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[*Critical Essays*, Vol. VII]

Status in Employment and Social Classes
(During the 20th and the 21st century)
Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Data
[DRAFT]

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Preface

This analysis is a synopsis for a future monograph, which regards the mutual relations of statuses in employment and social classes. The last three decades the value of “social class” has been degraded in scientific and public debates. Meanwhile, the research focus on statuses in employment is at a minimum level or is an extremely selective procedure. Usually, it regards the interesting phenomenon of part-time, flexible, and low income workers.

The only powerful reference to social classes is that one to the “middle class”. But that reference doesn’t regard the class under the determinations of either classical or modern social and political theories. It regards a *de facto* term, which has prevailed in parallel with the (global) political and geopolitical facts, the last decade of 20th century and onwards. Somehow, the aforementioned term confuses the “middle class” with the ambiguous group of citizens or households with “middle incomes”. In the mass media, day to day, and for years, the same reference is the only reference to classes and, therefore, “middle class” (of the people with middle incomes) is presented rather as to be the only class in the modern society. In the image of the social structure participate, as secondary “actors,” the poor (it is near to zero the references to rich) people and the excluded people. Thus, in the above mentioned image do not participate the bourgeoisie or the capitalists (or even the A. Smith’s “stock holders”), and, of course, the working class

(or the proletariat). The peculiar social absents (or the disappearances) are intense and glaring.

The employment statuses, during the last decade of 20th century and the twenty five years of 21st century, have had an impressive evolution. The majority of modern people know nearly nothing for this evolution.

This majority believes strongly that the employment decreases, in the developed countries. Their belief is wrong. The most people have the impression that employees (the wage-earners) decrease, too. It is a mistake. The global opinion is that capitalism reinforces the enterprises and employers (the basic core of entrepreneurship), as a general trend. This mistake is bigger than the previous. Modern capitalism reinforces only the large enterprises, and, at the same time, destroys the small and the medium enterprises. The employers in the modern world are few and they are going to be fewer (below of 5% or 2%). A set of information for the statuses in employment is absolutely necessary.

In this elaboration* you can read a brief gleaning of well known theories for the social class phenomenon and a broad report on the evolution of statuses in employment. The main question of this analysis is the next: Who is who? I'm confident that there are interesting answers and a framework for your further reading.

25 - 09 - 2025

Andreas N. Lytras

*There isn't any special part of the text with the bibliography. There are references, if they are necessary, in each page.

1

Status in Employment and Social Classes

1.1

A. Smith for the Classes

A. Smith believes that the price of goods is always broken down into three parts, the wage, the profit of capital and the (ground) rent. These parts are the primary sources of any income, any exchangeable value and any secondary income. He, in accordance with this approach, recognizes three classes, depending on the type of their income. The workers receive income in the form of wage. The holders of the stock or capital are receiving income from profits. Ground-rent is the source of income of the landlords. He notes that there are two groups of people, whose income is complex. The first is the lenders who have as income the interest. The interest represents a payment by the debtor to the lender for the profits to be made from the use of money. Interest is a derived income and, if debtor has not an analogous source from the profits of any capital, it must be paid by other debtor's resources (income either from wages or from ground-rent) to the lender. The second category is the farmers. Their income is complex. For them the land is just an instrument. Their income, then, is partially derived from the wages of their labor, and partly from the profits of their capital. In such a situation of farmers are the craftsmen.¹

A. Smith, through the analysis of income, is consolidating his assessment that capitalist society is separated into distinct groups. This distinction, in fact, is referred to, exclusively, economic causes. This approach is, undoubtedly, the most organized and original concept for the

¹ A. Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, London, G. Bell and Sons,

class organization of the capitalist society, until the end of 18th century. It is, at the same time, the first coherent analysis on the source of creation of profit and also the explanation for the mutual relations for workers and capitalists.

In his view, the relation of capital and labor is been described with the following manner: *“As soon as stock has accumulated in the hands of particular persons, some of them naturally employ it, by setting industrious people, whom they will supply with materials and subsistence, in order to make a profit, by the sale of their work, or by what their labour adds to the value of the materials. In exchanging of the complete manufacture either for money, for human labor, or other goods, over and above what may be sufficient to pay the price of materials and the wages of the workmen, something must be given for the profits of the undertaker of the work who hazards his stock in this adventure. The value which workmen add to the materials, therefore, resolves itself in this case into two parts, of which the one pays their wages and the other the profits of their employers upon the whole stock of materials and wages, which he advanced. He could have no interest to employ them, unless he expected from the sale of their work, something more than what is sufficient to replace his stock to him; and he could have no interest to employ a great stock rather than a small one, unless his profit were to bear some proportion to the extent of his stock.”*²

He adds to the aforementioned opinion, that: *“In this state the whole produce of labour does not always belong to the labourer. He must in most cases share it with the owner of the stock which employs him.”*³

² A, Smith, *ibid*, pp. 48-49.

³ *Ibid*, p. 50.

The last observation means, simply, that the appropriation of the wealth, which has been produced by the laborer, is the basic (or the exclusive) source of the income of stock holders (the other name of capitalists).

There are of course several questions on the hierarchy in the A. Smith's social structure. More strictly: which is the upper class and which is the middle class? It is logical to say that, in his schema, landlords look like as the closest to the properties of the upper class. In this sense, stock holders are some kind of middle class. Stock holders, certainly, keep the prevailing position in economy and increase their political power, in 18th century (and beyond). If we calculate the landlords and the stock holders as parts of the unity of upper class, then the farmers and the craftsmen are the members of middle class. We don't know clearly the real A. Smith's opinion. All of the above estimations are hypotheses.

A. Smith knows very well the consequences of "free market" economy's system and the dominant role of stock holders (or capitalists) in this field, for the society. He understands that: "Wherever there is great property, there is great inequality. For one very rich man, there must be at least five hundred poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many".⁴ The economic inequality and the social polarization are actives characteristics of the "free market's" economy and society.

⁴ A. Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, London, Methuen & Co. LTD., Vol. II, 1922³ (1904), p. 203.

1.2

Classical Marxism and the Classes

K. Marx describes clearly the class structure of capitalism in 19th century, during and after the period of the crystallization of the (either economic or institutional) results of industrial revolution (1841-50). In the capitalist society, according Marx's view the capitalists are, with any doubt, the members of the upper and dominant class. The working class, therefore the wage earners, is the lower class. There is still a class or the strata of petty bourgeoisie (farmers, craftsmen, small merchants, small owners of real estate etc.). The definition of the petty bourgeoisie looks like to the A. Smith's definition of farmers and craftsmen, with a different terminology.

The relations among capitalists and workers are, definitely and according to this view, relations based on exploitation. The total amount of the value is been produced by the workers. The total income of the capitalists' income is the result of exploitation. Marx writes: "Firstly. The *value or price of the labouring power* takes the semblance of the *price or value of labour itself*, although, strictly speaking, value and price of labour are senseless terms. Secondly. Although one part only of the workman's daily labour is *paid*, while the other part is *unpaid*, and while that unpaid or surplus labour constitutes exactly the fund out of which *surplus value* or *profit* is formed, it seems as if the aggregate labour was paid labour".⁵ After the above mentioned comments he adds: "part of that quantity of labour is realized in a value for which and equivalent has been

⁵ K. Marx, *Value, Price and Profit*, New York, International Co., Inc, 1969 (HTML Mark-up: Mike Ballard, miballard@stanford.edu, 1995; Proofed and corrected by Brandon Poole, 2009, Mark Harris 2010), pp. 20-21.

paid in the form of wages; part of it is realized in a value for which no equivalent has been paid. Part of the labour contained in the commodity is *paid* labour; part is *unpaid* labour. By selling, therefore, the commodity *at its value*, that is, as the crystallization of the *total quantity of labour* bestowed upon it, the capitalist must necessarily sell it at a profit”.⁶

The surplus-value is an integral part of any value and therefore of the exchange price of all commodities. The capitalists are not appropriating the entire surplus-value, but only a part of it, which is characterized industrial or commercial profit. Surplus-value represents the sum of the ground rent, the interest and the industrial or commercial profit. The industrial profit is determined, when removed from surplus-value the sum of the ground rent and the interest.⁷

The creation and the appropriation of surplus-value indicate the inverse economic interests for both the classes, the workers and the capitalists. Marxism notes the inverse relationship of profit and wage: “They stand in inverse ratio to each other. Capital’s exchange value, profit, rises in the same proportion as labor’s share, wages, falls, and vice versa. Profit rises to the extent that wages fall; it falls to the extent that wages rise”.⁸ This opinion comes from the substrate of the theory of value. This is the basic reason for the absent of any serious and specific critic from the field of liberal theory.

The working class, according to K. Marx’s approach, is the group of people who do not own the means of production and perform

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid, pp. 21-22.

⁸ K. Marx, “Wage Labour and Capital”, D. McLellan (ed.), *Karl Marx. Selected Writings*, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 273-294, and especially, p. 286.

productive work, within capitalist relations. The productive work, according to Marxist critical version -which derives once again from the A. Smith's analysis-, is the work which is exchanged with capital and creates surplus-value.⁹ It is specified, that the working class includes all the wage-earners (either they work with manual or intellectual labor). It is noted, that the need of capital to be raised require the manipulation of a great social force, a large group of cooperating direct producers, manual or intellectual labourers, who operate as a "collective worker". They, as a collective unity, exchange their labor with capital and produce both, the value of their wages and the surplus-value for the capitalists.¹⁰

The members of the petty bourgeoisie have a peculiar economic and social status. The typical groups are the peasants (farmers) and the handicraftsmen.¹¹ The members of petty bourgeoisie on one hand look like capitalists, as owners of the means of production and on the other hand as the workers of themselves. The member of the petty bourgeoisie "*as capitalist he therefore pays himself his wages and draws his profit on his capital; that is to say, he exploits himself as wage-labourer, and pays himself, in the surplus-value, the tribute that labour owes to capital*".¹² The provision of classical Marxism is pessimistic for this class or for this group of strata. A small part of them will turn into capitalists. The vast

⁹ K. Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value (Volume IV of Capital)*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, (1863), E-Book, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1863/theories-surplus-value/add1.htm#s12d>, [K. Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value (Volume IV of Capital)*, in Greek, (Θεωρίες για την Υπεραξία - τέταρτος τόμος του «Καφαλαίου»-, Αθήνα, Σύγχρονη Εποχή, Μέρος Πρώτο, 1981), Athens, New Times, 1981, pp. 452-453].

¹⁰ K. Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*, *ibid*, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1863/theories-surplus-value/add1.htm#s12d>, [K. Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*, in Greek, *ibid*, pp. 460-461].

¹¹ K. Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*, *ibid*, [K. Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*, in Greek, *ibid*, pp. 455-458].

¹² K. Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*, *ibid*, [K. Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*, in Greek, *ibid*, p. 458].

majority of them will face the loss of means of production and the personal degradation to the location of working class.¹³ The majority of the population, under these circumstances and with fast procedures, is going to be subordinated under the economic power of capital.¹⁴ The social polarization is the future of society under the capitalist relations.

¹³ K. Marx (1863), *Theories of Surplus Value (Volume IV of Capital)*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, E-Book, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1863/theories-surplus-value/add1.htm>. He writes: (The member of petty bourgeoisie) “..will either gradually be transformed into a small capitalist ...or he will suffer the loss of his means of production and be transformed into a wage-labourer”

¹⁴ K. Marx, “Wage Labour and Capital”, *ibid*, pp. 292-293.

1.3

M. Weber and W. Sombart for Classes

According M. Weber the leader of the modern capitalism is the bourgeois. The bourgeois is definitely the owner of every profitable enterprise, in a modern state, with free market of securities, commodities and labor.

M. Weber, surely, develops a precarious manner of perception of bourgeoisie, as a social class. He writes: “The citizenship” (‘bürgertum’, which means: the bourgeoisie) “first may include certain social categories or classes which have some specific communal or economic interests. As thus defined the class citizen” (bourgeoisie) “is not unitary; there are greater citizens and lesser citizens. Entrepreneurs and hand workers belong to the class. Second, in the political sense citizenship” (bourgeoisie) “signifies the membership in the state, with its connotation as holder of certain political rights. Finally, by citizens” (bourgeoisie) “in the class term, we understand those strata, which are drawn together in contrast with the bureaucracy or the proletariat and any other outside their circle as ‘persons of property and education’, entrepreneurs, recipients of funded incomes, and in general all the persons of academic culture, a certain class standard of living, and a certain social prestige”. “The first of these concepts is economic in character and is peculiar only in the western civilization. There were and are everywhere manual laborers and entrepreneurs but never and nowhere were they included in a unitary social class”.¹⁵

¹⁵ M. Weber, *General Economic History*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Publishers, 2009 [1981-orig. 1927, Greenberg Publishers Inc.], p. 315.

The easy way to translate the M. Weber's thoughts is to simplify the conclusions. First of all is that entrepreneurs and manual workers are two different classes. The entrepreneurs are surely privileged, as persons with property and education (with the recipients of funded incomes, and in general, with all the persons of academic culture), as well as with a certain class standard of living (probably high), and a certain social prestige (probably a great one). It is notable the reference to the two social groups of cities', namely the "greater citizens" and the "lesser citizens". It is not arbitrary to say that entrepreneurs belong to the "greater citizens" and the manual workers to "lesser citizens". This is an alternative explanation for the inequality and the social polarization. It is not the only indication of his perception for the class structure of capitalism.

I'm going to by-pass the analysis for fundamental kinds of grouping (class, status group, and party) within a community. The most notable part of the M. Weber' analysis regards the social structure, according to the criteria of positive or negative privilege for doing businesses (classes of market). It is, in my opinion, an extremely interesting elaboration. In the class structure there are three classes, namely the upper, the middle and the lower. In the upper class are included the industrialists, the merchants, the landowners-businessmen, the bankers, the brokers, the professionals with high qualifications arising from education and the employees based on monopoly of a particular skill. In the middle class are included the farmers, the artisans, some independent professionals and some employees. In the lower class belong

the skilled, the semi-skilled, and the unskilled workers.¹⁶ This estimation looks like provocatively to the approach of classical Marxism, for a social structure with three classes (capitalists, working class, and petty bourgeoisie). Despite the different terminology, the classes are very similar.

The special W. Sombart' approach attaches great importance to the subjective and particular the spiritual factors in the formation of capitalism. The capitalist entrepreneur and the capitalist spirit gave birth to capitalism.¹⁷ His analysis regards and the new type of bourgeois,¹⁸ the modern economic human. This person represents the subjective qualities and characteristics of the crystallized capitalism.

In the case of the new type of bourgeois the business individualism and the profit orientation have been released from any moral commitment. Is this behavior immoral? We could follow the thoughts of the analyst. The stock holder, as economic human, is speedy and resourceful, a human, who seeks to increase his wealth. He admires quantitative assessment through measurable methods. The major achievements of the bourgeois are to care much for his inventions. He looks for originality, innovations and the changes in fashion. He has the need, which is linked to the logic of personal hegemony, to put limits to his competitors. The bourgeois has the faith that technological ability could subjugate the natural forces.¹⁹ His tendency for speculation is now immeasurable and enhances in persistence. The bourgeois has the

¹⁶ M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978, Vol. I, pp. 303-305.

