


GREECE: FROM RESISTANCE TO CIVIL WAR

Edited by
Marion Sarafis



Introduced by Prof. Nicos Svoronos

GREECE:

From Resistance to Civil War

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*Introduced by
Professor Nicos Syronos*

Spokesman

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First published in 1980 by
Spokesman
Bertrand Russell House,
Gamble Street,
Nottingham

ISBN Paper: 85124 290 1
ISBN Cloth: 85124 289 8

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Cover design: Eugenia Apostolou

Printed by the Russell Press Ltd., Bertrand Russell House,
Gamble Street, Nottingham

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Editor's Foreword

This book is an edited version of the proceedings of a conference held at the London School of Economics from 12th-13th May 1978. The conference was organised by the Society for Modern Greek Studies (EAEMEII) — an association of Greek academics and graduate students — together with the Union of Greek University Teachers and Research Staff in Western Europe.

In presenting these proceedings, the editor must first apologise to readers for two regrettable defects. For the loss of the first day's discussions on the papers by Elisabeth Barker, Prokopis Papastratis and George Alexander, due to breakdown of the tape-recorder, the organisers must bear responsibility. The absence of Professor Hammond's talk is in response to his own request. He has agreed however to publication of the fairly full subsequent discussion which gives some idea of the content of the talk. I would also like to take this opportunity of thanking him for his kindly encouragement which did much to overcome my initial hesitations about undertaking the work.

Many people have contributed to the production of this book which could more correctly be described as a collective effort. Richard Clogs, Lecturer in Modern Greek History, of King's College University of London, has throughout given the experienced advice so much needed by an inexperienced editor. There has been constant discussion with Roussos Koundouros of the Society's secretariat; Dr. Yanis Yanoulou has been an ever-present help at all stages; Anna Syngelakis undertook the arduous task of transcribing the discussion tapes and has also acted as linguistic adviser for the Greek edition. In preparing both editions, with many of the contributors resident in Athens, Dr Prokopis Papastratis has proved an invaluable and most efficient "man on the spot" and has put in much work as my assistant in Greece. Finally, I would like to thank all the contributors for their interests and willing co-operation which has rendered the task of editing a real and a wholly unexpected pleasure.

The Conference organisers will, I am sure, join me in hoping that readers will find much that is new and much to interest them both in the stimulating papers and in the very lively discussion.

Marion Sarafis

The British and the Greek Resistance Movements EAM and EDES

Prokopis Papastratis

The subject of this paper is British relations with the Greek resistance movements EAM and EDES. Based mainly on the Foreign Office documents, it attempts to examine British policy towards these resistance movements and how it was achieved in the general context of the Anglo-Greek relations during this period.

The battle of Greece ended at the end of May 1941 when Crete was occupied by the Germans. The King and his hastily formed Government left Crete for the Middle East first and then for London. In Greece a political void was created as a result of the collapse of the Metaxas regime and the departure of the King and his Government. The leaders of the old political parties were unwilling and unable to fill it as they were cut off and had no influence upon the Greek people, while at the same time they were opportunistically hesitant to cooperate with the Greek Government in exile. This political void was filled by EAM-ELAS which expressed the will of the Greek people to resist the enemy. EAM was formed in September 1941 and ELAS in April 1942. The old political leadership with the exception of Canelopoulos showed a negative attitude on the issue of the resistance while the Tsouderos Government remained non-committal if not indifferent. EAM-ELAS was a rapidly expanding popular and political mass resistance movement where KKE was predominant and which was independent of the traditional political parties, of the Greek Government in exile and of the British. EAM-ELAS was not the only resistance movement but it soon became the more important one. The British reaction to the formation of EAM-ELAS is not yet known because the relevant documents are still not available. There is no doubt however, that in the summer of 1942 and especially after the arrival of Canelopoulos and Colonel Bakirjis in the Middle East the British authorities were sufficiently informed about EAM's character. During this time SOE was in contact with a group of republican officers who were planning to form guerrilla bands in the mountains but were hesitant to take the final decision.¹ The decision therefore of EAM to form ELAS and start guerrilla activities no doubt made SOE put pressure on these officers to put their plans into

