Security entails effective and efficient service delivery, complemented by appropriate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. These services include: education, health (including sanitation), human and institutional capacity building, physical infrastructure, environmental management, unemployment, immigration control, drug abuse, illegal drugs control, prostitution, human trafficking, terrorists control, crime rates control, energy, water, and natural resources, among others.

The efficiency and effectiveness of the delivery of these services are very critical not only to improved human living conditions but also to mankind in the performance of his societal role.

Notwithstanding the progress so far made by the APC Government in the social security sector of the economy, yet it fully recognizes the existing gaps in the social security policy sectors. In this regard, significant efforts are being made in the review and reform processes of the country's social security policy framework. For example, the office of the national security, the 6344 education policy, the environment protection policy, the forestry and conservation policy, the wildlife policy, the energy and water resources policy have been reviewed, among others. All these are efforts geared towards establishing good social security policy and prepare the country for the challenges of post hegemonic global governance, and hence prospect.

Conclusion: Summary of Major Findings and Recommendations:

Prospect for post hegemonic global governance is determined by a number of complicated political and socio economic issues, including huge investments (technological, financial, human etc) with colossal budgetary allocations, based on national security priorities. Although progress has so far been achieved, yet the Sierra Leone economy exhibits certain

exponential characteristics which obviously disqualify it from the race in post hegemonic global governance. Among these, the following are prominent:

- The population, including the national security forces is very small to successfully respond to any threat of instability and insecurity from competing greater powers such as US, China etc.
- The economy, though improving, is not only ill, but very weak for generating desired national income that will accommodate the huge cost of post hegemonic global governance.
- Even if there is prospect in the unemaginable very distance future, yet the existing gaps in the national security sectors – political/social/economic, certainly diminishes such prospects;
- Although prospect for Sierra Leone’s post hegemonic global governance is far beyond human imagination, the government, and of course the country as a sovereign nation state has fundamental and obligatory responsibility of providing security (national security) for the people. In view of this obligatory responsibility, the following policy measures are recommended;
- Review and address the existing national security gaps in all sectors (political, social, economic etc). This must be a continuous process so as

to meet the changing demands in national and local security sectors.

- Stimulate the economy for value added productivity in all sectors to witness economic development, political modernization and technological advancement.
- Strengthen efforts toward regional integration and review Sierra Leone’s foreign policy, taking cognizance of the domestic policy demands and strengthen international cooperation through regional and sub regional integrations.
- Walk towards the formation of a federal government at continental level-United States of Africa. With this form of government, prospect for post hegemonic global governance will increase.

It is hoped that if all of the above recommendations are addressed, then there may be hope in the continent’s prospect for post hegemonic global governance.

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
**Implications of Latin America’s State of
Insecurity**
By Ricardo E. Neeb Cantarero

Introduction

In the last 50 years, the perception of security, or insecurity, in Latin America has varied from a perspective of containing a foreign enemy, the Soviet Union, developed mostly from 1945 to 1960, to a struggle dynamic against an internal enemy, communism, supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba from the 1960s to the mid 1970s. During this period of time various human rights abuses and violations occurred and began to be massively and increasingly questioned since the beginning of the 1980s. Simultaneously, the government of the United States had fostered the fight against the internal and external enemies and joined this moment of questioning. Similarly, at the end of the civil wars and other subversion situations in Latin America, security began to derive into more internal dynamics emerging as a product of structural problems that many states in the region face and which translate into corruption, lack of transparency, low governability, little

citizenship participation, and an increasing questioning of authority.

An example of this can be observed in the World Bank governability indexes.¹ In the following chart, we can make a comparison between Finland and various countries in the Latin American region:



In this chart, we can perceive that the countries in the region, namely Guatemala, Honduras, Bolivia, and to a lesser extent Peru, show the lowest governability indexes according to the criteria of the World Bank. Coincidentally, Honduras and Guatemala are the two Latin American countries that face serious security problems and where policies seem outdated and use or pretend to use instead armed forces to fight problems of public safety. On the other hand, Bolivia and Peru, the main producers of coca at a world scale, also have had to use

¹ For more information, visit http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp

armed forces to combat the groups producing said cocaine.

This is due to extant structural problems produced by incipient consolidating processes that have heightened in the last decades, as can be observed in many countries in the Latin American subcontinent. This institutional weakness has provoked a deterioration that has had an impact on other areas that were not previously considered within the sphere of security itself. In other words, security problems that were previously external today have a tendency to become more internal problems. Therefore, the role of national defense in states with emerging consolidating processes tends to be more ample and engage in functions that go beyond the traditional mission of the field.

On the other hand, the end of Central American conflicts brought with it a strong questioning of the need to have armed forces, which were already questioned enough. At the same time, international conflicts in the region seemed unlikely given the fact that they had created various dialogue mechanisms precisely aimed at avoiding a resurgence of armed conflicts. In Peru, to a lesser extent, the questioning the need to have armed forces also took place.

During the special conference on security in Mexico, which took place in 2003, issues such as threats, worries, and challenges in the topic of the region's security were discussed. The result was quite a wide proposal which tended to secure several aspects that according to a traditional vision had nothing to do with

security. The Mexican conference considered terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, corruption, money laundering, weapons and human trafficking, cyber attacks, weapons of mass destruction and CBRN incidents, extreme poverty, social exclusion, natural disasters, diseases, among others to be threats against security.

The tendencies of the time influenced this thematic diversity. On the one hand, the United States looked for support for the war against terrorism. On the other hand, there were states that at the time experienced problems of internal security while other states adhered to the Canadian School of human security that had a broad proposal regarding security issues to be dealt with. Thus, we see overlapping phenomena of different kinds. There are deadly and intentional issues of a violent nature conflating with issues of development such as poverty and social exclusion, human wellbeing, and personal integrity as in the case of natural catastrophes.

These issues were witnessed in the Mexican conference. In the first place, the definition of security is very broad and does not explain in a concise manner what security really is. Secondly, security becomes too much of a broad concept and does not delve deep enough; therefore it becomes hard to implement policies aimed at solving such issues. Designing security and defense policies at a hemispheric level becomes practically

inapplicable.² Nonetheless, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the concept of multidimensional security and even changed its internal structure in order to do so. There was such a large agreement around this change that at this event the OAS reached a consensus at a hemispheric level.

The Declaration on Security in the Americas recognizes that the states in the hemisphere currently face “traditional threats to security and new threats, concerns, and other challenges that, in view of their complex characteristics, have meant that security is multidimensional in nature” (2003). The concept of hemispheric security broadens to incorporate the different perspectives on security threats and priorities in the region and includes political, social, health, and environmental aspects with the objective of building a new more flexible security architecture. Some actors, however, have criticized the broadening of security as a concept because it adjusts to a vision where infinite variables and factors conflate, making it a redundant, too broad, and too vague of a concept to be implemented in practice.

These critics deem it necessary to review the way in which we approach security. Security should focus on intentional and deadly violent phenomena. This implies that we could classify security based on two types of threats: the threats of a military nature that affect the interests of a state and that involve all possible extant actions in a conflict among states; and

the threats of a non-military nature that consider violent and sometimes transnational phenomena triggered by the definite intentionality to produce physical harm on a person. We can classify terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime in the latter group.


We also cannot ignore the fact that there are other phenomena that can have an impact and trigger threats. Such is the case of structural risks that affect development. It is these phenomena that affect the achievement of material conditions and the wellbeing of a person without necessarily and directly involving a risk to the physical security of said person, but they create the necessary conditions to enable and favor an emergence of threats of a non-military nature. Among other factors, we find in this group: poverty, economical instability and inequality, corruption, etc.

We also have to consider phenomena of catastrophes that affect a person’s wellbeing. In this classification we consider two types of events. The first type includes events mostly resulting from the work of nature that are hard to predict and which result in the loss of human lives, namely events of natural catastrophes. The second type is comprised of those events caused by the work of man that provoke the loss of human lives, namely events of human catastrophes.

In the following chart,³ we can observe in a synthetic manner the interrelation of the aforementioned phenomena:

² Tulchin Joseph, Raúl Benítez and Rut Damin. “El Rompecabezas: Conformando la Seguridad Hemisférica en el Siglo XXI”. Prometeo Libros, 2006, pp. 25.

³ Source: Course on Threats and International Security, Political Science Institute, Catholic University of Chile by Prof. John Griffiths and Ricardo Neeb.



This implies that today the state or states must be capable of using all of its capacities in order to be able to face these security dynamics. A consolidated state will be able to use all of its institutionalism in a coordinated manner to face its security threats as well as to prevent other phenomena turning into security problems.

On the other hand, a state that is not yet consolidated and having serious structural weaknesses will have more limited resources to act upon and it is precisely there where the need to use armed forces emerges. Armed forces then operate as a wild card that allows making up for these deficiencies. There are many examples, like Brazil and Bolivia, where the army has had to help in the social distribution as the only trustworthy institution with a national deployment capacity. In Brazil, Lula proposed the use of the army to supervise public construction sites because road construction inspectors were considered corrupt. Nonetheless, the army demanded a budget in order to fulfill this task and the budget was not approved.

Case Study: The Security in Central America and its repercussions in the Region.

In the following section, we will analyze what was previously described in relation to security taking Central America as a case study. In this sub-region, many countries face problems of internal security which have forced their governments to use armed forces in order to fight against crime, going a step further by proposing cooperation with other countries in the region with the hope to create an international force against terrorism and organized crime. This opens up many questions as to which would be the repercussions of implementing such a measure in Latin America.

In Central America, the institutional weakness regarding issues of security and justice, the lack of trust between states, and its strategic geographical position have favored the settlement of operational centers and “passing

zones”⁴ of drug trafficking networks.⁵ This situation led ex-President of Guatemala, Álvaro Colom to exhort to the creation of a multinational force in Central America similar to that of Afghanistan’s ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), consisting of a special body to face organized crime.

The increasing insecurity is greatly due to the atomization that Colombian cartels experienced following the death of drug lord Pablo Escobar. This atomization weakened the cartels’ negotiating capacity, while strengthening the Mexican cartels that increased their negotiating capabilities. Simultaneously, two phenomena emerged. One was the end of the PRI rule in Mexico which consequently ended the truce that cartels followed under certain behavioral guidelines. The other was the apparition of the *maras*, or organized gangs, throughout Central America.

These gangs were formed in the United States by Central American migrants and they are composed of people suffering from high social uprootedness and exclusion. Currently, there are approximately 70.000 members operating in gangs that spread from the United States to Central America (mainly in El Salvador and Guatemala) and have even branched out into Europe. The *maras* mainly recruit in the

overpopulated jails of Central America⁶ and have in turn been recruited in some cases by the Mexican cartels as their security forces (an example of this is the cartel Sinaloa). This recruitment has also taken place in the special forces of the Mexican and Honduran armies, the *Kaibiles*, both also working for the Zetas cartel, and all trained in the United States to fight against drug trafficking.

Until now, only the International Committee against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG, for its Spanish acronym) had played an important role in justice related issues. The institutions are corrupted to such a degree, however, that the CICIG is no longer sufficient to fight against organized crime. In this context, on June 22nd and 23rd of 2011 the International Conference in Support of the Central American Security Strategy took place and it was made clear that effective and long-lasting actions regarding issues of security were urgent. This conference gathered the different proposals of all participating countries.⁷

Mexico and Colombia indicated that they were willing to collaborate with the political and military training, but not with the disbursement of money.⁸ On the other hand, the United States had already increased its budget on the Merida initiative encouraged by George W. Bush.⁹ The Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton

⁴ It refers to the Central American countries directly affected by drug or human trafficking and organized crime. Among them we find Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Belice and often Haiti, Panama and Costa Rica.