¹⁷ W. Sombart, *The Bourgeois*, in Greek (*Ο Αστός. Πνευματικές προϋποθέσεις και ιστορική πορεία του δυτικού καπιταλισμού*, Αθήνα, Νεφέλη, 1998), Athens, Nefeli, 1998, pp. 348-350.

¹⁸ Ibid, pp. 167-172.

¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 180-183.

expectation for the expansion of sales, for the approach of new markets and for the seeking for new consumer masses. He has the need to reduce the price per unit of commodities in production, and in market place to use pretentious marketing techniques such as advertising. The bourgeois has the aspiration for the exclusion (from the market) and the destruction of its competitors. The need, then, for his private enforcement and for the ruthless speculation prevails absolutely in economic procedures and life.²⁰ The basic bourgeois' qualities of industrious energy, as the trend to saving, the honesty and solvency differ from the previous and obvious virtues and they become integral parts of the functioning of official business and finance, especially for the larger enterprises. The behavior of entrepreneurs is rather dissociated from the standards and the liabilities of the business organization. The virtues regard the institutional organizations, but they aren't personal obligations for the bourgeois.²¹ Are they optional?

The analysis of working class by W. Sombart is rather minimal in comparison to his analysis of bourgeoisie. Working class has been presented occasionally in his writings. But there are two publications with object the analysis of proletariat. The first is rather unknown and makes a general framework of the working class basically in German territories.²² The basic interesting for the masses of German proletariat is concentrated on the problems of difficult conditions of life. He understands the alienation from the land and the old communities. Sombart notes bad conditions of dwelling, the difficult procedure of working, the

²⁰ Ibid, pp. 186-189.

²¹ Ibid, pp. 190-193.

²² W. Sombart, *Das Proletariat*, Frankfurt am Main, Literarische Anstalt Rütten & Loening, 1906, pp. 5-8.

uncomfortable inclusion in modern industries and their general misery. The reference to the social alienation of proletariat is interesting.²³ The second publication is a book which regards an extensive examination of the political trends and trade-unions' practices of working class, during the 19th century.²⁴ W. Sombart estimates that the class struggle is real and active, but he also believes strongly that this struggle is not going to be transformed to a civil war. He predicts, in contrary, that reformist trend in the movement of working class is going to prevail. The future compromises and, therefore, the expected social system's reforms are going to improve the conditions of the life of proletariat and the social status of working class.²⁵

²³ W. Sombart, *Das Proletariat*, Ibid, pp. 10-12, 15-30, 36-40.

²⁴ W. Sombart, *Socialism and Social Movement*, London-New York, J.M. Dent-E.P. Dutton, 1909.

²⁵ Ibid, pp. 279-287.

1.4

Analyses for Upper and Middle Class in Modern World

When E. Bernstein (1899)²⁶ has criticized classical Marxism, according to the observation that the middle class (petty bourgeoisie) didn't disappear and its members did not become members of proletariat (until the end of nineteenth century), R. Luxemburg made an innovative management of Marxian analysis. She notes that: "It must show itself, first in the progressive increase of the minimum amount of capital necessary for the functioning of the enterprises in the old branches of production; second in the constant diminution of the interval of time during which the small capitalists conserve the opportunity to exploit the new branches of production. The result as far as the small capitalist is concerned, is a progressively shorter duration of his stay in the new industry and a progressively more rapid change in the methods of production as a field for investment. For the average capitalist strata, taken as a whole, there is a process of more and more rapid social assimilation and dissimulation".²⁷

She understands clearly the existence of two parallel tendencies in the case of middle class. A first trend is their compressions as a result of the functions of the concentration of capital. A second trend is the maintaining of their existence, due to the innovations of small enterprises. At the end of the process, their choices are limited.

²⁶ See, E. Bernstein, *Preconditions for the Socialism and the Tasks of Social Democracy*, in Greek [E. Bernstein, *Οι Προϋποθέσεις για το Σοσιαλισμό και τα Καθήκοντα της Σοσιαλδημοκρατίας*, Αθήνα, Παπαζήσης, (1899)], Athens, Papazissis, pp. 118-119, 123-133, 139-140.

²⁷ R. Luxemburg, *Social Reform or Revolution*, Rosa Luxemburg Internet Archive (marxists.org), 1999, (<https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1900/reform-revolution/index.htm>), Part One, Chapter 2 (<https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1900/reform-revolution/ch02.htm>).

In the same context of the debates in social democracy, in the first decade of twentieth century, a new more extensive division of labor has replaced that of the (first) “industrial revolution”. The social democratic analysis has included in its perception the initial formations of the new division of labor. K. Kautsky²⁸ understands the birth of a new social group and gives to it a name, namely the “new middle class of intellectuals,” which will become (partly) famous, during the 20th century. Its members are intellectual workers, probably, in the hierarchical levels of management of the big enterprises. It is one of the very early approaches for the “new middle class”.

According V. Pareto, in the economic environment, the two elites are the speculators or those who could be more broadly characterized as entrepreneurs and the “rentiers” who are possessors of property and income earners. The speculators-entrepreneurs are characterized by the residues of combinations (the foxes of the economy). The “rentiers” are characterized by the residue of the persistence of aggregates (the lions of the economic life). The classical entrepreneurs and the conservative are distinguished, by the circulation of the economic dominance and give a different sense in the daily life of society. Both are the groups of economic upper class.²⁹ This is one of the most unpleasant images of the economic upper class, in the 20th century. An aristocratic point of view records the circumstances of absolute power.

²⁸ K. Kautsky (1902), *The Social Revolution* [*Η Κοινωνική Επανάσταση*, Αθήνα, Παπαζήση], in Greek. Athens, Papazissis.

²⁹ V. Pareto (2003), *Traité de sociologie générale*, L'École Dominique-Racine, Chicoutimi, Québec (le 10 décembre), pp. 1588-1590.

P. Sorokin makes an interesting effort to describe the middle class, after his arrival in USA. In his well-known analysis³⁰ argues that in economic stratification, there isn't any reconfirmation of Marxian provision for the enlargement (and misery) of the working class and for the significant reduction of the middle class. The middle class as well as the middle-income strata, in his opinion, are increasing.

I must note that, according to P. Sorokin's approach, the middle class is identical to the employees of the upper rank.³¹ Therefore the comparison and the critic to Marxian predictions are rather irrelevant. The middle class in K. Marx's provision was the petty bourgeoisie, namely the small producers, the small property owners, and the own-account workers.

The middle classes are presented in a new synthesis, in 1951 (according the data of 1940's census), in C. Wright Mills' approach. In general, he understands that the middle class as a sum represents the 45% of employment. The working class represents the 55% of employment. The new correlation of groups or strata of the middle class is interesting. The 20% of employment is the percentage of the old middle class. The new middle classes have the 25% of employment. From this analogy the 10% are managers (they represent the 2.5% of total employment). The professionals are the 25% of new middle class (approximately the 6% of total employment). The sellers are the 25% of new middle class, too (approximately the 6% of total employment). The clerks represent the 40% of middle class (they are approximately the 10% of employment).³²

³⁰ P. Sorokin (1959), *Social and Cultural Mobility*, New York: The Free Press.

³¹ Ibid, p. 121.

³² C. Wright Mills (1969), *White Collar: The American Middle Classes*, Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press (1951), pp. 44-54, 63-65, 71-72.

In my view, this analysis has many realistic facets, but makes a bold overestimation of the new middle class, especially, with the integration in the new class of the sellers and the clerical workers (clerks who are not included in managerial personnel). In fact, I can't understand the differences of clerks or sellers (both are wage-workers' categories, they have low or average salaries and share with the working class an analogous relations to the private property) from the productive and economic conditions of the members of working class (wage-workers too), beyond the different kind of clothes, during the working time. In this case the image prevails on the real conditions of work and life.

The upper class of the after war USA is the "power elite", according to C. Wright Mills' approach. The members of "power elite", as an upper class, are the very rich entrepreneurs (they are employers), together with the managers of large enterprises, the politicians with their staffs, and finally the top US military officials. The managers do not have, in essence, different interests from the owners and they have the same social origin with the very rich. The political staff communicates, directly, with the very rich and their businesses. The military officials don't look so autonomous from the agents of economic power or the agents of political power.³³

According N. Poulantzas' view, a set of wage-workers' groups who are active in clerical or non-manual work participate in "new petite bourgeoisie". The real innovation of this analysis is the redefinition of "new middle class", in my opinion. "New petite bourgeoisie" is definitely

³³ C. Wright Mills (2000), *The Power Elite*, Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press (1956), pp. 7, 120-129, 198-224, 231-235.

a part of petite bourgeoisie according this analysis. The description of “new petite bourgeoisie” is been generated, initially, by the analysis on the distinction of productive and non-productive labor. The manual workers (productive workers), solely, contribute to the creation of surplus-value in material production and therefore they are the (only) real members of working class. The wage-workers, who work with intellectual work (non-productive workers, in N. Poulantzas’ opinion), produce “surplus-labor”, but they don’t contribute to the creation of “surplus-value” and for this reason they don’t participate in the working class. They are members of the new petite bourgeoisie, according their definition within economic relations. From the framework of political and ideological relations, the intellectual workers express and then execute the transmission of organizational power on the body of manual workers. As a result of organizational implementation of power, the differences between the agents of intellectual and the agents of manual work are the real and the symbolic substrate for their separation. The term “new petite bourgeoisie” reflexes the negative characteristics of (traditional) petite bourgeoisie’s ideological sub-set. This analysis technically (with the using of doubtful criteria) creates a large middle class, with a new (partly) name. I don’t agree with this theory, basically, on the Marxian origins (I think that is not real) of the analysis for the productive and the non-productive labor. I respect deeply the N. Poulantzas’ participation in the modern debate on the theory of social classes.³⁴

³⁴ N. Poulantzas (1984), *Social Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, in Greek (N. Πουλαντζάς, *Κοινωνικές Τάξεις στο Σύγχρονο Καπιταλισμό*, Αθήνα, Θεμέλιο, 1984), Athens, Themelio.

E.O. Wright makes a new reading of social structure and of middle class.³⁵ He considers that the class structure, during the modern era of capitalist society, is described by three classes, the capitalists, the working class, and the traditional petty bourgeoisie. At the same time, there are three “contradictory class locations”, namely the “contradictory class location of managers and supervisors”, the “contradictory class location of semi-autonomous workers” and the “contradictory class location of small employers”. The elaboration of managers, supervisors, and semiautonomous workers represents the perception, that the “new middle class” has been diffused. Some groups of the new middle class are now contradictory small groups, without their previous importance.

It is important, simultaneously, that E.O. Wright intervenes in the theoretical debate for the “class limits” of both social groups, the petty bourgeoisie class and the “small employers,” with a strange manner. The petty bourgeoisie, according E.O. Wright theoretical view, includes, exclusively, the own-account workers. Small employers are the entrepreneurs who are employing one to nine employees. The first definition is accompanied with an alternative definitions (during the analysis of empirical research), “the petty bourgeoisie is defined as any self-employed person employing no more than one employee...” while “...employers employing between two and nine employees (are defined) as small employers”³⁶. As full-fledged capitalist then E.O. Wright recognizes the employers with 10 and over employees. This is a notable definition for the exact limits of bourgeoisie, but remains the ambiguous

³⁵ E.O. Wright (1985), *Classes*, New York, Verso.

³⁶ Ibid, pp. 150-151.

class definition of the (so-called) “small employers” (and they remain as a “contradictory class location”).

A report of the US government,³⁷ for the distribution of household income, expresses the sureness that the majority of the population belongs to the “middle class”. This inclusion in the “middle class” is due to self-determination of the vast majority of Americans, who were interviewed in an opinion poll. This self-determination, even more, is related to the future consumer aspirations of these citizens.³⁸ The report considers that practically the families of “middle class” are those with an annual family income above the national poverty line (\$ 21.800 for a couple household with two children at school age and \$ 17.300 for a single-parent household with two children at school age) and at least up to the 75th percentile of the income scale.

The results of this perception of concepts, income groups and expectations are much less optimistic than the estimation for the majority of “middle class”. The report highlights that: “Yet, it should be clear that only a few unplanned expenses can dispossess any of these families from their middle class dreams. Loss of a job, unexpected illness that isn’t covered by health insurance, or the need to help out an elderly parent can create a severe budget crisis for any of the families that we describe above. This will require them to forego some of the things that middle class American families expect”.³⁹ The report continuous with (the

³⁷ U.S. Department Of Commerce (Economics and Statistics Administration), Office of the Vice President of the United States (Middle Class Task Force), *Middle Class in America*, Washington D.C., 2010 (January).

³⁸ The aspirations are the followings: a private home, the ability to cover medical expenses, a car for every adult member of the family, the ability to cover the costs of higher education of their children, the ability to cover the costs of family holidays and the social security or the ability to have the resources for a decent living after retirement. Ibid, p. 4-5.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 25.

authors' "disclaimer") the following: "In some areas of the country, even the two parent family at the 75th percentile of the income distribution would be unable to buy the average available house and would have to select a smaller-than-average house or live further away from their jobs and pay higher commuting expenses".⁴⁰ The report, therefore, recognizes rather than the self-determination of the "middle class" cannot be fulfilled.

The authors' team adds in the conclusions: "Unfortunately, not all families are able to afford the sort of expenditures that we lay out in this report. Even those families that can afford a middle class lifestyle must make regular sacrifices and may be one unexpected event away from disaster".⁴¹ The "middle class", then, doesn't exist as "middle class. The report, in fact, constructs an unreal reality and finally destroys it, as in a children's game. They need a children's audience to believe the sort time results, as parts of reality. Are they here?

An artificially broadening of "middle class" reflexes the establishment of global "middle class" in the study of H. Kharas.⁴² The determination of H. Kharas for the "global middle class" is extremely questionable. In the "middle class" are included those households where people consume \$10 to \$100, per day and per capita (PPP).⁴³

Almost the entire population of the advanced countries belongs to the "middle class". From the 1,84 billion people of the "global middle class" (2009), the majority of citizens come from USA, Canada, Japan, S. Korea, Australia, from the rest countries of Oceania and from the

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 26.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² H. Kharas, "The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries", OECD, Development Centre, *Working Papers*, No. 285, 2010 (January).

⁴³ [Purchasing Parity Power] H. Kharas, "The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries", *ibid*, pp. 8-9, 12.

countries of European Union. In this majority belongs the population of those European countries, which are not members of EU, too. The most extreme result regards the North America (USA and Canada). Their population was approximately 340 million people (in 2009) and the 338 million are members of the “middle class” (?!).⁴⁴ Where are the rich and the poor people?

Every “middle class” belongs, of course, in a social structure with at least an upper and a lower class. In the two above mentioned analytical efforts, middle class is the only class of society. The middle class as the only class of society isn’t a class, but something else. Therefore, analogous approaches look like the paradigms of arbitrary theoretical arguments.

G. Dumenil & D. Levy⁴⁵ (2011) argue that the middle managers (managers of personnel) are in a continuous procedure of degradation, while the much fewer top managers have become even powerful. The top managers make much more money by their intervention during the financial transactions of companies and they have crucial role in decision making. At the end of the process, they suggest in social analysis that these indices show the formation of new hybrid upper class. The hybrid class is a synthesis of capitalists and top managers.