practice, but without success. Thus, from these republican officers, only Zervas, who along with Pyromaglou had formed EDES, was willing to take up arms. EDES' political complexion was socialist but it lacked a consistent ideology. Zervas however was reluctant to leave Athens for the mountains in spite of the strong pressure exerted upon him. He finally did so under the threat that he would be exposed to the Germans.² It is obvious that for the British Zervas was the only alternative solution to an EAM monopoly of the resistance and this must be the reason why they kept the pressure on him, although he was considered as disreputable by the British authorities in Cairo.³ The other alternative resistance organisation to EAM-ELAS was EKKA which also had a socialist political complexion. EKKA however was too slow to take the field and when it did so in the spring of 1943, in the area of Amfissa, EAM-ELAS was already strongly established there. In the summer of 1942 it became apparent to the British that EAM-ELAS did not depend for its attitudes and policy on them, in contradistinction to EDES and the Tsouderos Government. Consequently it was realised that their policy of support for the King and his Government was contradictory to any support for and cooperation with EAM-ELAS. Nevertheless due to the importance of the resistance for the Allied war effort, attempts were made to bridge this basic contradiction by trying to reorganise the whole resistance movement in such a way as to be coordinated and controlled by the British authorities in Cairo. These attempts were made by the Anglo-Greek Committee in Cairo through the Tsigantes mission and the six Colonels in Athens. These attempts failed to materialise, the main reason being that EAM-ELAS was an already established resistance movement which could not be ignored or forced to submit itself to this reorganisation. As a result the only alternative solution for the British to the expansion of EAM-ELAS was to support EDES and EKKA. In the meantime and quite independently of these efforts taking place in Athens, a British military mission had been established in the mountains under Brigadier Myers after his group, along with ELAS and EDES forces, had blown up the Gorgopotamos bridge late in November 1942.

This failure to control the resistance movement from Cairo coincided in March 1943 with the deterioration of the relations between the Foreign Office and SOE over the issue of policy to be followed regarding Greece. This was a typical case of conflict between short-term military objectives and long-term political interests. The Foreign Office maintained that SOE by supporting EAM-ELAS for guerrilla activities was practically building up an opposition to the King and his Government whom the British Government had pledged to support. Therefore the Foreign Office tried to curb SOE activities in Greece but the Chiefs of Staff opinion to the contrary prevailed. The result of this interdepartmental conflict was the despatch of contradictory instructions to the British military mission in Greece. Thus the British liaison officers were

Instructed that their mission remain a merely military one and that they should at all times avoid getting involved in political discussions. They were also instructed that the British Government's wish was that they should not ever hesitate to show their confidence in the King and Government.⁴

In the meantime in Greece, Myers had developed in early February 1943 the idea of forming "National Bands". These bands would be political, militarily unified and under the command of the Commander-in-Chief Middle East. SOE had agreed to give the maximum support to them and when these bands would be sufficiently strong ELAS would be invited to join them. Colonels Zervas, Psarros and Sarafis, the latter at that time with an independent band in Thessaly, agreed to this plan.⁵ It is clear that the scheme aimed at minimizing the political activity of the guerrilla bands and as such it was concerned with the political activity of ELAS. For this reason Myers, having realised that EDES under Zervas would not present any problems in this respect, wished to strengthen the National Bands first and then invite ELAS to join them. What Myers and Woodhouse had in mind was a network of independent National Bands throughout the country, with British liaison officers passing on the instructions from the General Headquarters Middle East and acting as arbitrators in disputes. With this pattern ELAS would have to conform in order to continue receiving supplies. But EAM realised that the British had quite different intentions for the guerrilla movement from their own. The question involved, put briefly, was whether the resistance would consist of small, basically British-controlled guerrilla bands or of a large EAM-controlled popular army. Consequently, EAM counterproposed in their draft agreement the establishment of a Joint General Headquarters, responsible directly to the C-in-C Middle East with powers to settle disputes, send bands from one area to another and appoint military commanders.⁶ Cairo and London did not accept the EAM draft agreement because, as they pointed out to Myers, it was designed to bring all bands under EAM's control as this organisation would dominate the Joint General Headquarters. Myers was also told that the struggle for control of the bands was a symptom of something more fundamental: this was the aim of EAM to seize power and realise their political ambitions as opposed to the policy of the British Government which was to support the King and his Government. On the other hand the Foreign Office did not accept Leeper's repeated proposal for a showdown with EAM. In this they were probably influenced by a SOE memorandum on the possibilities of splitting ELAS from EAM. This paper exposed the difficulties of such a course of action, pointing out that it could not be done without political help. The Foreign Office however, believed that a successful showdown with EAM at that time would be desirable in order to avoid it later when British troops would land in Greece. But they doubted whether this