⁵ This problem has become visible since 2007 and returned to be the focus of attention after may of this year when the group “Los Zetas” murdered 27 peasants. 90% of the cocaine that arrives to the United States stops in Central America, generating close to US\$ 40.000.

⁶ This is another example on how the incapacity of the state to have a good penal system has an impact on security.

⁷ Among them we find Mexico, Colombia, the United States, and Spain.

⁸ Colombian president, Juan Manuel Santos suggested the creation of regional intelligence centers.

⁹ The region receives around 1.5 billion dollars to finance projects and programs related to security and justice. The Guatemalan minister Rolando del Cid stipulates that they need around 6 billions more in order to contain the advancement of crime.

who participated during the first day of this conference requested that Central American authorities and businessmen pay more taxes to finance the security strategy.¹⁰

According to the statistics, Spain contributed with 8 million Euros for the Central American security strategy for the period between 2010 and 2013. As a result, the Central American countries and their friend countries¹¹ decided to create a 2 million dollar fund to finance 22 projects on four specific areas.¹²

By the end of June 2011 and after the Guatemalan presidential debate where the possibility to increase North American troops in the region was discussed, Colom made declarations about the importance to receive military support to fight against organized crime. Subsequently, in July of the same year, in “The Guardian” newspaper, the former president emphasized the need to create an OTAN-type force in order to fight against organized crime. On this same month, the “Financial Times” newspaper declared its disagreement with drug legalization and asked for the collaboration of the United States to help fight this battle, as the main substance consumer.

At the moment, these petitions—probably under the auspices of Washington—have not

found an eco in the region, despite the insinuated pressure coming from different press venues that sometimes took the shape of direct demands to receive military and police force in Central America. This topic, however, has not reached a consensus and will generate a polemic debate because in many cases the states in the region find themselves in similar situations although to a lesser extent (except for Colombia). There are other states that prefer not to involve their armies in policing and paramilitary functions (constabulary duties) due to political reasons as is the case of Chile and Argentina.¹³

There is also fear among other regional actors of getting involved in a kind of action of such magnitude due to the potential consequences it could bring. Sending troops and police and coast guard units to fight cartels and criminal groups in Central America and Mexico could imply that in the future these organizations would act against national and citizens’ interests, or even worse, operate within their territories.

One must add practical matters to these apprehensions. Most policies in the continent suffer from the same inefficiency and corruption problems. In fact, with the exception of Chile where only 11% estimates it is easy to bribe the

¹⁰ Clinton’s logic follows the understanding that organized crime must be fought collectively by society and must not be financed by the poorest segments of society in the involved countries. Therefore, she believes in a larger taxation on businessmen instead of an increase of consumer taxes.

¹¹ These countries are USA, Spain, Canada, Colombia, South Korea, Finland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Norway, and the European Union, which operate under the concept of “Shared Responsibility.”

¹² These areas include crime prevention, combating organized crime, rehabilitation and social integration, penal system strengthening, institutional judiciary entities strengthening, and national security of the participating countries.

¹³ The concept constabulary can be explained as a transition zone strictly between the military and the police, an “undefined area” where generally there is a basic imposition of the law in an unstable territory. For more information, see Neeb, Ricardo. “La participación de policías civiles en operaciones de paz y el caso chileno,” which appeared in the Hemispheric Center for Defense Studies of the NDU electronic publication in the Spring of 2003. This publication is also available at http://www.fes-seguridadregional.org/index.php?option=com_booklibrary&task=mdownload&id=668&Itemid=319

police,¹⁴ the rest of the countries show a percentage above 24%. The countries that show the highest percentages in their perception of bribery are not Central American countries, but Argentina (58%), Brazil (54%), and Paraguay (61%) to name just a few.

There is also the problem of compatibility between regional policies. Not all count on the same level of equipment, training, organization, discipline, and function. There are police forces with a national militarized character as there are forces of a state type. The differences are profound and very hard to overcome at least in order to send police forces in a combined multinational operation.

This makes the military forces the only ones to be feasibly used in a scenario of an international force against Central American crime. Whether obvious differences exist, generally speaking military forces have common aspects. Moreover, there already exists an exchange of military forces in the region as well as the shared experience of Haiti. Therefore, the most feasible scenario is to send military forces to perform these operations, an idea that is without a doubt polemical among Latin American countries. In the last two decades many governments have argued that the USA does not want to intervene in the region, yet it needs this region to be secure. To achieve this, the objective would be to use Latin American police forces to relieve the USA from this task.

Conclusions

¹⁴ Class notes by Professors Ricardo Neeb and John Griffiths.

The institutional weakness of certain Central American states is generating a scenario of insecurity that heightens and expands in this sub-region. States have been unable to face this threat in a conventional manner and are using military forces in an attempt to contain the increasing criminal wave.

Nonetheless, this strategy seems insufficient and many affected states have proposed the possibility of creating a multinational force in order to face the problem, something that at the moment meets resistance from other states in the region because in their perception it would imply a series of problems arising from a potential reaction by force on the part of criminal organizations against the participating states.

Another aspect to be overcome by Central American states is the management of the received funding in order to boost their security.¹⁵ Although there is evidence of the importance of these security issues, the transfers carried out for the purpose of this item have not achieved the significance that they should and the resources are not geared towards it.

On the other hand, the strategy established in the Mexican conference does not reveal the stipulated amounts nor does it reveal the conditions of execution on security themes in the region. The source of funding is also

¹⁵ The main recipients are Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras, which between 2000 and 2007 received around 1.8 billion dollars. This budget was partially aimed at supporting public budgets, the payment of external debt, civil society, and economical infrastructure.

unclear even if they announced that the IDB (Inter American Development Bank) and the World Bank would disburse the funding.

It is unclear whether this strategy is a continuation of the Plan Merida, whether it will focus on the use of police and army forces in all aspects related to security, whether it will take an emphasis on the prevention and social policies, or whether it will respond to the real needs of the region. It is unclear how the institutions will be able to build coalitions in order to manage funds without falling into corruption and becoming subject to external auditing, a practice which does not always go along with success in security strategies.

Finally, we can foresee a scenario in which the insecurity in countries such as Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador will increase since there are no deep structural improvements on the horizon in order to face this situation with success. Therefore, under US pressures one cannot rule out the creation of a multinational force or something similar that could face the scourge. Nonetheless, the consequences that this would entail are hard to foresee at the moment.



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CAN TODAY'S GREAT POWERS AVOID A COLD WAR IN A WARM PACIFIC? FROM THE FULDA GAP TO WALU BAY

Josh Wineera

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For many Cold War warriors the Fulda Gap still evokes memories of the anticipated colossal clash between the former Soviet Union and American military forces. On the eastern side of the strategically important German lowland stood the powerful Soviet 8th Guards Army, opposing to the west the American V Corps. As Great Powers, the posture of the US and Soviet Union epitomised the predictable behaviour of bipolar, hard power competitors. Thankfully, the collision of men and materiel through the Fulda Gap did not eventuate, with the 1991 demise of the Soviet Union leaving the US as the global hegemony.

Half a world away, in fact some twenty years later, a new more subtle rivalry is developing. The mid-point of confrontation is centred on the warm tropical waters in the Fijian capital, Suva – at Walu Bay. To the north of Walu Bay lies the new American embassy, to the south the new Chinese embassy. While geo-strategists

and political pundits try to figure out how to correctly pronounce Walu, let alone place it on a map, a new Great Power competition continues at an increasing pace.

The January 2012 announcement by President Barack Obama that the US would shift its strategic focus to Asia Pacific left little doubt as to a new foreign policy to contain China's so-called rise in the region. That the announcement was delivered at the Pentagon clearly signalled a new mission for the Department of Defence (Obama, 2012). While international observers focussed on the symbolism of an American President surrounded by his Admirals and Generals, several would have been alert to the domestic message of support to a relatively new Secretary of Defence implementing a reprioritisation of the defence budget. Less momentous, certainly in terms of media impact, but just as important, was a statement made by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton two months earlier. Clinton's "America's Pacific Century" (Clinton, 2011), conveyed the rationale and framework for a whole-of-government approach to ensure continued US leadership in the region. Combined, the two announcements illustrated the US Government's 3-D's concept of defence, diplomacy and development.

The South Pacific is one of the least densely populated regions on the planet. It is mainly home to a scattering of islands encased in the world's largest ocean, an ocean rich with marine and seabed resources. While major regional players such as Australia and New Zealand naturally take a keen interest in the area, it is the many tiny sovereign nations that

actually sit squarely in the warm Pacific. Countries such as Niue, Tuvalu, Cook Islands and Vanuatu would be unfamiliar to many people outside the region but they, and others, occupy the vital ground. Although economic fishing zones extend from their sovereign territories the majority of the South Pacific remains international waters, uncontested spaces. It would be reasonable therefore to promote the need for maritime capabilities to help harvest and protect the fishing zones. In so doing, ensuring the unimpeded access to the sea lines of communication and maintaining the international system for global public goods. More importantly for America, there is an urge to curb Chinese influence in the region – cue the US military's potent Pacific Command.

The stage is certainly set for a new Great Power competition, a new Cold War. Two factors however, see the Chinese leading the race. First, the contest has already begun. In effect it has been going for over a decade with only one participant in the game. In this period China has been very active in the region. In contrast, the US has been somewhat absent, focussed on the Middle-East, Asia and Europe. Second, the preferred mode of engagement for China has been what Joseph Nye terms 'soft power' (Nye, 2004). No hard power, or coercive military might, has been exerted over the small Pacific Island countries. This has fostered new relationships that would have been deemed unlikely just 10 years ago. A good example is the Fijian 'Look North Policy' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). Frustrated with some traditional alliances, Fijian leaders have opted to build economic and cultural bridges towards

China. Benefits through Chinese development assistance and soft financial loans has manifested in to a close friendship. Little wonder that the US chose Suva as the new counter-balance field.

Fiji is not alone in its preference for Chinese help. Nuiean Premier Toke Talagi's comments that "if development aid is not forthcoming [from New Zealand], I would request aid from China instead" (NZ Herald, 2009) confirms the attraction for many of these island nations. With tiny populations, economic and monetary stimulus need not be the injection of hundreds of billions of dollars, as has been the case of US investment in to Iraq and Afghanistan. In the Pacific Island context, tens of millions of development dollars can go a long way. The support from China funds many projects that official development assistance organisations such as AUSAID from Australia or NZAID from New Zealand have not considered real aid-focussed work – projects outside the remit of the UN Millennium Development Goals. This has created the gap for geo-strategic influence. Chinese funds have been used to build the Parliament House in Vanuatu, a new court house and Ministry of Justice in the Cook Islands, sports stadiums in Papua New Guinea and Samoa, and many more non-traditional development projects (Crocombe, 2007). For Beijing it has been more effective to use smart dollars to achieve influence, rather than simply buying an armada of warships. This strategy has been particularly effective given that military engagement and military hardware is of little interest to these small nations. Many simply do not have a military force.

China has been very astute in recognising the strategic cultures within the South Pacific. In taking great pains to present itself as a friend, China is emulating the behaviour of the Soviet Union towards many Third World countries in the 1960's. Perhaps then it is more about the rise of America in the Pacific, rather than solely China that will impress future changes on to the geo-political eco-system?

With its vast array of military capabilities, the US strategy of coercion to contain China is a predictable counter. Hard power, as demonstrated against the Soviet Union, proved to be a very successful deterrent during the Cold War. But, is it appropriate today given the Chinese strategy has been to engage more with soft power to influence and draw favourable relations from the Pacific Island neighbourhood? Is this a symmetrical response? It would be very interesting to see which Great Power Navy would be more warmly welcomed to pay a shore visit.