In a survey of a team of researchers (Savage et al.),⁴⁶ there are “many facets” of the social and modern class analysis, in a peculiar

⁴⁴ C.f., H. Kharas, “The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries”, *ibid*, p. 16; World Bank, *National Accounts Data*, and OECD, *National Accounts Data Files*, 2014 (April-<http://data.worldbank.org>).

⁴⁵ G. Dumenil, D. Levy (2011), *The Crisis of Neoliberalism*, Cambridge Mass.-London, Harvard University Press.

⁴⁶ M. Savage, Devine, F. Cunningham, N. Taylor, M. Li, Y. Hjellbrekke, J., Le Roux, B., Friedman, S. Miles, A. (2013), “A New Model of Social Class? Findings from the BBC’s Great British Class Survey Experiment”, *Sociology*, No. 47(2), pp. 219-250.

synthesis. We can understand a partial distancing from the elaboration of J.H. Goldthorpe⁴⁷. The team of researchers adopts the P. Bourdieu's⁴⁸ suggestion on the distinction of economic, social and cultural capital.⁴⁹ Then it tries to construct and record indicators for measuring their impact (of the different kinds of capital) on the different professional categories (in this survey are rather meant as classes). The researchers complete their taxonomy with the G. Standing's recent intellectual construction,⁵⁰ the "precariat", which is a substitute of proletariat, but it represents a smaller proportion within the nowadays social structure, than the working class of the past.

There are also two categories of middle class: the established middle class and the technical middle class. I cannot understand totally

⁴⁷ J.H. Goldthorpe (1987), *Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain*, Oxford, Clarendon Press. C.f., J.H. Goldthorpe (2016), "Social class mobility in modern Britain: changing structure, constant process, *Journal of the British Academy*, 4, pp. 89-111. DOI 10.5871/jba/004.089.

⁴⁸ P. Bourdieu (1986), "The forms of capital", In: Richardson J. (ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, New York, Greenwood, pp. 241-258.

⁴⁹ I have several objections on the different kinds (or types) of "capital". The basic regards the nature of the "social capital" and the "cultural capital". My opinion is that their content regards the relative resources, but these aren't capitals or stock of any kind, during the capitalist era. If the aforementioned resources take place in any kind of money transactions, then their value is, definitely, an exchange value (an expression of capital, namely the only capital). We don't need any new term for the replacement of the established terms. The invention of new terms doesn't eliminate the facts and the economic or social reality. The readers have to understand the meanings. The searching for new words or for new syntheses of words (as innovative terms) doesn't make the life better or richer. After the invention of the "types of capital" the upper classes felt better, in my opinion, because the real stock holders were and looked too few, until that moment. The integration of the "different types of capital", in the scientific and the official vocabulary, has 'generated billions of holders of the different "types of capital"'. The real inequality died, then, and a "new type of equality" was born. Is this a reality? ...For whom?

⁵⁰ G. Standing (2011), *The precariat*, London, Bloomsbury Academic. G. Standing in his analysis has a provocatively lack of theory. There isn't any theory for employment statuses, too. There are observations for the surface of the flexible and cheap workers (the most are part-timers or even informal) and some selective gleanings (which are not systematizations). The lack of theory leaves free only a name, like a slogan. G. Standing just renames a portion of the (old?) proletariat. Today the precariat is more famous than the proletariat, in mass media's easy discussions. This is his great achievement. The proletariat was, in fact, a dangerous class for the capitalism and the upper classes, worldwide, for two centuries, at least. Could Standing or any other show a significant dangerous action of the (so called) precariat? I cannot remember anything and anywhere. I could think that the only dangerous dimension of the (so called) precariat is the broad segmentation of working class and of wage-earners, in general. This is a blessing for the upper classes or the sign for the defeat of working people.

the real social location of affluent workers. Is this some kind of a secondary “interim” class or an upper stratum of the lower categories? Is this a symptom of real chaos in the structure of society or a hope for the coming chaos in the minds of readers?

The three lower categories (the traditional working class, the emergent service workers, and the precariat) are more close to the notion of working class. This construction looks to me like as a patchwork. I can understand that the main problem of the survey is the lack of a solid scientific discipline in contrast to the view of the well known theoretical analyses on classes. I can’t see anywhere a clearly class of capitalists. The arbitrary terminologies are connected with several professionals who “participate” in the ambiguous seven “classes”.

The type of the empirical research’s sample and the recording of the answers allow me not to proceed in the evaluation of the validity of the classification, according to economic, social and cultural capital. Nevertheless, I understand that this survey has provoked at least a strong theoretical objection.

C. Mills⁵¹ has examined, briefly, the methodology of the elaboration and has ended up to an impressive conclusion, which gives to us a further confirmation for the problematic character of its findings: “My conclusion is that for the reasons I outline here, and for others that space limitations prevent me from mentioning, the GBCS is a fiasco. It is so theoretically and methodologically flawed that it can contribute little of value to our understanding of the structure of systematic social inequality in the UK”. I cannot fully adopt the above conclusion, but I’ll

⁵¹ C. Mills (2014), “The Great British Class Fiasco: A Comment on Savage et al.”, *Sociology*, 2014, Vol. 48 (3), pp. 437-444.

keep my deep skepticism. I'm thinking after this analysis that the capitalists, the members of working class and the petty bourgeois are not here, but is here the new "aristocracy" (this is the authentic meaning of "elite") and the "established middle class" (as a caricature of the past, the contemporary, and the future middle class), in the modern realm of arbitrary power of society and human (or scientific) mind. Is there a late "middle" age once again? The citizens of modern society must think, again and again.

1.5

Class and Status in Employment Reviews and Estimations

In a book which has been published in 2000,⁵² there is the suggestion that the previous (twenty or more years before the publication) predictions for the future relations of new technologies with human work were incorrect. In contrary to any common fear in front of technological evolution, the informatics' technologies, the telecommunications systems, and the robotics increase the numbers of workers and of the employees (the wage workers). At the same time, I expressed the opinion that the new production procedures and the new divisions of labor are connected with the broadening of the groups of cheap and flexible work (part-time work, time-sharing, outsourcing etc.).

The careful reader of that book probably could find references to the new forms of work, like to the broadening phenomenon of teleworking. This was a rather difficult observation (with a risky prognosis for the future), but there were clear indications in this direction of division of labor. It is not a surprise then the confirmation of that prediction, when, during the global pandemic crisis, almost everybody has had the experience of such a type of work, in administration, services, trade, education etc.

During the research for the aforementioned book, it became clear that the fear of middle management in large and medium-sized enterprises for their job security and the future of their specialization was

⁵² A.N. Lytras (2000), *Society and Work* (in Greek), Athens, Papazissis Publishers [find in Harvard University Library, HOLLIS (and several others)].

real. In the perception formed by that book, several of the valuable specializations were extremely “special”, according to their strict preconditions (educational or scientific qualifications and licenses) for their confirmation and positive reception. When new technologies made the previously demanding tasks simpler or easier, the specific specializations lost their productive significance and many of the relevant experts realized that they were much less useful.

Many of regular people cannot understand well the basic properties of robotics and automation. In contrary to their strong beliefs, the modern technologies make the working process simpler and do not make it more difficult or more demanding. Demanding is the manufacturing of the new means of production and the inventions of informatics technologies, but in these sectors there is the need of an extremely small percentage of human workers (usually less than 2% or even 1% of total employment). Here is an understandable example to everybody: The inventors of game platforms and of e-games are certainly highly specialized but the children, without any specialization and credential or license, play and achieve high (or the highest) scores. The analogous phenomenon is the active reality in production and labor process. The means of production facilitate the human work and make even an immature “child” (imagine the abilities of a modern woman or man) to be a productive worker in any sector. They permit, thus, to everybody (with an average educational preparation) to participate as a worker in every sector of production and increase the productivity.

The complex impact of broader competition among the much more workers (with lower level of specialization) and the increase of productivity create more profits. It is a pure capitalistic procedure,

because the evolution is only the following: from capitalism (of a broad division of labor) to capitalism (with a broader division of labor). Simply, many people or the most people believe that their work (with their educational preparation and professional credentials) is a special asset and something more than any other commodity. This is a (partly, but major) mistake for the perception of the reality. There isn't any post-capitalistic society or economy in front of their eyes. There isn't any industrial or post-industrial society. These ideas are illusions or even more these concepts are rather creations of the pure propaganda.

Human labor is valuable for capitalism, because as a commodity (the working time) is the only one which creates more value to the other material or immaterial goods and finally commodities (see again the analysis for A. Smith and K. Marx). Until the end of capitalism, this is the pure and unavoidable truth (if there is the need for a worker to believe to any truth, beyond his or her experience).

The main conclusions which were obvious in the 2000, by a theoretical view, made even clearer and empirically detailed, in 2016. The book on the evolution of wage labor (*Wage Labour in Modern Society*)⁵³ reveals once again the continuous increase of employment and of employees.

The wage labor, on the one hand, is a “pandemic phenomenon” in developed capitalist countries undoubtedly and gives the sureness that the procedure probably goes on, despite the interim fluctuations, even in countries with nearly 90% or more employees.

The employers, the core of the real entrepreneurship, represent insignificant percentages in the developed countries and the ongoing

⁵³ A.N. Lytras (2016), *Wage Labour in Modern Society*, Athens, Papazissis Publishers (eBook).

trend is the further reduction of their analogies, worldwide. The “new aristocracy” is here and is richer than ever before. It is really an elitist deviation of the capitalistic economic system and social structure.

The own-account workers in the developed countries are a minority, less than the 15% (in the most of them) of the employment. In this group of countries and especially in pioneers of the economic development, the obvious trend is the further reduction of the percentages (USA, Japan, and Germany). In several paradigms of countries, with broader groups of this category of workers, there is either the decrease (Greece and Italy) or the relative stability (Brazil and Mexico) of the percentages. There is a recent phenomenon of a small recovery of own-account workers (UK and France), but up to now do not approach the aforementioned percentage of Greece, Italy, Brazil and Mexico. These cases rather indicate the increase of the freelancers, namely the self-employed people without any property, in a synthesis with the established types of own-account workers (small farmers, craftsmen, small merchants, independent professionals etc).

For the contributing family workers, we cannot make many comments. In the past they were more significant and broader status in employment. As a working category they accompany the own-account workers. Today, in the most developed countries they represent insignificant percentages.

The same conclusions for all the above mentioned statuses in employment are reconfirmed in a book (with data until 2014) for combating unemployment [2017 (eBook) and 2020 (book)],⁵⁴ a

⁵⁴ A.N. Lytras [2017 (2020)], *A Radical Policy for Combating Unemployment*, Athens, Papazissis Publishers.

monograph (2021)⁵⁵ and a recent book (2024)⁵⁶, with the analysis of data until 2021. All these conclusions make easier the main result of observations: The intensive polarization of statuses in employment is the prelude of the social polarization.

We are going to glean the basic estimations:

a) The status of employers is that in which is located the capitalist class (capitalists is a small part of employers). There aren't capitalists who aren't employer, directly or indirectly (either stock holders who aren't members of the official management of enterprises, or stock holders who are members of boards but they aren't executives of enterprises). I am thinking, with an open mind, the E.O. Wright's suggestion that the employers with 10 or over employees are full-fledged capitalists, but the previous intervention of V.I. Lenin for a flexible lower limit of 15-30 employees and the R. Luxemburg's analysis create additional difficulties (for the prerequisites on the endurance of small capitals and for the separation between management and pure labor) for the final decision. I express the approach that the limit of capitalist class is in the (with a flexibility) location of the employers with (approximately) 15 to 19 employees. This of course regards the first and lower category of capitalists. In the category of employers with 20 or more employees there is the real core of bourgeoisie. The data indicate that the total group of bourgeoisie is a too small part of the status of employers (I estimate them approximately to the 2.3% in USA and less than 2% in UK and Japan) in employment. Finally and definitely, the

⁵⁵ A.N. Lytras (2021), "The Social Polarization and the Distribution of Employment, worldwide (2006-2018), in Selected Countries", *Critical Essays*, Athens, Panteion University, Vol. III_1 (in Greek).

⁵⁶ A.N. Lytras (2024), *The Bourgeois and their World. The social polarization in 21st century*, Athens, Papazissis Publishers (in Greek).

bourgeoisie represents less than 1% (or 1.5%) of the total employment or less than 0.5% of total population. That's why the capitalists cover, carefully (via their mass media and via the researches they funding constantly), themselves. That's why they cover their immeasurable wealth. They make sporadic appearances, usually, in the nights.

I ignore the kind of attitudes, the faiths and the appetites of the scientists or of the staff of institutions, who estimate that the upper class of the modern society is something like as "elite". Nevertheless, I understand that the capitalists of modern era believe strongly to their "excellency". They are "excellent" because they are extremely wealthy, and they are wealthy because they are "excellent". I percept that any heir of the old wealthy people (heritance is the basic origin of the younger wealthy people, with a complimentary group of much fewer newcomers, and with the "re-distributional" results of marriage and affinity) has a strong faith to their "aristocratic" virtues. All the (even fewer) others, probably, have to believe to a strong God. There is no alternative. These are the results.

b) The own-account workers and the small group of contributing family members are the basic corpus of petty bourgeoisie. They, either as possessors of private property, too, or as freelancers, are a significant set of groups or strata. They are of course a minority in every developed capitalist country, but they are also the last buffer for the defense of work autonomy. If they don't make the buffer of defense the starting point of a collective economic (the organization of the co-operatives of the new age) and political action (with demands for crucial institutional changes for the reinforcement of the work autonomy) they are going to watch something socially "abnormal": They are going to watch as living persons

their economic and social death. There is an active truth: Autonomy is an asset of dignified civilians and is a gift for human life. They have to protect it from the illusions of their future (capitalistic) profitability. They need the future high productivity and effectiveness of autonomy, but these are enemies to capitalistic “elites”. The “elites” are ready for the reception of the ex autonomous workers with extremely low remunerations, and therefore as living bodies, but not as living minds. Do not leave the future to luck.

I choose to say, that the employers with 1-9 wage-earners (and especially the employers with 1-6 wage-earners) have probably the characteristics of petty bourgeoisie, because they really work side by side with their wage-earners, use typically or actually contributing family members, and slightly reproduce their small capitals. Anyway, their function makes no special distance from the conditions of exploitation, as an authentic capitalistic function, but they are not full-fledged capitalists (as E.O. Wright said). The employers with 10 to 14 employees (if we scrutinize the relative enterprises we can understand that the major part of them employs closer to the 11 or 12 employees) have many similarities to the properties (and especially have an analogous economic endurance), with the broader category of very small employers. I estimate that all the above mentioned are the real majority in many national cases or even the vast majority, in some cases, of employers. The petty-bourgeoisie as group of strata is the majority of entrepreneurs, but they mentally reproduce the uncomfortable for them spiritual framework of bourgeoisie. If they are not going to “correct” their over-individualism and the false idea that they could alone protect their property, they are going to lose soon their productive and labor autonomy.

c) The enormous majority of employment is consisted with the employees. The enormous majority of developed countries in North America, Europe, and East Asia etc. is, undoubtedly, the working class. This is the message of the percentages over of (approximately) the 85% to, nearly, 94% (of the employees in USA), of total employment. This majority (and its continuous increase for seventy years) indicates that the absolute need for living labor, if any capitalist wants profits. In any sector of production (agriculture, industry, and services) the wage laborers create the regular or even the enormous profits of capital (with a manner, which, firstly, A. Smith has mentioned). The members of working class are all the wage-earners (either manual or intellectual workers, in all the sectors of production), who exchange their working ability (laboring power or just working time) with capital and create surplus-value (the value of the surplus-labor, the value of the unpaid working time). The surplus-value is the exact amount from which the capitalistic (and of course the commercial) profit is formed. Nothing more and nothing less there is here and now.

