



The post-Cold War order in East Asia



Today's lecture

- i. Lines of analysis and today's key question**
- ii. Comparison between CW-post CW in East Asia**
- iii. Bargaining for a new order –**
- iv. Remaining challenges**

Lines of analysis

- i. Security → dilemmas and strategies of key players**
- ii. Economic development → interdependence & regionalization**
- iii. Institutionalization → regional organizations and groupings, 'regionalism'**
- iv. History, identity → meanings and perceptions**

Key question:

Is it possible that the East Asian order seems to accommodate the rise of China, the military presence of the US, as well as leverage for medium powers?

The Cold War

- i. Bipolarity with a twist: US and USSR + Chinese involvement in the region**
- ii. Security architecture: US and USSR alliance systems**
 - i. Hub and spokes system with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan**
 - ii. Japan's unique position in security and economic development**
 - iii. Security & development**
- iii. History and (lack of) reconciliation: decolonization and nationalism**
- iv. Proxy Wars and hotspots: Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Afghanistan**
- v. Low institutionalization**
- vi. Weak common normative understanding of East Asia**

End of CW bipolarity

- i. 1991 collapse of USSR → End of bipolarity**
- ii. Changes to US and Russian involvement in the region, role of Japan, rise of China and India**
- iii. New bipolarity? Multipolarity? US unipolarity?**
- iv. Power vacuum (apolar)?**
- v. Parallel processes of the rise of new powers, regionalism and the evolution of the US HSS**
- vi. Coalitions: issue-based vs. bloc; balancing vs. bandwagoning (Narlikar)**

Post- Cold War: Transition to what?

- i. End of CW bipolarity → unipolar, multipolar or apolar?**
- ii. The rise of China**
- iii. Role of the US?**
- iv. Japan remilitarizing?**
- v. History and (lack of) reconciliation**
- vi. Old and new hotspots: Korea, Taiwan, East and South China seas**

Intersecting security dilemmas?

- i. 'Hard' hypothesis: end of CW + rise of powers + historical issues = arms race \Leftrightarrow security dilemma
- ii. China, Japan, SK in top 10 military spenders
- iii. East (+SE) Asia: 340 US billion in Defense from 200 in 2006
- iv. Southeast Asia: increasing trend (especially Singapore, Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia)



Does this ring a bell?



Post-CW: Economic bargains

- **Immediately post CW, US attempts to expand its CW order through threat of exclusion and inducement to accession → pressure on Japan's development model**
- **EA also anxious about post-CW order → leads to APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation)**
- **APEC addressed the following issues:**
 - **Japanese fear of US unilateralism**
 - **US fear of Japan surplus**
 - **EA fear of US abandonment**
 - **EA fear of Japanese dominance**
- **Resistance to APEC led by Malaysian PM Mahatir, but Japan unwilling to lead an order that excludes US**

Post-CW: Security bargains

- i. HSS still in place: unequal relationship but US demands junior partners contribute more**
- ii. SE Asian states pick up slack after Philippines closes US bases**
- iii. Prompts Japan's remilitarization and the impact in EA**
- iv. Balancing China's ambitions: US remains in play so China must cohabit, but wary of Japan**
- v. SEA countries, Australia push for inclusive regional institutions and fora → leads to ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)**

Result: ASEAN Regional Forum

- **ARF rests on three parallel negotiation tracks:**
 - 1. Justifying US presence by lending it wider legitimacy**
 - 2. Develop constraint among regional great powers through enmeshment**
 - 3. Giving middle powers a mediating role**
- **ASEAN states able to lead engagement with great powers because:**
 - **US saw it as supplementing its own alliance system**
 - **Japan saw it as a way to keep US engaged**
 - **ASEAN saw it as a way to remain relevant**
 - **China saw it as a way to counter 'China threat' perceptions**

Asian Financial Crisis to APT

- **US reaction to the crisis engenders a deep sense of betrayal and inadequacy → looking for regional solutions**
- **APT - ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, Korea) is formed as a response**
- **First 'exclusive' EA grouping**
- **Led to Chiang Mai Initiative (regional currency swap and monitoring mechanism)**
- **Allows China to pursue policy of excluding US from regional groupings and reshape incentive structure to prevent encirclement**