showdown would be successful as in the ensuing civil war they would have to support EDES against EAM which was at the time the most powerful organisation in Greece. As a result it was decided that the negotiations with EAM should continue while at the same time a distinction should be drawn between the political leaders of EAM and the rank and file and that all the fire should be concentrated upon the former. At the end the British accepted the two most important EAM proposals, namely that there should be a Joint General Headquarters responsible directly to the C-in-C Middle East and that the British liaison officers should not have any authority to issue orders but limit their functions to liaison. Final agreement was reached in early summer of 1943.⁷ This was indeed a modification in the Foreign Office attitude towards EAM. It can be explained by the fact that the Foreign Office realised that no other policy could be adopted towards EAM at the time. The British acceptance of EAM's proposals in the Military Agreement was clearly the result of military necessity, as EAM-ELAS was indispensable for the operation "Animals" which aimed at distracting German attention from the landing in Sicily.

The basic problem facing the British Government regarding the Greek political situation was whether EAM would attempt to seize power at the time of liberation. The Foreign Office expected that the Anglo-American invasion of the Balkans, under consideration at the time, would solve this problem. But the success of this operation was bound to be affected by the strong popular opposition to the King. At this point the British policy of support for the King became openly contradictory. On the one hand the Foreign Office decided that the King should declare that he would submit the question of the regime to a plebiscite, to prove that the British would not impose him on an unwilling people with their bayonets; on the other Churchill as well as the Foreign Office decided that in spite of the War Office objections the King should return to Greece with the first British troops.⁸ This contradiction was due to the fact that the Foreign Office wished to appeal to the moderates, as it used to call them. At the same time the Foreign Office was prepared to use the King as a rallying point in its effort to prevent EAM from gaining political predominance in Greece at the time of liberation. The unpopularity of the King and its consequences for British policy was a permanent feature which the Foreign Office had to face during all this period. Furthermore it is characteristic that the intervention of Churchill, the basic supporter of the King, in the Greek political situation increased from the time the opposition to the King became increasingly confirmed.

In autumn 1943 the fact that no Allied operations would take place in the Balkans brought the question of an EAM coup to seize power to the forefront. This question was actually presented in a more acute form as reports from Greece confirmed the reinforcement of EAM's position and the fact that the King's return would be actively opposed.

As a result British policy, without abandoning its basic principle of support for the King, was readjusted according to the existing political and military situation. Therefore the British Government accepted Leeper's proposals which amounted to the following: to break with EAM and attempt to divide it by discrediting its leadership and winning over its moderate members; the King to pledge that he would not return to Greece until the question of the regime had been settled and to appoint Archbishop Damaskinos as Regent. The last proposal was in fact a tactical withdrawal to an earlier demand by the opposition including EAM to the King, which the British Government had turned down a few months earlier. The question of the plebiscite had also been raised by Myers earlier in 1943 but the Foreign Office had also been down with indignation. This proposal however, as it was combined with a rupture with EAM, was meant to help in winning the moderates from EAM and uniting them under Damaskinos. The refusal of the King — unexpectedly reinforced by Roosevelt — to give this pledge and appoint Damaskinos as Regent removed from this policy the arguments which would render it appealing to moderate opinion and help to undermine the unity of EAM-ELAS. As a result this policy of directly attacking the EAM leadership was abandoned. In fact it was partially implemented, because the decision already in force to stop sending supplies to EAM-ELAS due to the civil war was reaffirmed.⁹

On 9 October 1943 civil war broke out in central and western Greece between ELAS and EDES which lasted until the end of January 1944. On the receipt of this news Cairo ordered the suspension of supplies to both sides. But, as evidence from British liaison officers showed that ELAS was the aggressor, the supplies to Zervas were soon resumed and in fact increased, as Cairo feared that he might be annihilated by ELAS. ELAS had the initiative in this phase of the civil war but the supplies sent to Zervas enabled him to hold his own. During the period of the civil war Zervas and ELAS received the following supplies (October 1943 to January 1944 inclusive)¹⁰:

Food and clothing:	Zervas 14 tons	ELAS 34 tons
Arms and ammunition:	Zervas 74 tons	ELAS 22 tons
Gold Sovereigns:	Zervas 18,000 coins	ELAS 927 coins

Out of the 22 tons sent to ELAS the first 16 were sent to them from October to mid-November 1943 to carry out special operations only, as approved by the Middle East Defence Committee. But in early November Churchill ruled that 'EAM and ELAS should be starved and struck by every means in our power'.¹¹ As a result, only 6 tons were sent to ELAS with the approval of MEDC, but this time for special operations in Eastern Macedonia, away from the scene of civil war. Out of the 74 tons sent to Zervas, 50 were received during December, while the January sorties to him were limited because more aeroplanes were not available.

EKKA which remained neutral in the civil war received in this period 14 tons of ammunition, 3,600 gold sovereigns and 2 tons of food and clothing.

On 20 December 1943 Woodhouse reported from Greece that ELAS as well as EDES had indicated their readiness to consider proposals to end the civil war. But on 4 January 1944 the civil war flared up again as Zervas attacked ELAS forces under Aris Velouchiotis. During the previous December Colonel Barnes, the Senior Liaison Officer with Zervas, had twice encouraged him in this sense. On 11 December Barnes had reported to Cairo. 'Zervas realised he must smash the ELAS soon to be of use to us, which I tell him is our reason for supporting him.'¹²

Two days later Zervas had received a stricture from GHQ Middle East regarding his not attacking the Germans and had expressed his willingness to do so. Barnes reported to Cairo: 'I told him I did not consider him strong enough to attack both ELAS and the Germans simultaneously, and preferred him first to consolidate himself as there would soon be plenty of action against the Germans. He has plans to clear Jumerka of ELAS very soon.'¹³

But although Barnes definitely encouraged Zervas to undertake this attack, it has not yet been ascertained whether Barnes himself was instructed in this sense by Cairo as a large number of documents bearing on these events remain closed. However the Foreign Office had informed Leeper on 4 November 1943 that it was established that Zervas should be given full liberty, in consultation with Barnes, to take what action he considered necessary for his defence.¹⁴ Thus when Barnes reported that Zervas would obey Middle East orders implicitly and that he could "stop him fighting ELAS with a word" Cairo was of the opinion that: 'It is not thought desirable to order him to desist until either EAM have agreed to the principle of reconciliation or until Zervas has attained his immediate objective, the occupation of all Epirus.'¹⁵

Woodhouse was also of the same opinion and he telegraphed to Barnes from his Headquarters: 'We are pleased as you are, about Epirus developments. ELAS General Headquarters are rattled and increasingly friendly to me. I believe now there is a good chance of settlement. Almost all extremists and fanatics have been conspicuously absent during the last few weeks. I presume you can stop Zervas crossing the Akheolos River. I should be delighted to see him here, but I doubt if it would help.'¹⁶

It is clear from the relevant documents that the British authorities viewed the Zervas successes in the civil war as a means to strike a balance between Zervas and ELAS and to strengthen Zervas' position in the resistance movement.

As Woodhouse pointed out, in a report on the civil war he sent to SOE Cairo in October 1943, EAM-ELAS had since last March been too

strong for the Allied Military Mission to enforce a policy upon them. He also stressed that the probable outcome of the civil war would be an increased strength in the hold of EAM-ELAS on Greece.¹⁷ The civil war stopped early in February 1944 in order to allow the negotiations for settlement to begin, but only after ELAS had counter-attacked and had driven Zervas' forces back to the point from which they had started.