The real active problem of our age is the extra broad segmentation of this enormous social majority. The members of working class are separated to three at least categories: the full-time and regular workers, the part-timers (who are divided to several sub-statuses of flexible work), and the public servants along as with the employees of public enterprises. The interests of these major groups of social majority are different, even slightly. The difference on the surface of their interests is the effective buffer for the common perception of their necessary unity. They cannot to form a common manner of express of the unity's demands. The sign of the nowadays victory of bourgeoisie is the projection of the enormous

social majority as a set of several minorities. This (objectively) majority has to change the level of demands and of collective action. The more obvious field is the political level, with unified demands for changes of institutions. The coming result of such a choice is the unity of the enormous majority, with the improvement of its significance in the functions of the social and the political system.

d) Two minor or extra small (according to their percentages) categories of wage-earners are not members of the working class. The managers of the upper ranks of management in the larger enterprises belong to the upper (the capitalists) class. Their wage-earner profile is euphemistic, because their function is closest to the capitalists and their enormous remunerations represent the consuming of a part of surplus-value (the alternative name of the A. Smith's "aggregate" profits). The second team is the small group of middle managers, who have obligations to transmit the orders and the pure choices of the owners and of the members of top management to the working class, while their salaries represent approximately the value of their working time. In this second team and only in this, there are basically the members of new middle class (if there is any), today. I don't give extra value to this phenomenon, but the results of the relative debates (for at least seventy years) for the new middle class imposes the "demand" for crucial comments (and the adding of useful data):

1) There is a general question: Was there a real social class with the well known name (new middle class), which made its appearance known by its action and special demands, ever?

The answer is easy and unique: Never. We cannot find a clear report or an "ambiguous" report for the opinions, the demands, and the

actions of a collective subject with the very name of the so called new middle class, in any country of modern society, at any time of the after war world. In this sense, the new middle class was and is a phantom of modern society.

The second question could be the next: Were and are there any positions of the broad group of wage earners, which are neither of working class nor of capitalists? Definitely, there were and there are, but they are fewer nowadays.

During the establishment and the rising of fordism - taylorism productive and labor organization there were several positions with the characteristics of the so called new middle class' positions. Never, of course, were more than the 10% (or a little more in some periods and countries) of the total number of wage-earners. In the post-fordism period these positions are fewer, less powerful, and more scattered.

Perhaps we should characterize these individuals as strata, because the term "class" tends to the overestimation of this social group. We could bring once again to the surface the final estimation of C. Wright Mills for the new middle class: "They are rearguarders. In the shorter run, they will follow the panicky ways of prestige; in the longer run, they will follow the ways of power, for, in the end, prestige is determined by power. In the meantime, on the political market-place of American society, the new middle classes are up for sale; whoever seems respectable enough, strong enough, can probably have them. So far, nobody has made a serious bid".⁵⁷

If we believe the C. Wright Mills' approach that new middle class is a group of rearguarders and "con-calculate" the opinion of this analysis

⁵⁷ C. Wright Mills (1969), *White Collar: The American Middle Classes*, *ibid*, pp. 353-354.

that the same social group is a phantom of social reality, then, the term “strata” in nowadays for them is a result of an overestimation, too. They are rather a group of scattered professionals (as wage-earners) with a low level of social significance.

2) Despite the previous comments there are still two unanswered questions: What are the occupations of the new middle class? (and) How many are the people (as a percentage) in each occupation and in total?

The analysis in this field is a difficult task, due to the kind of the collection and presentation of relative data. Surely, the occupations include more statuses in employment and there are not only the employees (the employers, the own-account workers, the contributing family members, and others). In some cases the employers and the own-account workers declare their position as managers or as professionals (this category of occupations regards especially the own-account workers). In several countries with developed democratic institutions (federal organization or developed local government) there is a big corpus (or even enormous – see, the organization of the public institutions of USA and Germany) of elected citizens. These citizens during their duties declare themselves as managers (or, in same category, as legislators or as administrative workers). They, definitely, are not managers or something like this, but there is the relative recording. At the same time, the incompatible kinds of data (there are different models of recording) are additional problems.

The analysis here is going to glean the indicative data of managers and professionals in two countries (USA and France).⁵⁸ Recent

⁵⁸ The table for the 1990 is a combination of two methods of recording. The first regards the statuses in employment [ICSE-1958, see, United Nations Statistical Office, “Supplementary Principles and

data for selected countries are going to conclude the references of this analysis.

Table 1.5.1

USA: Statuses in Employment, with Managers and Professionals, 1990, 2004 and 2008 (%)

Statutes/ Occupation	Employers and Own Account Workers a,b	Employees c	Contributing family workers d	Members of productive cooperatives e	Workers not classified by status in employment f	Total
1990						
0/1 Professional, Technical and Related Workers	15.19	16.11	2.21			15.89
2 Administrative and Managerial Workers	15.68	11.79	6.08			12.03
2004						
1 Managers	24.01	13.40	2.50			14.10

Recommendations for Population and Housing Censuses”, *Statistical Papers*, doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER/M/67/Add.1, United Nations, New York, 1990). The statuses according this method are the followings: a) employers, b) own-account workers, c) employees, d) contributing family members, e) the members of productive cooperatives, f) workers not classified by status in employment.

The second, according the ISCO-1968 regards the division of occupations 0/1 Professional, Technical and Related Workers, 2 Administrative and Managerial Workers, 3 Clerical and Related Workers, 4 Sales workers, 5 Service workers, 6 Agricultural, Animal Husbandry and Forestry Workers, Fishermen and Hunters, 7/8/9 Production and Related Workers, Transport Equipment Operators and Labourers, X. Workers Not Classifiable by Occupation, Armed forces occupations. See, ILO, International Standard Classification of Occupations 1968, (revised edition) Geneva, 1969.

The data for 2004, 2005 and 2008, are been recorded according ICSE-1958 and ISCO-1988. The ISCO-1988 has the following categories: 0 Armed forces occupations; 1 Managers; 2 Professionals; 3 Technicians and associate professionals; 4 Clerical support workers; 5 Service and sales workers; 6 Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers; 7 Craft and related trades workers; 8 Plant and machine operators, and assemblers; 9 Elementary Occupations; X Not elsewhere classified.

2 Professionals	15.67	20.18	4.37			19.74
<u>2008</u>						
1 Managers	23.69	14.14	4.65			14.70
2 Professionals	15.87	20.91	3.10			20.45

Source: Lytras (2016).⁵⁹

Table 1.5.2

France: Statuses in Employment, with Managers and Professionals, 1990 (%)

Statuses/ Occupation	Employers and Own Account Workers a,b	Employees c	Contributing family workers d	Members of productive cooperatives e	Workers not classified by status in employment f	Total
<u>1990</u>						
0/1 Professional, Technical and Related Workers	19.47	19.02	4.87		15.89	18.42
2 Administrative and Managerial Workers	3.53	0.15	0.07			0.27

Source: Lytras (2016).⁶⁰

Table 1.5.3

France: Statuses in Employment, with Managers and Professionals, 2004, 2008 (%)

Statuses/ Occupation	1 Employees	2 Employers	3 Own-account workers	4 Members of productive cooperatives	5 Contributing family workers	Total
<u>2005</u>						
1 Managers	5.32	37.58	23.17		22.8	7.11
2	16.67	16.80	12.84		0.64	11.49

⁵⁹ A.N. Lytras (2016), *Wage Labour in Social Organization*, Athens, Papazissis Publishers (in Greek), pp. 335, 337.

⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 340.

Professionals						
<u>2008</u>						
1 Managers	5.75	40.70	24.91		27.92	7.88
2 Professionals	13.12	18.18	15.50		1.51	12.41

Source: Lytras (2016).⁶¹

Table 1.5.4⁶²

The Distribution of Occupations in Selected Countries (2017-%)

Occupations/ Countries	0 Armed forces occupations	1 Managers	2 Professionals	3 Technicians and associate professionals	4 Clerical support workers	5 Service and sales workers	6 Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers	7 Craft and related trades workers	8 Plant and machine operators, and assemblers	9 Elementary Occupations	X Not elsewhere classified
France	0.7	7.2	18	20	8.3	16	3.1	9	7.6	10	-
Japan	-	2.2	-	23	20	22	3.5	-	22	7.1	1.5
UK	0.3	11	25	13	9.8	18	1.2	8.2	4.9	8.6	0.2
USA	-	10	22	14	10	18	0.2	8.7	5.9	9.8	-

The estimation of this analysis is formed, absolutely, by the data. Well, the data indicate that USA and France have developed different tactics for the collection, the recording and the presentation of the possible quantities' correlation of the managers and of the professionals (these two are iconic categories in the censuses of employment and of occupations), with the new middle class. Beyond the different tactics of recording, is clearly proved that a significant part of managers and

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 343.

⁶² See, A.N. Lytras (2019), "What about middle class?", *Journal of Sociology and Social Work*, 7 (1), pp. 81-93 and especially, p. 91.

professionals are either employers or own-account workers (especially in the USA). This fact “destroys” every narrative which focuses these categories, exclusively, as employees. The managers in France are significantly fewer than in USA and their percentages more reasonable. The professionals do not indicate any special case of workers. They are, in any case, a relatively small analogy of wage earners, while a smaller part and percentage of them covers or is going to cover the posts of middle management. The “hunting” for the phantom of the “new middle class” is, of course, continuous.

The recent comparative data (Table 1.5.4) don’t change the aforementioned image for the new middle class, via the multiple data of occupations. The interesting case is that of Japan. Possibly, is the only country, which doesn’t make a peculiar arrangement of the relative data for the managers. Additionally, it unifies the professionals and the technicians (etc.).

After the whole elaboration, I cannot decide for a clear answer to the next question: Which is the exact analogy of the new middle class? I’m thinking that a percentage (approximately) 10%-12% of employment (of the countries with a percentage of employees, approximately, 85% or more) is logical.

The conclusions for the correlation of the statuses in employment with the social classes are, according the prevailing opinion of this analysis, the followings:

i) The bourgeoisie includes the employers (their definition is described by A. Smith, K. Marx, M. Weber, W. Sombart, C. Wright Mills, E.O. Wright and G. Dumenil & D. Levy) with 15 or more (but not undoubtedly) wage earners. In this class are members the members of the board of enterprises

and their top managers (see, M. Weber, C. Wright Mills, E.O. Wright and G. Dumenil & D. Levy). The employers with 20 or more wage-earners are the real core of bourgeoisie. The top managers and the middle managers of public sector are not members of bourgeoisie.

ii) The petty-bourgeoisie (its definition is described by A. Smith, K. Marx, M. Weber, V.I. Lenin, R. Luxemburg, C. Wright Mills, N. Poulantzas, and E.O. Wright) includes the own-account workers (with the complimentary group of contributing family workers) and the small employers with 1-9 wage workers. There is an ambiguous possibility for the integration of the employers with 10-14 wage-earners, too. This dimension is special, because regards a relatively small number of employers.

iii) The enormous majority of employees (the wage-earners, either manual or intellectual workers, in any sector of production) are definitely members of the working class (their definition is described very well by A. Smith, K. Marx, M. Weber, W. Sombart, and E.O. Wright).

iv) The new middle class or strata or even “group of individuals” are the wage-earners, who cover the posts of the middle management (the supervisors and the consultants of the middle ranks) of enterprises. The top managers and the middle managers of the public sector belong to the new middle class (or strata or even groups of individuals), too. All the above mentioned groups are never been presented themselves as a united social subject, the last seventy years.

2

The Trends of Statuses in Employment

2.1

The Increase of Employment

Most everyday people today are strongly convinced that a terrible event has already taken place. This event is related to the adverse impact of new technologies, namely the information technology, the robotics, the telecommunications systems, the technological innovations and, most recently, the artificial intelligence, on human work. Automatic systems will be imposed on production and work. The human factor in work will be diminished. It is possible that it will disappear completely. The ability of man to survive from his work will disappear too. Automatic and robotic systems will replace every form of usefulness of the so-called living work.⁶³

All of the above seem like the eschatological perceptions, which are shaped by dogmatic approaches or have expectations of confirmation similar to those of the art of divination. However, consider some realities. Most of these views were expressed or written thirty or even forty (or

⁶³ Similar approaches have been expressed by analysts of different theoretical directions and substrates. I glean two approaches: J. Rifkin (1995), *The End of Work. The Decline of the Global Labour Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era*, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons; A. Gorz (1982), *Farewell to the Working Class. Essay on Post-Industrial Socialism*, London, Pluto Press, pp. 126-133. Significant theoretical answers are the next: H.A. Simon (1960), "The Corporation: Will It Be Managed by Machines?", M.L. Anshen, G.L. Bach (eds.), *Management and the Corporations*, 1985, New York, McGraw-Hill, pp. 17-55; R.N. Langlois (2002), "Cognitive Comparative Advantage and the Organization of Work: Lessons from Herbert Simon's Vision of the Future", *Economics Working Papers*, Paper 200220 (http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers/200220); F. Levy, R.J. Murnane (2004), *The New Division of Labour: How Computers Are Creating the Next Job Market*, New York- Princeton N.J., Russell Sage Foundation-Princeton University Press, p. 8; J.E. Smith (2020), *Smart Machines and Service Work: Automation in an Age of Stagnation*, London, Reaktion Books.

more) years ago. If they had any trace of sound foresight, some of the predictions should have already been linked to visible results. The next two tables indicate that anything predicted was not borne out in the slightest on the two most critical dimensions of the near to divination views of the future of work.

The first dimension concerns the number of employed people in general. The answer that can be easily and effortlessly deduced is that workers are increasing everywhere and their numerical increase is impressive. It is so impressive that normally any relevant discussion should be closed, without many justifications and accompanying comments. It is interesting, extremely interesting, that employment is increasing even in countries that have faced economic crises or the adverse consequences of the pandemic in the relatively recent and past period. Despite the fact that some countries have faced significant fluctuations in employment, in the long or medium term the increase was very dynamic. Similar comments should be made for countries facing serious demographic problems (Japan, Germany, France, Greece, etc.). And in these cases and the difficult intermediate periods, the increase was undeniable. The most impressive case was that of the USA. From 117 million in 1991, they had approximately 161 million people in employment, in 2023. The USA, together with Japan, the Republic of Korea, France, UK, Germany, Canada, are among others, the pioneer countries in the invention of new technologies and automation, as well as in their application in every sector of production (in industry or services). However, the number of working people in them has also increased (in some countries a lot). In this field, the facts are clearer than the obvious.

The previous predictions about the relationship of work with technology have completely and utterly failed.