Post 9/11 – US presence grows

- **Islamic fundamentalism provides common enemy**
- **US successfully drives ‘War on Terror’ narrative**
- **Practical consequence: US troops again allowed in as consultants, sharing bases, airspace...**
- **US recognised need to engage with moderate majority Muslim nations in SEA**
- **Small states use terror to bind US as counterweight to China?**

Two regional order options

EA engaged in stand-off between two 'institutional bargains' (Goh, 2013)

- 1. 'Inclusive' bargain perpetuating the US-led security order but incorporating China into a condominium, and retaining Japan's supplementary role as supporter state**
- 2. 'Exclusive' bargain with a new East Asian order centred around China that requires a core bargain btw Japan and China on their status, and a regional bargain on how China's power is restrained**

APEC Summit traditions...



Sino – Japanese relations

- **Both countries have pushed their own ‘vertical’ visions of integration:**
- **China: exclusive, East Asia-only vision pursued through economic statecraft and strategic restraint, confidence-building**
- **Japan: inclusive, Asia-Pacific vision pursued by drive for global integration, inclusivity, democracy, and ‘deeper’ economic integration**
- **What’s missing is a horizontal bargain between the two great powers**

Old and new hotspots

- i. Korea, Taiwan, South China Sea, East China Sea (Senkaku/Diaoyutai)**
- ii. With the exception of Taiwan (for the time being) as volatile as ever**
- iii. Hotspots, can we connect them under a common theme? What could that be?**
 - i. The rise of China**
 - ii. Historical legacies**
 - iii. Anarchy**
 - iv. The nature of the US security system?**

Environment and climate change

- i. One of the most vulnerable regions of the planet**
- ii. Source of large current and especially future emissions**
- iii. ASEAN way, current regional order up to the challenge?**
- iv. Possibility of climate change efforts being hijacked by regional rivalries?**

History and (lack of) reconciliation

- i. No process similar to France-Germany**
- ii. China → state patriotism and popular nationalism**
- iii. Japan → revisionist nationalism (denying responsibility)**
- iv. Memory of Japanese imperialism as an interpretive frame that limits government choices in SK and China**

The burden of history

Japan Generally Seen Favorably



PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q9v.

Apology Accepted?

Has Japan sufficiently apologized for its military actions during the 1930s and 1940s?

	No	Yes	No apology necessary	DK
	%	%	%	%
S. Korea	98	1	1	1
China	78	4	2	16
Philippines	47	29	19	5
Indonesia	40	29	6	25
Malaysia	30	22	10	38
Australia	30	29	26	16
Japan	28	48	15	9

PEW RESEARCH CENTER.

How Asians Rate China, India, Pakistan, Japan and the U.S.

Favorable views of ...

Views in:	China	India	Pakistan	Japan	U.S.
	%	%	%	%	%
Bangladesh	77	70	50	71	76
China	-	30	30	8	50
India	31	-	15	43	55
Indonesia	66	62	52	77	59
Japan	7	63	19	-	66
Malaysia	74	46	43	75	51
Pakistan	78	13	-	51	14
Philippines	38	50	33	80	92
South Korea	56	59	30	22	82
Thailand	72	45	27	81	73
Vietnam	16	67	36	77	76
U.S.	35	55	18	70	-

Source: Spring 2014 Global Attitudes survey. Q15a, b, h-j.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Trump's EA policy?

What we know:

- i. More “self-interested” (in a narrow sense), more “transactional” (in a superficial manner)**
- ii. Asia Pivot (incomplete) now in question**
- iii. Withdrawal from Trans Pacific Partnership (but it lives on)**
- iv. Re-evaluation of alliances**
- v. First elements of a more explicit anti-China containment policy?**

Possible side-effects

- i. **SK nuclearisation**
- ii. **Japan's rapid militarisation + China's reaction**
- iii. **Vagueness regarding existing security arrangements**
- iv. **Reduction of US security influence → a vacuum?**
- v. **More adventurism and volatility**

Tutorial questions

- i. What was the impact of the end of Cold War in the East Asian security environment? Is East Asia today a 'safer' place than during the CW?**
- ii. Has the role of the US declined?**
- iii. How has the region accommodated the rise of China?**
- iv. Is war in East Asia inevitable?**