US policymakers seeking to establish a Containment strategy towards China would be well advised to avoid the pitfall of a revisionist approach to the Cold War. Arranging policy objectives to duplicate the wrestle for power with the Soviet Union would be folly. A careful examination of China's posture in the Pacific would reveal a sophisticated interdependence of relationships. The bipolar struggle of today is not about a fight for power, but a struggle to share power.

Charles Gati's three phases of Containment in the Cold War; confrontation followed by confrontation and competition, and finally confrontation, competition and cooperation,

(Gati, 1974) is a useful construct to determine where the current US-China relationship might lie. Gati's phases spanned over 30 years, however today's timeframes have been greatly compressed. We are already in the second phase – confrontation and competition. The key question is whether the direction yet to be travelled is forward or backwards? Ideally two more phases should be added to allow a de-escalation scale for a more positive outcome. Including the phases; competition and cooperation and finally cooperation alone could help build a more virtuous position to strive for. To achieve cooperation in the Pacific, China and the US should be encouraged to do so through a regional governance structure. While they are Great Powers, Great Powers can become consumed and blinded with peer competition and confrontation. During the Cold War many countries were resigned to the role of spectators, acquiescent to the ideology of Washington or Moscow. For that reason a real challenge rests with the Pacific countries to be more assertive, to have the confidence to persuade Washington and Beijing that the Pacific environment is not a passive one. It is time to apply Pacific Power. The small nations within do have the ability to influence and manage the bipolar nature of the US-China relationship. It is obviously in their best interest to do so. Rather than being idle proxies of the Cold War era, countries like Samoa, Tonga and Kiribati can and should take an active role in accommodating both Great Powers. A Pacific-block of nations, as already established in organisations such as the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), are appropriate mechanisms by

which the region can integrate Chinese and the American goals, thereby contributing to global governance. The PIF can become the fulcrum upon which the US-China relations balance and maintain equilibrium.

America has recognised the role of this third player in the Pacific bipolar environment. Last year the largest and highest level US delegation ever, led by Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides, participated in the 2011 PIF in Auckland, New Zealand. Astute followers of Pacific culture would have noted that Auckland has the largest Polynesian population of any city in the world, providing a unique insight to the opinions and perspectives of the other small Pacific nations. No doubt Beijing and Washington realise the value of their New Zealand embassies to report on the attitudes and feelings towards their respective countries from this source.

If the countries of the Pacific ultimately want to encourage affirmative Great Power relationships and behaviour then that narrative needs to be communicated consistently, constantly and unreservedly. Acknowledging that both the US and China are indispensable to the region would go some way towards mollifying strategic miscalculations.

For China, a choice would be to resist or respond to the US military overtures, its hard power. Certainly, it could engage in a contest to militarise and arm the Pacific. It has the economic means to do so. Such a policy however, would surely unravel all of the good relations that it has carefully cultivated and enjoyed as benefits of its soft power approach. As a result an attritional arms-race would be

counter-productive. In whose interest is it to be perceived as the aggressor?

For the US to reassert its military presence in the Pacific, post Iraq and Afghanistan, is understandable. There will not however, be the overestimation of the utility of force with China. Smart power (Nye, 2004), the combination of hard and soft power, will undoubtedly drive the formulation of US policy for Asia-Pacific. For this to occur with any measurable success there would need to be a sharp and sustained rise in US diplomatic engagement and economic initiatives. The message would simply be “hey, don’t forget about us, it’s not all about China”. Ironically, while an arms-race in the Pacific would be dangerous, a development aid-race would not be without hazards. A Pacific awash with money might sound great to some, but it could quite easily destroy what are already delicate economies and financial systems.

A Cold War in the Pacific is avoidable. While the US and China might wrangle for dominance, for hegemony, it does so against a backdrop of nations that are quite accepting of both Great Powers. The notion of shared power in a bipolar environment may be inconceivable to some. To the people of the Pacific this would be a much preferred arrangement than one that becomes the flash-point for confrontation. No one wants another Fulda Gap.

Both China and the US are indispensable to the Pacific. There is the likelihood that multi-aligned diplomatic, economic and security relations will become more common. A security arrangement with China, in tandem with an economic agreement with the US, or vice versa, might

form the foreign policy of a Pacific nation. In regional terms, the PIF could become the conduit for power sharing between China and the US. Perhaps even a model of political discourse for other international institutions grappling with the Great Power relationship. A third party in a bipolar world might appear implausible but if the effect is constructive dialogue and moderated behaviour then the prospects for post-hegemonic global governance are promising.

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TOPIC GROUP 3

ASIA FOCUS

Essays in this section are unified by their geographical focus on Asia. Sachin N. Pardhe and Ramesh Gyawali offer insights on the role of South Asia, especially India, in the new post hegemonic world order. Y Ratana argues that U.S. and China both play indispensable roles in future development and security of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian) countries. Mei Zhao offers the Chinese perspective on US/China relations and suggests how China's engagement in international governance may be the best path to global order.



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POST HEGEMONIC GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ROLE OF INDIA

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The institutions which function in international political arena are neither created in vacuum, nor do they exist in one. Their very existence and the role is shaped by the contemporary global political economy and global power relations as well as the global power structure. ‘Realist believe that the territorial states continues to be primary actor in both domestic and international affairs and reject the popular belief that economic and technological factors have eclipsed the nation state and are creating a global economy and society in which political boundaries and national loyalties are no longer relevant. Even in a highly integrated economy, states continue to use their power and to

implement policies to channel economic forces in ways favorable to their own national interests.’

The last decade of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century have been crucial in this context as despite predictions about the close end of unipolar world, skeptics are not too sure that the US will decline in near future. However, ‘We are at this time going through the period of what economic historians call “catch-up”. Asia is catching up with the more advanced regions of the world and the center of the global economy is shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific.’ This phenomenon is being described by many scholars in different ways, some are suggesting it a decline of the West in general and USA in particular, other are still skeptic and looking at it as a relative decline of the US. Whatever the case may be, but it definitely has changed the attitude of the Western powers and US particularly towards the East and East towards the West and has allowed at least some say in decision making. Though the US will remain the most powerful nation for at least few more decades, its dominance will decrease especially in economic if not in military sphere, and instead India and especially China “is poised to have more impact over the world in the next 20 years than any other country.” An interdependence theory approach, based on institutional and economic interrelationships between major powers in an age of globalization, simultaneously argues that a “win-win” situation is possible by managing conflict and terse power relations.

Therefore, future shape of global governance, including international financial institutions and the designing of a new global financial architecture is, perhaps, the most immediate and wide-ranging element of reform for maintaining global stability and security.

NEW GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW GLOBAL ACTORS:

Global governance is not synonymous to global government; it is not a single top-down, hierarchical world order. It is the collection of governance-related activities, established norms and rules, structures and institutions formal and informal, existing at a variety of levels in the world. We refer to these as the “pieces of global governance.” With the rise of ‘Market-State’ traditional notions of sovereignty associated with the state are coming under pressure of these ‘pieces of global governance’. The existing institutional structures no doubt have become outdated and needs reforms. A group of scholars, eminent leaders have already started commenting in this context. According to United Nations Deputy Secretary-General Asha-Rose Migiro, “We need to ensure both greater synergies among, as well as participation of, all stakeholders,” she said. “We need to work together to make our institutions more effective, fair and accountable. The name of the game is ‘delivering for the people.’” According to Migiro, the gap between “old structures and new realities” was causing divergences among groups of countries at differing stages of development.

However, with the rise of new economic powers from rule takers to the rule makers, the

question that has become more crucial is how these emerging powers are going to respond to the existing global structures, would they apply their growing power to shape the new sets of rule or would they choose to go along with the existing structure.

The Global power shift narrative suggests the dynamic nature of power and its transition from the west to east with the emergence of the rapidly growing economies and the huge market in the east, however the role of any nation or a region in international arena is determined by not only because of its physical and economic strength but also the capacity, ability and the willingness of the nation to shoulder the responsibility. It is the burden sharing capacity and willingness of a nation in the international regimes that determine its position, influence and the relative power of the country. Therefore to assess the role of India in global governance, it is essential to locate India in this framework.

INDIA IN SOUTH ASIA:

India is a developing country with a large number of poor people of multiple matrix of economic human development. However, India in South Asia is Elephant in the room. South Asia’s geographic location, midway between the oil rich Middle East and the South East Asian regions, and the Indian Ocean suggests its strategic importance and ‘after years of marginalization, South Asia is steadily increasing its influence in international affairs’. The global power shift narrative further leveraged the South Asia’s importance in global politics and compelled the global power to look

at the region with changed perspective. However, this is not the only factor that has magnified the role of India in global order. India being the major power in South Asia has emerged as an important actor and being recognized as a major player in international politics by the US and the EU. Two factors that strengthened India's position in global perception are its polity (the largest stable democracy in the world) and its relative impressive economic growth. However, India's leadership of the region is not accepted unequivocally. While India considers itself to be status-quoists, the small neighbor states think of India as the 'big brother'. Pakistan, with whom India has shared a very turbulent history since independence, has persistently challenged the leadership of India in South Asia. These regional conflicts have been preventing the region from emerging as a strong economic centre and impeded the economic as well as political benefits to the countries. In contrast to its pre-1990 foreign policy, considering the global power shift narrative and growing importance of the east and Southeast Asia, India is now engaging its neighbors differently. However, the rise of China and the potential Chinese threat to India's interests in South Asia and Indian Ocean Region have been crucial factors in shaping its relations with the major global powers in general and US in particular. As China emerges as the pre-eminent player in the Asia-Pacific region, many analysts in the US are speculating over whether India could be a balancer to China in the region. However, India's Strategic Partnership with the US and the EU are signs of India coming into her own

and being recognized as an important contemporary and future partner. India, the acknowledged leader of the South Asia, is transcending that role to play a larger global role, a development that is endorsed by the US and the EU in their respective strategic partnerships with India. Though it seems a new phenomenon if looked at the history of India, India always had a very broad and universalistic approach towards the world. As early as 1947, India was active with its soft power approach (though the concept was not yet coined) and played a significant role in decolonization processes. The country was also active in the United Nations as well as in leading the Non-Alignment Movement. This was primarily due to the vision of India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru-that as a big country with long civilization history, India was not merely a regional but also an international power. After years of marginalization the US now has acknowledged the role of India in global governance and that is the part of changed attitude towards India. This changed attitude towards India is primarily because of following major things:

- a) India's economic liberalization policy and the subsequent emergence of India as one of the fastest growing economies,
- b) the nuclearization of India and
- c) the geostrategic importance of India in new global architecture.

These key elements have not only changed India's perception of itself but also the world's perception of India.

On economic front India is still managing the transition from a developing to a developed one

and has a long way to go before it emerge as a major global power, however, above factors have already granted India a say in global affairs which at least in regional context cannot be easily ignored by the major global actors.

GLOBAL APPROACH:

In a globalised world, just as India engages the world, India is also being engaged by the world. The most dramatic transformation has been in the India-US relationship. This new relationship has multiple aspects. These two largest democracies have moved from being 'estranged democracies' to 'engaged democracies'. For the first time in its bilateral relation with India, US has recognized the de-facto role of India in leading the region totally de-hyphenating from Pakistan.

This is important as the US and Europe / EU are engaging the two emerging powers – China and India – which are pursuing two very different political and economic models of growth.

India's strength lies in its ideational proximity to the West, being the world's largest non-Western democracy. India has successfully integrated its pluralism and diversity with institutionalized democracy that has the potential to be a model for others more specifically its neighbors.