Table 2.1
The Increase of Employment (1991-2023),
in Selected Countries (Thousands)

Country/Year	1991	2011	2021	2023
Argentina (Urban Areas)	4,215.62	10,765.73	12,241.62	13,293.5
Australia	7,670.535	11,213.82	13,100.83	14,123.96
Brazil	56,859.9 (1990)	90,931.21	91,187.7	99,281.77
Canada	12,857.37	17,244.29	18,942.28	20,170.91
China		764,200	772,530 (2014)	
Cyprus		398.214	431.716	479.924
Egypt	14,703.3 (1993)	23,345.81	27,241	29,886.07
France	22,058.31	25,719.82	27,929.63	28,588.58
Germany	37,006.54	38,723.45	41,514.03	43,041.03
Greece	3,615.92	4,015.55	3,927.98	4,193.45
Japan	63,690	60,587.02	66,266.41	67,470
India	282,423 (1994)	394,554.4 (2012)	406,349.8	471,885.7
Italy	21,502.08	22,597.64	22,553.96	23,579.95
Korea (R.)	18,648.75	24,703.95	27,400.58	28,548.99
Mexico	30,534.1	46,359.44	53,309.31	58,858.62
Spain	12,621.84	18,421.41	19,773.59	21,182.2
UK	26,206.9	29,305.25	32,164.54	33,013.94
USA	117,718	139,869.2	152,580.7	161,036.5

Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

2.2 The Wage-Earners

Table 2.2
The Evolution of Employees (1991-2023),
in Selected Countries (Thousands)


Country/Year	1991	2011	2021	2023
Argentina (Urban Areas)	2,962.1	8,277.641	8,864.288	9,869.985
Australia	6,524.553	9,971.842	10,901.11	11,912.93
Brazil	40,685.65 (1990)	61,973.91	60,624.1	68,277.79
Canada	10,961.57	14,599	16,291.27	17,518.17
China		684,750	666,690 (2014)	
Cyprus		326.745	380.549	428.187
Egypt	8,199.9 (1993)	14,281.5	19,733.09	21,042.42
France	18,691.95	22,719.64	24,377.77	24,881.94
Germany	33,428.37	34,186.42	37,783.75	39,327.7
Greece	1,925.66	2,586.01	2,677.92	2,895.47
Japan	50,020	53,187.12	59,406.55	60,760
India	42,032.2 (1994)	74,399.97 (2012)	92,608.13	110,981.1
Italy	15,399.99	16,939.74	17,630.02	18,541.71
Korea (R.)	11,698.67	12,559.39	20,752.89	21,828.41
Mexico	16,877.6	30,780.95	36,298.51	40,404.14
Spain	9,384.824	15,389.29	16,601.53	17,962.96
UK	22,540.95	25,146.62	27,792.83	28,578.31
USA	107,102	130,329.7	142,535.7	151,241.9

Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

The general trend which is observed in employment is also confirmed by the evolution of the number of employees (this is the second dimension), worldwide. There is no doubt (with one exception) that the number of employees (the wage-earners) is steadily increasing in all the compared countries, either modestly or spectacularly. These data provoke us to ask: Where and how were the aforementioned predictions

about the possible end of human labor are based? Were these approaches ultimately and completely unfounded?

Graph 1



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

The ILO's Statuses in Employment

ILO's officially recognizes six statuses in employment, namely the 1. Employees; 2. Employers; 3. Own-account workers; 4. Members of producers' cooperatives; 5. Contributing family workers; 6. Workers not classifiable by status.

See, ILO, *Fifteen International Conference of Labour Statisticians. Report of the Conference*, ICLS/15/D.6 (Rev. 1), International Labour Office, Geneva, 1993.

The Employees

"Employees" who "are all those workers who hold the type of job defined as 'paid employment jobs'. Employees with stable contracts are those 'employees' who have had, and continue to have, an explicit (written or oral) or implicit contract of employment, or a succession of such contracts, with the same employer on a continuous basis. 'On a continuous basis' implies a period of employment which is longer than a specified minimum determined according to national circumstances. If interruptions are allowed in this minimum period, their maximum duration should also be determined according to national circumstances. Regular employees are those 'employees with stable contracts' for whom the employing organization is responsible for payment of relevant taxes and social security contributions and/or where the contractual relationship is subject to national labour legislation".

See, ILO, *Fifteen International Conference of Labour Statisticians. Report of the Conference*, ICLS/15/D.6 (Rev. 1), International Labour Office, Geneva, 1993.

Similar observations can be made for a smaller number of the compared countries and for the proportions (%) of employees (Graph 1). The percentages of employees increase in this comparison, too. This increase also means a general decrease in the proportions of the remaining statuses in employment (employers, own-account workers, and contributing family members), as a whole. In the leading countries of today's world the usual proportion is around 85% and above. The tendency to approach this milestone is shown much more by Italy and the Republic of Korea or much lesser by Greece and Mexico, while the expansion of the proportion in India is accompanied by the finding that (in any case) it is much lower than 50% of employment.

Four countries have come very close to or exceed the 90% of employment (Cyprus, Germany, Japan and the USA). Obviously, the USA is the leader among the leading countries with a percentage of 93.92%. I imagine that these countries will not be characterized with any problematic and really non-existent name, like as "post-capitalist" countries.

The above mentioned predictions of the past, then, have been, at least until now, incorrect. Despite their wrongness, they offer a valuable example of a way in which social thinking is defined. Ideas must be related to reality. Even the most radical ideas concerning strategic choices for the future of society must be based on the existing situation, without arbitrary socio-critics and generally without intellectual fluctuations.

These views, even without the intention of their authors, can only have one role. They become the substrate of propaganda to pressure current and future workers, as well as the unemployed people, to work in extremely precarious and cheap jobs as wage earners (BOX1). Therefore,

some economic “factors” really like much the misleading dissemination of this information and the fear that is caused among wage earners.

In any such case of misleading propaganda, those who are vulnerable are those who are more economically weak and unable to access the most reliable information. Among the weakest workers are certainly the women. In connection with their need to ensure more time to support their family and especially their children, they become an easy target of employers’ pressure to work in precarious and cheaper jobs (BOX2).

BOX 2.1

Part-time Wage-Earners (% in total employment), in Selected Countries

Country/ Year	2005	2011	2017
Australia	32.9	34	34.7 (2016)
Canada	28.2	29.5	29.7
France	31.4	31.8	32.1
Germany	29.3	32.5	33.4
Greece	12.5	15.7	18.1
Japan		21.8 (2010)	24
UK	34.3	35.7	33.7
USA	15.8	17.3	15.8

Source: ILO (2018), *Incidence of part-time employment by sex - Common definition (%)*, [Downloaded on SAT, 13 OCT 2018, 09:15 +0200, from ILOSTAT].

BOX 2.2

Women and Men Part-timers (%), in Selected Countries

Gender	Men		Women	
Country/Year	2001	2008	2001	2008
Australia	11.67	12.3	38.80	37.73
Greece	2.63	4.23	8.51	13.58
Japan		9.89		33.17
Korea (R.)	5.18	6.55	10.38	13.20
UK	8.32	10.25	40.26	37.77
USA	7.97	8.02	17.96	17.82

Source: OECD (2013), *Dataset: Incidence of Full Time, Part Time Employment*, www.oecd.org.

In my book which has published, in 2024 (*The Bourgeois and their World*),⁶⁴ I claim that: “capitalism cannot make profits without human labor. This fact does not mean that professions and specializations that do not correspond to or adapt to the developments of modern technology (information technology, robotics, automation and artificial intelligence) are not transformed or disappear. Some, possibly, demanding professions or highly specialized scientific specialties may be devalued or lose their importance and prestige. It has happened several times in the context of capitalism and will happen again. Despite all these developments, we are inclined to the opinion that only the mediation of a major labor, productive, and social transformation or a completely revolutionary (in the field of the formation of social relations) political change is possible to reconstruct, in some possible ‘post-capitalist’ perspective, the existing regime of capitalist relations. Until that moment, production will be based on ‘human labor’, because this is the nature of the capitalist organization of the economy, as well as because the agents of capital and the agents of labor respond to corresponding properties and mutual relations. All the evidence and the measurable data from international organizations (of unquestionable reliability) reinforce this claim”.

⁶⁴ A.N. Lytras (2024), *The Bourgeois and their World*..... Ibid, p. 174.

2.3 The Trends for the Employers

Employers

“Employers are those workers who, working on their own account or with one or a few partners, hold the type of job defined as a ‘self-employment job’, and, in this capacity, on a continuous basis (including the reference period) have engaged one or more persons to work for them in their business as ‘employee(s)’. The meaning of ‘engage on a continuous basis’ is to be determined by national circumstances, in a way which is consistent with the definition of ‘employees with stable contracts’. The partners may or may not be members of the same family or household”.

See, ILO, *Fifteen International Conference of Labour Statisticians. Report of the Conference*, ICLS/15/D.6 (Rev. 1), International Labour Office, Geneva, 1993.

What are the chances of someone, who is not an heir, to become an entrepreneur with personnel? International data series show that in the best of the cases, the chances are limited to proportions lower than eight percent. In most countries in the next table (Table 2.3), the chances are even lower. We see that employers are below the 5% (with one employee or with thousands of employees). It is interesting that there is an obvious trend to reduce their proportion in several cases. It seems that the generally very low percentages of employers, together with the aforementioned significant trend for further reduction (from the small percentages to the insignificant), point out either the trend for entrepreneurship to become an almost aristocratic privilege or the

unpleasant reality that capitalism of our time is hostile and fights small and medium-sized enterprises (BOX3).

Table 2.3
Employers in Selected Countries (%)

Countries/Year	1991	2011	2023
Australia			6.83
Brazil	4.84 (1990)	3.47	4.22
Canada	6.48	4.78	3.71
Cyprus		4.53	1.89
France		4.48	4.84
Germany			3.98
Greece	6.30	7.53	7.28
Japan		2.27	1.62
India	2.13 (1994)	1.40 (2012)	3.31
Italy			6.22
Korea (R.)		6.18	4.97
Mexico	7.85	4.82	5.24
Spain			4.81
UK		2.52	1.56

Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

BOX 2.3
Enterprises with Personnel in Manufacture (%),
According OECD (2005, 2017 or the closest available year)

Country/ Number of Employees	1-9		10-19		20 and over		[250 and over]	
	2005	2017	2005	2017	2005	2017	2005	2017
France	82.67	88.40	7.74	5.45	9.59	6.15	[0.84]	[0.70]
Germany	59.61	61.72	22.26	17.81	18.13	20.47	[1.04]	[2.36]
Greece (2008, 2017)	95.61	91.87	1.74	4.29	2.65	3.84	[0.17]	[0.23]
Japan (2011, 2016)	75.90	74.62	10.11	10.40	13.99	14.98	[0.83]	[0.93]
UK	73.09	78.40	11.55	9.41	15.36	12.19	[1.24]	[0.91]
USA (2008, 2015)	65.21	66.99	13.64	13.41	21.15	19.60	[1.65]	[1.66]

Source: OECD (2020), *Enterprises by business size*, 1-9 persons employed/ 10-19 persons employed/ 20-49 persons employed, Number, Annual, 2020, <https://data.oecd.org/chart/6OjT>, <https://data.oecd.org/entrepreneur/enterprises-by-business-size.htm>.

We should not leave without comment the measurements for pioneering countries, such as Japan and the UK. The impressively low rates in these countries indicate that entrepreneurship is almost inaccessible to the majority of the population. In such cases, only inheritance, marriage, and untold forms of unjustified wealth can become the prerequisites for their inclusion in some categories of entrepreneurship. We cannot make any specific comment for employers in USA, because the country collects and presents employers and own-account workers as unified category for both the statuses. I have, of course, a straight estimation for this statistical tactic: The real percentages of employers in this pioneer country of modern capitalism are extremely low and they are uncomfortable for the official narrative, which regards the reinforcement of entrepreneurship (which cannot be reconfirmed, surely). The analogous comments could be made for the own-account workers, too.

The analysis for employers must not forget the unacceptable gender gap for the women employers. The women, definitely, have not the equal right to the entrepreneurship and they face the clear exclusion from the production or the distribution of wealth worldwide. The, provocatively, broad gap in employment and the functional exclusion from the mechanisms of creation of personal autonomy and of prosperity are the prelude for the narrative of the genders' extensive class differentiations. The result is the further exclusion from any aspiration for the future equality (BOX 2.4).

BOX 2.4

Women Employers in Selected Countries, 1993-2021 (%)

Country/ Year	1993*	2003*	2021**
Australia	32.06	33.45	32.78
Greece	13.09	17.54	28.10
Japan	18.13	18.18	15.98
S. Korea	-	17.80	25.89

*Source: A.N. Lytras (2016), *Wage Labour in Social Organization*, Athens, Papazissis Publishers (in Greek), p. 269

**Source: A.N. Lytras (2024), *The Bourgeois and their World. The social polarization in 21st century*, Athens, Papazissis Publishers (in Greek), p. 312.

2.4

The Own-account Workers

Own-account workers

“Own-account workers are those workers who, working on their own account or with one or more partners, hold the type of job defined as ‘a self-employment job’, and have not engaged on a continuous basis any ‘employees’ to work for them during the reference period. It should be noted that during the reference period the members of this group may have engaged ‘employees’, provided that this is on a non-continuous basis. The partners may or may not be members of the same family or household”.

See, ILO, *Fifteen International Conference of Labour Statisticians. Report of the Conference*, ICLS/15/D.6 (Rev. 1), International Labour Office, Geneva, 1993.

A second kind of Own-account workers:

The **Members of producers’ cooperatives***

The “Members of producers’ cooperatives are workers who hold a “self-employment” job in a cooperative producing goods and services, in which each member takes part on an equal footing with other members in determining the organization of production, sales and/or other work of the establishment, the investments and the distribution of the proceeds of the establishment amongst their members. It should be noted that “employees” of producers’ cooperatives are not to be classified to this group”.

See, ILO, *Fifteen International Conference of Labour Statisticians. Report of the Conference*, ICLS/15/D.6 (Rev. 1), International Labour Office, Geneva, 1993.

* This particular employment status is very rarely found in records of employment, after 1990, and when there are some data for it, the relevant percentages are very low.

Table 2.4
Own-account Workers in Selected Countries (%)

Countries/Year	1991	2011	2023
Australia (1991, 2011, Own-account workers + Employers)	14.00	10.85	8.67
Brazil	23.61 (1990)	25.37	25.55
Canada	7.77	10.42	9.37
Cyprus		11.54	8.21
France (1991, Own-account workers + Employers)	12.60	6.67	7.79
Germany (1991-2011, Own-account workers + Employers)	8.22	11.04	4.35
Greece	28.79	22.69	20.16
Japan	13.49	6.43	5.97
India	64.43 (1994)	61.92 (2012)	54.86
Italy (1991-2011, Own-account workers + Employers)	24.32	23.46	14.18
Korea (R.)	26.68	16.74	14.95
Mexico	23.64	22.63	22.25
Spain (1991-2011, Own-account workers + Employers)	20.35	15.74	10.05
UK (1991, Own-account workers + Employers)	12.98	11.32	11.59
USA (Own-account workers + Employers)	8.73	6.74	6.03

Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

What about the own-account workers? There are three parallel trends. For the most countries the trend of percentages is downward (Australia, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Japan, India, Italy, S. Korea, Spain, and USA). At the same period two countries present an upward trend (France and UK). Brazil and Mexico (they have low level of prosperity of the population) keep their high percentages of this status in employment. Canada notes fluctuations at the same (rather low) level.