It is quite possible that Zervas would have reacted the way he did in the civil war irrespective of Colonel Barnes' encouragement. Zervas was strongly anti-communist and, as Woodhouse had reported late in September 1943, he had a strong royalist following in his organisation. Woodhouse also reported after the civil war had started that by that time a great many undesirables used EDES as an asylum to escape from EAM-ELAS and had turned it into a general refuge from EAM. This fact, added Woodhouse, was probably welcomed by Zervas.¹⁸

EAM's participation in the civil war would be explained by the fact that it no doubt wanted to have the monopoly of the resistance and at the same time was afraid of any efforts to undermine its position. In the negotiations which followed the civil war the aims of EAM and the British were completely contradictory. EAM wished to settle the issue of the formation of a single national Government and then discuss military matters such as the formation of the united army. On the contrary, Woodhouse pointed out to Cairo that the success of the ELAS plan to neutralize Zervas' bands depended on the achievement of the National Government as proposed by EAM. Therefore military problems should be settled before a coalition Government was created. Cairo agreed and additionally instructed Woodhouse to achieve a geographical demarcation of the areas to be controlled by Zervas and ELAS.¹⁹

At the conference which followed at Plaka²⁰ in February 1944 the three main resistance organisations EAM-ELAS, EDES and EKKA were represented. But soon Kartalis, the EKKA representative and chairman of the conference, expressed to Woodhouse his strong feelings against EAM-ELAS and told him that his sympathies were wholly with EDES and that EKKA would back no solution unless EDES agreed. As for Pyromaglou and Zervas, they kept asking Woodhouse for precise guidance all the time.²¹ In fact, in the conference it was the British who were negotiating with EAM-ELAS and not Zervas or EKKA. It is therefore not surprising that the very next day after the conference had started Woodhouse telegraphed that the negotiations had reached deadlock in practice but that they would continue in theory. Thus, the conference continued to meet because neither the British nor EAM wished it to break up. After several meetings no results were reached on the two subjects under discussion, the formation of a "Preparatory Government Committee" and the powers of a single Commander-in-Chief for the guerrillas. Woodhouse informed Cairo that the resumption of civil war was imminent. Cairo then authorised him to warn all con-

cerned that in the event of civil war breaking out they would publicly denounce the leaders whom they considered to be at fault. Thus according to the British, ELAS agreed under pressure to sign a resolution, already accepted by Zervas and EKKA, to the effect that movements of guerrilla bands into each other's territory in case of operational necessity should not be regarded as hostile acts justifying resumption of civil war. Zervas and ELAS also agreed not to move into the other's territory beyond the line held by them on the eve of the truce. Leeper commenting on the signed agreement pointed out that the conference, which EAM had tried hard to make political, had concluded — due to Woodhouse's ability — with purely military decisions. And this was exactly what the British wanted.²² In fact EAM had failed in their effort to form a National Government according to their terms. This led EAM to form PEEA, the Political Committee of National Liberation. The formation of PEEA worked as a catalyst in Greek affairs in the Middle East. The Greek Armed Forces revolted in favour of PEEA and, as a result of the crisis which followed, Tsouderos' Government resigned. This crisis was viewed by the British in the context of their policy towards EAM. This policy as it was formulated by Leeper aimed at the formation of a National Government where all the traditional political parties would participate united against EAM and where EAM would be invited to participate too. If EAM did decide to participate it would actually reduce itself to a minority party in it. At the same time the British obviously hoped that this decision would make it difficult, if not impossible, for EAM to seize power at the time of liberation. In case EAM refused to participate, the Foreign Office was prepared to denounce it to the Greek people and hold it responsible for breaching the national unity. Therefore what the Foreign Office needed was an able politician with a strong personality who would abide faithfully by the British policy and whom the British would confidently promote as the right person for the premiership of the National Government. In Papandreou they found a suitable prime minister for the occasion. Papandreou, the leader of a small splinter group of the old Venizelist party, was already known to the British for his anti-communism and was not involved until then in any of the numerous political intrigues. In the existing situation he was the only politician available to be used and as Eden pointed out, their only hope as far as he could see.²³

The refusal of EAM to enter the National Government despite its initial agreement in Lebanon did not prompt the Foreign Office to break with this organisation.²⁴ The Foreign Office realised that only EAM's entry into the Government would secure the political stability in the Greek situation which was indispensable for the unopposed arrival of the British forces and the National Government in Greece.