To look at the issue of global perception towards India and India's response to it has two crucial dimensions to analyze.

a) From the perspective of the existing global stakeholder is how to integrate these emerging economies into global rule making institutional structures.

b) From the emerging powers perspective the issue of what it might do with its new position. To answer these questions one needs to analyze India's foreign policy that shows a mix of balancing and hedging of interests. Current institutions of global governance are a product of World War II and do not reflect the current changed geopolitical and global economic realities. The asymmetric power equations among states are reflected in institutional structures of global governance. It is for this reason that India has started seeking to create a new multilateralism – India is a member of IBSA (INDIA, BRAZIL and South Africa) a trilateral development initiative, BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China). Notwithstanding multiple challenges and bottlenecks there is optimism in India's growing relations with its neighbors China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and other countries of South Asia, as all of them are governed by the factor of economic interdependence and have had close historical and cultural relations with India. India's "look east" policy is also an example of India's changed policy perceptions. India's initiative in this context reflects an expanding set of networks with South-East Asian countries (aimed at enhancing trade and economic relations), and West Asia and Central Asia (focused on strengthening and further securing India's energy security). This also covers the Indian Ocean and littoral. However India's global engagement is also seen with skeptic eye by many. India's pursuit of a permanent UNSC seat is seen in the region and outside as a pursuit of national interest (wanting veto power) and not as an

attempt to change the system. Rather, India wants to be like one of the Permanent Five Members.

INDIAN PERSPECTIVE:

India is a still relatively poor and developing country as compare to China. However, India has been committed to its extra-regional role. So when we speak about the global redesign the structure, the process, the effectiveness has to take center stage. It is very clear that the institutions we have reflect the geopolitics and the global economics of 1945 and not 2011.

One example the composition of United Nations Security Council and the veto power of the P-5 nations, international financial institutions and the voting power based on quota system, the dominance of G-8 in global economy.

And all are the issues where India has voice and made a contribution. The G-20 summit in Pittsburg in 2009 was a good start in right direction it seem to have set in process a process to redesign the international financial architecture. It is a positive step that it's now the G20 and no longer the G-7 or G-8 that declared itself to be the premier forum for international economic cooperation. G-20s have talked about a mandated shift of at least a 5% in the IMF's quota the quota share from develop countries to developing and emerging market economies without affecting the existing share of the poorest countries. They also mandated the shift of at least 3% of the world banks voting powers.

Without affecting the old non-alignment principle India is increasingly moving towards a

world of multi-alignment that is that we are finding itself participating in lots of small grouping which bring a lots of countries together with common interests ranging from IBSA, BRIC, to a small group called IOR-ARC (The Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation).

Since the economic liberalization India's global presence has been steadily visible.

India's increasing role however, has another dimension to discuss. India's globalization and emergence as a major power have led New Delhi to reconsider its role. India's role in maintaining peace and stability in its backyard, nuclear issue, managing global commons, climate change, and sustainable development are some of the important issues that India needs to address as it takes a step ahead in global polity.



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US Indispensable Role in Regional Architecture: Peace, Stability and Development

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1. Introduction

Within the last decade the Asia and International communities have been experiencing a profound change, change from world peace, stability, and development and prosperity to more uncertainty and instability. Although, it was observed that, Southeast Asia is growing in the positive way especially enjoying the democratic development, economic growth, cultural exchange, and strengthening mutual understanding and cooperation, it does not mean that this region, ASEAN in particular, has no difficulties and challenges at all. In fact, there are a number of challenges either small or big ones; some are urgent while others require long-term responses.

The challenges in this region are confronting by many is the bad impact of world economic-financial crisis, terrorism, proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction, global warming and natural disaster and disease, maritime security, human trafficking, drug smuggling, border conflict, civil war, and arms race and so on and so forth.

In addition, ASEAN is seen as there is no regional defense body set up yet to response promptly and effectively to the provocative acts like arms race, piracy, intra-state conflict and terrorism. The countries in this association appear reluctant to have regional defense institution despites their concerns raised in series of ASEAN defense meetings.

Furthermore, the ASEAN as well as Asia Pacific Region remain under the threats of Non-Traditional Security (terrorism, transnational organized crimes, epidemics, natural disasters, etc) and Traditional Security (territorial disputes both sea and land Arms proliferation both nuclear and conventional and political and legal disputes. Although emerging security issues have been on the rise, defense and security cooperation among ASEAN member-states has faced with difficulties which demand us to think of new ideas for effective cooperation among ASEAN member-states and between ASEAN and outside partners, among which defense cooperation is very important.

To deal with security challenges and threats in the region, it requires both bilateral and multilateral cooperation among cooperation partners of ASEAN. Hence, all demanding resolution rests on promoting the confident building, preventive diplomacy and the conflict resolution among ASEAN Member States and international cooperation. No single country can deal with the threats alone for instance war

against terrorism, economic-financial crisis and climate change and global warming. Thus, it needs badly the international community work together as one to address the threats.

There are regional mechanisms were invited to tackle the regional and global issues or threats, such as ASEAN Regional Forum and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, APEC, ASEAN plus China, Korea, and Japan, or ASEAN + 3, EU-ASEAN, US-ASEAN, China and SCO, ARF, ASEAN+3+3, and ADMM-Plus. These mechanisms is recognized as playing a prominent role in maintaining regional peace and stability, and some positive factors are gaining the upper hand in regional security cooperation. However, this article is aiming at focusing on the bilateral relationship between the United States of America and ASEAN in area of defense cooperation.

The paper attempts to answer a hypothesis: *“Engagement of US Cooperation to maintaining and enhancing peace, stability and development in present and future of South-east Asia is indispensable. This hypothesis will be answered in two focuses, first, it will focus on general aspects of US position in the world and second US role in Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) especially involvement of US in achieving ASEAN goal, building ASEAN Community in 2015.*

2. U.S. Position in the Today-World

There are different views about position of the United State of America in the world stage or global leadership in the late 20th century and early 21st century: some might see it as in

remarkable decline, others might view the America's leadership as in relative decline and/or just decline after has been gaining its solely recognition as only one super power in World War II and post-World War II and then end of cold war in the contexts of international politic dominance (foreign policy), economic and military powerWhile participating in series of lectures organized by ITD (Institute for Training and Development) and sponsored by the State Department at ITD Conference Room, the issues of U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security and the decline of power of America in the global arena and emerging super power namely China were raised and discussed. First argument based on dramatic difficulties and challenges that the United States of America has been in trouble both a) international politic crisis in the last two decades that is starting with Bush's government decided to go into war in Iraq in the purposes of destroying the popular named Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), bringing democracy and freedom to Iraqi and getting rid of dictatorship in this country, then after 9/11/1 terrorist attack to World Trade Center in New York, U.S. declared its strong commitment to war against terrorism and do whatever it can to bring justice to victims of 9/11 attack, security to Americans and the world community and thus, went to war in Afghanistan, counter insurgency and terrorist activities in Pakistan... Bush's administration appeared to use hard-line approach (hard power) rather than soft-line approach (soft-power) to deal with most issues; to many they saw Bush's foreign policy also upset some of its allied countries and many

countries in the world. Bush's administration also did not only upset and stirred the anger and sentiment against American interest in the Middle East, but also ignored to make close relationship with emerging regional body in Southeast Asia namely ASEAN.

Anti-Americanism has increased in recent years, and the United States' soft power -- its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the values that underlie them -- is in decline as a result. According to Gallup International polls, pluralities in 29 countries say that Washington's policies have had a negative effect on their view of the United States. A Eurobarometer poll found that a majority of Europeans believes that Washington has hindered efforts to fight global poverty, protect the environment, and maintain peace. Such attitudes undercut soft power, reducing the ability of the United States to achieve its goals without resorting to coercion or payment. (Joseph S. Nye, The Decline of America's Soft Power: 2004)

Bush's legacy had left to the next leadership of this country, the Obama's administration. Obama's administration is inevitable to continue the Bush's legacy and manages it by its own way. Obama's government has been trying all efforts to bring back good name of America at home and at world stage, but nevertheless, although, it seems that U.S. Foreign Policy has restored under Obama's administration, it is doubt by the world community that this is a real intention or just political game of America especially the change of leadership style between the Democratic

Party and Republican Party; it is simply to argue that this is because trouble in Iraq is not yet over, and U.S led war in Afghanistan remains continue and plus with current political debate on U.S.-Iran crisis over Iran Nuclear Program Development. b) economic crisis: 2008 financial and economic recession heat U.S has tremendous impact American economic growth (inability to sustain the growth and world economic system), bringing the country into depth foreign debt and allowing sharing of world power due to emerging world economic power from developing country like China and or India and last it causes tragedy to the global economic growth worldwide especially Europe, East Asia and Southeast Asia. There has been a lot of debate internationally and locally about the today and future world of world economic system after 2008 crisis and blames of crisis also made worldwide. In addition, post 2008 crisis, the world faced another sever crisis, it was European crisis; within this context, many came/or continue to state that the world power is shifting from the West to East; it means the decline of West's economic power and the rise of East's economic power to the world (this rising not only China but also emerging of ASEAN as a strong Regional Institution, playing vital role in the global politic and economic community. ASEAN can manage to attract the major powers (U.S.A., China, Japan, EU and India) to engage in its dialogue partners and cooperation. And so far, ASEAN maintain its position, ASEAN's centrality and driving force. In addition, in response to the world financial and economic crisis, during the 2009 Asia

Economic Forum hosted in Phnom Penh, international and regional diplomats, and scholars had called the world community to work together hand in hand to resolve this problem; it called for all countries in the world not regarding big countries or small countries, well-developed or least developed, powerful countries or powerless countries to see this crisis as all crisis, not close the door (protectionism), settling thing alone or with allied countries...it is because this crisis cannot solve a lone. This was a strong message and won support internationally. The second argument simply relies on the fact that there is relative decline but not really decline of US power in the world at all or it may be viewed that the expression of US decline of power is just an exaggeration or spoiling the public opinions in gaining political support at home (US) or it is another new strategic approach of the United States to domestic and international affairs in revealing US in the global governance. In fact, despites some difficulties and challenges US faced, US remains the most strong power in the world, military, economy, political leadership and good education. Therefore, there is a mixed opinion on where today America stand in the world leadership. However, whatever views/perspectives are there is undeniable fact that U.S. is facing difficulties and challenges at home and international arena. At the same time, U.S. especially under Obama's administration had appealed to the world community to work together in the fight for economic growth, development, world peace and stability. It calls for multilateral mechanisms to deal with any


kind of threats to home, region and international. This is knows as smart power. Smart power was employed by Joseph S. Nye in his book titled *The Power to Lead*, which published in 2008↪ refers to the combination between hard power and soft power.

Nye argues, however, that the most effective leaders are actually those who combine hard and soft power skills in proportions that vary with different situations. He calls this smart power. Drawing examples from the careers of leaders as disparate as Gandhi, Churchill, Lee Iacocca, and George W. Bush, Nye uses the concept of smart power to shed light on such topics as leadership types and skills, the needs and demands of followers, and the nature of good and bad leadership in terms of both ethics and effectiveness.(Joseph S. Nye, *The Power to Lead*: 2008).

In brief, although, it has seen that U.S. has been experiencing and facing a number of difficulties and challenges at home and at global community particularly economic crisis, heavy foreign debt, that allowing world power shift and discrediting U.S. Foreign Policy (critique), heavy military expense...it still worldwide recognizes that though there can be emerging major powers come to play in the global governance, but there is no any rising major powers can substitute the leadership of the United States. United States, despites these unfavorable factors, continue to enjoy its leadership as solely super power on earth for unpredictable period of times in the future. U.S. remain a leading in many fields:

1. economic development with GDP in dollars in 2010: 14,526,550 millions and in 2011 \$15.088 trillion dollars (2012 estimate) (IFM's projection) . In economic sphere, U.S. is still home of largest markets and trade. It remains free economy although it takes some more long time to fully recover from 2008-financial and economic downturn. All kinds of goods and materials around the world are fluxed into the US market.
2. highest military expense in the world: defense expense is 19% or \$700 billions of the total amount of federal spending \$3,598 billions in 2011.