The own-account workers have decreased their percentages, in Japan, as they were in 1991 the 13.49% of the total employment and they represent the 5.97% in 2023. In Germany, in 1991, they represent 8.22% of total employment. The indication of 2023 shows a downward trend, with 4.35%. The enlargement of the own-account workers in the UK is remarkable. Perhaps, this evolution regards rather the freelancers than the self-employed people with private property and small personal production (in any sector). The similar evolution there is in France, but with lower percentage. The real estimation of own-account workers for the U.S. is rather impossible. We should suppose that they have a larger analogy than the employers if we take into account the data of countries (for employers and own-account workers) at the same level of economic standards and social prosperity (Japan and UK). The aforementioned data enhance the estimation for the polarization within work and social organization in pioneer countries.

In India there is an impressive fact. I don't think that the enormous group of own-account workers (much more than the 50% of total employment) is the indication of an environment of so good entrepreneurial conditions. The trend for the reduction is definitely strong but early. We can observe that the employees and own-account workers

have a strong connection, but under inverse relations. When the first status (the employees) increases the second status (the own-account workers) decreases. India is appeared, in the nowadays, as a national economy that has not overcome the traditional structures and this fact is illustrated in self-employment. The data represent the relatively slow transition from traditional (even more the family-based structures) organization to the type of modern labor relations (the latter constitute in a way the “economic islands” of the national process of development).

2.5

The Contributing Family Workers**Contributing family workers**

“Contributing family workers are those workers who hold a ‘self-employment’ job in a market-oriented establishment operated by a related person living in the same household, who cannot be regarded as a partner, because their degree of commitment to the operation of the establishment, in terms of working time or other factors to be determined by national circumstances, is not at a level comparable to that of the head of the establishment. Where it is customary for young persons, in particular, to work without pay in an economic enterprise operated by a related person who does not live in the same household, the requirement of ‘living in the same household’ may be eliminated”.


See, ILO, *Fifteen International Conference of Labour Statisticians. Report of the Conference*, ICLS/15/D.6 (Rev. 1), International Labour Office, Geneva, 1993.

The contributing family members belong to a contradictory category of workers. The status is a peculiar one, in the official statistics, which regard to employment. The contributing family members are the group of “dependent” workers (in the economic units), who are not agents of wage-labor. They don’t receive, directly or indirectly, any remuneration. At the same time, the official definitions notes that the contributing family workers “hold a ‘self-employment’ job” (see the above box). Family, dependency, and self employment, are the three elements of the

contradictory situation. If they are really dependent (and they are not slaves) then they are unrecorded wage-earners (and the statistical offices accept this recording). If they “hold a ‘self-employment’ job” then there is the result that the own-account workers’ status “includes” contributing family workers, too. If are simply members of a family in employment, then they are not real “partners” or collaborates of a family (there is also an exception for the young people, out of the family household) job and they create a distortion to another category of employment, namely the unemployment rate and the recorded unemployed people. The status of contributing family member, regardless of the reliability of the recordings, covers larger analogies of unemployment than those which are recorded formally. One of the most serious problem is (*if there is any*) that they may cover informal and unrecorded paid-work, too.

The aforementioned issues the reasons which do not permit to me to comment extensively and in detail the data (I am going to add comments for contributing family workers, separately, during the discussion of the national data) of this status in employment. The next Graph 2 shows the extremely small percentages in the pioneer, developed and prosperous countries, even after a recent and strong reduction (in Greece and in Japan).

Graph 2



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

2.6

The Statues in Employment: Estimation of the Polarization

The analysis gives to us the multitude of data, which reconfirm undoubtedly the orbit to the labor and social polarization. The evolution of the correlation of the employers, employees, own-account workers, and contributing family workers indicates a clear and continuous process.

The employers (both, with a small number of wage-earners or with many wage-earners) are an extremely small analogy of the statuses in employment. The entrepreneurs who own the larger enterprises represent an insignificant percentage of the employment and an even smaller proportion of the total population of the modern developed countries. Every regular citizen cannot have any (regular) contact with any regular rich entrepreneur, namely the real member of the bourgeoisie of our age. Even more, it is a result of a provocatively good luck the opportunity for a young person to become a member of this class. Typically, this society is an open society and here there is the potential of social mobility. For the status of employers and for the bourgeoisie, the road is “blocked”, the social mobility is inactive and the relative positions are inaccessible.

The regular citizen has the “distinguished” luck to become a wage-earner, but it isn’t a guaranteed condition to become a regular full-time worker. Surely, the extra-extra large majority (approximately the 85% and over) of people and workers are or are going to become wage-earners (or employees). In many cases, the nearly 25% or even the approximately 33.33% of the total people in employment (even more of the employees) are part-timers and flexible workers. The latter are definitely members of

the working class (the only exception regards the persons who try to live the difficulties of the unlucky people, as a hobby). The members of working class are of course the regular full-time wage-workers in any sector of production, if they aren't members of middle management (supervisors etc.), at least. More and more in numbers and in percentages are what they are, namely workers, even if they don't like to listen the definitional term of their condition, even if they hate any reference to the working class, even if they don't feel any sense of unity with the similar others, even if they believe absolutely to the possibility of the future benefits of greed.

There is a kind of dignity in employment which fights with the possibility of a future misery. The own-account workers, with the complimentary status of the contributing family members, modestly, decrease their percentage and constitute a stable minority, basically, around the 10% or less (or much less), in the pioneer countries of capitalistic development. The countries with broader percentages confront, in the process of their "improvement" and according to the orbit of the continuously reducing analogies of the own-account workers, the future spectrum of a much intensive polarization in employment. The broader mass of wage earners everywhere build up a condition in employment with lesser and lesser analogies of own-account workers, even slightly every year. The work autonomy as an asset or as an opportunity for personal independence in the environment of employment is becoming, more and more, unsure and will, possibly, be inaccessible in the near future. The own-account workers, possibly and in several countries, alter themselves to small employers, during the more auspicious periods (for a short period), namely during the summers in

touristic activities, or in the touristic regions in a broader spectrum of activities. During the winters they come back to the relative safety of the self-employment. The connections with very small employers indicate the similar petty-bourgeoisie's class qualities. The minority of the petty-bourgeoisie (smaller or larger) is the only sure and existing middle class⁶⁵ in nowadays society. The members of this minority, as survivors of the past inauspicious events, exist with the stable threat of the future inability to continue their activities. They are lucky people, because they were not unlucky, in the past. The future prognosis is ambiguous.

Within the enormous majority of wage-earners, there are the members of "new middle class" or of "new middle strata" or, according to this analysis the "groups of scattered individual-wage-earners (who have positions of the middle management)", as representatives of a small minority of employees and a smaller minority of total population. In this sense, the different approaches, for the possible (relative or even more absolute) majority of the "middle" groups (or class?) of the scale of (households') incomes, and of population, don't correspond to any active dimension of reality. I am thinking seriously the audacity of the authors or the supporters (and of the transmitters in any level of education) of the intellectual constructions for the "middle class of incomes." What about them?

The social polarization is not a dead end. We have the opportunity to examine carefully the actual circumstances and to choose a fertile field to overcome the present reality. We need an environment in employment of autonomy, real freedom during working time, and the economic

⁶⁵ A.N. Lytras, "What about middle class?", *Journal of Sociology and Social Work*, 7 (1), 2019, pp. 81-93.

dignity, with a visible road to the improvement (or to the continuous prosperity). This day must not be delayed. It is the day in which every agent of work will be absolutely identical to the ideal citizen, in a civil society, without the need for dominance and subordination.

A political coalition⁶⁶ (with the participation of associations, informal societies or collectivities, trade-unions, political movements or parties, and individuals) of wage-earners, own-account workers, and small employers, or roughly the 9/10 of the population of any modern and developed society could support a vital minimum program for major changes within capitalism and the existing legality. These are:

- 1) *The equal distribution of the seats in every national, federal, local parliament and council,*⁶⁷ *along with the equal distribution of the seats in every governmental and even in any top (after elections) administrative institution to women and men.*⁶⁸
- 2) *The introduction of referendums (even digitals) could add to the improvement of democracy. The introduction of institutions of the direct democracy (in the local and the community level) increases the people's participation.*
- 3) *The election of judges and of the policing staff (for short periods).*⁶⁹
- 4) *The reduction of managing power of the owners (and of the managerial staff) of enterprises and the substitution of it with contractual*

⁶⁶ For the analysis for the new collective social subject (an active subject in the political field), see, A.N. Lytras (2000), *Society and Work....* (in Greek), *ibid*, pp. 287-290, 305-324; A.N. Lytras (2008), *Political Strategy for the Social Classes*, Athens, Papazissis Publishers (in Greek).

⁶⁷ A.N. Lytras (2020), "The Modern Subject of Social Reversal. The working class and the politics of the social majority", J. Batou, A. Zapheirees, D. Kaltsones, A.N. Lytras, G. Maniates, J. Oriol Marrero Martinez, P. Papakonstantinou, G. Tolios, G. Tsagolov, *Do Marx's Ideas Endure?*, Athens, Topos (in Greek), pp. 143-184.

⁶⁸ A.N. Lytras (2020), "The Modern Subject of Social Reversal....", *ibid*.

⁶⁹ A.N. Lytras (2020), "The Modern Subject of Social Reversal....", *ibid*.

arrangements for the working time, the levels of productivity and the targets of enterprises.

5) The strong enhancement of cooperatives in the banking, the consuming, the constructions, and the collective management of real estates and buildings.⁷⁰

6) The increase (with doubling or even tripling) of the legal rights of building for every owner of private property on land (for the small owners with one or two plots of land – the same prediction there is for one or two apartments),⁷¹ if the new buildings are going to be fully sustainable (in the production of energy and the protection of the environment).⁷² Special predictions will be in action for bigger properties.

7) The direct reduction of the weekly working time to the 32 hours, without any reduction to the wages and the remunerations. The flexibility is permitted, but any flexible worker (for the weekends, the holidays, the nights etc.) must gain the equal remuneration with the wage-earner who works 32 hours per week. The (even self-directed) working teams or the working groups are the desirable form of workers, as we can observe to the most competitive private enterprises. The establishment of a generous system of the basic or minimum guaranteed income could be an interim solution for the overcoming of the extreme incomes' inequalities.

8) The effective minimization of unemployment, could be done by the aspired general development (due to the future increase of circulation, the optimism from the increased ownership and the expected expansion of

⁷⁰ A.N. Lytras (2019), *The Democracy of our Social Future*, Athens, Parateriterio (in Greek).

⁷¹ For the importance of private properties (shops, houses etc.) for the petty-bourgeoisie, see, A.N. Lytras (2010), *Petty Bourgeois' Function and Organization in Greece*, Athens, Papazissis Publishers (in Greek); A.N. Lytras (1993), *Prolegomena to the Theory of Greek Social Structure*, Athens, A.A. Livanis-Nea Synora (in Greek).

⁷² A.N. Lytras (2020), *The Greek Society in the 21st Century*, Athens, Papazissis Publishers (in Greek), pp. 329-331.

*the mass of values - the wealth increases whenever the circulation increases, according A. Smith-, within a national economy) and a new model for combating unemployment (the beneficiaries of the model are going to be autonomous workers) based in partial private funding (the contributors of private funding have guaranteed yields, without any other entrepreneurial investment, action, responsibility, and risk) and partial public funding. The minimization of unemployment is a crucial element for the framework of the increase of the mean remuneration of the active workers, at the same time, too.*⁷³

*9) The decrease of the public budget from the today's level of approximately the 40%-50% of GDP (in some cases the 50% and over) to a level near to 33.33%. The private enterprises and the cooperatives could share the others 2/3 of GDP (1/3 for each category).*⁷⁴ *The supporting of health and education systems has as starting point the nowadays States' standard (the public expenses as percentages of GDP) of funding. This future change could reinforce the economic development, with more equal distribution of incomes, while contributes to the limited states' control on the economic procedures.*

*10) The fertile and optimistic previous conditions in regard with the available resources, could easily accompany the reallocation of (public) social security system to a management by a cooperative organization*⁷⁵ *(after the needed institutional transformations, according the principles of "Rochdale"*⁷⁶*).*

⁷³ A.N. Lytras, *A Radical Policy for Combating Unemployment*....., *ibid*, pp. 120-148; A.N. Lytras, "An Alternative for Combating Unemployment", *Journal of Sociology and Social Work*, 4 (2), 2016, pp. 59-71.

⁷⁴ A.N. Lytras (2019), *The Democracy of our Social Future*, Athens, Parateriterio (in Greek), pp. 63-73.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, p. 72.

⁷⁶ See, the "Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers."

11) *The free of charge, for the people, function of justice is absolutely necessary and could be achieved. The change of the role and the type of choice of the lawyers (advocates or legal consultants) are achievable, too.*

12) *The fully free of charge, for the people, delivery of the education system, the health services and the (even with high cost) healing is achievable, for the innovative mind with the proper democratic sensitivities.*

This set of a dozen of demands could accompany the good realities in public education (which needs some modifications for the problems from the states' control and the necessary innovations on the studies' methods and programs) in European continent and the advanced civil rights of today and of the past. The free and equal citizens could be the free and equal workers of any status in employment. Anything of the fundamental principles of legality does not change, but nothing of the conditions of nowadays will be the same.

3

**The national cases
of the distribution of statuses in employment**

3A


**The national cases
of the distribution of statuses in employment**
America and Oceania

3A.1

Argentina


(Urban Areas)

Graph 3A.1.1



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

In Argentina, the available data regard only the metropolitan areas. The years of the above graph 3.1.1, are the next: 1991, 2001, 2011, 2021, and 2023. We observe the strong increase of the total employment. All the statuses in employment increase in numbers too. The only exception regards the contributing family workers. An enormous broadening is observed for the employees (the wage-earners).

Graph 3A.1.2


Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

- 1) The percentages of employees increase, continuously but modestly, during the period: 1991-2011. The next fluctuations accompany the (slight) decrease in 2021. The recovering of 2023 put the analogy of this status to the 74.5% of total employment.
- 2) The continuous decrease of the analogies of employers (with even 1 or many employees) is a fact in the data of Argentina. The percentage of 2023, namely the 3.31% of total employment, approaches the analogies of this status in the pioneer countries (UK, Japan, and USA – according my estimation).
- 3) The own-account workers present percentages near to or slightly over 20%. The relative stability is the basic characteristic of these measurements.
- 4) The contributing family workers represent insignificant percentages.

3A.2


Australia

Graph 3A.2.1



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

In Australia, the data regard the years: 1991, 2011, 2021, and 2023. We observe the strong increase of the total employment. All the statuses in employment increase in numbers too. An enormous broadening is observed for the employees (the wage-earners). It is nearly a doubling of the number of workers of this status in employment.


Graph 3A.2.2

Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

- 1) The percentages of employees present intensive fluctuations, but they represent over of the 4/5 of total employment. The recovery of 2023 put the analogy of this status to the 84.35% of total employment.
- 2) We have no separated data for employers till 2021. The decrease of the analogies of this status (with even 1 or many employees) is a fact in the data of Australia, the biennial 2021-2023 (from the 7.19% to the 6.83%).
- 3) The own-account workers present percentages from 9.40% to 8.67%. The relative stability but below of 10% is the basic characteristic of these measurements.
- 4) The contributing family workers represent insignificant percentages.