The attitude of EAM regarding the issue of the National Government and its eventual participation in it still remains one of the most

controversial questions of that period; the more so as no satisfactory explanation was ever given for this decision by the leadership of that organisation. The EAM decision to participate in the Lebanon Conference and even send a PEEA delegation was clearly contradictory to the formation of PEEA itself. This contradiction was clearly contradictory to the difficulty of EAM and in fact of KKE, the leading political force in this organisation, in implementing its policy. There are two possible explanations for this difficulty of EAM: either it doubted whether it had the power to fulfill its policy or, and most probably, it had not clarified its own ideological conceptions as regards the existing political situation. EAM's decision to enter the National Government was the last of a series of policy revisions, not as yet adequately explained, which resulted in tactical defeats. In this decision the leadership of EAM and KKE were no doubt influenced by the fact that the Soviet Union had not recognised PEEA. They were also influenced by the Soviet advice available to them through Novikov and Popov.

The entry of EAM into the National Government secured for the British the political aspect of the Greek question. The military aspect of this question was secured with the despatch of a small British force to Greece with the approval of the Soviet Government and in accordance with the Caserta Agreement. The despatch of a British Force was viewed as a political necessity by the Foreign Office and Churchill on the one hand and as a military one by the Chiefs of Staff on the other. The Foreign Office view finally prevailed at the War Cabinet but not before Eden had stated that, unless a government friendly to Britain was established in Greece with the help of British forces, British political influence in S.E. Europe and its strategic position in the E. Mediterranean would be at risk. The importance attached by the Foreign Office to the despatch of British forces is clearly shown by their decision to prevent the early return of the King, in order to make the arrival of the British troops more acceptable. The Soviet Government did not hesitate in September 1944 to agree to the despatch of the British forces to Greece adding that it did not intend to send any Soviet troops there.²⁵ This Soviet decision was no doubt in accordance with the secret agreement on the Balkans which was *de facto* in force from the summer of the same year. With the Caserta Agreement the British secured the all-important Athens areas as well as control of the ELAS forces at the crucial time of liberation. EAM by signing this agreement was consistent in the policy it was following from the time it entered the National Government.

British policy towards Greece in the period under examination would have remained the same irrespective of the appearance or not of EAM. The creation of EAM and its influence resulted in British policy intervening much more directly than would have been necessary otherwise. The British used Zervas to the limit, in order to counter-balance the influence of EAM and they were successful to a certain degree.

They could not achieve more in the circumstances because Zervas' personality was self-defeating for this purpose. However the British policy was proved to be successful having achieved its initial aim, namely to restore its political influence in Greece.

Footnotes

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2. Woodhouse, *The Struggle for Greece 1941-1949*, London 1976, p.29. Woodhouse, Early British Contacts with the Greek Resistance in 1942, *Op.Cit.* p.358.
3. Woodhouse, Summer 1943: the Critical Months, in *British Policy towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece*, edited by Ph. Auty and R. Clogg, London 1975, p.119.
4. R7640 FO 371/33163 Warner to Dixon November 2, 1942. R2050 FO 371/37201 "Political Aspects of the Greek Resistance Movement", March 6; minutes by Dixon March 7, 1943. R2133 FO 371/37216 Extract from War Cabinet Conclusions 38(43) March 8, 1943. R2363 FO 371/37222 "Policy towards Greece" FO Memorandum March 15, 1943. R2432 FO 371/37195 C.D. to Sargent March 16, 1943. R2434 FO 371/37195 General Ismay to Sargent March 17, 1943
5. L. Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, London 1971, vol.III, p.361.
6. Woodhouse, Summer 1943 in Auty and Clogg, *Op.Cit.* p.137. E.C.W. Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, London 1955, pp.114-116. R4502 FO 371/37202 Sweet-Escott to Dixon, May 25, 1943; Texts of the two draft Agreements. Woodhouse, Summer 1943 in Auty and Clogg, *Op.Cit.* pp.123-124. R4502 FO 371/37202 Cairo to Myers telegram 0765 May 27, 1943. R4697 FO 371/37202 Leeper to FO telegram 107 May 27; FO to Leeper telegrams 63 and 66 May 28, 31; minutes by Dixon May 29, 1943. R4753 FO 371/37202 Leeper to FO telegram 109 May 30, 1943. R4622 FO 371/37202 SOE Cairo, Memorandum "Possibilities of splitting the ELAS from EAM" May 12, 1943.
8. R4717 FO 371/37202 FO to Leeper telegrams 81 and 82, June 14, 1943. R5683 FO 371/37222 Major Holmes (WO) to Dixon June 28, 1943. R5684 FO 371/37222 C.D. to Sargent and Glendonner Memorandum June 28, 1943. R5586 FO 371/37222 Dixon Minute June 29, 1943. R9703 FO 371/37231 Leeper to FO telegram 295 October 5, 1943. R10450 FO 371/37206 Archbishop Damaskinos to Minister of State, undated. WP (43) 526 "Policy towards Greece" Eden Memorandum Nov.21, 1943. WM (43) 160 Conclusions, Confidential Annex November 22, 1943. R12837 FO 371/37231 Eden to Churchill December 5.6 and 8; Churchill to Eden December 9; Leeper to FO telegram 379, December 7, 1943. CAB 65/40 WM 169 (43) 2 Confidential Annex December 13, 1943. R2766, R2767 FO 371/43679 Leeper to FO telegrams 116 and 117 February 20, 1944.
11. R11098 FO 371/37207 Minute by the Prime Minister Nov.3, 1943.