U.S. Federal Spending – Fiscal Year 2011 (\$ Billions)



Source Data: CBO Historical Tables

Therefore, it can conclude that although US has facing difficulties at home and overseas, military budget is not in jeopardy cut. US always want its military or defense to be strongest in the world because it is prior to its homeland security, the safety of the country and citizens in particular and the world as a whole in general. Or national security defense remains only priority compared with other areas of US priorities.

3. exceptional model of political leadership: very modernized democratic system, diversification of races, cultures and religions. It adsorbs and encourages the migration; it is liberal democracy, freedom and human rights, education, diversity of cultures and human races.

In addition, on security, stability and peace, U.S. plays also a leading role in the war against terrorism, counter-insurgency, maritime security, peace keeping operation because it has very qualified human resources, hi-tech military equipments and weapons, huge number of militaries worldwide and biggest budget for security-defense. With the most qualified military, hi-tech weapons and military technology, it allows United States that can reach its enemies effectively anywhere in the world. Under Bush's administration particularly after 9/11/1 attack the Congress approved the imperative right of the government to use force to capture or kill the terrorist groups or networks in any countries, for instance, U.S. special forces killed Osama Bin Laden, the founder of the militant Islamist organization Al-Qaeda in Pakistan in May 2011. All these factors allow U.S. to continue its role in leading the world. Therefore, U.S. role in world community is indispensable.

In the 2010-United State Defense Strategy, it prioritizes military role in the protecting the U.S interests in the country and outside the country.....

United States' Strategies with their Key Allies and Some Major Powers

Again, after the Cold War, US has become the single global superpower in both economic and military power. Global strategic outreach of the US has gone far enough to manage the world. However, the war in Iraq and Afghanistan and the economic crisis in 2008 have shrunk the influence and power of the US on the regional and global stage.

The global image of US under Bush administration had reduced remarkably. Only after Obama administration, US's image has been restored. US started to pay more attention to Southeast Asia and East Asia. The return of US to the region creates both opportunities and challenges. The opportunities the democracy oriented countries will gain more moral and political support. Military cooperation and strategic hedging foreign policy conducted with various countries in the region can be strengthened with the presence of the US. Some countries in Southeast Asia even look to US for security protection.

US has been trying to restore trust and confidence with her traditional allies such as Japan and South Korea. The sinking of the South Korean ship and the nuclear threat from North Korea gave US a great opportunity to make sure that Korea and Japan cannot move away from US's security umbrella. The rising threat from China, as perceived by South Korea, Japan, and other countries in the region has pushed these countries to stick closer to US's collective security alliance. It has done through various means, such as highest level of State visit of leaders of these countries, ministerial level of exchange of visit and higher

ranking officers meetings to strengthen security cooperation. On the other both the U.S. and Japan have seen and recognized the top-peak of economic booming and the significant roles in regional cooperation. Such economic booming is not a threat for regional security, instability, and freedom. The most important point is to build together for inter-national cooperation capability which will be implemented by all parties.

China has shown more assertive foreign and defense policy in recent years in order to prove that China is not a weak country anymore. China is transforming itself to become a superpower country although still named as developing country. The economic power of China has supported China to expand her strategic and political influence in the region and around the world. China has been pursuing peaceful rise and peaceful development with harmonious society and region. However, the military modernization of China makes some countries in the region to be fearful for their security especially those countries that have territorial conflict with China. It is understandable that Vietnam is trying to survive by allying herself closer to US. But Vietnam is always consistent in her foreign policy that is "neutral and independent". Vietnam will never become military ally with any country including the United States. China feels uncomfortable with the move of some ASEAN countries towards the United States. China always perceives that US always try to contain China. This is understandable if one looks from Chinese point of view. Therefore, China has

doing her utmost efforts to break the containment wall created by the United States.

China has approached ASEAN in multidimensional ways namely economic cooperation (trade and investment), financial aids and loans, cultural exchanges and education, ethnic Chinese linkages, military cooperation and assistance. China has shown more cooperation and partnership with ASEAN in dealing economic issues and non-traditional securities issues.

The long term vision of China is China will create her own sphere of influence in the region in order to reduce US's influence. China needs to expand her strategic outreach to the region especially South China Sea in order to get access to resources to support her industrialization. China and the U.S. have tried very hard to change their strategies in Asia. Both of them have strongly strengthened their relationships. In this relation, having elected as the president of America Barak Obama said that his government would fully cooperate with China in terms of North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons. Mrs. Hilary Clinton, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that the US is a superpower both in Atlantic & Pacific area. So, the US is willing to form a potential counterpart who can have close cooperation with each other for the shake of Human beings. At the same time, China and the US have begun rebuilding bilateral tie after having postponed due to the opposing that the US had sold weapons to Taiwan. This made clear after the visiting Mrs, Hilliary Clinton to China.

However, for the world peace, stability and development particularly in Asia Pacific and Southeast Asia, the United States and China have been trying to have better understanding each other , improve bilateral dialogue and cooperation by the a series of State Visits of two leaders and a number of higher level meetings of the two nations despites sour relationship on the issues of U.S-Taiwan strong support, engagement of U.S. in South China Sea's conflicts and military supports to some ASEAN countries to this conflict, which are reacted by strongly by China as interference of internal affairs of China and its neighboring countries. In addition, the February 2012 visit to Washington by Chinese Vice President Xi to US and China CEOs marked another good sign for further promotion of economic and business cooperation of the two countries. (Remarks by Vice President Biden and Chinese Vice President Xi to US and China CEOs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Hall of Flags, Washington, D.C.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/14/remarks-vice-president-biden-and-chinese-vice-president-xi-us-and-china->) In addition, US and China had also reaffirmed their stand on to work with South Korea, Japan and Russia to resume Six-Party Talk with North Korea on North Korea's Nuclear Program which is stalled before the death of former leader of North Korea, Kim Il Sung. This issue is believed that it will be raised in next ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia this year (Cambodia is the Chair of ASEAN this year)

The relationship between India and the U.S. has been seen to be even bettered in the field of national defense since both countries signed “the new Framework of Indian-US Defense Relation” in June 2005. Such framework aimed at enhancing military cooperation in terms of national defense industrialization and information technology. And in June 2006, both countries had paved their way for a closer interaction in political decision making based upon civil nuclear weapon cooperation program.

The relationship between Russia and the U.S. has been seen in good prospective recently. That is, when the President Barrack Obama and Russia President Dmilry Medvedev agreed on the old nuclear weapon agreement which signed by President Bill Clinton and President Boris Yelsin. This is a positive sign and good hope for all the people in the world who are afraid of the wide spreading of nuclear weapons that could be sold out to terrorists for threatening to the global security and peace.

President Barrack Obama promised to review all new strategies for solving conflicts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mrs. Hillary Clinton considered the war in Afghanistan as the urgent issue to be solved. She also confirmed that “new strategies of the U.S. have been progressed. She also promised that the implementation of those strategies would be implemented before one month. She reaffirmed that all of these were the U.S. politics supported by the cooperation of country partners-Pakistan and Afghanistan. American

diplomat used the words **cooperation and coordination between each other**. This can be considered as a new political stance of Foreign affairs compared to previous administrations. It does not matter where, Asia or other continents, Mrs. Hillary Clinton has had only one objective. That is, achieving the best results.

In short, the cooperation between all the major powers and all the countries in Asia Pacific region are very important for the welfare, peace, and security in the region and in the world as well. The roles, functions, and participations of all the countries in the Asia Pacific play the most significant contribution in globalization and in the context of filling each other for perfectness. Naturally, there is no country that can develop itself without having any relationship with others. However, such claim does not mean that all the relationship and cooperation with all the major powers can be done without having any obstacle and irritation. Mistrusting and facing one another always occur as we had experienced in the past and in recent time such as the wide spreading of nuclear weapon (Iran), the nuclear tests of North Korea recently, rebellions, trans-national crimes, piracy, trans-national drug smuggling. The world has traveled along way and the strategic conditions cannot be seen only as black and white in the context of military as found in the Cold War. Everything cannot be done without having participations from other countries in the region whether it is bilateral, trilateral or even in its own alliances.

3. U.S. Role in Regional Architecture in Enhancing Peace, Stability and Development


ASEAN is a single Regional Body in South-east Asia with population of nearly 600 million people, which is 8.8% of the world's largest population and GDP in 2010 had grown to US\$1.8 trillions and was ranked 9th largest economy in the world (Figure 1). (wikipedia) .

The ASEAN economic growth appears to be a little bit slowdown due to recent world economic slowdown particularly unsolved dept crisis in Europe and United States of America.

According to the Nation Search, due to this problem, Thailand and Singapore are facing huge cuts. It found that Thailand's GDP for 2011 is revised downwards to 3.5 per cent from the 4.5 per cent projected earlier, while Singapore's GDP is down to 4.5 per cent from 5.5 per cent. Malaysia saw a downgrade to 4 per cent from 4.5 per cent, while the Philippines' GDP was cut to 4.3 per cent from 4.4 per cent. The GDP estimate for Indonesia, the region's biggest economy, remains unchanged at 6 per cent (Nation Search). This impact derives from low demand growth in

China, Europe and slow economic growth of US. The global GDP estimate is now about 3.3 percent, down from 3.8 percent. ASEAN economy is recovering due to gradual recovery of US economy and expansion of trade and business with China. US is the third biggest market for ASEAN, many countries in ASEAN rely on their exports to US market. ASEAN accounts for 6% of all world trade. According to Foreign Trade, US Census Bureau released on May 24, 2011, the United States is the largest

export market, comprising 12% of its exports, while exports to Japan make up 12%, China 10% and India 3%. In return, US also see ASEAN as an important gateway of their market. ASEAN has the third-largest economy in Asia, after Japan and China. As a developing region, its per capita income is low but its GDP is rapidly growing: an almost 170% increase over the past decade. ASEAN and the United States also welcomed an increase in trade in the first half of 2010, after the recent financial crisis. Two-way trade was valued at \$84 billion during that period, a 28% increase over last year. They also agreed that more needs to be done to prevent global financial crises, citing both the current crisis and the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98. And in 2011, US-Southeast Asia Trade Triples over Last Two Decades.



Source: Foreign Trade, US Census Bureau

Enhancing strongly regional peace, security, stability and development, ASEAN cannot go without the engagement and cooperation with the United States of America.

US relationships and cooperation with ASEAN was seen as best than before start with the Obama's administration. US started to pay more attention to Southeast Asia and East Asia. The return of US to the region creates both opportunities and challenges. The opportunities the democracy oriented countries will gain more moral and political support. Military cooperation and strategic hedging foreign policy conducted with various countries in the region can be strengthened with the presence of the US. Some countries in Southeast Asia even look to US for security protection.