3A.3 Brazil

Graph 3A.3.1



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

In Brazil, the data regard the years: 1990, 2011, 2021, and 2023. We observe the strong increase of the total employment. All the statuses in employment increase in numbers too (with the exception of contributing family workers). An enormous broadening is observed in the numbers of the employees (the wage-earners). It is nearly a hundred millions the number of workers of this status in employment.


Graph 3A.3.2

Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

- 1) The percentages of employees present intensive fluctuations, but they represent over of the 2/3 of total employment. In the 2023 the analogy of this status was the 68.77% of total employment.
- 2) The employers show fluctuations of their analogies [from the 3.47% (2011) to the 4.22% (2023), during the 21st century].
- 3) The own-account workers present percentages, all the years with available data, around the 1/4 of the total employment.
- 4) The contributing family workers represent insignificant percentages. From the 2.69% to the 1.46% is moving the concrete status.


3A.4 Canada

Graph 3A.4.1



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

In Canada, the available data regard the years: 1976, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2011, 2021, and 2023. We observe the strong increase of the total employment. All the statuses in employment increase in numbers too. The only exception regards the contributing family workers. An enormous broadening is observed for the employees (the wage-earners). There is the doubling of this status.


Graph 3A.4.2

Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

- 1) The percentages of employees present several fluctuations, but over of the 84.64% (2011) of total employment. In 2023 the analogy of this status is the 86.55% of total employment.
- 2) The decrease of the analogies of the employers (with even 1 or many employees) is a fact in the data of Canada, after the 2001. In the 2023 their percentage is the 3.71%
- 3) The own-account workers present a percentage of 9.37%, in 2023, after several ups and downs.
- 4) The contributing family workers represent insignificant percentages.


3A.5 Mexico

Graph 3A.5.1



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

In Mexico, the data regard the years: 1991, 2001, 2011, 2021, and 2023. We observe the strong increase (nearly doubling) of the total employment. Three statuses in employment increase in numbers too. An exception is the status of contributing family workers. An enormous broadening is observed in the numbers of the employees (the wage-earners). It is going to be a tripling of the number of workers in this status in employment, if the active trend continues.


Graph 3A.5.2

Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

- 1) The percentages of employees present a continuous increase, over of the 50% (even in 1991) of total employment. In 2023, the analogy of this status is the 68.65% of total employment.
- 2) The decrease of the analogies of the status of employers (with even 1 or many employees) is rather unstable, after the 2001 (around of 5%). In the 2023 their percentage is the 5.24%, after a small recovery.
- 3) The own-account workers present percentages around 22% (2011-2023) after several fluctuations.
- 4) The contributing family workers represent low percentages (3.86%, in 2023), after the first year of the comparison.
- 5) Mexico is one of the few countries, with data of the members of producers' cooperatives (0.11%, in 1991).

3A.6 USA

Graph 3A.6.1




Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_AJ].

The years in the above graph are the followings: 1951, 1991, 2011, 2021, and 2023.

In USA there is the continuous and strong increase of employment for seventy years (and more). It is, undoubtedly and impressively, a fact. The leading country of the world and one of the more advanced in the sector of informatics, robotics, and telecommunications, despite the social problems and the inequalities, is based on human labor for the development and the global economic achievement. The employees, namely the wage-earners, are the centre of the above mentioned evolution of total employment. The sum of the employers and own-account workers (in this database) does not reproduce the potential of employees. The numbers of contributing family workers are too small.

3A.6.2



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

Table 3A.6.1**Employment by status in employment in USA (2021)**

Status in Employment/ Country	Employees	Employers	Own-account Workers	Contributing Family Workers
USA	93.4%	2.3%	4.2%	0.1%

Source: ILO [ILOSTAT (Database)], *Employment by sex and status in employment* - ILO modelled estimates, Nov. 2022 (thousands), Downloaded from ILOSTAT. Last update on 18/01/2023 16:12:07.

- 1) In USA, the status of the employees is a “pandemic” phenomenon, in employment. The evolution is impressive for its percentages. The employees are members of a great and unquestionable majority, in 1951. They represent the 90.98% in the 1991. They present a small increase the next years. In the 2023, their percentage is the 93.92%. There are, of course, the other statuses, and among them the employers of the employees.
- 2) For decades we cannot have a clear recording of the employers. The country’s census’ office presents the sum of the data for the next statuses in employment: the employers and own-account workers. We have had then a blurred image of the distributions in employment and of the social correlations.
- 3) The ILO’s estimation (Table 3A.6.1) gives to the researchers a clearer view to the percentages of the statuses: The employers are the 2.3% and the own-account workers are the 4.2% of total employment, in 2021!
- 4) The contributing family workers represent insignificant percentages.


3B

**The national cases
of the distribution of statuses in employment
*Africa and Asia***

3B.1

China

Graph 3B.1.1




Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

The years in the above graph are the followings: 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014.

In China there is an enormous labor force and the greater population of employment, in one single country, worldwide. China is the second economic power, from the second decade of the 21st century. Employment increases (slightly) during the available years of the concrete database. Certainly, these data cover a sort period and the last year (2014) regards the situation until the middle of the decade: 2011-2020. The numbers of employees decrease (slightly). This is the only country with a recording of decrease of the employees (wage-earners). In contrary, there is another global “innovation”. The sum (I suppose) of own-account workers and employers increases significantly.

Graph 3B.1.2



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

1) The decrease of the percentages of employees is significant in China the above mentioned years (rather rapidly). China is not the only country with a decrease of the analogies of wage-earners, but it presents a stable orbit of this process. Definitely, the employees are members of a great majority in employment (86.30%, in 2014).


2) We don't know anything, below of the surface, for the real power of employers in China. There isn't even a reference for the status, in the official statistics. The peculiar situation covers the percentages of them in total employment.

3) In this exceptional case, the own-account workers increase to the “dignified” analogy of 13.70% (2014). This is the results of the simpler statistics. [Do they include the employers?]

4) There isn't any mention for the contributing family workers.


Egypt

Graph 3B.2.1



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

In Egypt, the data regard the years: 1993, 2001, 2011, 2021, and 2023. We observe the strong increase of the total employment (the doubling and over). The statuses of employees (the wage-earners) and of own-account workers increase in numbers too. The exceptions are the employers and contributing family workers). An enormous broadening is observed in the numbers of the employees (the wage-earners). It is going to be the nearly tripling (2023) of the initial number of workers (1993) of this status in employment.


Graph 3B.2.2

Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

- 1) The percentages of employees present a continuous increase, over of the 55% (even in 1993) of total employment. In 2023, the analogy of this status is the 70.41% of total employment.
- 2) The decrease of the analogies of the status of employers (with even 1 or many employees) is impressive, after the 2011. In the 2023 their percentage is the 2.94%! Is it the right measurement or the result of distortion?
- 3) The own-account workers present percentages around 18% (2021-2023) after several fluctuations.
- 4) The contributing family workers represent low percentages (4.87%, in 2023), during the 21st century.
- 5) The “workers not classifiable by status” show some spasmodic fluctuations.

3B.3 Japan


Graph 3B.3.1



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_AJ].

The data for employment in Japan regard the years: 1991, 2011, 2021, and 2023.

The total number of workers increased from 63.69 millions (in 1991) to 68.47 millions (2023). This is the strong evidence that the new technologies create more and more jobs, even in economically powerful countries (with a great tradition in the global division of labor). The major part of the numbers of new workers regards the wage earners (60.76 millions, in 2023). The numbers of employers decrease for a decade (or more). The numbers the own-account workers are at the same level for 12 years. The contributing family workers decrease continuously. It isn't insignificant the number of “workers not classifiable by status”.

Graph 3B.3.2

Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

1) In Japan, the status of the employees is now a “pandemic” phenomenon, in employment. The evolution is impressive for its percentages. The employees are members of an obvious majority, in 1991. They represent the 78.64% in that year. They present a strong increase the next years. In the 2023, their percentage is the 90.05%.


2) The employers were the 2.27%, in 2011, the 1.70%, in 2021, and the 1.62%, in 2023. Are going the “few” to be “fewer”? This is the prediction for Japan: The employers are going to be fewer, but richer. The extreme social polarization is here. We hope for another future.

3) The own-account workers in Japan are the 5.97% of total employment, in 2023. They represent less than the half percentage (%) of 1991. This evolution accompanies the social polarization. The modern capitalism destroys systematically the petty-bourgeoisie.

4) The contributing family workers represent now insignificant percentages. They were nearly the 8% of total employment, in 1991.

3B.4 India


Graph 3B.4.1



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

The years in the above graph are the followings: 1994, 2000, 2012, 2021, and 2023.

In India, there is an enormous employment's population (the second globally) and the country has a very big general population (it is among the two bigger), in one single country (worldwide). India is among the major economic powers (member of the G20), during the 21st century. Employment increases continuously during the available years of the concrete database. Certainly, these data show a doubling of the initial number (in 1994) of total workers. The numbers of employees increased to nearly 111 millions. This is the only country with a recording, for the own account workers, which represent over of the double number in comparison to the employees (wage-earners). There is also another global “innovation”: Contributing family workers are 79.35 millions (in 2023). The number of “workers not classifiable by status” is not insignificant (nearly 7 millions in 2023).


Graph 3B.4.2

Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

- 1) In India, the status of the employees (wage-earners) is still a sporadic phenomenon, in employment, while the impressive increase of its percentages. They were a small minority, in 1994 (14.88%). They presented a strong increase the next years. In the 2023, their percentage is the 23.52%, namely less than the 1/4 of total employment. India looks like a traditional economy and society, in which capitalism dominates (even strongly) only in “economic regions” (rather in big cities).
- 2) The employers were the 2.13%, in 1994, the 1.40%, in 2012, and are the 3.31%, in 2023. The several fluctuations make unsure any further prediction.
- 3) The own-account workers in India were and still are the majority of workers. After a continuous and strong decrease, are the 54.86% of total employment, in 2023.
- 4) The contributing family workers do not represent insignificant percentages. They are the 16.82% in 2023. They “reinforce” the powerful image of the own-account workers in employment.
- 5) Less than 2% are now the “workers not classifiable by status”.

3B.5 Korea (R.)

Graph 3B.5.1



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].


The years in the above graph are the followings: 1981, 1991, 2001, 2011, 2021, and 2023.

In S. Korea, employment increases continuously during the available years of the concrete database. Certainly, these data show a doubling of the initial number (in 1981) of total workers.

The numbers of employees increased impressively (from 6.60 millions in 1981 to 21.82 millions 2023).

This is a country with a recording of a large status of the own account workers, while their number is rather stable. The contributing family workers decreased strongly during the aforementioned period). The number of “workers not classifiable by status” is not insignificant.

Graph 3B.5.2



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].


- 1) In S. Korea, there is a peculiar situation in regarding to the collection and the presentation of data almost for all the statuses in employment. We cannot make a reasonable set of comments for all of them. The evolution, after 2000, looks like as closer to the active reality, but the gap of the percentages in 2011, 2021, and 2023 creates many doubts. We can make only the reference to the percentage of employees (the 76.46%) in 2023.
- 2) The employers are the 4.97%, in 2023. The several fluctuations make unsure any further approach for their active situation.
- 3) The own-account workers are the 14.95%, in 2023, after a continuous decrease, during the 21st century.
- 4) The contributing family workers do not represent now significant percentages (3.15%). We cannot make comments for the percentages of 2001 and 2011.
- 5) Less than 0.50% is now the percentage of the “workers not classifiable by status”.

3C
The national cases
of the distribution of statuses in employment
Europe

3C.1

Cyprus


Graph 3C.1.1



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_AJ].

The available data regard the years: 1999, 2001, 2011, 2021, and 2023. Cyprus is a small country, with a small population and equally a limited labor force. Therefore employment is lesser than 500 thousands workers. In 2023 the workers were 428,187 workers. Despite this fact, it is impressive the next one. There was a (nearly) doubling of the numbers of workers in 26 years. The employees (the wage-earners) have had a doubling of numbers too. The own-account workers have a significant decrease of their numbers. The extraordinary fact was definitely the extreme decrease of employers. The contributing family workers are much fewer now than in 1999. The conclusion from these data is that the extremely small minority of employers prevails on the great majority of their employees (wage-earners). The fast modernization shows its real impact to employment and society.

Graph 3C.1.2



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

1) The employees from the (nearly) 3/4 of employment (1999) they are the (approximately) 9/10 now (2023). Who could have any doubt? They are an enormous majority.

2) The employers were nearly 5% in 1999. They are in 2023 the 1.89%. This is the miracle of the implementation of memoranda (and the programs of the institutional lenders, in Cyprus) in the previous decade. The lenders destroyed the local small and medium entrepreneurship. This is an excellent achievement. They made the local economy the fertile field only for an “aristocratic” minority.


3) At the same time, the lenders destroyed the own-account workers too. This is another great achievement of the lenders. The own-account workers represent only the half now (the 8.21%, in 2023), than the percentage (the 16.35%) of 1999. These are the results of the excellent expertise of the so-called international institutions. They have to read better the available knowledge.

4) The contributing family workers have insignificant percentages.

3C.2

France

Graph 3C.2.1




Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

The data for employment in France regard the years: 1983, 1991, 2011, 2021, and 2023.

The total number of workers increased from 21.35 million (in 1983) to 28.58 million (2023). This is the strong evidence that the new technologies create more and more jobs, even in economically powerful countries (with a great tradition in the global division of labor). The major part of the numbers of new workers regards the wage earners (24.88 million, in 2023). The numbers of employers are at the same level for a decade (or more). The same conclusion regards the own-account workers. The contributing family workers decrease continuously. Insignificant is the number of workers not classifiable by status.

Graph 3C.2.2



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].


Employment' distribution in France looks like the case of Canada.

- 1) The percentages of employees present several minor fluctuations during the last decades, but they represent percentages over of the 82.90% (1983) of total employment. In 2023 the analogy of this status is the 87.03% of total employment. Its strong majority is a fact.
- 2) The analogies of the employers (with even 1 or many employees) are below of the 5% in France, after the 2011. In the 2023 their percentage is the 4.84%
- 3) The own-account workers represent a percentage of 7.79%, in 2023.
- 4) The contributing family workers represent now insignificant percentages.

3C.3

Germany


Graph 3C.3.1



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

The data for employment in Germany regard the years: 1991 (the first recording after the unification of the country), 2001, 2011, 2021, and 2023.

Despite the interim fluctuations, the total number of workers increased from 37 millions (in 1991) to 43.04 millions (2023). This is the strong evidence that the new technologies create more and more jobs, here too, like as in every economically powerful country (with a great tradition in the division of labor, worldwide). The major part of the numbers of new workers regards the wage earners (39.32 millions, in 2023). The number of employers is 1.71 million, in 2023. The number of the own-account workers (1.87 million in 2023) is very close to the number of employers. The contributing family workers decrease continuously.

Graph 3C.3.2


Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

- 1) The percentages of employees present several minor fluctuations during the last decades, but they represent a percentage of 91.37% of total employment in 2023. The enormous majority of this status is a fact.
 - 2) The analogies of the employers (with even 1 or many employees) are below of the 4% in Germany, in 2023.
 - 3) The own-account workers represent a percentage of 4.35%, in 2023.
 - 4) The contributing family workers represent now insignificant percentages.
- The polarization of the statuses in employment and, therefore, the social polarization are undoubtedly here.