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12. R13508 FO 371/37210 Barnes to Cairo December 11, 1943.
 13. R13769 FO 371/37210 Barnes to Cairo December 13, 1943.
 14. R11098 FO 371/37207 FO to Leeper telegram 241 Nov. 4, 1943.
 15. R544 R1046 FO 371/43675 Barnes to Cairo January 8 1944 and "Periodical Intelligence Summary No. 2 up to 9th January 1944".
 16. R544 FO 371/43675 Woodhouse to Cairo for repetition to Barnes January 10, 1944.
 17. R11673 FO 371/37207 Col. The Hon. C.M. Woodhouse to Brigadier Keble "Recent Crisis in Free Greece" Pertouli, 19 October 1943.
 18. Ibid.
 19. R2260, R3222 FO 371/43678 Woodhouse to Cairo February 4 and 1944.
 20. In the Public Record Office files the Foreign Office designates what usually known as the Plaka Conference by the name Merokovo, the population of the village of Myrofyllo, where the first stage of the conference took place.
 21. R3430 FO 371/43681 Woodhouse to Cairo February 22, 1944.
 R3103 FO 371/43680 "Minutes of the 7th Meeting" February 21, 1944.
 R2846 FO 371/43679 Woodhouse to Cairo, February 15, 1944.
 22. R3430 FO 371/43681 Woodhouse to Cairo February 28, 29, 1944.
 R3251, R3303, FO 371/43680 Leeper to FO telegrams 129, 132 February 28, 29, 1944.
 R3962 FO 371/43682 Woodhouse to Cairo March 1, 2, 1944.
 23. R13126, R13188 FO 371/37209 Leeper to FO and FO to Washington telegrams 387 and 8714 December 12 and 17, 1944.
 R8897 FO 371/43688 Leeper to Eden May 24, 1944.
 R7081 FO 371/43702 Eden minute April 30, 1944.
 24. R11504 FO 371/43714 COS Minute 1238/4 to Churchill July 19 and FO minutes July 24-28, 1944.
 25. R12457 FO 371/43715, WO (44) 433 "Despatch of British Forces to Greece" Eden Memorandum August 8, 1944.
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 R15679 FO 371/43777 Churchill to Eden M918/4 Sept. 29, 1944.
 R15193 FO 371/43692 Kerr to FO telegram 2530 Sept. 23, 1944.

In 1944, as the war in Europe moved to its climax, the extraordinary struggle of the Greek Resistance moved into its tragic phase. Caught in the quite extraneous decisions agreed between the super powers, the Greek people found that their own wishes were not to be allowed to determine their fate.

From Resistance to Civil War explores this tense drama and points a moral which is relevant far outside the frontiers of Greece.

Contributors include top-level participants in these events such as Brigadier Eddie Myers (Head of the British Military Mission to the Greek Resistance 1943) and Thanasis Hajis (Secretary-General of the left-wing EAM Resistance Movement 1941-44), as well as British, German and Greek historians who have drawn extensively on Government Archives which have only recently become available for study. The book is edited by the widow of Major-General Stefanos Sarafis, military commander of ELAS, the National Popular Liberation Army, for the Society for Modern Greek Studies (EAEMEPI).

ISBN 0 85124 290 1
£2.95

Spokesman University Paperback No.25