Obama's administration and its achievements with Southeast Asia: signing Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with ASEAN in the 15th ASEAN Summit in 2009, Phuket Thailand. The in the 15th ASEAN Meeting it also adopted the revised Priorities for Cooperation under the ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership which would reinvigorate the cooperation between ASEAN and the US and would contribute positively to ASEAN community-building efforts. The Meeting acknowledged the need to make progress in the development of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) and agreed to collectively address the global economic crisis. The Meeting reaffirmed ASEAN's commitment to work closely with the US towards the successful conclusion of the ASEAN-US Science and Technology Agreement, and expansion of the ASEAN-US Fulbright Scholarship and Training Program. The Philippines proposed to host a Special DG Meeting and a Special SOM to chart directions

for ASEAN-US cooperation in the next three years. (ASEAN Chairman's Statement on the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) +1 Sessions, 22July 2009, Phuket, Thailand) U.S. under Obama's administration has vowed to continue to further strengthen cooperation in other fields following this progress such as the Peace keeping and natural disaster and human relief [e.g. joint training and exercise on Global Peace Operation Initiatives (GPOI) with some ASEAN nations, like Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand,], maritime security (dialogue partner, providing training, contributing policy and education) and expanding trade and economic market between the two dialogue partners. There are two important strategic entry points for the US: South China Sea and Mekong River. These two issues have been the stumbling bloc of China's relations with her neighbors in Southeast Asia. US's strategies, therefore, are: increasing military cooperation with like minded countries in the Southeast and East Asian region; increasing its soft power through economic and mass media; reducing the promotion of democracy and human rights in those countries which are not comfortable with this such as Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Burma; increasing people to people diplomacy through education, cultural exchanges, and volunteerism; more engagement with hardliner such as Burma. To analysts, the US's return to Southeast Asia clearly demonstrates US's intention to reduce the influence of China in the region. US do not and never wish to see China rise in an uncontrollable way. US do not want to loose her global single superpower status. The seek

for energy and other natural resources have pushed US to maintain her global status and role in order to explore and get access to more resources to support US's economic and strategic position.

Following mission of Hilary Clinton to ASEAN-US Summit in Phuket 2009, US continue its active involvement and commitment to strengthen security and defense cooperation with ASEAN. US had signed joint declaration in Vietnam 2010, and become a member of ADMM-Plus. ADMM, a highest defense mechanism in ASEAN, was created in 2006 in Singapore by ASEAN in the purpose of to build a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility and a dynamic and outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world; strengthening security and defense cooperation, to serve as a robust, effective, open and inclusive component of the regional security architecture, and which lays a strong foundation for the ADMM to cooperate with Dialogue Partners from the Plus countries to address common security challenges; and regional defense and security cooperation among ASEAN Member States through concrete and practical cooperation to address defense and common security issues. With these reasons ADMM Plus were set up in 2010 in Hanoi, Vietnam; the ADMM Plus will meet triennially. Currently there are only 8 countries as members of ADMM-Plus; there are Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russia and United States of America. It is the highest level meeting between ASEAN and its dialogue partner, the

Plus countries. The first ADMM-Plus meeting was hosted in Hanoi, Vietnam, marked crucial milestone in the history of ASEAN. The participation of the Plus-eight countries was viewed as a tremendous success of ASEAN's role and performance, especially in the last two decades, as regional driving force/seed and centrality in the world body. It was also seen that the meeting had shown the enhancement of trust and confidence building among Asia and Pacific countries in military affairs. (Joint Declaration in 2010, Vietnam) and last year President Barak Obama attended the ASEAN-US and East Asian summits in Bali, November 17-19, 2011 to discuss the importance of cooperation on the region's most pressing political and security challenges, including maritime security, non-proliferation, and disaster response. President Obama underscored the Administration's commitment to deepening engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and playing a leadership role in its emerging institutions. He has made clear that full and active U.S. engagement in the region's multilateral architecture helps to reinforce the system of rules, responsibilities, and norms that underlies regional peace, stability, and prosperity. United States continues to strengthen and support ASEAN on *maritime security, non proliferation and disaster response and humanitarian Assistance* and fight against terrorism and other issues like illicit drug smuggling and human trafficking and transnational crimes.

1. Maritime Security and Fight against Terrorism

Maritime security remains one of the top priorities for regional cooperation, even though the overall threat has been significantly reduced. Security in the Strait of Malacca has improved remarkably as the result of security measures by Indonesia, Singapore and later joined by Thailand in September 2008. Since the implementation of the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) the annual figure on piracy and armed robbery incidences has been on a downward trend. In recent month, the Malacca Strait no longer seems to be the hotspot in Southeast Asia.

Terrorism remains a pre-eminent national, regional and global security threat. Some countries have proactively managed their threats and others are reacting to threats. Most governments have built their operational capabilities to respond to terrorism but still hard to do with prevention of ideological extreme causing radicalization. To fight terrorism effectively, governments should invest a multi-prolonged response, especially dealing appropriately with youth vulnerable or subjected to be terrorists. The issues in (Southern) Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia are seen to be predominantly ethnically or religiously and politically motivated, but there are factors which fuel the insurgency. It is more likely that violent would continue unabated into a foreseeable future. Terrorism is very complicated issue; terrorists have their systematic organization and well organization; they can move and act quickly. Terrorism is no longer a single issue of a country or nation but it is international So far, there is no individual country has fought successfully against terrorism. There are

concerns about terrorist threats in the region and the close proximity to the regional terrorist network's areas of operation (Philippine, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia), which could make Cambodia a terrorist safe heaven objective; situation in Southern Thailand; challenges to our land and sea border security; and threats from cross-border criminal activities and potential relationship with terrorism. Not all countries in this regional grouping has efficient capacity to cope with maritime security threats, thus U.S. vowed its active engagement to work with its partners in the Asia-Pacific region to build capacity and promote cooperation on maritime security issues, including by:

- Providing training, assistance, and equipment to regional maritime police and civil authorities to enhance their capabilities to secure the maritime space and address transnational security challenges such as piracy, illicit trafficking, and illegal fishing;
- Building facilities and providing equipment and technical support to enhance the ability of Southeast Asian nations to monitor the maritime domain and assess and share information;
- Hosting regional workshops to promote adherence to standard operating procedures and protocols that ensure safety at sea, help build a shared vision of international norms and behaviors in the maritime domain, and foster discussion of interpretations of customary international law; and

- Hosting and co-hosting multinational capacity-building exercises with regional military partners.

2. Non Proliferation

Nuclear Proliferation has been a great worry and challenge at present time. It is not new to the world. All superpower countries always want to produce more weapons to protect their countries. This does not only happen to the superpower countries but also to the countries which potentially want to produce and enlarge their nuclear weapon.

The issue of the nuclear weapons is a great worry for the world. In this 21st century it is the time that the world community is paying attention to the monitoring of the nuclear proliferation. The United Nations and related institutions have showed their worry of the nuclear proliferation. As we have seen of the recent nuclear tests, the launching and test of cross-continent ballistic missiles caused a great worry to the region and the world as a whole. In addition, the ambition of producing nuclear weapons is another burden to the world. For decades, nuclear crisis has been a hot issue for the world; and in the lately bilateral talk between America and Russia, both superpower countries had agreed on nonproliferation and nuclear reduction. The threat of this issue is as a whole. Up to now, the hot issue remains a great problem, which calls for serious measurement in order to reduce and abolish nuclear crisis for human beings.

By understanding consequence of nuclear impact to human lives, all living creatures, environment and universe, ASEAN had

declared the region will be free of nuclear ambition, the nuclear free zone. President Obama and other EAS leaders welcomed the successful conclusion of a 40-year long negotiation between ASEAN and the Nuclear Weapons States to enable the latter's accession to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) protocol. All sides have agreed to take the necessary steps to enable the signing of the protocol and its entry into force at the earliest opportunity. The president called for EAS leaders to reaffirm their support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Action Plan adopted at the May 2010 Review Conference and for the Nuclear Security Summit to be held in Seoul in March 2012, and agreed to work together toward a successful Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference in December 2011 and Endorse efforts undertaken in other regional institutions, including the ARF, to strengthen the capacities of all EAS members to address the challenge of proliferation in the Asia-Pacific region.

3. Disaster Response and Humanitarian Assistance

Southeast Asia nationals have been facing natural catastrophes such as great storms, heavy unseal rains and flood and tsunami, earthquakes and volcano in the last more than a decade. The costs of these natural disasters are huge impact on human security and social welfare of the affected countries and other countries in the region as whole. Indonesia is seen a country affected by strong natural disasters within the last decade by landslide,

storms and flood. The Indian Ocean Tsunami hit Indonesia in December 2004 was seen as most destruction in the history of this country, which took about 170,000 lives died and destroyed homes, schools, buildings and livelihoods devastated by the disaster and damaged hundred millions of dollars of its economy. Not just only Indonesia alone, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia had hit by heavy flood and storm last year. Among the four countries, except Cambodia can almost free from tremendous natural disasters every year; it is only last year a heavy rain and flood took long and covered nearly all parts of Cambodia; as result it damage hundred millions of dollars and destroyed houses, roads and people lives. Thailand, Philippines and Vietnam face flood and storms every year, some big and some small. 2011 was seen as the big natural catastrophe in the history of Thailand.

Due to its long experience and current natural disasters in the region, the leaders of ASEAN have been raising this issue in its meetings and finding way to response to this problem.

ASEAN have expressed their deep concerns on the climate change and global warming in this century and called for all countries in the world particularly the most advanced industrial countries to work together to protect the earth, environment and all living creatures in this universe. The developing countries call all developed countries to bear the costs of impact of climate change and global warming and transfer technology and education to the developing countries in order to allowing them

enhancing their capacities to deal with the threats of the nature.

In the 2009 Press Release, the ASEAN Secretariat based in Jakarta, Indonesia announced that The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) is expected to enter into force by the end of the 2009. AADMER is a regional legally-binding agreement that binds ASEAN Member States together to promote regional cooperation and collaboration in reducing disaster losses and intensifying joint emergence response to disasters in the ASEAN region. AADMER is also ASEAN's affirmation of its commitment to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). According to the Press Release, *Margareta Wahlström, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Disaster Risk Reduction said that "the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) is the first of its kind in the world, an agreement that binds Asian states together to address disaster risk reduction and improve their preparedness for response. I congratulate ASEAN and the Governments of Southeast Asia for their foresight and engagement in affirming their commitment to the HFA and for offering partnerships to the United Nations and other partner organisations to help achieve the objectives of the Agreement."*

Although AADMER had already come into force, ASEAN cannot deal with natural disasters that happen very often in the region due to its limit of human resources and materials resources (equipments and technology) and of budget effectively and

immediately. Some friends of ASEAN like United States, Japan, China and South Korea have been also helping ASEAN to respond to this problem by providing aid reliefs (medicine, tents, food and other materials) and finance to affected countries. Or to put another way, to deal with great disaster i.e. large disaster in 2009, 2010 and 2011, it is beyond ASEAN's ability, thus, it needs friends of ASEAN to help. At the East Asia Summit (EAS) held on November 19 in Bali, Indonesia, President Obama expressed strong commitment to work with EAS member countries in disaster preparedness, institutional strengthening, and of bringing a unique set of capabilities, skills, and expertise in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In order to enhance the region's disaster response capabilities and cooperation, President Obama:

- Pledged further efforts to advance humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the region, including through a proposal to further develop a Rapid Disaster Response Agreement to create a legal and procedural framework for accelerating deployment and acceptance of assistance personnel, supplies, and services in the event of future disasters;
- Called for regular disaster relief exercises as a means to improve preparation and interoperability, noting Indonesia and Japan's successful co-hosting of the ASEAN Regional Forum's Disaster Relief Exercise (DiREx) in March 2011 and commending the Republic of Korea for its decision to host the next DiREx;

- Endorsed an Indonesian-Australian paper on enhancing regional cooperation on disaster relief, including enhanced information-sharing, capacity-building, and interoperability; and
- Encouraged efforts to build resilience and preparedness at the community level, including developing mechanisms to coordinate public and private sector efforts, such as the recently launched Pacific Rim Coordination Center, a virtual platform that facilitates disaster information-sharing and strengthens public-private partnerships in order to enhance the region's disaster risk reduction and response activities.