3C.4


Greece

Graph 3C.4.1




Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment (thousands)* – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_AJ].

Graph 3C.4.2



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment (thousands) – Annual* (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

Graph 3C.4.3

Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

Greece


The data for Greece regard the period: 1983-2023. You can read an extensive analysis for the distribution of employment's statuses and the correlations with the social classes in the country (see Panteion openeclass, Academia.edu, and Researchgate.net): A.N. Lytras (2025), "The Social Structure in Greece (1983-2023)", *Critical Essays*, Athens, Panteion University, Vol. VI.

- 1) After a rather long period of social transformations, in Greece, the wage-earners are members of the majority of employment in the middle 1980'. In 2023 they represent the 69.05% of total employment.
- 2) The employers are over the 6% all the period after 1991. Now (2023) they are the 7.28%. The large "majority" of this minority includes the employers with small number of wage-earners (in each economic unit).
- 3) The own-account workers are members of large social group. After a long period of continuous reduction they are still the larger national group of own-account workers among the developed countries.
- 4) The contributing family workers were a rather large social group in 1983. Now they are much fewer.

3C.5

Italy

Graph 3C.5.1



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

The years in the above Graph are: 1983, 1991, 2001, 2011, 2021, and 2023.


Employment, in a general level, increased from 20.55 million (1983) to 23.57 million (2023).

The employees increase from 14.59 million (in 1983) to 18.54 million (in 2023).

The employers (with even 1 or many employees) are (in 2023) 1.47 million.

The own-account workers were (in a sum with employers) in 1983 nearly 5 million, but their number decreased to 3.32 million (the own-account workers only) in 2023.

The number of contributing family workers decreased the last decades significantly. They are less than the 1/4 of the initial number (of 1983).

Graph 3C.5.2


Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

- 1) The percentages of employees present the continuous increase for forty years. Today this status represents 78.63% (2023) of total employment. Its strong majority is a real fact.
- 2) The analogy (%) of the employers (with even 1 or many employees) is the 6.22% of total employment in Italy (2023).
- 3) The own-account workers (only) represent the 14.18% of total employment in 2023.
- 4) The contributing family workers represent now insignificant percentages.

3C.6

Spain

Graph 3C.6.1



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

The years in the above Graph are: 1986, 1991, 2001, 2011, 2021, and 2023.


Employment, in a general level, increased from 10.08 million (1986) to 21.12 million (2023).

The employees increase from (nearly) 7.60 million (in 1986) to 17.96 million (in 2023).

The employers (with even 1 or many employees) are (in 2023) 1.2 million (nearly).

The own-account workers were (in a sum with employers) in 1986 nearly 2.42 million, but their number decreased to 2.12 million (the own-account workers only) in 2023.

The number of contributing family workers decreased the last decades significantly. They are less than the 1/10 of (their) initial number (of 1986).

Graph 3C.6.2


Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

- 1) The percentages of employees present the continuous increase for thirty seven years. Today this status represents the 84.80% (2023) of total employment. Its strong majority is a real fact.
- 2) The analogy (%) of the employers (with even 1 or many employees) is the 4.81% of total employment in Spain (2023).
- 3) The own-account workers (only) represent the 10.05% of total employment in 2023.
- 4) The contributing family workers and the “workers not classifiable by status” represent now insignificant percentages.

3C.7

UK

Graph 3C.7.1



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

The years in the above Graph are: 1983, 1991, 2001, 2011, 2021, and 2023.

Employment, in a general level, increased from 23.70 millions (1983) to 33.04 millions (2023).


The employees increase from (nearly) 20.82 million (in 1983) to 28.86 millions (in 2023).

The employers (with even 1 or many employees) show a reduction of their numbers from 738 thousands (2011) to 514 thousands (in 2023).

The own-account workers were (in a sum with employers) in 1983 nearly 2.38 millions, but their number increased to 3.83 million (the own-account workers only) in 2023.

The number of contributing family workers decreased the last decades.

Graph 3C.7.2



Source: ILO (2024), *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) – Annual (Time period: 1948 – 2023), [Last updated: 22/12/2024 14:29:01, https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer17/?lang=en&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX_STE_NB_A].

- 1) The percentages of employees represent a continuous and strong majority, for forty two years. Today this status represents the 86.56% (2023) of total employment.
- 2) The analogy (%) of the employers (with even 1 or with many employees) is the 1.56% of total employment in UK (2023), after an impressive reduction (2011-2023). They touch the real “nothing” of employment. The (nearly) “nothing” (of employment) has the privilege of the accessibility to the appropriation of wealth. This is a reasonable cause for the absent of bourgeoisie, from the funded researches, in UK, on the social structure! The invention of a new-style “elite” substitutes the bourgeoisie. It is a chaos.
- 3) The own-account workers (only) represent the 11.59% of total employment in 2023, after several fluctuations on the same level. This is the last step for something which looks like as entrepreneurship.
- 4) The contributing family workers and the “workers not classifiable by status” represent now insignificant percentages.

Appendix National Data (2006-2018)

Database:

ILO [-ILOSTAT], *Employment by sex and status in employment* (thousands) -- Annual data, [Downloaded on SUN, 4 AUG 2019 11:47 +0200 from ILOSTAT, (www.ilo.org)].

Indicator: Employment by sex and status in employment (thousands).


Description: The employed comprise all persons of working age who, during a specified brief period, were in one of the following categories: a) paid employment (whether at work or with a job but not at work); or b) self-employment (whether at work or with an enterprise but not at work). Data are disaggregated by status in employment according to the latest version of the International Standard Classification of Status in Employment (ICSE-93). Status in employment refers to the type of explicit or implicit contract of employment the person has with other persons or organizations. The basic criteria used to define the groups of the classification are the type of economic risk and the type of authority over establishments and other workers which the job incumbents have or will have.

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Russia (Russian Federation)	163
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
Australia

Graph App.1



Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).


Graph App.2




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Canada

Graph App.3




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.4


Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Chile

Graph App.5




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.6


Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

China

Graph App.7




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.8


Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Cyprus

Graph App.9




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.10


Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Egypt

Graph App.11




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.12


Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

France

Graph App.13




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.14


Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Germany

Graph App.15




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.16


Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Greece

Graph App.17




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.18


Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Hungary

Graph App.19




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.20


Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Japan

Graph App.21




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.22


Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

India

Graph App.23




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.24


Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Indonesia

Graph App.25




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.26


Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Italy

Graph App.27




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.28


Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

S. Korea (Republic of Korea)

Graph App.29




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.30


Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Mexico

Graph App.31




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.32


Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Russia (Russian Federation)

Graph App.33




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.34


Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

U.K.

Graph App.35




Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.36


Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

USA

Graph App.37



Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Graph App.38

Source: ILO, ILOSTAT (2019).

Andreas N. Lytras C.V.

Sources: 1) https://en.everybodywiki.com/Andreas_N._Lytras
2) https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ανδρέας_Ν._Λύτρας

Andreas N. Lytras^[1] is a Professor of Sociology at Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, in Athens (Greece). He teaches sociology, and especially theory of social classes, social exclusion, and theory of work. His research includes surveys on employment, unemployment, and social inequalities.^[2]

Studies and scholarship

Andreas N. Lytras studied Political Science (degree: 1984) and Sociology, at Panteion University.^[3] During the preparation of his Doctoral Thesis he was a Special Postgraduate Scholar (SPS-EMY) at the Department of Sociology of Panteion University (1985-1989).^[4] He was awarded a PhD (with a grade of Excellent) from the Department of Sociology at Panteion University, in 1989.^{[4][5]}

Academic and professional career

Andreas N. Lytras has had and still has an active scientific career for thirty-seven years. During his scholarship, as an EMY (SPS), he has had teaching duties (1985-1989). In 1990, he started teaching as a Special Scientist (equal to) Lecturer and then as (equal to) Assistant Professor (of Pr. Act 407/80) at the Department of Sociology of Panteion University. In 1996, he was elected and appointed Lecturer and, in 2000, Assistant Professor at the aforementioned Department. In 2004, he became permanent Assistant Professor. In 2005, he was elected and appointed Associate Professor and, in 2009, Professor, at the Department of Sociology (Panteion University-Athens).^[5] In addition to many years of undergraduate teaching, he has taught, for decades, in postgraduate (and interdepartmental) programs of the Department of Sociology. In postgraduate programs he has supervised a series of diploma theses. He has taught in postgraduate programs at Ionian University and the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (EKPA-Department of Primary Education and the Department of Political Sciences and Public Administration). He has also taught at the National School of Public Administration, where he has supervised *Final Theses*, and has participated in examination committees. He supervised a number of PhDs, which have been successfully examined.^[6] He has participated, as a member of evaluation committees, in dozens of doctorates (in several of them participated in the three-member committees), at Panteion University, the EKPA, the Ionian University and the University of the Aegean.^[6]

He was elected and served, in four terms, as President (*Head*) of the Department of Sociology at Panteion University [2006-2008, 2008-2010, 2013-2016 (until January 2016, with extension of the term), and 2020-2022].^[7] After an election, he has served as Vice Rector for Academic Affairs and Personnel (2007-2011), for a four-year term, and, for an equivalent

term, as President of the Special Account for Research Funds (SARF-ELKE) at Panteion University.^[8] He is the Dean of School of Social Sciences at Panteion University (2024-....).

Andreas N. Lytras was appointed Director of the (Greek) National Labor Institute (NLI-EIE/from 1995 to 1996) and Director of the (Greek) National School of Public Administration (NSPA-ESDD of EKDD/ from 1997 to 1998).^[8] He was appointed, as General Director (from 2001 to 2004), at the General Hospital of Athens (GHA-GNA) Korgialenio-Benakio EES (public hospital, known as: *old Hospital of Greek Red Cross*).^[9] In 2010, he was appointed President of the (Greek) Council of Higher University Education (SAPE)^[10] and during that tenure he was a member of the Presidium of the (Greek) National Council of Education (ESYP).^[10]

Works and contributions

Andreas N. Lytras' work^[11] includes several publications (in Greek and in English^[12]). There are fourteen books,^[11] fourteen other volumes (PhD thesis, other academic surveys, reports, and a master plan of a public institution),^[13] chapters within collective volumes, articles (and announcements in conferences)^{[14][15][16]}. It should be noted that there are (among the several references or citations to the aforementioned works) even chapters on A.N. Lytras' research in PhDs of Greek^[17] and international universities^[18]. Several of the above mentioned books have been used for years as text books in six Greek universities (Panteion University,^[19] University of Crete,^[20] Polytechnic of Crete,^[21] University of Peloponnese,^[22] University of Aegean,^[23] and Democritus University of Thrace^[24]). His books and other publications have been included into many Greek^[25] and international^{[26][27]} academic libraries (as well as in national^{[28][29][30][31]} or state libraries,^{[32][33]} worldwide).

The analysis on the evolution, structure, and organization of the contemporary Greek society has had and still has an obvious scientific impact, in Greece and worldwide.^{[34][35]} His estimations on the special characteristics of the Greek social structure (and especially the traditional petty bourgeois phenomenon)^{[36][37]} have created a significant recognition from social researchers.^[38] There is an analogous focus by social analysts for his contributions on class analysis^{[39][40][41][42]} and employment^[43] (as well as combating unemployment and social exclusion).^{[44][45]} The publicity even of his newest surveys is obvious,^{[46][47][48][49]} in Greece.

Selected works

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A.N. Lytras, *The Bourgeois and their World*, Athens, Papazissis, 2024 (in Greek).⁷⁷

A.N. Lytras, "Autonomous Workers for Combating Unemployment and the Enhancement of Solidarity", *Youth Employment Magazine*, September 2022 (ISSN 2704-6540), No. 20, pp. 62-69 [https://issuu.com/youthemploymentmagazine/docs/the_youth_employment_magazine_-_issue_20].

⁷⁷ Lytras, Andreas N. (= <https://bookpoint.gr/contributors/1070565#all>); A.N. Lytras, *The Bourgeois and their World*.... (= <https://bookpoint.gr/book/1324776>).

A.N. Lytras, “The Social Polarization and the Distribution of Employment, worldwide (2006-2018), in Selected Countries”, *Critical Essays*, Athens, Panteion University, Vol. III_1 (in Greek).

A.N. Lytras, *A Radical Policy for Combating Unemployment. The Future Network: Autonomous Workers, Stock Holders, Consumers and the State*, Athens, Papazissis, 2020 (ISBN 978-960-02-3611-8).^[50]

A.N. Lytras, *The Greek Society in the 21st Century*, Athens, Papazissis, 2020 (in Greek).^[51]

A.N. Lytras, *The Democracy of our Social Future*, Athens, Parateriterio, 2019 (in Greek).^[52]

A.N. Lytras, “What about middle class?”, *Journal of Sociology and Social Work*, 7 (1), 2019, pp. 81-93, [DOI: 10.15640/jssw.v7n1a10].^[53]

A.N. Lytras, “Combating unemployment: A simulation of policy implementation within a postgraduate lesson”, *Review of Decentralization, Local Government and Regional Development*, 2018, n. 91, pp. 12-23, https://issuu.com/peny24/docs/t_91.^[15]

A.N. Lytras, *A Radical Policy for Combating Unemployment. The Future Network: Autonomous Workers, Stock Holders, Consumers and the State*, Athens, Papazissis, 2017 (eBook) [<https://itunes.apple.com/us/book/a-radical-policy-for-combating-unemployment/id1213798305?mt=11>].^[54]

A.N. Lytras, “An Alternative for Combating Unemployment”, *Journal of Sociology and Social Work*, 4 (2), 2016, pp. 59-71, [DOI: 10.15640/jssw.v4n2a7, URL: <https://doi.org/10.15640/jssw.v4n2a7>].^[55]

A.N. Lytras, *Wage Labour in Modern Society. The current realities and the challenge of change*, Athens, Papazissis, 2016 (eBook) [<https://itunes.apple.com/us/book/wage-labour-in-modern-society/id1108352456?mt=11>].^{[56][57]}

A.N. Lytras, *Wage Labour in Social Organization. The realities in employment and the consolidation of work autonomy*, Athens, Papazissis, 2016 (in Greek).^[58]

A.N. Lytras, *Petty Bourgeois' Function and Organisation in Greece*, Athens, Papazissis, 2010 (in Greek).^[59]

A.N. Lytras, *Political Strategy for Social Classes. Analytical Essays*, Athens, Papazissis, 2008 (in Greek).^[60]

A.N. Lytras, *Analyses on Social Structure. Social policy and organization in the twenty-first century*, Athens, Papazissis, 2007 (in Greek).^[61]

A.N. Lytras, D. Prontzas, *Agricultural Exploitation in Greece. Society, Production and Property in 1951*, Athens, Papazissis, 2006 (in Greek).^[62]

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A.N. Lytras, *Essays on Class Analysis. Approaches to the classic theory of social classes*, Athens, Papazissis, 2004 (in Greek).^[64]

A.N. Lytras, *Society and Labour: The Role of Social Classes*, Athens, Papazissis, 2000 (in Greek).^[65]

A.N. Lytras, *Prolegomena to the Theory of Greek Social Structure*, Athens, A.A. Livanis-Nea Synora, 1993 (in Greek).^[66]

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