Chairman of ASEAN, Indonesia together with leaders of ASEAN member states had expressed deeply welcome to this message. This shows another positive move of the United States of America in participating with ASEAN because ASEAN really need the US in strengthening its regional architecture stronger.

Building ASEAN Community by 2015

The primary goal of ASEAN is its strong ambition to build ASEAN Community by 2015 after the recovery from its 1997-98 economic crisis and 2008-world financial and economic crisis. ASEAN do want to move forward as fast as possible to building up a strong regional cooperation community which is known as ASEAN Community. All ten Member States of ASEAN put their commitment and pledge to doing anything possible in order achieving their goal, building ASEAN Community, by 2015. ASEAN Community is composed of three

pillars namely ASEAN Political- Security Community (APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). The ASEAN Community's establishment was declared by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) at its 9th Summit in October 2003, which was held in Bali, Indonesia. A year later ASEAN established the Vientiane Action Programme to realise this goal. (<http://www.aseansec.org>). The spirits of action commitment of building up ASEAN community by 2015 comprising the three pillars were reaffirmed and agreed in Cebu, the Philippines in 2007 by the leaders of ASEAN. The core or primary aims and goals of the three pillars are summarized as follows:

- The APSC is expected to maintain and strengthen peace, security and stability and enhance ASEAN's capacity for self-management of regional security. It includes maritime cooperation and fight against terrorism, but no plan for a regional military bloc or defense pact. Besides, member countries are free to pursue their own foreign policies and defense arrangements.
- The mission of the AEC is to develop a single market and production base that is stable, prosperous, highly competitive and economically integrated with effective facilitation for trade and investment in which there is free flow of goods, services investment, skilled labours, and freer flow of capital. But it will not adopt a common currency like the European Union. And last but not least, the ASCC is for a Southeast

Asia bonded together in partnership as "a community of caring and sharing societies".

- The ASCC Plan of Action contains four core elements: Building a community of caring societies, managing the social impact of economic integration, Enhancing environmental sustainability, and Strengthening the foundations of regional social cohesion towards an ASEAN Community. In 2005, member countries agreed to establish an ASEAN Charter, which would serve as the legal and institutional framework for the regional organisation and the ASEAN Community. Although it will not take on any supranational functions, with its ambitious goals, the ASEAN Community is believed to have far-reaching and important impacts on the lives of the people in Southeast Asia. (ASEAN: Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015)

The outcome of such community establishment came from a series of serious observation and study of issues in the cold war and post cold war, the emerge of globalization, the rise of China and India in areas of rapid economic growth and political influence in the Asia Pacific, South East Asia and other parts of the world (Africa) and together with impact of Asian financial crisis had forced ASEAN to shift from its original preventive diplomacy of maintaining peace and harmony among its member states and in the region to the constructive diplomacy of community building to cope with increasing political and economic competition in a complicated globalized world.

At the first ASEAN-U.S. Leaders Meeting on November 15, 2009, President Obama expressed his “strong support for ASEAN’s ambitious goal of creating a community by 2015, including its bold effort to achieve economic integration.” The Facility has supported a wide variety of ASEAN activities, including the scorecard for the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, the roadmaps for four priority integration sectors, the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN’s trade facilitation work program, and standards harmonization. The Facility also supported ASEAN in its response to Cyclone Nargis, delivered training in post-disaster damage assessment and needs analysis, and supported ASEAN’s pandemic preparedness and response program. The Facility is working with the ASEAN Secretariat to establish the region’s first Human Rights Resource Center, develop a repository of migrant labor laws and regulations to promote migrant labor rights in the region, and train customs officials on how to identify and curb cross-border bulk cash smuggling. September 24, 2010, in the second ASEAN-United States summit in New York City, U.S. Senate John Kerry (D-MA), Foreign Relations Committee Chairman announced Resolution “S. Res. 640” supporting U.S. Engagement with ASEAN and Member States

“Recent tensions in East Asia drive home the significance of multilateral institutions in the region like ASEAN that can arrive at consensus-based solutions to disagreements. I am pleased that the administration is enhancing political, security and economic cooperation in Southeast Asia through ASEAN,

and hope that organization can continue to enhance its role as a regional problem-solver on transnational issues ranging from climate change to maritime security. I am confident that today’s meetings will be an important part of the broader U.S. effort to participate actively in East Asia’s regional institutions,” said Chairman Kerry.

November 19, 2011, the White House issued an immediate release that U.S. President Barack Obama welcomed leaders of the ASEAN countries to the first U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting to be held in the United States, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meetings in New York City, on Friday, September 24. In his opening remarks, Obama praised ASEAN’s leadership in Asia and reiterated the grouping’s importance to the United States, both economically and politically: ASEAN countries are increasingly playing a leadership role in the region, and ASEAN itself has the potential to be a very positive force in global affairs. That is why the United States has accepted ASEAN’s invitation to join the East Asia summit, which will help us meet regional and global challenges together.

In response to President Obama’s statement, the Vietnamese President Nguyen Minh Triet, as 2011-Chairman of ASEAN, also welcomed the close ties between ASEAN and the United States, saying, “relations between ASEAN and U.S. play a very important role to the security, peace, and development in the region.”

Current development between ASEAN and United States is the United States continues to express its strong support and

commitment which was made in the past to strengthen bilateral cooperation between ASEAN member states and US. This refers to the current official visits of US envoy Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs to some ASEAN countries From February 8-16 2012 like Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia and Cambodia. In Cambodia, Secretary Campbell met with the Cambodian Foreign Minister to discuss bilateral cooperation and support Cambodian leadership of ASEAN events in 2012. This year is the 35th anniversary of the United States' engagement with ASEAN and Secretary Campbell also announced that Washington, D.C., will be hosting the 4th US-ASEAN Summit in November. Campbell said "I look forward to visiting Cambodia many times in the months ahead" in preparation for ASEAN events this year.

In brief, the United States of America particularly under Obama's administration has been making very positive progress its Foreign Policy towards ASEAN since early stage of the administration by continuing to support ASEAN to achieve its object and goal to build ASEAN Community; providing ASEAN assistances and technical support (trainings), moral support and expanding trade and business and so on and so for. Thus, it can conclude that the United States' role in enhancing Regional Architecture towards peace, stability and development is indispensable.

Cooperation and competition is the nature of international relations. From the current analysis of the motivation and strategies among

the regional superpowers, it shows that US is trying to build an alliance with her traditional and new friends in the region in order to check the rise of China. US consider that the rise of China can definitely change the status quo of regional security architecture which provides security and economic risks for US's interest in the region. Some countries in the region are not comfortable with the rise of China as well so they seek to have closer relations with US. Whatever strategies US and her allies are using, China is for sure rising and changing the status quo. It is natural to see China to expand her strategic outreach in the region and world. It is quite certain that China is going to be the most important player in the region.

In term of check and balance power in the region, ASEAN hope to see the competition between China and US definitely will not challenge the small states in the region, but bring blossom to the region. If they are tough and resilient, they will take side which will divide further the region. Nothing is certain for the future security risks deriving from China-US confrontation, but some believe that in such globalized world, war will not take place.

ASEAN really needs US and China to help them to become more stable, peaceful, and development especially to strengthen ASEAN Centrality. The two countries are the two biggest markets for ASEAN. The cooperation between all the two majors powers (and all the countries in Asia Pacific Region) are crucial for the welfare, peace, stability, and security in the region and the world as well. The roles, functions, and participations of all the countries in the Asia Pacific are viewed as the most

significant contribution in the globalization world and in the context of filling each other for perfectness. Naturally, there is no country that can develop itself without having any relationship with others.

So, the hope of the people in Asia Pacific Region and in the world as a whole is to see United States play more vital roles in the region and help the region to call or persuade other countries China, China and Russia, Russia and the U.S., the U.S. and India, China and Japan to adopt a policy for development partner, that will bring the region to economic prosperity and stability and in reverse, it also benefits to their countries as in this regard, too.

US may need to balance his bilateral cooperation between ASEAN member-state so that countries in this region may not feel unhappy with US engagement as imbalance. Of course, this is depending upon the US interests and trust and confidence relation the dialogue partner has to one another. US have been better cooperation with some traditional alliances like Thailand, Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia more than other ASEAN member-state.

Treatment of US to particular country has big impact not on the country but allows other countries that lack of US good treatment feel excluded. If you really mean to strengthen democracy, promoting freedom and human rights in Southeast Asia, US should do more engagement in this region than what it had before. Major Powers like Russia, EU, China, Japan, India and South Korea including United Nations recognize ASEAN as emerging strong Regional Organization particularly socio-

economic development in the recent decade; ASEAN is becoming a big market for China, Japan, Korea, and United States and contribution of ASEAN toward world security, peace-keeping and development. ASEAN really need US to help the socio-economic growth and expanding trade, business and market, this will promote the living condition of people in this region, reducing poverty and unemployment. It is to make ASEAN more attractive region for foreign investment and tourism industry.



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America's Decline? China's Rise? -----A Chinese Perspective

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What has impressed me most in this visit to the United States, either attending the seminars or watching the primary debates, is that the academics, the think tanks, and the politicians are seriously discussing the significant transition with the decline of US power and influence, the significant domestic economic crises, the rise of China, and how the country will meet these changes. My essay will present a Chinese view on the question of America's decline and China's rise, and how a rising China will exert her influence on global governance.

- I. The Debates over the Decline of the US in Chinese Academia

In my opinion, among the world's nations, the Americans have a distinct sense of exigency. They have been asking themselves the same question whether the US power would decline for over two hundred years. The founding fathers asked it; people tied the answer to the expansion of American frontiers before and after the Mexican-American War and Spanish-American War.

Since 1980s, the Chinese academia has paid attention to the debate in the US over the decline of America. This debate was caused for the following factors:

1. The decline of America's economic power and the rise of Japan and West Germany.

The US experienced the second "depression" since the 1930s. Its exports turned red in 1971 and, except for some years, continued to have deficits ever since. On the contrary, Japan's foreign trade increased rapidly and had a 300 million surplus in US dollars for the first time in the post-war era in 1965. In 1971, the US terminated the convertibility of the dollar to gold which officially ended the Bretton Woods system. This was considered a clear sign of America's "decline".

In the same time, both Japan and Germany rose in international trade and finance. Japan's rise was most impressive due to her manufacturing competitiveness that enabled Japan to capture growing share in world trade and accumulated huge trade surplus. However, even when Japan's share in global exports increased from 6.5% in 1980 to 8.9% in 1989, Japan was still the third largest exporting country after the US and West

Germany. But it was Japan, not Germany that drew the attention because of her economic expansion. On the cover of the Time magazine, the Statue of Liberty was donned in Japanese kimono.

Japan's huge trade surplus and growing financial power were not used for domestic needs, but for overseas investment and expansion. Reflecting American fear of large Japanese investment in the US, the *Forbes* magazine issue published on February 22, 1988, commented that Hawaii, while still under the American flag, was on its way to becoming a Japanese economic colony.

2. The publication of scholarly works, such as *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*¹

by Paul Kennedy and *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America*² by Ezra Vogel. The Chinese scholars of international studies organized their discussion on the question of America's decline. *American Studies Quarterly*, of which I was the managing editor, published a special issue in 1992 on this subject. I invited Xu Guoqi, then a doctoral candidate at Harvard, to write an article introducing that debate in the United States.³

In this period, the discussion on America's rise and fall in the Chinese academia showed two characteristics. First, the discussion was mainly based on Paul Kennedy's book and his argument that overexpansion led to the decline of great empires. The Chinese scholars

contemplated the questions raised by Kennedy wondering if the US, still leading the world in the fields of economy, military, and diplomacy but moving downward percentage wise in the world's GDP, trade, and high-technology, would follow the trajectory of Spain, Holland, and Britain to decline due to overexpansion? Could Japan surpass the US to become the superpower? Second, the Chinese discussion was focusing on the shifting balance of power in politics, economies, and international status among the US, Japan and Germany. China was rarely a factor in this equilibrium.

Since the 2008 global financial crises triggered by the subprime mortgage crisis in the US, the decline of the US has attracted attention once again in Chinese academia. First, struggling under the 2008 financial crisis, the US medium and long term economic prospects are unclear. Second, America's image has been severely damaged since the 2003 Iraq War. Many commentators, including Joseph Nye who first proposed the concept of "soft power" were very concerned with the decline of America's soft power because of American unilateralism. Third, the rise of the emerging countries, especially China, have affected the power balance and presented a big challenge to America's "world-leading" ability.

The discussed questions in China include: has America lost her ability in innovation? What are the criteria to judge America's decline? In the context of economic crisis and war on terror, have America's "soft power" and "smart power" eroded? What will be the trend of development in the US in the next 20 or 30

¹ Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).

² Ezra F. Vogel, *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).

³ Xu Guoqi, "America in Crisis: A Review of the Debate on American Decline," in *American Studies Quarterly*, No.1, 1992, pp.135-158.

years? Will China and other emerging countries surpass the US?

Compared to 1980s, Chinese academics now have much more accessibility to information and a wider perspective. Through the internet, academic exchanges, visiting the US and other sources of information, the Chinese academics can keep up with the debate over the US decline in America and form their own opinions. This round of discussion is different from the early one in the following aspects: first, it is an on-going discussion that has shown no sign of cooling off; second, it has involved not only experts, but also politicians, business community and ordinary people; third, the discussion goes beyond the US. The discussion also addresses the issues of China's rise, the change in her international status, China's soft power, and the challenges in current Chinese society; fourth, with more and better understanding of the US, the Chinese scholars have demonstrated more reason, depth, and comprehensiveness. Their discussions encompass American politics, economics, civil society, ability in innovation, and elements in her soft power.

II. Is the US in Decline?

The Chinese are divided on whether the US has declined or is declining.

Some believe that the unprecedented global financial crisis and worldwide recession were originated in the US, the international financial center and the sole super power. As the culprit for the worst recession since the Great Depression, the US is struggling to pull herself out of the economic trough. The American unilateralism under the Bush

administration has undermined American soft power and fanned anti-Americanism, especially in the Islamic world. The rise of China, Brazil, Turkey and other emerging countries has accelerated the movement toward a multi-polar world that reduces American hegemony. Therefore, America's decline is an undisputable fact.

Others, represented by Professor Wang Jisi, dean of College of International Relations at Peking University and Madame Zi Zongyun, former director of the Institute of American Studies, CASS, argue that there are varied criteria to judge a country's decline. In a chronological and historical comparison between the current US and the US in 1945, America's power has declined. Another method is the horizontal comparison to compare the US with other countries and regions. In the 1960s, American power declined relative to the Soviet Union; in the 1970s and 1980s, not only the dynamic Japan and the four Asian "little dragons", even Germany and other European developed countries outgrew the US in GDP growth rate. However, the US economy has outperformed other developed countries since the 1990s. As the major challenges today come from the emerging countries, the US economic and military superiority over Europe, Japan, and most developing countries have enlarged. Its status in the West has been increasing, not declining.

Moreover, the criteria are diverse, including aspects of institutional and technological innovation, international competitiveness, domestic political stability, military capacity, citizenship, education, talent

attraction, ideology and culture, and influence on international organizations. America is still leading in all these aspects. Therefore, America's decline is just relative.

Madame Zi Zhongyun further argues that judging America's decline should not be based on her share in the global GDP. America's percentage is naturally going down when other countries' are going up. The real issue is if America's high unemployment rate continues and leads to the decline of both per capital income and standard of living, then that will constitute the real decline. However, she emphasizes that as a country of immigrants, America appeals to the talents from all over the world and has the ability in innovation. America will not decline as long as she draws human capital, "the flow of human capital is by choice. A country can be hardly deemed as in decline when it continues to attract and take in talents."⁴

Professor Wang Jisi is a prolific scholar with perceptive opinions on the topic of America's decline and China's rise. I participated in the research project headed by him that explored the domestic dynamics that made the US a great power. His (and our) general conclusion is that to predict the sustainability of America's national power (not comparing international standings with other big powers), we must analyze the four fundamentals that historically gave America her vitality:

First, the tradition and spirit of rule of law have guaranteed America's long-term political

stability. Reflected both in a sound constitutional system and in a deeply rooted law-abiding tradition, rule of law is one of the cornerstones of America.

Second, there has been consistency and commonality in American social values, forging a shared American identity and profound patriotism.

Third, technological and institutional innovations have been the driving force in social development. In more than a century, America has maintained her economic power as a result of her resourcefulness and creativity in research and technology.

Four, America has a mature civil society that is capable of self-correction to avoid prolonged distortion of national priorities and strategic misjudgment in foreign policy.⁵

Of course, the US has been living with problems of the gap between rich and poor, partisan politics, racial tensions, the decline of government authority, and the "Messiah Mentality" in foreign policy, all eroding America's soft and hard power. But so long as these four above mentioned fundamentals are intact - so far they still are - the so-called decline of American power or international standing is only relative to other countries.

III. American Hegemony and the Rise of China

⁵ See Wang Jisi, Zhao Mei, Zhu Wenli, and Wang Dong, "Understand American Power and Its Diplomatic Advantage and Characteristics: A Research Report," 2008; Wang Jisi and Cheng Chunhua, "Decline or Renewal: U.S. Power and Primacy Revisited," in Huang Ping and Ni Feng eds., *Annual Report on American Studies* (Beijing, Social Sciences Academy Press, 2011); I was inspired by Joseph Nye's point in our talk in the Kennedy School, Harvard University on February 13, 2012 that America's soft power originated in her civil society.

⁴ My interview of Zi Zhongyun on January 20, 2011. See Zhao Mei, "Interview of Madame Zi Zhongyun", in *American Studies Quarterly*, No. 1, 2011, pp.21-22.

Since the 2008 financial crisis, the US and Europe have been facing daunting economic difficulties while China, Turkey, Brazil and other emerging countries have seen fast growth. Is this a challenge to the dominance of the developed world?

China's national power has been growing tremendously since her open-door reforms in the 1970s. The different political and social systems of the US and China lead some people to conclude that naturally a rising China is a challenge to America. As the balance of power shifts, China and the US are destined to compete for hegemony.

I beg to differ with this claim. My rebuttal is based on the following argument: we need to deconstruct American hegemony. Both Wang Jisi and Fareed Zakaria have done analysis. Wang interprets the US hegemony as having four components: regime hegemony, economic hegemony, political and ideological hegemony, and military hegemony.⁶ Fareed Zakaria argues that there have been three tectonic power shifts over the last five hundred years in world history. The first was the rise of the Western world, a process that began in the 15th century. The second was the rise of the United States that took place in the end of the 19th century. The third great power shift, Zakaria calls it "the rise of the rest,"⁷ is what we are experiencing today. He concludes that "at the politico-military level, we remain in a single- superpower world. But in all other dimensions- industrial, financial,

educational, social, cultural – the distribution of power is shifting."⁸

Inspired by the arguments made by Wang and Zakaria, I believe that China has not challenged America's hegemony in the four areas of regime, military, economy and culture. In terms of regime, America has been playing the leadership role in the existing global governing organizations such as the UN, IMF, WTO, NAFTA, and a number of international agencies to prevent weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. These agencies predated the rise of China. China is a later joiner to the international community, not an instigator. In the economic area, even China's economic power and US-China trade frictions grow in tandem; the US financial dominance is still the core of her economic dominance. China has a long way to go to become an international economic power like the US, let alone to replace her. America's military hegemony is even more dominating. Given China's increasing spending on military, the US defense budget is more than 50% of the world's total defense budget. As the undisputable strongest military power, American military technology is way ahead of China. When it comes to America's cultural hegemony, Joseph Nye has made perceptive remarks on America's soft power, "Soft power, is to attract people through soft sources of power, such as policies, values, and cultures."⁹ So, has China's economic rise led to the rise of her soft power and worldwide acceptance of Chinese culture?

⁶ Wang Jisi, "America's Hegemony and China's Rise," in *Foreign Affairs Review*, No. 84, Oct. 2005, pp.13-14.

⁷ Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World: Release 2.0* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), pp.1-2.

⁸ Fareed Zakaria, op.cit., p.4.

⁹ Joseph Nye, Ezra Vogel, Xue Lan, and Anthony Saich, " The Rise of China's Soft Power," April 19, 2006, at http://www.iop.harvard.edu/JFKJrForumArchive/transcripts/04192006_6_The_Rise_of_Chinas_Soft_Power.pdf, Feb. 19, 2012.

My answer is no. The Confucius Institutes may have helped teaching Chinese language and introducing the culture, but the Chinese institutions and culture, including her popular culture, are much less popular worldwide than the Hollywood products.

The analysis of the four aspects of American dominance leads to my conclusions. First, in a long time to come the rise of China will not pose a threat to the US; next, China's rise may challenge America's regional hegemony in Asia; last, China and the US are not destined to conflict. They can work together on many issues such as anti-terrorism, climate change and economic crisis.

As discussed above, there are mainly two different views on America's decline in China. What is the percentage of people who have either view? How much does either view affect China's foreign policy, especially her US policy?

I am not an expert in the Chinese foreign policy, and it is difficult to find credible opinion polls in China. However, I believe there is a divide between the ordinary Chinese and the elite in their opinions on America's decline and American/China policy.

The ordinary Chinese are more radical in believing that the decline of America and the rise of China is a *fait accompli*. China's rise will challenge and eventually replace America's hegemony; therefore it provokes American policies to contain China. The current international order predated China's rise and is dominated by the US to China's disfavor. The so-called "global governance" is an American conspiracy. Therefore, China needs to take

measures to guard against America's containment through changing and directing the international agenda. This view is popular with the ordinary people and is shared by some scholars.

The Chinese policy-makers and *Intelligentsia* are more moderate, even though some of them have been called hawks on US policy. They view the decline of the US as relative. Although China has increased her national power greatly in the past 30 years, she is facing many pressing domestic social problems. America will continue to be the most powerful country in the world in the next 20 to 30 years. They are also convinced that the US politicians, think tanks and experts, anxious about China's different political system, values, and her actions on human rights and issues related to the practice of religion, including the recent veto on the UN resolution on Syria, consider a rising China as an adversary, not a partner, and genuinely do not want to see China's rise challenge America hegemony. Nevertheless, these Chinese believe that cooperation, not confrontation, is the best option in China's US policy. The radical view may have some influence on China's foreign policy, but the moderate opinion is dominant and shared by the majority, including myself.

In my opinion, the most acute issue for the US/China relations today is the lack of trust. How to increase mutual trust and understanding that will enable the US and China to jointly face global challenges is the question worth the hard thinking by both countries' leaders and scholars. From a Chinese perspective, I believe that it is in

China's best interest to get involved in global governance. China's goal is not to overthrow the existing governing order, nor to seek to dominate the agenda, for which China has no such ability, but to reform and uphold current order with an eye on fairness and justice, and to play a contributive role in making new rules. China should continue to treat big power relations as the core of global governance, actively participate in the multilateral mechanisms such as G20 and BRIC four summits. Participation and cooperation are China's best hope to help move the global order to become more just and fair.



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